diff --git "a/output_1c59267fde6c16cd8597e47279ca8419b17a935d.jsonl" "b/output_1c59267fde6c16cd8597e47279ca8419b17a935d.jsonl" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/output_1c59267fde6c16cd8597e47279ca8419b17a935d.jsonl" @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +{"id": "a54dca859478c2f0d532685574590c57c216422b", "text": "January 28, 1997\n\nMr. John Pereira\nDirector\nHistorical Review Group\nCenter for the Study of Intelligence\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nWashington, DC 20505\n\nRe: Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16\n(Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)\n\nDear John:\n\nUnder the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. \u00a7 2107 (Supp. V 1994), the Review Board has the authority to \"direct a Government office to . . . investigate the facts surrounding, additional information [and] records . . . .\" Section 7(f)(1)(C)(ii). Pursuant to this authority, the Review Board is seeking to resolve in a complete and comprehensive manner certain questions related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that CIA may have held prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. Accordingly, we request that CIA provide complete and comprehensive answers to the questions identified below.\n\nOn May 12, 1992, Director Robert M. Gates testified to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding CIA's records on Oswald prior to the assassination. Mr. Gates testified that \"[p]rior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages . . . .\" (The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1972: Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1992) (emphasis added) (copy enclosed). It is the Review Board's current understanding, however, that at the time of the assassination, CIA held at least three separate files (including soft files) on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 file (201-289248), an HTLINGUAL file, and an Office of\nMr. John Pereira \nJanuary 28, 1997 \nPage 2\n\nSecurity file.\u00b9 We have identified references to one or more other possible Oswald files including possible soft files designated as follows: CI/SI, CI/SIG, CI/LSN, and CS/LSN.\n\n1. Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\n2. Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.\n\n3. For the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please identify which records (and the total number that) were in the file at the time of the assassination.\n\n4. To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.\n\nFor each question, please explain the basis for the answer and the sources (records or persons) whom you consulted to answer the question. To the extent that you are not able to answer a question completely, please so indicate and provide the best reasonable answer. If, during the course of your research, you learn that any record relating to a pre-assassination file or record has been destroyed, please provide us with all available information related to the destruction of the records or files.\n\nThese queries should be interpreted in their broadest reasonable sense. To the extent that you question whether certain responses may be within the scope of our request, please let us know and we can advise you whether we would wish to include it. We anticipate that the responses to these questions will be referenced in CIA\u2019s Final Compliance Statement.\n\n\u00b9One Office of Security file on Oswald (or relating to Oswald) may have been numbered 351-164. In addition, Margaret Stevens may have held an Office of Security \u201cMS-\u201d file on Oswald.\nMr. John Pereira \nJanuary 28, 1997 \nPage 3\n\nWe request that you make this information available to us by February 24, 1997. If this does not provide you with sufficient time, please let us know, in writing, by what date you believe you will be able to answer the questions fully.\n\nThank you for your attention to this matter.\n\nSincerely,\n\n[Signature]\n\nDavid G. Marwell \nExecutive Director\n\nEnclosure\nTHE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992\n\nHEARING\nBEFORE THE\nCOMMITTEE ON\nGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\nUNITED STATES SENATE\nONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS\nSECOND SESSION\nON\nS. J. RES. 282\n\nTO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY\n\nMAY 12, 1992\n\nPrinted for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs.\n\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\nWASHINGTON : 1992\n\nFor sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office\nSuperintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402\nISBN 0-16-039035-4\ndenied, you say postponed. I am curious as to how long the postponement will be. Will it be until the national security or privacy are no longer threatened? Do we want to require a mandatory review every two years?\n\nGoing along, some of the language is fairly broad. We had the exchange here a few moments ago about an intelligence agent. Then there is another section that gives us an exception\u2014\"an intelligence method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized.\"\n\nThe one that troubles me most, although I know there is a reason for it, but I just am concerned about the doors it may open, is \". . . an invasion of privacy of a living person, whether that person is identified in the material or not.\" I am concerned about that being used as a ground for requesting postponement of disclosure.\n\nSo I think, consistent with all that you have said here, I hope that you will give us the benefit of your second look at that Section 6 of this proposed Act.\n\nChairman Glenn. Thank you.\n\nSenator Cohen?\n\nSenator Cohen. No further questions.\n\nChairman Glenn. Good. Thank you very much. We may have additional questions. It has been a long session this morning here, and we have additional questions from other members or questions after we review. We would appreciate an early reply so it could be included in the record. Thank you very much. We appreciate.\n\nMr. Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.\n\nSenator Specter. Thank you very much.\n\nChairman Glenn. The next panel is the Honorable Robert Gates, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Honorable William Sessions, Director of the FBI. Gentlemen, you have been very patient here this morning. I know we had told you you would be on by about 10:00 here. We are about an hour late on that, or a little over. We appreciate your forbearance this morning. We look forward to your testimony this morning.\n\nMr. Gates, if you would lead off, we would appreciate it very much.\n\nTESTIMONY OF THE HON. ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\n\nMr. Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and to describe the nature of the documents held by the Central Intelligence Agency that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy.\n\nSenator Sasser. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Director could pull the mike just a little bit closer? Thank you.\n\nMr. Gates. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.\n\nLet me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution, that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists and, most importantly, the public access to government years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.\n\nEven before the introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.\n\nThis new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older.\n\nIn addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the history staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.\n\nBecause of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.\n\nThis is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we hold, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. Indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are that many of these will be released shortly.\n\nAs we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our historical review program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward-leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency today will make publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.\n\nTo understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.\nUnfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized, all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.\n\nThese records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations.\n\nPrior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages, some of which originated with the FBI, the State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see firsthand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and we are providing them to the National Archives.\n\nThe records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald, some 83,000 pages, most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.\n\nThe Committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere.\n\nOur staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 78 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in part, overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.\n\nAlthough our documents do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway.\n\nA preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.\n\nThe CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act which protect the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure, the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA.\n\nHowever, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.\n\nWhile I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give an example of this type of material.\n\nDuring the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of CIA employees. These files contain fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping the information confidential.\n\nSimilar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.\n\nIf legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of Government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.\n\nThe effort required to declassify the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources within the intelligence community, I have allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the\nI was a college student at William and Mary, and I can remember how the word spread like wild fire between classes of that horrible event. I made my way to Washington that weekend and stood at the intersection of Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues, where I waited for hours to watch the President's funeral cort\u00e8ge. I will never forget it.\n\nI entered public service less than three years later, hearing President Kennedy's inaugural call, a call I think many in my generation heard. He said then, \"Now, the trumpet summons us again, not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need, not as a call to battle, though in battle we are, but as a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation, a struggle against the common enemies of man\u2014tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.\"\n\nMr. Chairman, the only thing more horrifying to me than the assassination itself is the insidious, perverse notion that elements of the American Government, that my own Agency, had some part in it. I am determined personally to make public or to expose to disinterested eyes every relevant scrap of paper in CIA's possession, in the hope of helping to dispel this corrosive suspicion. With or without legislation, I intend to proceed. I believe I owe that to my memory.\n\nThank you.\n\n[The prepared statement of Mr. Gates follows]\n\nPREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GATES\n\nMr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, \"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992,\" and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.\n\nLet me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution\u2014that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.\n\nEven before the passage of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 50-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.\n\nBecause of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to\nbegin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.\n\nAs we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our Historical Review Program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart.\n\nTo support the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and one box of microfilm provided to the Warren Commission by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, not organized, and highly disorganized. This makes the process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.\n\nThese records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.\n\nAs you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 38 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and military intelligence. The documents in this file were not organized along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. This file is the only one that we have on Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald\u2014some 33,000 pages\u2014most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.\n\nYou have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains the microfilm. The microfilm, in this file, is part of the collection. We estimate that within the 68 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent of the documents include material from a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.\n\nBy way of example, I include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they are primarily concerned with activities concerning Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.\n\nThe CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.\n\nWhile I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were released to a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports, (performance evaluations), and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the privacy concerns of the individuals in keeping the information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of anonymity. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to protect the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.\n\nIf legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of Government to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.\n\nThe effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have allocated additional personnel to the JFK files and to the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK files and other documents of historical interest.\n\nI believe these efforts are consistent with the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, we have prepared our technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.\n\nFirst, we are outside the body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.\n\nSecond, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearance for document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.\n\nThird, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by the Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or the Executive Branch agencies.\n\nFourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.\n\nFifth, and finally, Section 8 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing attorney work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.\n\nThese are the technical problems that I believe can be solved and that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.\nBut, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.\n\nChairman GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Gates.\n\nMr. Sessions.\n\nTESTIMONY OF THE HON. WILLIAM S. SESSIONS, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID G. LEITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE\n\nMr. Sessions. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I have a complete statement which I will file, and there are some diagrams which I will also make available for the record, and a photograph of the files themselves.\n\nChairman GLENN. Without objection, your entire statement will be included in the record.\n\nMr. Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to appear before you to testify about FBI investigative records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I applaud this process and your efforts. It is fundamental that Government exist to meet the needs of its citizens. An examination of these issues is directly related to satisfying the intense interest and concern of our citizens about the circumstances surrounding that tragic event some 29 years ago.\n\nFrom the outset, I would like to state emphatically that I favor maximum disclosure consistent with the law and the legitimate need for protection of certain small but highly sensitive categories of information. I can assure you that the FBI will work cooperatively through the Department of Justice with both the Senate and the House to develop a comprehensive approach to these important issues.\n\nAs you know, the Government has conducted a number of reviews of the assassination. The Warren Commission, the House Assassinations Committee, and the Church Committee all conducted reviews that I believe can be best categorized as exhaustive. It is my understanding that the FBI provided massive amounts of information to those entities to help ensure that they accomplished their missions. Once again, we desire to be as helpful as we are able.\n\nImmediately following the shooting of President Kennedy, the FBI began a massive investigation. An intense effort was made. Related investigations were conducted and much information was exchanged, as Director Gates has noted, between the various agencies. As is the case with all major investigations, thousands of pages of documents were created to record the results of these efforts and to facilitate the investigations.\n\nMany different kinds of information were recorded in the FBI files. The results of thousands of interviews of witnesses, other individuals with possible helpful knowledge, and contacts with confidential informants were memorialized. Communications between the FBI headquarters and our field offices, and vice versa, were included, as were communications between the FBI and other agencies. Forensic reports were recorded. In all, FBI files relating to the assassination contained over 499,000 pages of documents, with a few more pages added every time the FBI follows up on a new allegation or a new issue arises.\n\nAfter Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, the FBI began receiving requests for information relating to the assassination. By 1978, four years later, over 200,000 pages of material had been processed and made available to the public through the FBI's public reading room. Many authors, journalists, historians, and others have visited and revisited these materials, which remain available today as a valuable source of historic information.\n\nI would like to briefly describe to the Committee a breakdown of FBI records relating in some way to the assassination. The FBI has four core files that relate directly to the investigation of the assassination. Our cooperation with the Warren Commission and the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby\u2014those are the four core files. There are approximately 499,000 pages in these files, 263,000 of which are duplicate pages that were cross-filed, third agency records, and some FBI records that have not been processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.\n\nApproximately 223,000 pages, or 94 percent of the records we have processed, have already been released to the public. In addition, the FBI has several other much smaller files as a result of other directly related investigations, such as the investigation of Marina Oswald, and these files comprise approximately 22,000 pages, 13,000 of which are duplicate, third agency, or unprocessed pages. Fifteen percent of these pages processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act have been released to the public.\n\nOf the pages available in the FBI reading room on the main floor at FBI headquarters, approximately 189,000 pages, or 94 percent, are available in their entirety. The remaining 12,000 pages in the reading room reflect some degree of redaction. The information that has not been disclosed or that has been redacted to some degree falls within the exemptions that are enumerated in the Freedom of Information Act and the protections of the Privacy Act.\n\nThis includes information that, one, is classified on the basis of national security; two, would disclose the identities of individuals who specifically requested confidentiality; three, would disclose the identities of confidential informants or sources; four, is highly personal information about individuals; or, five, originated with other Government agencies and those agencies specifically requested that the information not be released based upon exemptions applicable to those particular agencies.\n\nWhile I strongly favor maximum disclosure under the law, there are certain types of information that are particularly critical to successful law enforcement investigations and national security; for example, information that is properly and appropriately classified, information that would identify confidential sources, and information that would disclose sensitive investigative techniques or the types of information the disclosure of which could negatively impact upon our ability to fulfill our mission. Information in FBI files that has not been disclosed publicly falls largely within these descriptions of information.\n\nIn any case, I believe it is extremely healthy for the country to have these issues aired and to be resolved. The public interest dic-\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham \nDO Focal Point \nfor JFK Board \n\nLee Strickland \nDA Focal Point \nfor JFK Board \n\nFROM: John F. Pereira \nChief, Historical \nReview Group \n\nSUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 \nfrom JFK Board \n\n1. Attached is \"Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)\", which was received from the Assassination Records Review Board on 29 January 1997. The request is for additional details related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that may have existed in the Office of Security and in the DO.\n\n2. Please advise how you would like us to respond to this request. We are asked to make the information available to the Board by 24 February 1997.\n\nJohn Pereira \n\nAttachment\nMEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson \nHistorical Review Group \nCenter for the Study of Intelligence\n\nFROM: Janet A. Ecklund \nChief, Information Management Branch \nOffice of Personnel Security\n\nSUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board\n\nREFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997\n\n1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.\n\n2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.\n\n**Question 1:** (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\n**Response:** (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,\nand the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.\n\n(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.\n\n(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.\n\n**Question 2:** (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.\n\n**Response:** (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:\n\n- #0077826 Opened approximately July 1952\n- #0090079 Opened approximately February 1953\n- #0093466 Opened approximately July 1953\n- #0119144 Opened approximately May 1955\n(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.\n\n(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:\n\na. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled \"U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15\"\n\nb. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American \"defectors\" from May 1959 to October 1960\n\nc. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors\n\nd. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors\n\ne. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961\n\nf. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.\n(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.\n\n(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.\n\n(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).\n\n(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.\n(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:\n\na. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959\n\nb. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled \"Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship\"\n\nc. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959\n\nd. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959\n\ne. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959\n\nf. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled \"Rebuffed\"\n\ng. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled \"U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15\"\n\nh. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960\n\ni. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961\n\nj. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter\nk. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas\n\nl. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961\n\nm. Form 745 \"Indices Search Request\" dated 12 October 1961\n\nn. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure\n\no. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961\n\np. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962\n\nq. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure\n\nr. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled \"Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'\"\n\ns. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.\n\n(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\nt. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald\n\nu. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)\n\nv. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)\nw. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963\n\nx. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963\n\ny. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).\n\n**Question 4:** (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.\n\n**Response:** (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.\n\n(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.\n(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.\n\n(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.\n\n3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.\n\n4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.\n\nAttachment\n\n8\n\nSECRET\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD\n\nOn 8 April 1994, the complete set of SRPOINTER and HTLINGUAL security support files and indexes held by the Office of Security were destroyed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the approved Records Control Schedules 31-76 and 31-83 and by the Office of General Counsel.\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Terri Bagal\nInformation Review Team\nOffice of Security\n\nVIA: Robert J. Batinger\nAssistant General Counsel\nLitigation Division\n\nFROM: Stephen K. DiRubio\nInformation Management Officer\nOffice of General Counsel\n\nSUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction\n\n1. This responds to your memo of 9 February 1994 requesting confirmation that the security support files of the HTLINGUAL project are not the subject of a current litigation, investigation, or other inquiry that would preclude their destruction pursuant to normal guidelines for records of this type. A review of OGC files located no currently active cases involving the HTLINGUAL project. Therefore, OGC poses no objection to destruction of the files if authorized by your approved records disposition schedule.\n\n2. For your information I have attached a copy of a March 1990 memorandum in which OGC provided guidance to the DO regarding destruction of MECHAOS and HTLINGUAL project files. According to that memorandum, files pertaining to HTLINGUAL may be destroyed only if: (1) they meet the criteria for destruction on the applicable NARA approved records disposition schedule; (2) are not responsive to a FOIA or Privacy Act request currently being processed by the office concerned; and (3) do not document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, or constitute files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain. As the attachment indicates, NARA's requirement that the SSCI concur in any proposed destruction has already been met.\nSECRET\n\nSUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction\n\n3. I apologize for the delay in responding to your request. Please let me know if I may be of further assistance.\n\nAttachment:\nAs Stated\n\nStephen K. DiRubio\nSECRET\n\nSUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction\n\nDCI/OGC/REG/SKDiRubio;skd/76195 (6 Apr 94)\n\nDistribution:\nOriginal - Addressee\n1 - OGC Registry\nMEMORANDUM FOR: C/OIT/IMB\n\nFROM: W. George Jamason\nChief, Litigation Division, OGC\n\nSUBJECT: Destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Project Files\n\nREFERENCE: Request for Authorization to Retain or Destroy Questionable Records: 14IC's for MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Projects, from IMS/MPG/IRMB, dated 18 December 1989\n\n1. The referenced request seeks concurrence for the destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL files in accordance with routine records destruction schedules approved by the National Archivist. Subject to the qualifications set forth below, the proposed destruction can proceed without legal objection.\n\n2. On several occasions over the past 12 years, DO/IMS has proposed that the Agency identify and destroy MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL records in accordance with routine records destruction schedules. The major reason not to do so has been the existence of litigation that has necessitated retention of those records. With the settlement of the National Lawyers' Guild litigation, a major obstacle to routine records destruction appears to have been eliminated.\n\n3. That case alone, however, does not govern the records retention or destruction of MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files. In addition, destruction may proceed only in accordance with the records disposition authorization provided by the Archivist on 17 March 1978. (Job Nos. NCI-263-77-18 and NCI-263-78-1). The approval given by the Archivist is subject to essentially the following conditions: (1) files and documents that are the objects of FOIA and Privacy Act requests, or those involved in any other litigation, are not to be destroyed; (2) files that document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, and other files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain, are not to be destroyed; (3) no disposal will occur prior to review and concurrence of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.\n\n4. In reviewing the materials you have provided, I have been able to conclude that then SSCI Chairman, Birch Bayh, in several separate letters dated 6 April 1978, informed the DCI that the Committee had no objection to the implementation of the records disposal lists approved by the Archivist. In my\nview, therefore, condition number (3) has been satisfied. Accordingly, with the exception of the case of Hurwitz v. United States, there appear to be no ongoing court cases relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files that necessitate the retention of those materials. All HTLINGUAL materials relating to Leo T. Hurwitz, therefore, should be retained. In addition, any records pertaining to Dr. Sidney M. Peck (Peck v. CIA) should be retained. I am not aware of any other matters that would require retention of the files at the present time, but you should contact the Agency's FOIA Coordinator to determine if there are any outstanding FOIA or Privacy Act requests relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL that should not be destroyed. If so, materials should be retained in accordance with the requirements of the Records Disposal List. Finally, of course, information that the Agency must maintain that is of foreign intelligence value also should not be destroyed.\n\n4. I would also point out that the terms of the National Lawyers Guild settlement require that all agencies of the Federal Government, including the CIA, shall not use, release or disclose, within or outside the Government, certain information relating to the National Lawyers Guild and its subunits. Accordingly, if there is CIA information derived from the FBI's investigation relating to the National Lawyers' Guild, Agency records, files or indices must be appropriately marked so as to permit implementation of the settlement agreement. This means that, to the extent MHCHAOS records are not isolated but are contained in other Agency files, some means of ensuring that the information is not disseminated must be made.\n\n5. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.\n\nW. George Jameson\n\ncc: C/ALD/OGC\n9 February 1994\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: OGC/Litigation STEVE\n\nFROM: Terri Eagal\n Information Review Team\n\nSUBJECT: Files Scheduled For Destruction\n\n1. On 7 February 1994, this office was given direction by Mr. Archibald, Legal Advisor for the Office of Security, to deal directly with your office in reference to the attached.\n\n2. If you have any questions about the attached, please feel free to call on 40615. Your prompt assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.\n\n3. Thank you for your coordination and cooperation in assisting the Records Control Schedule Analysts; Terri Eagal 40615 and Lydia Hoffman 40616.\n\nTerri Eagal\nInformation Review Team\nMEMORANDUM FOR: James Archibald\nOffice of Security, Legal Advisor\n\nFROM: Terri Eagal\nInformation Review Team\n\nSUBJECT: HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files\n\n1. On 7 December 1993, this office coordinated with Barry Zeeman of DO/IMS, on 47411, in reference to the HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files. I asked Mr. Zeeman if his office had any problems with our office destroying these files as they were within our guidelines for destruction. He responded by saying that they had retired their files in 1991 and would have to look into it further. On 8 December 1993, Mr. Zeeman called to say that his office, DO/IMS, had no problem with us destroying our support files to their HT LINGUAL project as they destroyed their files in the late 1980's. The few files they retired in 1991 were on the Administrative and Policy issues of HT LINGUAL.\n\n2. Since the DO no longer has a need for the information in these files (list is attached) and has essentially approved their destruction, we have supplied to you copies of our own Security Records Control Schedule which verifies that these files meet destruction criteria. As you can see though, by the comment on the SR POINTER Files, we need to be sure there is no litigation open before we destroy.\n\n3. In light of paragraph 2, our office now awaits OGC approval. Your coordination with OGC in this effort is greatly appreciated. Please note, destruction of these files include the SR POINTER name index which is currently utilized by this office for the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act (PA) cases. Destruction of this index will aid in decreasing unnecessary review and research on part of FOIA and PA.\n\n4. Thank you. If we can be of any assistance to you, please call either Barbara Deavers on 40268, Terri Eagal on 40615 or Lydia Hoffman on 40615.\n\nTerri Eagal\nInformation Review Team\n\nDistribution:\nOriginal - Jim Archibald\ncc - Len Kaplan\n\nCL BY 2039256\nDECL OADR\nDRV FM SEC 13-87\n\nSECRET\n28 Security File Review Log.\nLists of security files received by External Activities Branch personnel in connection with external activities, requests, and cover and documentation matters.\n\n29 Security Duty Office Reporting Files.\nSecurity Duty Office events reports. Duplicate copies of reports prepared by Security Duty Officers concerning individuals who contact the Agency. (Published in the Federal Register, CIA-51, Notification of Systems of Records, Privacy Act of 1974). The Federal Register must be amended for any data changed or discontinued.\n\n30 Security Duty Office Operational and Instruction Files.\n a. Copies of duty reports, guard post instructions, and duty officer rosters.\n b. Records copies of requests for telephone background checks.\n\n31 Security Reports Files.\nRecords copies of correspondence and reports on operational activities in connection with Office of Security projects.\n\nTEMPORARY. Destroy when 6 months old.\n\nTEMPORARY. Destroy 5 years after cutoff. Cut off at end of each calendar year, hold in current files area for 2 years, transfer to AARC for 3 years, then destroy.\n\nTEMPORARY. Destroy when superseded obsolete, or no longer needed.\n\nTEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off when backstop arrangement is terminated, hold in current files area for 3 years, then destroy.\n\nTEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off at termination of project, hold in current files area for 1 year, transfer to AARC for 2 years, then destroy.\n| SPECIAL PROJECT MATERIAL |\n|--------------------------|\n| Record copies of reports pertaining to the SRPOINTER Project. (Discontinued). |\n\nTemporary. Hold in current file area until litigation concluded then destroy.\nSecurity Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files\n\nDavid G. Ellis\nMail Intercept Program\nMcAuley, Peter F. SFN 156003\nMcAuley, Peter F.\n99358 PROJECT CHAPERON\nOS-PROJECT POINTER\nPROJECT SETTER SFN 159144\nPROJECT SETTER\nSRINDIAN SFN 507356\nPROJECT SRINDIAN\nSR POINTER/REDSKIN\nSR POINTER\nPROJECT SR POINTER\nPROJECT SR POINTER Cuban Watch List\nSR POINTER/HT LINGUAL Material Duplicated from CI Staff.\nReport JAN 29 75\nDraft Memorandum on Background of SR POINTER Prepared\n23DEC74\nOS Personnel Directly and Indirectly Involved with SR\nPOINTER\nWESTPOINTER SFN 583870\nPROJECT WESTPOINTER\nSSD Mail Cover\nU.S. Post Office Liaison\nFile with no name related to Mail\nSR POINTER INDEX\nVOL 1 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL\nVOL 2 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL\nVOL 3 Record of BANJOES Received\nVOL 4 PROJECT HT LINGUAL Clearance #90079 29NOV56-29NOV63\nVOL 5 SR POINTER General Admin and Policy April 63\nVOL 6 Original SR POINTER Documents\nVOL 7 Documents Reviewed by George Clark OGC\nVOL 8 SR POINTER SFN 119144 Informant BANJO\nVOL 9 PROJECT SR POINTER Admin 11JUN52-5FEB58 #77826\nVOL 10 HT LINGUAL Statistics SFN 119144\nVOL 11 SR POINTER GENERAL SFN 93466\nVOL 12 PROJECT Outline and Chronology #77826\nVOL 13 Record of BANJOES Received (VOL 6)\nVOL 14 SR POINTER Statistics JAN68-MAR70\nVOL 15 SR POINTER\nVOL 16 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 18JAN62-\n29MAR63\nVOL 17 SR POINTER 13MAR70 #90079\nVOL 18 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 27JUL54-\n19DEC61\nVOL 19 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 1FEB56-2SEP58 Memos to CI\nStaff\nVOL 20 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 9SEP58-15AUG60 Memos to CI\nStaff\nSecurity Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files\n\nVOL 21 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 26AUG60-6JUN62 Memos to CI Staff\nVOL 22 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 25JUN62-25MAR64 Memos to CI Staff\nVOL 23 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 2JUL53-27DEC57\nVOL 24 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 8JAN58-22DEC58\nVOL 25 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 7JAN59-22DEC60\nVOL 26 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 3JAN61-27DEC61\nVOL 27 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 23JAN63-2MAR64\nVOL 28 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 25MAR64-23DEC64\nVOL 29 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 4JAN66-29MAR67\nVOL 30 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 30MAR67\nVOL 31 FANFOLD Coding System #90079\nVOL 32 Watch List JAN66\nVOL 33 #90079 DC Survey\nVOL 34 #94866 Radio Moscow\nVOL 35 SFN 77826 PROJECT SR POINTER Post Office Department, Relations With\nVOL 36 PROJECT DAYLIGHT SFN 243550\nVOL 37 Review of HT LINGUAL Project Outline 10AUG59\nVOL 38 POINTER\nSR POINTER Information\n\nHT LINGUAL- A DO project. Opening U.S. citizen's mail going to other countries (mostly Soviet Union) & mail incoming from other countries (1950's). Most mail was opened in NY. Actual opening & monitoring of mail assigned to OS with info turned over to the DO.\n\nSR POINTER- OS name for HT LINGUAL\n\nWESTPOINTER- Opening mail in San Fransico (also known as MK SOURDOUGH). Targeted the Chinese.\n\nPROJECT INDIAN- Targeted mail to/from Pakistan.\n\nBANJO- Actual letters (copies) intercepted.\n\nPROJECT SETTER- Mail opened in New Orleans, targeting South America.\n\nProject was exposed in Rockefeller Commission report. Project names release with JFK info.\n06 December 1993\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Phil Boycan\nServices Team Leader\n\nFROM: William Marshall\nServices Team\n\nSUBJECT: Transfer of POINTER and related files\n\nREFERENCE: Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993 from Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) to Jim Archibald (OGC)\n\nMemorandum, dated 23 November 1993, from Jim Archibald (OGC) to Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT)\n\n1. On 30 November 1993, Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB) received a copy of an Office of General Counsel (OGC) memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, wherein Jim Archibald advised that it would be prudent for I&SB to transfer the below list of files to the Information Review Team (IRT).\n\n2. In accordance with this memorandum, I&SB (3S04 Stafford) transferred the below list of files, on 06 December 1993, to Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) via Barbara Deavers (G20 Stafford).\n\n3. Therefore, as of 06 December 1993, I&SB considers itself absolved of the responsibility as custodian of the files. Conversely, as of 06 December, IRT assumes the responsibility as custodian of the files.\n\nFILES TRANSFERRED FROM OS/I&SB TO OS/IRT:\n\n1. HT LINGUAL (BANJO) ......................... 0119144\n2. WESTPOINTER .................................. 0583870\n3. SR POINTER .................................... No case number visible\n4. (DAVID G. ELLIS FILE) ..................... No case number visible\n5. PROJECT INDIAN ............................... No case number visible\n(Continued on next page)\n\nWARNING NOTICE\nINTELLIGENCE SOURCES\nOR METHODS INVOLVED\n\nCL BY 0701140\nDECL OADR\nDERV FRM COV 1-82\n\nCONFIDENTIAL\n| | Description | Case Number |\n|---|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------|\n| 6 | HT LINGUAL | 0090079 |\n| 7 | SR POINTER/OS PERSONNEL | No case number visible |\n| 8 | HT LINGUAL | 0090079 |\n| 9 | PROJECT HT LINGUAL | 0090079 |\n| 10| HT LINGUAL | 0090079 |\n| 11| SR POINTER | 0077826 |\n| 12| SR POINTER | 0093466 |\n| 13| SR POINTER (BANJO) | 0119144 |\n| 14| SR POINTER (BANJO) | 0119144 |\n| 15| WATCH LIST | No case number visible |\n| 16| HT LINGUAL | 0119144 |\n| 17| DC SURVEY | 0090079 |\n| 18| PROJECT DAYLIGHT | 0243550 |\n| 19| SR POINTER (CUBAN WATCHLIST) | No case number visible |\n| 20| HT LINGUAL (BANJO) | 0119144 |\n| 21| HT LINGUAL | No case number visible |\n| 22| SR POINTER (BANJO) | 0119144 |\n| 23| RADIO AMATEURS IN USSR | No case number visible |\n| 24| FANFOLD CODING SYSTEM | 0090079 |\n| 25| SR POINTER (MAPS) | No case number visible |\n| 26| RADIO MOSCOW | 0094866 |\n| 27| PROJECT CHAPERON | 0099358 |\n| 28| SR POINTER | No case number visible |\n| 29| MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM | No case number visible |\n| 30| SR POINTER | 0090079 |\n| 31| PROJECT OUTLINE CHRONO/SR POINTER | 0077826 |\n| 32| PETER MEAULEY | 0156003 |\n| 33| US POST OFFICE LIAISON | No case number visible |\n| 34| SSD MAIL COVER | No case number visible |\n| 35| PROJECT SETTER | 0159144 |\n| 36| SR POINTER/REDSKIN | No case number visible |\n| 37| SR POINTER | No case number visible |\n| 38| OS PROJECT POINTER | No case number visible |\n| 39| RECORD OF BANJOES | No case number visible |\n| 40| SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL | No case number visible |\n| 41| SR POINTER | No case number visible |\n| 42| HT LINGUAL | No case number visible |\n| 43| SR POINTER | 0090079 |\n| 44| ORIGINAL SR POINTER | No case number visible |\n| 45| SR POINTER/BANJO | 0119144 |\n| 46| SR POINTER/BANJO | 0119144 |\n| 47| SR POINTER/BANJO | 0119144 |\n| 48| HT LINGUAL | 0119144 |\n| 49| SR POINTER | No case number visible |\n50. PROJECT HT LINGUAL ........................................... 0090079\n51. PROJECT SR POINTER ........................................... 0077826\n52. SR POINTER ..................................................... 0093466\n53. SR POINTER ..................................................... 0093466\n54. SR POINTER ..................................................... No case number visible\n55. BANJO ............................................................. No case number visible\n56. CLAUDETTE BOUFFARD ........................................... No case number visible\n57. CLARE LENK ..................................................... No case number visible\n58. STOLEN AGENCY CREDENTIAL ................................ No case number visible\n59. SR POINTER ..................................................... 0090079\n\nWilliam Marshall (C)\nOS/I&SB\n\nBarbara Deavers (C)\nOS/IRT\n**SUBJECT:** REMOVAL OF SRPOINTER FILES FROM 3S04 STAFFORD TO G20 STAFFORD\n\n**FROM:** Leonard M. Kaplan \nC/IRT \n(G20 Stafford)\n\n**DATE:** 23 Nov 93\n\n**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)\n\n| OFFICER'S INITIALS | DATE RECEIVED | DATE FORWARDED | COMMENTS |\n|--------------------|---------------|----------------|----------|\n| 1. OS/Legal Advisor | 11-24 | 11-27 | 8 SA |\n| 2. | | | |\n| 3. | | | |\n| 4. | | | |\n| 5. | | | |\n| 6. | | | |\n| 7. | | | |\n| 8. | | | |\n| 9. | | | |\n| 10. | | | |\n| 11. | | | |\n| 12. | | | |\n| 13. | | | |\n| 14. Please call when signed. Thank you. | | | |\n| 15. | | | |\n\n**Comments:**\n\nDear [Name],\n\nI have been informed that the SRPOINTER files are a subset of the HTLWHT files. I recently recommended to OS that it continue with the DO's IMA, and the Agency's Form Office to determine the ultimate disposition of these files.\n\nIn the interim, I agree that it would be prudent to allow your office to retain these files. Please call me if you'd like to discuss this matter further.\n\nSincerely,\n\n[Signature]\n23 November 1993\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: James Archibald, OS Legal Advisor\n6N20 Stafford Building\n\nFROM: Leonard M. Kaplan\nChief, Information Review Team\nOffice of Security\n\nSUBJECT: Removal of SRPOINTER Files from 3S04 Stafford (I&SB) to G20 Stafford (IRT)\n\n1. Per a telephonic conversation with Will Marshall of the OS/Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB), this memo will formally request a transfer/relocation of the noted SRPOINTER files to OS/Information Review Team (IRT).\n\n2. I&SB is currently holding the SRPOINTER files as Mr. John Daley, formerly an I&SB Security Officer, served as the OS referent, as well as for his historical perspectives of the files. Mr. Daley has since retired and it has been informally agreed that IRT will serve as the focal point holder of the files.\n\n3. A formal transfer will serve to alleviate I&SB's role as an \"intermediary\" in the occasional to frequent use of the SRPOINTER files for IRT's formal responses to Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests. Additionally, as IRT serves as the focal point for other public and Agency requests, it is necessary to reference these files.\n\n4. Your concurrence is required per C/I&SB instructions for a formal move of the SRPOINTER files from 3S04 Stafford to G20 Stafford.\n\nLeonard M. Kaplan\n\nConcurrence: * See note on reverse\n\nJames Archibald\n\nWARNING NOTICE\nINTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED\n\nCL BY 2129112 DECL OADR DERV FRM COV 1-82\n\nCONFIDENTIAL\n| FROM | Extension NO. | DATE |\n|------|---------------|------|\n| J. Barry Harrelson | CSI 97-210 | 9 May 1997 |\n\n| TO | DATE | OFFICIAL'S INITIALS | COMMENTS |\n|----|------|---------------------|----------|\n| John Pereira, C/HRG | 9 May 1997 | | |\n| Janet A. Ecklund | | | |\n| C/MB, OPS | | | |\n| 1S12 Stafford | | | |\n| J. Barry Harrelson | | | |\n| CSI/HRG | | | |\n| 2E20 IPB | | | |\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Branch\nOffice of Personnel Security\n\nVIA: Chief, Historical Review Group\nCenter for the Study of Intelligence\n\nFROM: J. Barry Harrelson\nHistorical Review Group\nCenter for the Study of Intelligence\n\nSUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board\n\nREFERENCE: A. Memo for C/IMB, dtd 27 Feb. 97,\nSame Subject\nB. Memo for DA/DO IROs (CSI 97-062),\ndtd 31 Jan 97\n\nThe following actions need to be taken to complete the\nAgency\u2019s response to the JFK Board\u2019s Request for Additional\nInformation and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination\nFiles):\n\na. Response to Request: CIA has to provide an official\nresponse that will become a part of the public record. The\nresponse should be a releasable version of your memorandum of\n27 February 1997; according to the classification markings, most\nof the text is unclassified. I recommend that you send me an\nannotated copy indicating what can be released. I will prepare\nthe response and coordinate it with you. Also please review the\nattachments to the memorandum for possible release. The JFK\nBoard may consider documentation of the destruction of\npotentially relevant files as assassination records. HRG will\nhandle any additional coordination (OGC, DO, etc.) required.\n\nb. Transfer of Oswald\u2019s OS File(#0351164): The original\nOffice of Security subject file on Oswald currently held by the\nOffice of Personnel Security should be transferred to the\nHistorical Review Group. The file will be incorporated into the\nAgency\u2019s JFK Assassination Collection and reviewed for release\nunder the JFK Act of 1992. Most documents in this file will\nprobably be duplicates of documents in the HSCA sequestered\nmaterial held by HRG, however, under the JFK law all \u201cOswald\u201d\nfiles are considered assassination records. The ARRB staff has\nasked for access to the file when practical.\nSUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board\n\n- c. Defectors File (#0341008): The ARRB staff has requested access to the parts of the Defector File that contain the Oswald documents, items a-f, listed in your 27 February memorandum. (We were unable to locate documents \"e\" and \"f\" in the HSCA sequestered collection.) Assassination- and Oswald-related documents in this file will most likely be declared assassination records. HRG will handle any third Agency coordination required.\n\nPlease let me know when it will be possible to give the ARRB staff access to the files. The access is considered for background purposes only, and any notes taken will be reviewed by your staff and HRG. If a file is considered sensitive, access can be restricted to one ARRB staff member and monitored by your staff. The review can take place either at your office or in HRG. If you any questions, please give me a call, secure 31825.\n\nJ. Barry Harrison\nSUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board\n\nDC\\CSI/HRG/JBHarrelson:bas/x31806 (9 May 97)\ng:hrg/req#160S.doc\n\nDistribution:\n\nOriginal - Addressee\n1 C/IP&CRD\n1 [Linda Cipriani], OGC\n1 - C/HRG\n1 - B. Harrelson\n1 - HRG File\n5 June 1997\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD\n\nSUBJECT: Review of OS Records on LHO and Defectors\n\nFROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC\n\n1. Over the course of three half days, 29 May, 2 and 4 June, 1997 ARRB Staff member Michelle Combs reviewed the Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald and a multi-volume file collection entitled \"Defectors.\" These were made available by Ms. Janet Ecklund in OS offices in Stafford Building.\n\n2. At the request of OS, the undersigned was present during the review. Mrs. Combs took notes of items of interest and put yellow stickies on a number of documents. She advised Ms. Ecklund that she (Mrs. Combs) would write a memorandum on what she had done and pass it to Mr. Gunn. Further, she advised that Mr. Gunn might want review the files personally.\n\n3. Ms. Ecklund stated she would keep these files segregated within her office for quick retrieval if we wanted to see them again.\n\nGary M. Breneman\n27 October 1997\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD\n\nFROM: Janet A. Ecklund\nChief, Information Management Branch\nOffice of Personnel Security\n\nSUBJECT: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY\nAIN: 0351164\n\n1. The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31 January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence (HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was generated by the John F. Kennedy Board's desire to review and declassify relevant material. The results of this review were forwarded to the HRG/CSI on 27 February 1997.\n\n2. During the Information Management Branch's (IMB) research in response to the above tasking it was noted that Volume V of the Oswald files was not on the shelf where Volumes I-IV and VI-VII were located. A search of the entire area where the volumes had been maintained failed to locate Volume V. The IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an all out search for the missing volume. The search failed to find Volume V.\n\n3. In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by page prior to being turned over to HRG/CSI and another attempt was made to locate Volume V or to locate persons who might know what happened to it. Volume V was not located nor were any persons located who were knowledgeable of its status.\n\n4. During the complete review of the Oswald files no time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V had been consolidated into other volumes or that Volume V never existed, but that a numbering error resulted in what should have been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this error to occur.\n24 December 1997\n\nDr. T. Jeremy Gunn\nExecutive Director\nAssassination Records Review Board\n600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor)\nWashington, D.C. 20530\n\nDear Dr. Gunn:\n\nRe: Request for Additional Information and Records\nNo. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and\nNo. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File)\n\nThis is a partial response to the ARRB's referent request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is believed the following comments and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of Security questions. The DO response is pending.\n\n1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel Security which provides details about the files it had on Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they were created. These include the Office of Security file on Oswald, a general file on Americans who had defected to another country and information about HTLINGUAL files.\n\n2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977 memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which explains the numbering of that Office's file on Oswald. In particular, it explains why the \"missing\" volume V may never have existed.\n\n3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald Security file and the file on American defectors.\n\n4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will be processed according to current release guidelines.\n\nIf you have any questions about this response, please advise.\n\nSincerely,\n\nJ. Barry Harrelson\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD\n\n1. Pursuant to ARRB \"Resquet No. CIA-16, the Office of Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following responses are provided to those questions which pertain to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.\n\n**Question 1:** Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\n**Response:** At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. One file entitled \"Defectors File\" (#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and the second file was Office of Security subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.\n\n2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.\nQuestion 2: For other than the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.\n\nResponse: As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:\n\n#0077826 Opened approximately July 1952\n#0090079 Opened approximately February 1953\n#0093466 Opened approximately July 1953\n#0119144 Opened approximately May 1955\n\n3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In the Office of Security this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. The Office of Security actually conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information being referred to the Directorate of Operations.\n\n4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This file contained information was from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:\n\na. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled \"U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15\"\n\nb. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American \"defectors\" from May 1959 to October 1960\n\nc. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors\nd. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors\n\ne. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961\n\nf. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.\n\n5. The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its disposition have been unsuccessful.\n\n6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine Listing as being approximately one and one-half inches thick and in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained the limited biographic data on each name.\n\n7. The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:\n\na. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959\n\nb. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled \"Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship\"\nc. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959\n\nd. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959\n\ne. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959\n\nf. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled \"Rebuffed\"\n\ng. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled \"U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15\"\n\nh. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960\n\ni. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961\n\nj. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter\n\nk. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas\n\nl. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961\n\nm. Form 745 \"Indices Search Request\" dated 12 October 1961\n\nn. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure\n\no. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961\n\np. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962\n\nq. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure\n\nr. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled \"Third American in 2 Months\nLeaves Soviet 'Home'\"\n\ns. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.\n\n8. In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\nt. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald\n\nu. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)\n\nv. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)\n\nw. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963\n\nx. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963\n\ny. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).\n\n**Question 4:** To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.\n\n**Response:** It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of\ndocuments increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.\n\n9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.\n\n10. The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.\n\n11. A representative of the Office of Personnel Security/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. He made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.\n16 September 1998\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk\nExecutive Director, ARRB\n\nFROM: J. Barry Harrelson\nJFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM\n\nSUBJECT: CIA-16, Oswald Pre-Assassination Files\n\n1. This is further to my letter of 24 December 1997 in response to referent request.\n\n2. That letter, was a partial response which provided the Office of Personnel Security's information. The Directorate of Operations' (DO) response was still pending. The DO response was provided on 2 September 1998 and it is attached.\n\n3. Please note that both responses are contained in the Agency's Compliance Declaration dated 2 September 1998 at Attachment V(2).\n\n4. This completes the Agency's action on CIA-16. If you have any questions about this matter, please advise.\n\nSincerely,\n\nJ. Barry Harrelson\n\nEncl. A/S\nDO Response to Board Request CIA - 16\nOswald Pre-Assassination Files\n\nThe Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.\n\nPrior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the documents from an interest file would be transferred to the 201.\n\nGiven that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection.\n\nIn sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10335-10014.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 51, "total-input-tokens": 59366, "total-output-tokens": 23927, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 1663, 1], [1663, 3922, 2], [3922, 4325, 3], [4325, 4899, 4], [4899, 10938, 5], [10938, 17467, 6], [17467, 21475, 7], [21475, 31421, 8], [31421, 37916, 9], [37916, 38648, 10], [38648, 39887, 11], [39887, 41925, 12], [41925, 43522, 13], [43522, 45571, 14], [45571, 46908, 15], [46908, 48114, 16], [48114, 49991, 17], [49991, 51680, 18], [51680, 51989, 19], [51989, 53590, 20], [53590, 53802, 21], [53802, 53953, 22], [53953, 56201, 23], [56201, 57985, 24], [57985, 58642, 25], [58642, 60629, 26], [60629, 62113, 27], [62113, 62332, 28], [62332, 63918, 29], [63918, 65000, 30], [65000, 65671, 31], [65671, 67208, 32], [67208, 70803, 33], [70803, 71696, 34], [71696, 73479, 35], [73479, 74928, 36], [74928, 75314, 37], [75314, 77161, 38], [77161, 78097, 39], [78097, 78317, 40], [78317, 79242, 41], [79242, 81057, 42], [81057, 82677, 43], [82677, 84803, 44], [84803, 86849, 45], [86849, 88824, 46], [88824, 90141, 47], [90141, 91920, 48], [91920, 93868, 49], [93868, 94654, 50], [94654, 96066, 51]]}} +{"id": "c87a1ccc1172b796e733f479ea03a568eb22bd29", "text": "5 December 1996\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO\nDO JFK Focal Point\n\nFROM: J. Barry Harrelson\nCSI/HRG\nJFK Project Officer\n\nSUBJECT: Priority Requests from ARRB Staff\n\nREFERENCE:\n\nREQUESTS:\n\n1. The ARRB Staff is planning to interview Russ Holmes about his JFK Ancillary (working) Files. Dave Marwell has requested that Holmes be given on one day clearance so that he can look to the files. How do you want to handle?\n\n2. Has David Vance Vanek (SSN 482-38-5577) ever worked for the Agency (DO)? Vanek is an army officer who served in Thailand and Vietnam; could have been detailed to Agency. He figures in one of the conspiracy theories that the ARRB staff is currently taking depositions on. Can DO check or is this an OP issue - we have not had a lot of luck with OP. Initially the ARRB staff was going to make this a formal request, but agreed to hold off for the moment. The theory involves counter-terrorism training and the death of an American with knowledge of JFK assassination.\n\n3. Agency Officers in Moscow: The ARRB staff is researching Oswald's contacts in Moscow. The records shows that he came into contact with other Americans besides Snyder (the Consular Officer). Gunn requested a list of the CIA officers in Moscow a few weeks ago. Based on discussions with Ellie, etc., I told him a list did not exist and would be considered very sensitive if we did prepare one. I ask him to be more specific; if he had names, we would check against Agency records. Since then his staff has located a list of senior officers in Moscow prepared for the HSCA (Eileen has copy). He has now resurrected his requests. Let discuss the next step.\n\n4. Did Mrs. G. Stanley Brown (Verna Deane Stebbens Brown, born 12 August 1928) work for the Agency; what was her status when she was in Moscow as Embassy receptionist/secretary? She is the wife of George Stanley Brown, an Agency employee from 1952-1962. According to the ARRB staff, she had contact with Oswald (see item #3).\n\nI will give you a call on Friday to discuss our responses to the above request.\n\nCC:\nOctober 27, 1996\n\nMr. Barry Harrelson\nHistorical Review Group\nCenter for the Study of Intelligence\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nWashington, D.C. 02505\n\nRe: Status of Assassination Records Review Board Requests to CIA for Additional Information and Records\n\nDear Barry:\n\nI am writing to follow-up on our letter of October 7, 1996, regarding the status of Assassination Records Review Board requests for information and records from the CIA.\n\nFormal Requests:\n\nCIA-1\n\nReview Board staff review continues. No CIA action needed at this time.\n\nCIA-6 (Cables and dispatches)\n\nCIA has agreed to make records available (or to have a response) by November 1, 1996.\n\nCIA-7 (Histories)\n\nCounterintelligence. CIA has made material available and Review Board staff examination is ongoing.\n\nMexico City. The Review Board awaits CIA's compilation of the portion of the Mexico Station history that was shown to G. Robert Blakey.\nMr. Barry Harrelson \nOctober 27, 1996 \nPage 2\n\nOther Histories. No response has been received to our agreement that CIA identify within two weeks the histories that can be made available and those that should be subject to further discussions.\n\nCIA-8 (Intelligence community staff)\n\nCIA had promised to provide a report to the Review Board within two weeks. Nothing has been made available.\n\nCIA-9 (Publications and analytical materials)\n\nWe have received no materials responsive to this request. Additionally, no response has been received from CIA regarding the list of publications that are identified in an LBJ Library finding aid that the Review Board staff provided.\n\nCIA-10 (Interagency source register)\n\nCIA has not yet made available the records that it had agreed to provide within two weeks. (was Oswald on)\n\nCIA-11 (Duran\u2019s original statement)\n\nCIA has agreed to make some further attempts to locate Duran\u2019s original statement.\n\nCIA-12 (JMWAVE materials)\n\nCIA has agreed to make materials available on a rolling basis.\n\nInformal requests:\n\nSpas Rankin. CIA has made the Spas Rankin file available to the Review Board. Review Board staff research continues. When research is complete, staff will discuss issues with CIA.\n\nMarilyn Murrett. CIA has made the Marilyn Murrett file available to the Review Board. Review Board staff research continues. When research is complete, staff\nMr. Barry Harrelson \nOctober 27, 1996 \nPage 3\n\nwill discuss issues with CIA.\n\nHTLINGUAL. It is the Review Board staff's understanding that CIA continues its search for HTLINGUAL records and will provide an oral briefing on the subject. It is also our understanding that some HTLINGUAL records have been located, but that they have not yet been made available to the Review Board.\n\nRecent and additional informal requests that we have discussed with you:\n\nOperational Reports for Cuban Exile Groups. The Review Board staff has been unable to locate in the collection monthly operational reports for the DRE, CRC, or MRR for the period between March 1963 and March 1964. Please advise us whether these records exist and when we may review them.\n\nMoscow. CIA has been asked to search for additional information regarding Mosco as discussed with Michelle Combs on October 24, 1996.\n\nTape. CIA has been asked to search for additional information regarding a tape as discussed with Irene Marr on October 24, 1996.\n\nPlease let me know of any inaccuracies in this letter or any suggestions that you have. Thank you for your help and cooperation.\n\nSincerely,\n\nT. Jeremy Gum\nGeneral Counsel and Associate Director for Research\nMEMORANDUM\n\nTo: Barry Harrelson\n\nFrom: T. Jeremy Gunn\n\nSubject: Requests to CIA for Records-Related Information - UPDATE\n\nDate: January 9, 1997\n\nThe following is a list of our current requests for information. These should be considered informal requests for which we await your response. If you have any additional questions or responses, you should call either Bob Skwirot or the analysts identified below. We are willing to formalize any of the requests into our numbered series if you would so prefer.\n\n| Date | Request Description | Responsible Party |\n|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|\n| 9/6/96 | Spas/Raikh files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them. | Combs |\n| 9/6/96 | Spas/Raikh file in Box 15 folder 34. Who is the person signing the DCD messages? Did Raikh work for CIA? Did he work for DCD/OO? What is relationship between documents in file and Raikh? | Combs |\n| 9/6/96 | Location of cable identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:550630 (Box 34, F 22) p. 2. Cable number (IN 24738) 7 July 62. We can send fax if helpful. | Legaspi |\n| 9/6/96 | Marilyn D. Murrell files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them. | Combs |\n| 9/6/96 | Information on HTLINGUAL | Combs |\n| 9/6/96 | Information on Angleton's filing system at CI | Combs |\n| 10/17/96 | Location of DRE, CRC, MRR(?) monthly operational reports | Legaspi |\n| 10/24/96 | Tapes | Marr |\n| 10/24/96 | Moscow | Combs |\n| 11/06/96 | Tapes of Alvarado Interrogation | Marr |\n| 12/10/96 | New Orleans, Hunter Leake, Clay Shaw, QKENCHANT, and ZRCLIFF | Legaspi |\n| 12/10/96 | Claude Barnes Capehart | Skwirot |\n| 01/07/97 | Howard Guebler | Gunn |\nDecember 18, 1997\n\nMr. John Pereira\nChief\nHistorical Review Group\nCenter for the Study of Intelligence\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nWashington, D.C. 02505\n\nRe: Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board\u2019s Requests for Additional Information and Records\n\nDear John:\n\nI am writing to follow-up on our telephone call earlier today and to convey my serious concern about the status of CIA\u2019s responses to the Review Board\u2019s requests for additional information and records. Although CIA has completed its responses to several requests, and many others have been answered in part, a significant number of requests have not been answered \u2014 including some that were made more than two years ago. On many occasions we have been assured that responses would be forthcoming, only to have promised dates come and go without answers. It is now extremely important that these requests be answered promptly so that we may conduct a proper follow-up if necessary. The issues that we can now identify as being of the highest priority are identified in the text below by double asterisks (**) and we request that they be answered within the next month. We request that the remaining requests be answered by April 1, 1998.\n\nThe remainder of this letter is divided into two parts: first, a listing of the formal requests for information and records, and second, a listing of the informal requests for information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies.\n\n---\n\n1As identified more fully below, the issues are: CIA-1 Organizational Material, CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches, CIA-13 Backchannel Communications, CIA-IR-03 HTLINGUAL Documents, CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton Files, CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart, CIA-IR-15 Electronic \u201ctake\u201d from Mexico City, CIA-IR-21 DRE Monthly Operational Reports, CIA-IR-22 \u201cA\u201d Files on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison.\nInformal Requests\n\nEach of the following informal requests was previously made to CIA. For future reference, they will be referred to by the \"Informal Request\" (IR) number provided below.\n\nCIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64 (see RIF 104-10065-10199).\n\nThis request is complete.\n\nCIA-IR-02 Location of Cable Identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630.\n\nThis request is complete.\n\n**CIA-IR-03 Full Computer Search for List of Documents in HTLINGUAL File.\n\nCIA agreed to undertake a computer run for all HTLINGUAL documents in April 1997. To date, no response has been received by ARRB. All computer searches for these documents should be documented in a formal letter for the record.\n\n**CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton's Files.\n\nThe Review Board seeks to ensure that it has taken all reasonable steps to account for any files that James Jesus Angleton possessed or controlled that related to the assassination and to Lee Harvey Oswald. Because of the perceived controversy surrounding the disposition of Angleton's files, the Review Board believes it prudent to obtain a clear understanding of the types of files that he maintained and their ultimate disposition. (The Review Board does not seek to explore any subjects in Angleton's files beyond those that may have pertained to the assassination.) To date, CIA has made available certain documents provided by the CIC and the case files for Mangold v. CIA. The Review Board requests any additional information in the possession of CIA that would explain the disposition of Angleton's files.\n\nIn addition, the ARRB staff's review of the Mangold v. CIA files designated additional documents from those files as assassination records. These documents are: Tab D, documents Nos. 95, 109-116, 120, and 121; and from the Denied\nMEMORANDUM\n\nJuly 20, 1998\n\nTo: Jeremy Gunn\n Executive Director\n\ncc: Bob Skwirot\n CIA Team Leader\n\nFrom: Michelle Combs\n Associate Director for Research and Review\n\nSubject: CIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post in 104-10065-10199 from 1959-1964\n\nIn response to ARRB's first informal request, CIA provided several documents from the Directorate of Operations which contained lists of the CIA employees assigned to the country post found in record number 104-10065-10199. These lists of CIA employees were not designated as assassination records.\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Laura Denk \nExecutive Director, ARRB\n\nFROM: J. Barry Harrelson \nJFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM\n\nSUBJECT: CIA-IR-1, CIA Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64\n\n1. This is in response to referent request.\n\n2. Searches were made for information responsive to the request and materials were provided for examination by ARRB staff. No documents were selected for the JFK Collection.\n\n3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any question, please advise.\n\nJ. Barry Harrelson", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10336-10000.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 9, "total-input-tokens": 10620, "total-output-tokens": 3523, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 2065, 1], [2065, 2977, 2], [2977, 4370, 3], [4370, 5589, 4], [5589, 8197, 5], [8197, 10158, 6], [10158, 11949, 7], [11949, 12503, 8], [12503, 13014, 9]]}} +{"id": "f4d8bfd8bf4272776309e4147d961bcea3786ab4", "text": "17 September 1998\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk\nExecutive Director, ARRB\n\nFROM: J. Barry Harrelson\nJFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM\n\nSUBJECT: CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number 104-10151-1-206\n\n1. The following is in response to subject request.\n\n2. Searches were made for information responsive to subject request and materials were provided for examination by the ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members selected a number of documents. Those documents have now been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be processed and released to NARA.\n\n3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any questions, please advise.\n\nJ. Barry Harrelson\nMEMORANDUM\n\nSeptember 12, 1998\n\nTo: Laura Denk\n Executive Director\n\ncc: Bob Skwirot\n CIA Team Leader\n\nFrom: Michelle Combs\n Associate Director for Research and Review\n\nSubject: CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206\n\nIn CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the Review Board requested additional information on a source identified in RIF number 104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA provided the source\u2019s 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald\u2019s 201 file. All of these materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.\n\nGiven the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review Board agreed to protect the source\u2019s true name and cryptonym. Documents from this source are identified as the product of \u201ca valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts.\u201d\nMEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director\nAssassination Records Review Board\n\nFROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland\nChief, Information Review Group\nCentral Intelligence Agency\n\nSUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IJDECANTER/Cryptonym]\n\n1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I respond to the Assassination Records Review Board (\"ARRB\" or \"Board\") regarding their current deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source ([IJDECANTER]). It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US intelligence interests.\n\n2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board\u2019s statutory purpose and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., \"TRUSTED\") for the actual cryptonym [IJDECANTER] in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable.\n\n3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations.\n\n4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided\nSECRET\n\nSUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IJDECANTER] Cryptonym\n\ninformation to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source [(identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER)]. It concludes by stating that this source [IJDECANTER] has had his \"... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA].\" It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information -- \"bona fides ... established\" -- and by otherwise having [IJDECANTER] known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.\n\n5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:\n\n- what information was compromised?\n- what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?\n- what understanding of the information did the service(s) have?\n- what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States?\n\n6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.\n\n7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a\nSECRET\n\nSUBJECT: (S) Protection of Cryptonym\n\nsatellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e., concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was directly and immediately lost.\n\n8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment of the United States; if they do not, the United States may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-\u00e0-vis defectors in our fold.\n\n9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.\n\n10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion, we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period of time.\nSECRET\n\nSUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER/Cryptonym\n\n11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media.\n\n12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-\u00e0-vis harm:\n\n- First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.\n\n- Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.\n\n- And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.\nSECRET\n\nSUBJECT: (S) Protection of Cryptonym\n\n13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release.\n\nLee S. Strickland\nCIA TALKING POINTS\nre Protection of \"IJDECANTER\" Cryptonym\nBefore the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)\n\n26 AUGUST 1998\n\n\u2022 The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA.\n\n\u2022 We request the postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER).\n\n\u2022 It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would:\n\n \u2022 provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-intelligence effort,\n\n \u2022 result in concomitant damage to US counter-intelligence interests, and,\n\n \u2022 have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.\n\n\u2022 Mindful, however, of the Board\u2019s statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however:\n\n \u2022 a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., \"TRUSTED\") for the actual cryptonym (IJDECANTER) in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or,\n\u2022 if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., \"a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts.\"\n\n\u2022 As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety.\n\n\u2022 The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source.\n\n\u2022 It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.\n\n\u2022 It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER).\n\n\u2022 It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his \"... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA].\"\n\n\u2022 It is this final fact which is critical.\n\n\u2022 By having released this substantive information -- \"bona fides ... established\" -- AND by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.\n\n\u2022 I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.\nThe practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:\n\n- what information was compromised?\n- what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?\n- what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have?\n- what information did the receiving intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party?\n\nThe first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.\n\nQuestions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.\n\nQuestion 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented.\n\nQuestion 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation.\n\n- If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the detriment of the other service.\n\u2022 If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree.\n\n\u2022 This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-\u00e0-vis defectors in our fold.\n\n\u2022 In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article.\n\n \u2022 The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States;\n\n \u2022 they know or suspect what he told the US;\n\n \u2022 they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said;\n\n \u2022 they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.\n\n \u2022 And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.\n\n\u2022 In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.\n\n\u2022 The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.\n\n\u2022 But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,\nof course, information on the public record via the media.\n\n- There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of [IJDECANTER].\n - Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence organization.\n - It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time.\n - Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current assets or public statements by inactive ones).\n - Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know from experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).\n\n- There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board's time. They are not insignificant, however.\n - ONE, is foreign relations.\n - In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal.\n - This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.\nSECRET\n\n- TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service.\n - This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors.\n - The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.\n\n- THIRD, is an equitable issue.\n - The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control;\n - The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;\n - While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take.\n - Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release.\n - But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.\nSECRET\n\ng:\\irg_frontoffice\\general\\lss\\arrbijtp.doc\n(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10336-10034.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 14, "total-input-tokens": 16113, "total-output-tokens": 4556, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 686, 1], [686, 2437, 2], [2437, 4038, 3], [4038, 5956, 4], [5956, 8292, 5], [8292, 10327, 6], [10327, 10580, 7], [10580, 11844, 8], [11844, 13362, 9], [13362, 14504, 10], [14504, 15983, 11], [15983, 17408, 12], [17408, 18460, 13], [18460, 18557, 14]]}} +{"id": "dd1f7341042156551533bf506ecf9914d9693e59", "text": "The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.\nChairman\nCommittee on Government Operations\nHouse of Representatives\nWashington, D.C. 20515\n\nDear Mr. Chairman:\n\nThe Director has asked me to respond to your letter of April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolution 454 were enacted into law.\n\nI should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information.\n\nTo help the committee understand the nature and number of CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing the answers to the specific questions you raised in your letter.\n\nSincerely,\n\nStanley M. Moskowitz\nDirector of Congressional Affairs\n\nEnclosure\nThe Honorable John Conyers, Jr.\n\nSUBJECT: Agency Records on the JFK Assassination\n\nOCA/LEG/DMPearline:rw 23 April 1992 (OCA 1123-92)\n(OCA 1123-92/1)\n(OCA 1123-92/2)\n\nOriginal - Addressee (w/enclos)\n1 - DCI\n1 - DDCI\n1 - ExDir\n1 - ER\n1 - D/OCA (w/enclos)\n1 - DMPearline Signer (w/enclos)\n1 - OCA/LEG Subject File (w/enclos)\n1 - OCA Record (w/enclos)\n1 - D/Center for the Study of Intelligence (w/enclos)\n1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of these records?\n\nYes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 pages of such records which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald file (originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA. Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The vast majority of documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the civil rights movement.\n\n2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the HSCA that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages.\n\nThe CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency were asked to explore newly advanced theories, the search for documents could be a rather large undertaking involving the review of thousands of additional documents. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines describing the kinds of records sought.\n\n3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the FBI? If so, approximately how many?\n\nWe believe that between 40 percent and 50 percent of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the FBI.\n4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.\n\nA small number of CIA's records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.\n\n5. How many of these records have been reviewed for release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)? How many of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?\n\nCIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, representing 1,969 documents, under the FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.\n\n6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would be released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454?\n\nIt is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because consideration for protection of classified information and other sensitive categories of information would be required on a document by document basis. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of individuals involved.\nTRANSMITTED TO:\nNAME: JOHN PEREIRA\nORGANIZATION: OGC\n\nBLDG, ROOM\n\nTELE/EXT: 76160 (FAX 574 3208)\n\nSUBJECT: OCA LETTER (W/ENC) & INR MEMO (W/O ATT) & CIA NS DRAFT MOU WITH STATE\n\nTRANSMITTED FROM:\nNAME: KEN MCDONALD\n\nBLDG, ROOM: 316 AMES\n\nTELE/EXT: 80147 (FAX 522 9280)\n\nMESSAGE:\n\nJohn - The OCA letter (which Doned Pease sent us yesterday) has many suggested changes on it. I think I sent you an earlier draft of our proposed access memo of understanding with State, to which the Wilcox memo refers.\n\nKen\nThe Honorable John Conyers, Jr.\nChairman\nCommittee on Government Operations\nUnited States House of Representatives\nWashington, D.C. 20515\n\nDear Mr. Chairman:\n\nThe Director has asked me to respond to your letter of 6 April requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolution 454 were enacted into law.\n\nI should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information.\n\nTo help the committee understand the nature and number of CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing the answers to the specific questions you raised in your letter.\n\nSincerely,\n\nStanley M. Moskowitz\nDirector of Congressional Affairs\n\nEnclosure\n1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of these records?\n\nYes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 pages of such records which consist of CIA's Oswald file (originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records collected in response to specific requests from the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of names trades requested by the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the civil rights movement.\n\n2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the House Assassinations Committee that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages.\n\nThe CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines of the kinds of records sought.\n\n3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If so, approximately how many?\n\nWe believe that between 40% and 50% of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.\n4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.\n\nA small number of CIA's JFK assassination records, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.\n\n5. How many of these records have been reviewed for release under the Freedom of Information Act? How many of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?\n\nCIA has released 7,432 pages of JFK assassination records, representing 1,969 documents, under the Freedom of Information Act. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.\n\n6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would be released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454?\n\nIt is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.\nApril 14, 1992\n\nThe Honorable Robert M. Gates\nDirector\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nWashington, D.C. 20505\n\nDear Director Gates:\n\nI am pleased to learn that you will be testifying before the Committee on Governmental Affairs on Tuesday, May 12, 1992. The hearing will begin at 9:00 a.m. and be held in Room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Building. The subject of the hearing will be the \"Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992.\" The legislation proposes to create an independent review board to govern and coordinate the release of government information relevant to the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy. As required by Committee rules, please have 100 copies of your written testimony delivered to the Committee by close of business, Friday, May 8, 1992. While your written testimony may be as long as you wish, please plan to limit your spoken testimony to five to seven minutes in length.\n\nYour testimony will be extremely helpful to the Committee and to the Congress as it considers this important legislation. While you may discuss whatever aspects of the legislation you desire, particularly how it relates to the records and resources of your agency, the Committee would appreciate learning your views on several specific subjects:\n\nWhat are the reasons which the Central Intelligence Agency has records related to the assassination of President Kennedy?\n\nWhat have the methods been to date for the identification and definition of Central Intelligence Agency records as material related to the assassination of President Kennedy?\n\nWhat steps has the Central Intelligence Agency made to assess the scope of relevant documents outside of materials requested by earlier investigative or other official committees or commissions, or through the Freedom of Information Act?\n\nWhat is the volume of material which you might recommend be released to the public without concern for further postponement?\nWould you be opposed to a provision requesting agencies, whenever possible, to self-certify materials which may released without agency objection?\n\nWhat recommendations can you make with regard to the need for interagency working groups to identify third-agency records in agency files, to avoid duplication, and to assist in the efficient disclosure of information to the public?\n\nWhat are the logistical, manpower, and resource concerns that you have with regard to the review and release of assassination material?\n\nThank you for your assistance and consideration. I look forward to seeing you on May 12th. In the event that you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your staff has already been very helpful to the Committee in its preparation for the hearing. They may also contact Dr. Leonard Weiss, Staff Director, or Steven Katz, Counsel, at 202-224-4751.\n\nSincerely,\n\nJohn Glenn\nChairman\nHEARING\nbefore the\nSENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\non\nS.J. Res. 282:\nTHE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992\n\nTuesday, May 12, 1992\n9:00 a.m.\nRoom 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building\n\nWITNESS LIST\n\n* * * *\n\nPanel 1:\n\nThe Honorable David L. Boren\nUnited States Senator (D-OK)\n\nThe Honorable Arlen Specter\nUnited States Senator (R-PA)\n\nThe Honorable Louis Stokes\nUnited States Representative (D-OH)\n\n* * * *\n\nPanel 2:\n\nThe Honorable Robert M. Gates\nDirector\nCentral Intelligence Agency\n\nThe Honorable Williams Sessions\nDirector\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\n\n* * * *\n\nPanel 3:\n\nJames Lesar\nPresident\nAssassination Archives and Research Center\nWashington, D. C.\n\nProfessor Ernest May\nKennedy School of Government\nHarvard University\nCambridge, Massachusetts\n\nProfessor Athan Theoharis\nDepartment of History\nMarquette University\nMilwaukee, Wisconsin\n\n* * * *\nHEARING\nbefore the\nSENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\non\nS.J. Res. 282:\nTHE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992\n\nTuesday, May 12, 1992\n9:00 a.m.\nRoom 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building\n\nWITNESS LIST\n\n* * * *\n\nPanel 1:\n\nThe Honorable David L. Boren\nUnited States Senator (D-OK)\n\nThe Honorable Arlen Specter\nUnited States Senator (R-PA)\n\nThe Honorable Louis Stokes\nUnited States Representative (D-OH)\n\n* * * *\n\nPanel 2:\n\nThe Honorable Robert M. Gates\nDirector\nCentral Intelligence Agency\n\nThe Honorable Williams Sessions\nDirector\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\n\n* * * *\n\nPanel 3:\n\nJames Lesar\nPresident\nAssassination Archives and Research Center\nWashington, D. C.\n\nProfessor Ernest May\nKennedy School of Government\nHarvard University\nCambridge, Massachusetts\n\nProfessor Athan Theoharis\nDepartment of History\nMarquette University\nMilwaukee, Wisconsin\n\n* * * *\nOUTLINE OF TESTIMONY ON JFK RESOLUTION\n\nA. Agreement with Principles of Legislation.\n 1. Favor disclosure of as much material on JFK as is consistent with protection of intelligence sources and methods.\n 2. Established own declassification program. Presumption will be in favor of disclosure.\n 3. Pledge to cooperate with any reasonable mechanism to declassify documents.\n\nB. Describe Nature and Amount of Records.\n 1. Reasons for having records.\n 2. Volume of existing material and who it belongs to.\n 3. How we have identified material related to JFK assassination.\n\nC. How Much Material Can be Released?\n 1. Give estimate of amount of material to be released under CIA program or resolution.\n 2. Describe material that could not be disclosed.\n a. Example of Intelligence Sources and Methods that would require withholding.\n b. Example of material the release of which would invade privacy.\n 3. Describe resources\u2014manpower and funds\u2014to achieve results.\n\nD. Concerns with Resolutions.\n 1. Address only Intelligence Community Concerns. Will defer to DoJ on Constitutional objections.\n2. CIA or other agencies that originate documents should conduct initial review of material to determine whether it can be released. Material withheld from public release could then be made available to Review Board.\n\n3. Agencies that originate information should be allowed to review it for release even if that information is contained in a document prepared by another agency or Congress. Suggest interagency working group to handle coordination issues likely to arise with disclosure of third agency documents.\n\n4. Will cooperate with any request by the Board for additional material that has a reasonable relationship to the assassination.\n\n5. Would hope that the Board will consult with DCI before using subpoena power to compel production of material that involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods.\n\n5. Exemptions need to be clarified so as to ensure that deliberative process information and identities of covert employees are protected.\n\nE. Conclusion: Pledge to cooperate with whatever mechanism is established to declassify material. Hope that this effort will help to dispel myths regarding JFK assassination.\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD\n\nSUBJECT: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)\n\n1. On 28 April, the undersigned attended a public hearing on the proposed Assassination Materials Disclosure Act conducted by the House Government Operations Legislation and National Security Subcommittee. Majority Committee/Subcommittee Chairman Conyers and Ranking Minority Member Horton were present for the entire hearing; majority Subcommittee members English, Neal, Peterson, and Thornton and minority members Shays and Schiff and full Committee member Martinez attended at least part of the hearing. The Committee's Press release, which criticizes the government and particularly CIA as releasing JFK-related documents \"at a snail's pace\", and witness statements are attached.\n\n2. The hearing was well attended by the public and attracted much media coverage. Eight witnesses testified in four groups: Congressmen Louis Stokes (assisted by Robert Blakey, former counsel to the House Select Committee on Assassinations) and former HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton testified first. The congressmen were followed by the movie \"JFK\"s director Oliver Stone, who was followed by Howard Willens, Counsel to the Warren Commission, and James Johnston, Counsel to the Church Committee. The session closed with a panel comprised of Ms. Leslie Harris, Chief Legislative Counsel for the Washington office of the ACLU; Dr. Herbert Parmet, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College and Graduate School of the City University of New York, and Dr. Harold Rellyea, American National Government Specialist at the Congressional Research Service.\n\n3. Chairman Conyers advised in his opening remarks that the Committee wanted to hear from the Executive branch and thus would hold another hearing session. He noted that \"after much negotiation,\" the Director of Central Intelligence would be testifying in mid-May. He further noted that the Committee also hoped to hear from the Attorney General, but negotiations with the Justice Department were still ongoing. Conyers was criticized of the DoJ at the outset, noting that the Committee had\nSubject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)\n\nreceived a long, single-spaced letter from Justice detailing numerous \"legalistic\" objections to the resolution, which he characterized as not reflecting a real willingness to work together to release the documents to the American people.\n\n4. The general tone of the session was strongly in favor of the resolution and disclosure of the vast majority of the material. Most witnesses conceded that there might be some materials that required postponement of disclosure, but the bias was clearly toward disclosure. Even Oliver Stone, in response to a comment from Congressman Shays that he (Shays) found it hard to imagine what national security or privacy issues would persist after 30 years, conceded that there might be some exceptions, but Stone thought 98 percent of the material could be released. Several witnesses, including Congressman Stokes and Church Committee counsel, suggested that most national security information should be released under the resolution, but that privacy interests posed greater concerns. Congressman Hamilton warned that the Congress should be careful that nondisclosure \"loopholes\" do not \"swallow up the bill,\" which is why he said that review by an independent board was so important.\n\n5. Stone's testimony had quite an impact on the hearing. Several congressmen and witnesses credited his movie \"JFK\" as \"the reason we are all here today.\" Chairman Conyers appeared particularly impressed with Stone, describing his testimony in exchanges with later witnesses as \"persuasive\" and \"compelling.\" A few potentially tough questions were thrown at Stone--did he not over-lionize Garrison; how much research did he do for the movie and did he seek to talk to or obtain information from the government as part of his research process? However, there was no aggressive follow-up to Stone's answers. Discerning observers may have picked up on the fact that Stone's \"research\" seemed tailored to and limited by pre-conceived conspiracy theories. (For example, when asked if he had talked to President Ford, a member of the Warren Commission and advocate of disclosure of the JFK documents, Stone answered no--that it was pretty obvious where Ford stood as a proponent of the lone gunman theory.)\n\n6. When asked about his personal views, Stone said he believed that there were two conspiracies. The murder conspiracy was small and covert--perhaps involving no more than five to ten people--and was led by the \"intelligence agencies.\" Stone did not mention CIA by name at this point.\nSubject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)\n\nHe mentioned Oswald's alleged ties to naval intelligence, and also said that a closer look should be taken at an operation \"MONGOOSE\" and a Colonel Lansdale. He also posited a bigger \"cover-up\" conspiracy after the fact, spearheaded by President Johnson (who Stone alleged told Earl Warren he would be responsible for World War III if the Commission tied the Cubans into a conspiracy). Stone theorized that a much broader \"Establishment\", while not directly involved in the assassination, was not sorry to see Kennedy go because he was an agent of profound change embarking upon several courses that disturbed that \"Establishment\", including pulling out of Vietnam. In response to a later question about various theories, Stone called the Mafia theory a \"red-herring.\" Stone said \"as you know, the CIA has always used the Mafia for plausible deniability\" and that it was important to look behind the Mafia at \"who pulls the strings.\"\n\n7. Other matters of Agency interest discussed include that both the Warren Commission attorney and particularly the Church Committee attorney castigated CIA for \"lying\" to the Warren Commission. The particular example offered had to do with \"AMLASH.\" This individual came up in connection with traces the Agency apparently conducted for the Warren Commission. CIA purportedly had a relationship with AMLASH in connection with a Castro assassination plot, but did not make this fact known to the Warren Commission. The witnesses characterized this as pertinent information CIA consciously withheld from the Warren Commission. Also, when the final panel engaged in a broader discussion of government disclosure and FOIA with the subcommittee, the ACLU held up the CIA Openness Task Force report as an example of why FOIA was a \"dismal failure\" as the mechanism to \"vindicate the public's right to know.\" (On 18 March Conyers rigorously questioned Gary Foster on the task force report when his subcommittee held a hearing on \"Government Secrecy After the Cold War.\")\n\n8. A major recurring theme was concern that, despite the need to make the documents publicly available, the Administration would not support the resolution and it could be vetoed. Congressman Hamilton stated that, if the resolution were vetoed, he hoped that at minimum the House would pass a resolution to release its own records. (Such an action would be problematic for the Administration, because much Executive branch information is contained in House records, and the House also probably considers documents obtained from Executive agencies as part of its\nSubject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)\n\nrecords.) Most witnesses thought the Congress should try to avoid a constitutional confrontation with the Administration, however, and a few practical suggestions to help work around problems were made. For example, the ACLU suggested that the Review Board might be modeled after the Advisory Committee established in connection with the State Department's preparation of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, with which CIA's historical staff is familiar. This body was established by a provision included in last year's Foreign Relations Authorization Act.\n\n9. In conclusion, the hearing did not get into much detail on provisions of the resolution. Much time was spent on general propositions like the fact that the documents ought to be released and why, and matters tangential to core issues raised by H.R. 454.\n\nVictoria L. Pepper\nAssistant General Counsel\nOffice of Congressional Affairs\n| Pages | Date | Description |\n|-------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | 6 Mar 64 | Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA |\n| 4 | 30 Jan 76| CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s. |\n| 1 | 6 Mar 64 | DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding. |\n| 4 | 6 Mar 64 | Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents. |\n| 5 | 6 Mar 64 | Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin. |\n| 1 | 31 Oct 59| State Cable from Moscow to SecState. |\n| | | \" Redacted copy of same. |\n| 1 | 1 Nov 59 | Press clipping |\n| 1 | 2 & 4 Nov| Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query |\n| 3 | 2 Nov 59 | Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept |\n| 1 | 9 Nov 59 | State Cable, Moscow to SecState |\n| | | \" Redacted copy of same |\n| 1 | 9 Nov 59 | State Cable, Tokyo to SecState |\n| | | \" Redacted copy of same |\n| 1 | 16 Nov 59| Press clipping |\n| 1 | 26 Nov 59| Press clipping |\n| 1 | 25 May 60| Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms |\n| 7 | 12 May 60| Attachment to above |\n| 2 | 12 May 60| FBI report, fr Dallas |\n| 2 | 25 Oct 60| State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors |\n| | | \" Redacted copy of same |\n| 1 | 3 Nov 60 | DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming) |\n| | | \" Redacted copy of same |\n| 1 | 18 Nov 60| Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming |\n| | | Handwritten descrip of letter cited above |\n| 2 | 21 Nov 60| Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors |\n| | | Declassified version of Oswald info from ff |\n| | | List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter |\n| 1 | 18 Nov 60| Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell |\n| 9 | 21 Nov 60| Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above |\n| 2 | 9 Dec 60 | 2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201 |\n| 3 | 11 Jul 61| Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept |\n| 4 | 26 May 61| 2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept |\n| 1 | 13 Apr 61| DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship. and passport (signed Rusk) |\n| 1 | 26 Jan 61| State MemCon re Oswald |\n| | | \" Redacted copy of same |\n| 14 | 13 Jul 61| Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible |\n| 1 | 28 Sep 61| Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201 |\n| 4 | 13 Oct 61| Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow |\n| 1 | 7 Dec 61 | Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald |\n1 3 Mar 62 Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives\n5 26 Apr 62 Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items\n9 7 Sep 62 Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas\n2 \" Redacted pages from above\n7 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas\n3 24 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans\n3 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas\n(appearingly different from above)\n2 8 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report\n20 7 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff\n20 25 Oct 63 FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above\n14 31 Jan 64 Report, not really contemporary with this file, entitled: \"Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City...\"\n28 Sep--3 Oct 63\n14 \" Redacted copy of same\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence\n\nFROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz\nDirector of Congressional Affairs\n\nSUBJECT: JFK Testimony\n\n1. Attached is a copy of your opening statement for the 12 May hearing before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on the JFK Joint Resolution. Because we are commenting on legislation, Executive Branch guidelines require us to submit the testimony in advance to OMB for Administration clearance. We also intend to provide your opening statement in advance to the DoJ and FBI. As you know, Director Sessions will be joining you for a panel presentation before the Committee.\n\n2. Please let me know whether you have any objections to release of your statement to OMB, DoJ, and the FBI. The Committee has requested that an advance copy of your statement be provided to them by 8 May.\n\nStanley M. Moskowitz\n\nAttachment:\nas stated\nCIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS\nRELEASE IN FULL\n2010\n\nSTATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES\nDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE\nBEFORE THE\nCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\nUNITED STATES SENATE\n\n12 MAY 1992\nMr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, \"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992,\" and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.\n\nLet me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution\u2014that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger even 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that the CIA participated in the murder of John F. Kennedy.\n\nEven before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and\nmethods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. As we speak, this Group has already begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, which includes all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.\n\nAs we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, we will use a presumption in favor of releasing as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to do so.\nTo understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consist of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of information provided to the House Select Committee on Assassination between 1977 and 1979, and over 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald, accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.\n\nAt first blush, you might think that this is an enormous amount of material for the CIA to have on the assassination. It is important to recognize, however, that virtually all of these are essentially \"secondary\" documents collected after the assassination as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. There were some documents that did exist before the assassination, but they were only brought together in response to investigations of the event. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this very point.\n\nAs you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination, the CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 33 documents (less than 150 pages), of which 28 documents consisted of material originated by the State Department, the Navy, the FBI, and newspaper clippings. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first hand how slender it was at the time. As I have\nalready noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities in the U.S. after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA collected all the rest of the material on Oswald\u2014some 33,000 pages in total.\n\nI should emphasize that much of the material held by CIA originated from other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm. However, we estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 16% originated from the FBI, and a smaller number of records (less than 1%) originated from the State Department or elsewhere. A variety of other government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.\n\nAlthough our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review. A preliminary review of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet\nUnion, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation, Cuban exile activities, copies of FBI reports about Oswald, and even information about Watergate.\n\nThe CIA cannot simply act to declassify or release documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to proceed to review for declassification these documents. While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers.\nAlthough largely irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of living individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose this information in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will be willing to make redactions, substitute generic information, or summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.\n\nThe effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff, and to form the Historical Review Group that will undertake the review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.\nWhile we are in complete agreement on the need to declassify documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, I do have certain technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.\n\nMy primary concern with the joint resolution, as currently drafted, is that it directs the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board to make the initial determination as to whether materials related to the assassination held by all Executive Branch agencies, including CIA, can be released to the public. Vesting this review authority in an outside body is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. In addition, I am concerned that placing responsibility for classification determinations in a Review Board that has no particular expertise in making intelligence classification determinations and is unfamiliar with the assassination material is bound to result in delays in releasing the material. It will also result in a duplication of effort since originating agencies will have to review the decision of the Executive Director to release particular documents.\n\nI share your belief that the review of documents be done in an expeditious and efficient manner. To that end, I propose that the initial review of assassination materials be made by the\noriginating agencies and completed within a reasonable period of time. As I have indicated, the CIA has already begun this process. Documents that an agency determines cannot be released to the public would then be reviewed by members of the Review Board, who could operate with a lean staff. Any dispute between an agency and the Review Board over the release of a document could then be resolved by the President or his designee. This arrangement would ensure that the initial review of documents is accomplished quickly by individuals who are in place and have the necessary substantive experience to declassify documents while at the same time providing an independent review of all decisions made to withhold information.\n\nSecond, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff. As Director of Central Intelligence, I have an obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods, and to uphold that obligation I could not make classified information available to the Board until it took the necessary steps to safeguard that information.\n\nThird, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review\nBoard without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies. Once again, this provision conflicts with my statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods; that duty should not be delegated to an outside body. I believe that the joint resolution should provide that an agency that originated information found in another's document should have the opportunity to review the information and raise necessary objections prior to its release to the public. An interagency working group should be established to coordinate the review and release of this \"third agency\" information in a timely fashion.\n\nFourth, the joint resolution defines \"assassination material\" broadly to include any records that relate \"in any manner or degree to the assassination.\" I believe we have already identified these documents as a result of previous inquiries from investigative bodies, such as the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations. These investigations were thorough, and any additional requests for information should bear some reasonable relationship to the JFK assassination. Perhaps a panel of distinguished historians could be formed to provide advice to the Review Board as to what, if any, additional material should be reviewed.\n\nFifth, the joint resolution provides only a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information. This may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be large\nvolumes of material at one time. If the initial review of documents is done by the Executive Director, the joint resolution should be amended to provide that an agency may request a reasonable extension of time to determine whether documents may be released.\n\nFinally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, may not be adequate to protect Agency interests in certain respects. For example, there is no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed. I also believe that \"intelligence agent\" under section 6(1)(A) of the joint resolution should be defined to include covert employees of an intelligence agency, or former employees who retired undercover from an intelligence agency.\n\nWhile I believe that the joint resolution can be improved, I want you to know, Mr. Chairman, that the CIA will cooperate with whatever reasonable mechanism is established to declassify the assassination material. As Director of Central Intelligence and as Robert Gates, private citizen, I am committed to making this process work. It is my hope that the declassification of this\nNOTE FOR: DCI\n\nFROM: Neal Wolin, SA/DCI\n\nRe: JFK Testimony\n\nAttached is the draft JFK testimony, as prepared by OCA. The draft has been coordinated with OGC, the Center for the Study of Intelligence (both Dave Gries and Ken McDonald), and the DO. The handwritten edits are mine and Dave Gries'. A briefing book with Q's and A's will be ready by COB Friday. As Stan's cover note suggests, the testimony must be coordinated with others in the Executive; OCA's preference is to send it out tomorrow.\n\nDave and I agree that the section of the draft testimony commenting on the proposed legislation (pp. 7 et seq.) is too long and runs the risk of overwhelming the positive message you relay in the first part of the statement. It seems to me that while you should lay down your objections to the legislation's scheme clearly (and even forcefully), you should do so in language that will leave the impression (which is consistent with the reality) that (1) you are in agreement with their basic objectives relating to the material in question and (2) that you are doing, and will continue to do, all that you can to accommodate the release of material consistent with your statutory obligations.\n\nIn particular I think it unnecessary to reiterate your \"statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods\" more than a couple of times. Moreover, I think the paragraph on the definition of \"assassination material\" (middle of p.9) unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. One of the impetuses for the JFK resolution, after all, is the notion (crazy or not) that previous inquiries were insufficient in scope; this paragraph feeds right into that criticism. Some of the other \"technical\" criticisms (i.e., paragraphs on pp. 9-10) seem important to make (especially if the basic model of the legislation is adopted) but might be better included in a post-hearing letter to the committee or something. Again, otherwise I fear you run the risk of leaving the perception of trying to nitpick the concept of JFK material declassification to death.\n\nNeal\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence\nChief, Administrative Law Division, OGC\n\nFROM: David M. Pearline\nDeputy Director for Legislation, OCA\n\nSUBJECT: Follow-up to DCI's 15 May JFK Testimony\n\n1. We have reviewed a transcript of the Director's 15 May testimony on the JFK Assassination Materials Resolution to identify those questions with respect to which CIA committed to provide answers for the record. A copy of the transcript with relevant portions marked is attached.\n\n2. The following specific questions require follow-up action:\n\n a. How much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? (p. 5)\n b. Why was the Oswald file opened at the CIA 14 months after his defection? (p. 5)\n c. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? (p. 5)\n d. Was that picture in his [Oswald's] file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that you can shed some light on? (p. 5)\n e. [W]hat consisted of new information [in the Oswald file] that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere? (p. 14)\n f. [W]ould the establishment of such a panel of outside experts [by DCI, to review redactions in the absence of legislation] . . . violate the Privacy Act? (p. 16)\n\n3. I assume CSI, in coordination with appropriate components, will take the lead on all questions except for the last. I understand OGC will take the lead on the Privacy Act question. (Note: OGC advises that the issue of why Oswald's file was not opened for 14 months after his defection is addressed in the Findings and Recommendations volume of the HSCA Report at pp. 200-202.) I appreciate your assistance in preparing proposed responses for the record.\n\nAttachment\n\nDavid M. Pearline\nDraft: 14 May 1992\n\nSTATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES\nDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE\nBEFORE THE\nSUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND\nNATIONAL SECURITY\nCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS\nUNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\n\n15 MAY 1992\nMr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on House Joint Resolution 454, \"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992,\" and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter, just as I did before your Senate counterparts last Tuesday.\n\nLet me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution\u2014that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.\n\nEven before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible.\nconsistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.\n\nBecause of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.\nAs we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.\n\nIn connection with these historical review guidelines, I have recently commissioned a task force to review Agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I have instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed into the historical review program, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records.\n\nTo understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to\nplace them in some context. CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized\u2014all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.\n\nThese records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.\n\nAs you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents (amounting to 124 pages), some of which\noriginated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. (Although I reported slightly smaller numbers to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs earlier this week, a subsequent count by my staff revealed these exact numbers.) Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.\n\nThere has been some comment on this pre-assassination Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this is but the first installment--an example of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.\n\nThe committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by\nCIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.\n\nMr. Chairman, you have also asked about assassination materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be\nminimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.\n\nAlthough our holdings at CIA do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review, and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.\n\nCIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of\nRepresentatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.\n\nWhile I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum\namount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.\n\nIf legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.\n\nThe effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.\n\nI believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to the committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I\nintend to address only Intelligence-Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.\n\nFirst, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.\n\nSecond, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.\n\nThird, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.\n\nFourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.\nFifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.\n\nThese are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\nBut, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.\nStatement of Admiral William O. Studeman, USN\nDeputy Director of Central Intelligence\n\nBefore the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law\nCommittee on the Judiciary\nU.S. House of Representatives\n20 May 1992\n\nMr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide\nour views on House Joint Resolution 454, \"The Assassination\nMaterials Disclosure Act of 1992,\" and to describe the nature of\ndocuments held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John\nF. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on\nthis important matter.\n\nLet me begin, as the Director did last week in testifying on\nthis subject, by emphasizing that I am in complete agreement with\nthe purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be\nmade to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as\npossible government documents relating to the assassination of\nJohn F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving\njournalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to\ngovernmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger\nover 28 years after the assassination. Further, we believe that\nmaximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had\nanything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.\nEven before introduction of this joint resolution, the Director recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, he announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, the Director has directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.\n\nBecause of high interest in the JFK papers, we are not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is but a small fraction of what we have,\nbut it is an indication of our commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and we anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.\n\nAs we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, the Director recently-approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. The Director believes that we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and he has instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.\n\nIn connection with these historical review guidelines, the Director has recently commissioned a task force to review Agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The mission of this task force is to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed into the historical review program, our intention is to bring to the\nFOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records.\n\nTo understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized\u2014all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.\n\nThese records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations.\nPrior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents (amounting to 124 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.\n\nThere has been some comment on this pre-assassination Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all the material that we will review--an example of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.\n\nWe have been asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,\nin the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.\n\nWe have also been asked about assassination materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.\nAlthough our holdings at CIA do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review, and, as I said earlier, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.\n\nCIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, we will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. We hope to work with you, Mr. Chairman, to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents.\nWhile we expect that a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.\nIf legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, the Director has stated that he would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.\n\nThe effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and both the Director and I are personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, the Director has allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.\n\nI believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to the committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will\ndefer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.\n\nFirst, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with the Director's statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.\n\nSecond, we are concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.\n\nThird, we are concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.\n\nFourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.\nFifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.\n\nThese are technical problems that we believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\nBut, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.\nThe Honorable John Glenn \nChairman \nCommittee on Governmental Affairs \nUnited States Senate \nWashington, D.C. 20510 \n\nDear Mr. Chairman:\n\nI am writing to correct for the record two statements I made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.\n\nI testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations.\n\nIn addition, I was asked at your hearing by Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State Department might have requested those files, but I was not certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January 1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed \"detailed and objective.\"\nThe Honorable John Glenn\n\nTo avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of correcting the public record, I suggest the following unclassified statement:\n\nIn response to a request from the US embassy in Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed \"detailed and objective.\"\n\nI enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful. A similar letter is being sent to Ranking Minority Member Roth.\n\nSincerely,\n\nRobert M. Gates\nDirector of Central Intelligence\n\ncc: Senator Cohen\n Senator Boren\n Senator Murkowski\nThe Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.\nRanking Minority Member\nCommittee on Governmental Affairs\nUnited States Senate\nWashington, D.C. 20510\n\nDear Mr. Roth:\n\nI am writing to correct for the record two statements I made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.\n\nI testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations.\n\nIn addition, I was asked at your hearing by Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State Department might have requested those files, but I was not certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January 1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed \"detailed and objective.\"\nThe Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.\n\nTo avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of correcting the public record, I suggest the following unclassified statement:\n\nIn response to a request from the US. embassy in Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed \"detailed and objective.\"\n\nI enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful. A similar letter is being sent to Chairman Glenn.\n\nSincerely,\n\nRobert M. Gates\nDirector of Central Intelligence\n\ncc: Senator Cohen\n Senator Boren\n Senator Murkowski\nThe Honorable John Glenn\nThe Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.\n\nSUBJECT: Corrections on DCI Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs\n\nOCA/LEG/SMDunne:me/37916 (21 May 1992) OCA 2157-92\n\nDistribution:\nOriginal - Addressees\n1 - DCI\n1 - DDCI\n1 - ExDir\n1 - DDO\n1 - D/OCA\n1 - D/CSI\n1 - C/DCI History Staff\n1 - ER\n1 - OCA Records\n1 - Leg Subj File\n1 - SMD Signer File\n1 - SMD Soft File\nStatement of Senator John Glenn\nChairman, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee\nHearing on\nS. J. Res. 282, \"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act\"\nMay 12, 1992\n\nThe bill before us today, S.J. Res. 282, is the \"Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992.\" The legislation was introduced by Senator David Boren and Senator Arlen Specter. An identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by our colleague, Representative Louis Stokes.\n\nThe legislation would require the government to release records to the American public which are \"relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.\" The bill would establish an independent review board within 90 days of enactment, and this board would work as quickly as possible to release the records to the public through the National Archives and the Government Printing Office.\n\nThe bill creates a strong presumption on releasing documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.\n\nIt is also important to stress that the legislation does not authorize any official investigation of the assassination. Its only purpose is to create a process by which the American public may be given the most complete access to review relevant records, and make their own observations and assessments. The Committee's work and the hearing today is likewise limited to this purpose.\n\nThis bill is the result of a climate of suspicion and distrust that has grown over the years regarding the official explanation of the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a climate nurtured by many books, articles, television programs, and the recent movie \"JFK.\" Disclosure of information is the only reliable way to maintain the public trust, and dispel distrust. Those of us who knew President Kennedy personally and remember where we were when we learned of President Kennedy's assassination must exercise our responsibility to the next generation of Americans, whose historical knowledge of the\nassassination of President Kennedy will be significantly improved by the release of these records.\n\nIronically, it was President John F. Kennedy who first required scheduled declassification in the release of Executive Branch national security information. Declassification schedules remained in effect until President Reagan eliminated the requirement in 1981, and President Bush persists in this same practice. It is likely that more government documents related to the Kennedy assassination could have been released over the past 12 years if declassification was still a priority. It is also fair to say that the 1986 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, including broad law enforcement exemptions, have narrowed the release of Kennedy assassination records by the FBI.\n\nThe public interest in the history of the assassination of President Kennedy has been insatiable. In one noted bibliography, a total of 5,134 books, articles, reports, films, or television programs were produced on the subject between the years 1963 and 1979. The Library of Congress has over 250 holdings on the subject. The FBI continues to receive reports, allegations, and requests for further investigation. Indeed, as Director Sessions may testify today, the FBI has recently located and interviewed two of the three \"hobos\" who were identified as witnesses of the shooting, as well as seven Dallas police officers who were not previously interviewed by government investigators.\n\nThe speculation about the assassination of President Kennedy may be more cruel than the truth itself. It is arguable whether the disclosure of new information will dampen the speculation, but I hope that the breadth of information made available will answer many questions and provide many history lessons.\n\nI view the Committee's mandate as determining whether the process for review and release of the records is fair and appropriate; and that exemptions, when needed, must be kept to a minimum. The Department of Justice has told the Committee that it will recommend a presidential veto of the bill as written. I hope we can find a way to construct a process for release of assassination related records that will be efficient and effective, will gain the confidence of the public, and will address concerns of the Justice Department that are legitimate.\n\nThe authors of the bill are to be congratulated for working quickly to propose an independent and accountable mechanism to release records related to the assassination. However, we must carefully consider the parameters of the bill.\n\nI believe that the major issues include:\nFirst, how will agencies and others who hold records define the universe of \"relevant\" Kennedy assassination materials? It is important to be able to go beyond the frame of reference of previous inquiries of commissions and committees, but the question must be asked: Where will the search for documents end?\n\nSecond, the definition and search for \"relevant assassination material\" also raises important questions of human resources and costs to organize and make material available to the Review Board. How much will this cost?\n\nThird, what is the best mechanism to govern the review and release of records in an independent, accountable, and credible manner. The tension between management and public confidence in the process cannot be overlooked. However, it may be important to simplify the process. The bill proposes a five-member Review Board, with an Executive Director and staff. Are we creating a Rube Goldberg machine, or are these layers necessary?\n\nFourth, we must ask why the bill, which acts in the name of openness in government, also exempts the Review Board from the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and judicial review?\n\nFifth, is the issue of standards for postponement of disclosure. I strongly believe that the government should practice disclosure of information as the rule, unless there are demonstrable reasons for protecting the information. It is important to emphasize that while hundreds of thousands of pages of material will be released, the bill contains national security and privacy exemptions, and withholds personnel and administrative records relating to past official inquiries.\n\nI personally believe that the agencies and the Congress, which hold Kennedy assassination records should not wait for the passage of legislation, and the resolution of all issues in the bill, before releasing documents. It is my intention to move legislation through the Committee as quickly as possible, but regardless it will take time for whatever authority is created in statute to become assembled, establish procedures, and begin its work. We will hear today how ready key agencies and congressional officials are to release their records. If even some of the material can go out the door without further adjustments, then let's give the public access now. The review board or whatever authority is created will certainly have the opportunity to face the more difficult issues shortly thereafter.\n\nToday we are fortunate to have several experts and authorities to discuss these issues. These include the authors of the legislation, as well as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation. We are grateful to have our other witnesses as well. Among them is attorney James Lesar, President of the Assassination Archives and Research Center. Mr. Lesar's work represents the track record on public access to Kennedy assassination material under the Freedom of Information Act. He will speak to the nature and limitations of current access arrangements. We also have two prominent twentieth century historians, Professor Ernest May of Harvard University and Professor Athan Theoharis from Marquette University. Each possess extensive experience regarding the federal records of the intelligence and federal law enforcement communities. We welcome all of you to the Committee.\n1. Initial Review of assassination materials. It should be made clear that section 5 of H.J.Res. 454, which requires that records not provided to the Archivist for public disclosure be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment, is not intended to preclude agencies from conducting their own reviews and making as much information available as possible before the Review Board conducts its review of assassination materials. Suggested clarifying report language:\n\nThe Committee notes that some agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, have already begun to review and release assassination materials. Section 5(a)(2), which requires that all records of an official investigation for which an agency is custodian be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment of the Joint Resolution, is not intended to preclude agencies from continuing any reviews that they have ongoing and transferring documents to the Archives for public release wherever possible. In fact the Committee encourages such reviews to continue inasmuch as they can provide for more expeditious release of assassination materials to the public.\n\n2. \"Third agency rule\" adhered to in review of documents. The legislation on its face does not necessarily provide that the agency or department that originated the information will have any input into a decision to disclose the record, or will even be apprised of such a decision after the fact. Suggested clarifying report language:\n\nThe Committee understands that existing regulations within the Executive Branch require that classified information originated in one agency may not be disseminated outside another agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency. The Committee expects that agencies that are custodians of records will follow this practice before providing information to the Archivist under section 5(a)(1) for public release pursuant to section 4.\n\nSection 5(a)(2) requires agencies that are custodians of records of official investigations to make such records available to the Review Board. The Board will then make a determination of whether the material qualifies for postponement under the criteria set forth\nin Section 7 and shall inform the custodian of records and the originating body of the record of its determination. The Committee expects that the Review Board also will consult with the agency or department that originated the information in reaching its determination as to whether public disclosure of the material must be postponed to ensure that it is apprised of relevant sensitivities presented by that information. For example, the Review Board should consult with the relevant Executive Branch agency that provided information incorporated into a Congressional document before making a decision to release that document and shall inform the originating agency of a decision to release that information.\n\n3. Identities of covert employees qualify for postponement. \"Intelligence agent\" is something of a term of art that, left undefined, might not be construed to protect information that would reveal the identity of covert employees of intelligence organizations. Suggested clarifying report language:\n\nThe term \"intelligence agent\" as used in section 7(a)(1)(A) is intended to permit postponement of release of information that would reveal the identity of a domestic or foreign intelligence or counterintelligence asset, collaborator, foreign liaison contact, or covert employee of a United States intelligence organization, where the identity of any of these currently requires protection.\n\n4. Board access to \"any record\" of an Executive agency. In addition to adding language to section 10(1)(1) to clarify that requests for additional records must be made by the Review Board itself, report language should make clear that the Committee does not intend the Board's discretion in this regard to be unbounded. Suggested report language:\n\nSection 10(1)(1) provides that the Review Board may request \"any record\" from an Executive agency. The Committee intends to give the Review Board wide latitude to determine what additional records may be held by agencies that are relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. Rather than the Committee attempting to define what records should be requested, the Committee believes that this judgment is best left to the Board, which will develop expertise in assassination-related issues and documents as its work\nproceeds. However, the Committee does not intend to vest unfettered discretion in the Review Board to request any and all records of agencies without regard to their relationship to the assassination. The Committee expects that the Board will request only documents that may bear some reasonable relationship to the assassination, and that the Board will be guided by the principle that unreasonable risk of exposure of sensitive intelligence or law enforcement sources or methods is to be avoided.\n1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered\n - Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working files\n - Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries\n\n2. Pages released (227,000)\n - Percentage of pages redacted; 70 %\n\n3. Process of declassification\n - Former senior officers in HRG review\n - Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG)\n\n4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 1992\n - Records related to the assassination or investigation into the assassination\n - Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of records\n -- \"Clear and convincing evidence\" must be presented to the Board\n E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring protection\n - Source or method currently utilized\n - Foreign government relationship currently requiring protection\n\n5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there is \"clear and convincing evidence\" to support a postponement\n - Board then has to justify on the record each redaction with which it agrees\n - Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in Federal Register within 14 days\n- Options available: substitute language e.g., \"Northern European station\"\n - Also, summary of a record\n - Board has access to every document in full\n\n6. Issues raised by Board's decisions:\n\n- Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of information that is 30 years old with damage to current intelligence operations\n\n- Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki\n\n- Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover\n - Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US\n\n- Liaison, joint operations in Mexico\n\n- Briefing of the Board by Dave Edger, Jeff Smith, Central Cover, DO desk officers, others\n\n- Problem of accumulative effect of releases--eroding cover, ability to conduct operations\n\n7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree with Board's determination\n\n- President has sole authority to require postponement of a record or information\n\n -- President required to advise the Board within 30 days of the Board's determination\n\n -- This is published in the Federal Register\n\n8. Current appeal (now resolved)\n\n- Issues: identification of Agency asset liaison relationship identification of station\n\n- Potential appeal: Tokyo station\n\n9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g., history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff records\nCSI 1997-552\n10 December 1997\n\nNOTE FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence\nDeputy Director\nOffice of Congressional Affairs\n\nFROM: John Pereira\nChief, Historical Review Group\n\nSUBJECT: JFK/Possible Letter from Congressman Burton to EXDIR\n\nJeremy Gunn, Executive Director of the JFK Board, told HRG yesterday that Congressman Dan Burton may well write a letter to the EXDIR expressing concern about whether CIA will be able to meet the deadline for declassification of assassination-related records. Burton chairs the Government Reform and Oversight Committee which has cognizance over the JFK Board.\n\nGunn said that he briefed members of Burton\u2019s staff last week and told them he was concerned that the Agency may not have enough resources dedicated to JFK to finish the review of documents by 1 September 1998. Gunn showed the staffers the recent exchange of letters between the Board and the EXDIR on the same issue. According to the staffers, Burton has a strong personal interest in the release of the assassination records. The staffers gave Gunn the impression that Burton\u2019s strong interest will prompt him to write to the Agency.\n\nDuring our discussion with Gunn, we reviewed with him the Agency\u2019s clear commitment to declassifying all assassination records. We also explained that we have shifted four additional contractors to the JFK project, and will shift more if necessary, even at the cost of slowing down or stopping other declassification efforts.\n\nJohn Pereira\nThe Honorable George J. Tenet\nDirector of Central Intelligence\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nWashington, D.C. 20505\n\nDear Director Tenet:\n\nAs Chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, I have a great interest in ensuring that the Assassination Records Review Board, which is under the jurisdiction of the Committee, completes its work by its scheduled termination date of September 30, 1998. Earlier this year I introduced H.R. 1553, now Public Law 105-25, which extended the authorization of the Review Board for one additional year, until September 30, 1998. This one-year extension of authorization for the Review Board was included in President Clinton's fiscal year 1998 budget, and received bipartisan support in Congress.\n\nDuring consideration of H.R. 1553, I stated my firm intention for this to be the final extension of authorization for the Review Board. Accordingly, I believe that it is of utmost importance that all federal agencies holding assassination records fully cooperate with the Review Board, in a timely manner, in order that documents may be processed and transferred to the National Archives, in compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-526).\n\nThe Review Board has advised me that while it perceives that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) generally has been cooperative and helpful, the Board nevertheless believes that the CIA is not transferring records to the Board at a pace consistent with the need to complete the work on time. The Board similarly has advised that, unless it receives processed records in a more expeditious manner, it is prepared to use its legal powers to order a transfer of records to the Board which would then vote to open the records without benefit of a pre-review by the CIA. The Board has informed me that it does not wish to take this step, but that it is fully prepared to do so if necessary to complete its work by its September 30, 1998, termination date.\n\nI urge you to take all appropriate steps to ensure that the CIA promptly fulfills its obligations under the law by expeditiously reviewing and transferring the relevant records to the Review Board.\n\nSincerely,\n\nDan Burton\nChairman\nThe Honorable Dan Burton\nChairman\nCommittee on Government Reform\nand Oversight\nHouse of Representatives\nWashington, D.C. 20515\n\nDear Mr. Chairman:\n\nThank you for your letter of December 16, 1997 in which you expressed interest in the status of Central Intelligence Agency\u2019s (CIA) processing of records related to President John F. Kennedy\u2019s assassination.\n\nYou referred to the Assassination Records Review Board\u2019s concern that CIA may not be processing records at a pace sufficient to complete the work on time. I want to assure you, as I did to the Review Board\u2019s Executive Director in the enclosed November 21, 1997 letter, that the Agency is committed to taking all necessary steps to meet the statutory deadline of September 30, 1998 for reviewing all of the Agency\u2019s assassination-related materials. As the Review Board has noted, we are cooperating fully with the Board and its staff in this effort.\n\nWe share the Review Board\u2019s goal of declassifying and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent possible. As you are aware, it is important that there be a proper review of all the records so that still sensitive information that might warrant continued protection can be identified to the Board. For the past several years a team of experienced reviewers has been dedicated to the task of declassifying the assassination records. Recently we shifted several additional personnel to the team in order to accelerate the processing of documents and assure the prompt transfer to the Review Board and ultimately to the National Archives.\nThe Honorable Dan Burton\n\nI understand the importance that the Congress and the President have placed on disclosing to the American people all available information about the assassination. To this end, we have released more than 200,000 pages of material and are working diligently to complete our review of the remaining records.\n\nIf you or your staff require any further information or would like a briefing on our declassification program, please have your staff contact Mr. Jim Meehan, Office of Congressional Affairs, at (703) 482-8796.\n\nSincerely,\n\nDavid W. Carey\n\nEnclosure\nThe Honorable Dan Burton\n\nDCI/OCA/Liaison Grp/JPMeehan:dms/37976 (29 Dec 97 INTERIM)\nOCA 97-1969 (FN:wdata/action/liaison/burton.doc)\nRevised from INTERIM LTR (never sent) to FINAL LTR (6 Jan 97)\n\nDistribution:\nOriginal - The Honorable Dan Burton, HGR&OC\n 1 - EXDIR/CIA (Follow-up to SCI 97-536)\n 1 - DCI\n 1 - DDCI\n 1 - ER (ACTION ITEM: ER 97-5851)\n 1 - DCI/OGC\n 1 - DCI/CSI\n 1 - DDO\n 1 - DO/IMS\n 1 - DA/OIM\n 1 - DA/OIM/IRG\n 1 - DA/MS\n 1 - D/OCA\n 1 - AO/OCA\n 1 - OCA Records (ACTION ITEM: A/97-05697)\n 1 - JPMeehan Chrono\nMr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, \"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992,\" and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.\n\nLet me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.\n\nEven before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and\nmethods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.\n\nBecause of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.\nAs we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart.\n\nTo understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized\u2014all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.\nThese records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.\n\nAs you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.\nYou have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% of the documents originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.\n\nAlthough our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House\nSelect Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.\n\nThe CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.\n\nWhile I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal\ndocuments ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.\n\nIf legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.\n\nThe effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing\nresources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.\n\nI believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, I cite our technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.\n\nFirst, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.\n\nSecond, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.\n\nThird, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by\nCongress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.\n\nFourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.\n\nFifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.\n\nThese are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.\nBut, again, whatever the future course of the legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.\n\nAdded comment on personal reaction at the time.\n\nAs termed personally to make available every way.\n| Pages | Date | Description |\n|-------|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | 6 Mar 64| Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA |\n| 4 | 30 Jan 76| CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s. |\n| 1 | 6 Mar 64| DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding. |\n| 4 | 6 Mar 64| Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents. |\n| 5 | 6 Mar 64| Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin. |\n| 1 | 31 Oct 59| State Cable from Moscow to SecState. |\n| 1 | 1 Nov 59| Redacted copy of same. |\n| 1 | 2 & 4 Nov| Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query |\n| 3 | 2 Nov 59| Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept |\n| 1 | 9 Nov 59| State Cable, Moscow to SecState |\n| 1 | 9 Nov 59| Redacted copy of same |\n| 1 | 16 Nov 59| Press clipping |\n| 1 | 26 Nov 59| Press clipping |\n| 1 | 25 May 60| Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms |\n| 7 | 12 May 60| Attachment to above |\n| 2 | 12 May 60| FBI report, fr Dallas |\n| 2 | 25 Oct 60| State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors |\n| 2 | 3 Nov 60| Redacted copy of same |\n| 1 | 18 Nov 60| Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming |\n| 1 | undated | Handwritten descrip of letter cited above |\n| 2 | 21 Nov 60| Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors |\n| 1 | | Declassified version of Oswald info from ff |\n| 7 | | List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter |\n| 1 | 18 Nov 60| Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell |\n| 9 | 21 Nov 60| Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above |\n| 2 | 9 Dec 60| 2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201 |\n| 3 | 11 Jul 61| Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept |\n| 4 | 26 May 61| 2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept |\n| 1 | 13 Apr 61| DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship and passport (signed Rusk) |\n| 1 | 26 Jan 61| State MemCon re Oswald |\n| 1 | | Redacted copy of same |\n| 14 | 13 Jul 61| Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible |\n| 1 | 28 Sep 61| Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201 |\n| 4 | 13 Oct 61| Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow |\n| 1 | 7 Dec 61| Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald |\n1 3 Mar 62 Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives\n5 26 Apr 62 Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items\n9 7 Sep 62 Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas\n2 \" Redacted pages from above\n7 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas\n3 24 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans\n3 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas (apparently different from above)\n2 8 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report\n20 7 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff\n20 25 Oct 63 FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above\n14 31 Jan 64 Report, not really contemporay with this file, entitled: \"Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City...\"\n28 Sep--3 Oct 63\n14 \" Redacted copy of same\nCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO\nDECLASSIFICATION AND/OR\nRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT\n\nJune 14, 1966\n\nMR. TOLSON:\n\nJustice Fortas returned my call of midday,\n6/13/66, late last night. I told him that I wanted to see him\nabout a matter which he might consider bordered on a violation\nof judicial ethics. He was told that I had been able to discuss\nmatters in confidence with him on several other occasions, i.e.,\nthe Jenkins case, [redacted] boyfriend, and other items which\nMr. Hoover had me handle with him, and that I therefore felt that he\nwouldn't mind if this matter was brought to his attention.\n\nThe Black case was then brought up and he was told that\nalthough he had disqualified himself, he might not desire to discuss this\nmatter. Justice Fortas replied that he would be glad to not only discuss\nthis matter but any other matter with me on a confidential basis at any time.\nHe then asked me to have breakfast with him at 7:45 a.m. this morning.\n\nUpon seeing the Justice in his home for breakfast, we\npreliminarily engaged in small talk and eventually got down to the meat\nof the problem. I gave him a complete rundown on the exchange of corres-\npondence that the Director had had with Katzenbach. He was told specifically\nof Katzenbach's evasive tactics in attempting to defend Bobby\nKennedy.\nI then mentioned the Black case and told him that while the Director planned\nto furnish the Attorney General specific, honest, hardhitting answers to the\nSupreme Court's questions, we nevertheless knew that Katzenbach would\nthrow our answers out the window and present his own slanted version to\nthe Supreme Court. Justice Fortas agreed.\n\nJustice Fortas stated that the entire matter boiled down to a\ncontinuing fight for the Presidency. He stated that Kennedy was of course\nout to capture that segment of voters which in the past had belonged to\nVice President Humphrey. He mentioned that Kennedy, to a certain extent,\nhad succeeded in capturing this left-wing group. He added that of course if\nfacts, as possessed by the FBI concerning Kennedy's approval of wiretapping\nwere made known to the general public that it would serve to completely\ndestroy Kennedy.\n\nCDD:amr\n(2) CONTINUED.....OVER\nMemorandum to Mr. Tolson\n\nJustice Fortas spoke of the Black case. He stated that after Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall had ineptly and inadequately presented the matter of electronic devices to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court had held a confidential meeting among themselves. Although Justice Fortas and Justice White disqualified themselves, they still attended the meeting. At the meeting it was decided among the Justices that rather than remand the Black case to a lower court, the Supreme Court would set itself up as a tribunal to gather further information concerning the usage of electronic devices and afterwards make a decision. The Justices, with the exception of Byron White, felt that if the case was immediately remanded to a lower court Attorney General Katzenbach would, in order to win the case, pick his own Judge and thereby attain victory. Justice Fortas stated that some of the Justices in the Supreme Court were somewhat belligerent in their attitude towards Kennedy and Katzenbach. He stated these men would not be \"pushed around\" regardless of the politics involved.\n\nJustice Fortas stated that the problem at hand was to determine how the FBI's irrefutable evidence exposing Kennedy and the Department in their clear-cut authorization for usage of microphones could be gotten to the Supreme Court and to the people. I showed him at this point several memoranda taken from the file, including the New York telephone memorandum which Kennedy had signed. He stated that there was no doubt in his mind but what the FBI acted in a complete, above-board and honest manner at the specific urging of Kennedy and the Department. He then stated that he fully recognized that Katzenbach would only slant any reply the FBI gave him in answer to the questions posed by the Supreme Court.\n\nAfter some deliberation, Justice Fortas stated that he thought the best thing to do would be for him to slip in the back door and see the President. He stated he would tell the President all of the above facts. As an aside, Justice Fortas asked me if the President had been aware of the exchange of correspondence pertaining to the Director and the Attorney General. I replied that the Director in all fairness and in order to protect the FBI, had definitely advised Watson and the President. The Justice replied that this was good, however, he felt that the President would want to know his opinion as a result of seeing it from the Supreme Court.\n\nHe then stated that his plan of action would serve to protect the President and the FBI and could spell \"back seat\" for Katzenbach and Kennedy. He mentioned that he would recommend to the President that the President should immediately call Katzenbach in his office and tell him that\n\nCONTINUED.... OVER\nMemorandum to Mr. Tolson\n\nhe was very greatly concerned about this entire matter and that, in order for honesty and justice to prevail, an arbitrator should be set up who would listen to all of the evidence and then furnish a complete report to the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas added that naturally the arbitrator would be someone whom the President could trust to furnish the absolute true facts.\n\nHe stated the next problem would be to find this particular man. He said he had in mind somebody like Ken Royall, former Secretary of the Army. He asked me what I thought of him. I told him I naturally had heard Mr. Royal's name, however, Mr. Hoover would have far better judgment on this matter than I would. He next stated that perhaps someone like Ross Malone, former President of the American Bar Association, would be good in this regard. I told him that we had enjoyed very favorable relations with Mr. Malone. Justice Fortas then mentioned that there was an immediate past President of the American Bar Association from the State of Virginia. I told him he probably was thinking of Lewis Powell. He stated this was correct. He asked me what I thought of Powell. I told him that Mr. Powell had generally concurred with Mr. Hoover's beliefs concerning crime, however, on occasions he had been somewhat naive and a little weak. Justice Fortas stated that he thought Royal or Malone would be the best man.\n\nJustice Fortas told me that he would take the above action immediately. He stated he was going to Jacksonville, Florida, today; however, he would try to talk to the President prior to his departure---if not, he would discuss this matter with the President Thursday morning, 6/16/66. I told him that time was growing short inasmuch as the Supreme Court wanted an answer almost immediately. He stated this was true and that, as a matter of fact, once the arbitrator was appointed all of his facts would have to be gathered and furnished to the Supreme Court within two weeks. He stated he thought this could be done.\n\nJustice Fortas told me that he wanted to mention another subject. He stated that he had already taken steps to disqualify himself in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that the Black, Baker and Hoffa cases would be continuing cases which would go on for many years. He asked me if I knew of any irregularities on the part of Bobby Kennedy in connection with the Hoffa case. I replied in the affirmative, stating that Kennedy on one occasion had specifically asked an FBI representative to place a microphone on an attorney by the name of Haggerty. I stated this action had been taken despite the fact that the FBI had not wanted to do this. Justice Fortas replied that he had felt that such might be the case and that under the circumstances\n\nCONTINUED.....OVER\n\n- 3 -\nMemorandum to Mr. Tolson\n\nhe would sit with the rest of the Supreme Court on the Hoffa case and would make certain that Kennedy was exposed. He stated that he felt that the Supreme Court would definitely confirm the decision of the lower court in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that this opinion had been expressed to him by the other Justices.\n\nJustice Fortas next inquired if I had known a former Bureau employee by the name of Courtney Evans. I told him that I did know Evans. He asked if I knew of Evans' association with Kennedy. I told him that we were well aware of this relationship. I then briefed Justice Fortas completely concerning Evans. I told him of the statements made by Edward Bennett Williams with respect to the fact that Kennedy planned to use Evans as his \"ace in the hole.\" I told Justice Fortas that Mr. Hoover had instructed me to call Evans in and to show him approximately eight memoranda which had previously been prepared by Evans. Justice Fortas was advised that Evans had been told that he had not only prepared but approved such memoranda and that we demanded to know if the facts as he had given them at the time of preparation were as true now as they were then. I told Justice Fortas that Evans had affirmed the truthfulness of these facts and had sadly indicated, \"Facts are facts and can't be changed.\" I also told Justice Fortas that we had specifically asked Evans if Bobby Kennedy had been furnished information from microphone coverage in the Black case. The Justice was advised that Evans had admitted that he had frequently briefed Kennedy in this regard. The Justice was told that we next inquired of Evans whether or not Kennedy knew that such information came from microphone coverage and that Evans had replied that there was one specific occasion in which Kennedy specifically could have inferred that the information could only have come from microphone coverage.\n\nJustice Fortas asked if the President knew of Evans' background. I told him that apparently the President did not know this. It was further mentioned that Evans was currently employed by Katzenbach, obviously at the urging of Kennedy. Justice Fortas replied that this was the worst news he had received since Bobby Kennedy's urging that the Viet Cong be allowed to sit down at the conference table. He stated that the President should definitely be told of this fact. He then mentioned that several members of the Supreme Court are well aware of the background of Evans as well as the background of such characters as Sheridan, Bellino, and other henchmen of Kennedy's.\n\nCONTINUED.....OVER\nMemorandum to Mr. Tolson\n\nAt this point, I told Justice Fortas of the memoranda in which the Director in 1963, at the specific request of the President, had furnished the President concerning Bellino, et al., and that the President had the following day dismissed these individuals from employment at the White House. I mentioned that Kenny O'Donnell had immediately advised Bobby Kennedy, and Bobby Kennedy had had Ed Guthman issue a direct threat to us in connection with this matter. Justice Fortas stated this was typical of Kennedy.\n\nJustice Fortas next made reference to the decision handed down by the Supreme Court yesterday in connection with confessions. He stated that he sincerely hoped that the Director and the personnel of the FBI would pay close attention to the conclusion of the statement by Chief Justice Warren wherein the Chief Justice clearly implied that the FBI was a model agency for all law enforcement to follow. Justice Fortas told me that he wanted the Director to know that following Thurgood Marshall's inept and stupid presentation to the Supreme Court regarding the general matter of confessions, he, Justice Fortas, had been instrumental in instructing Thurgood Marshall to specifically return to the Department and ascertain exactly how the FBI handled the matters of questioning of subjects, arraignment of subjects, confessions, etc. He stated that Marshall therefore, as a result of such action, had found it necessary to submit such procedures to the Supreme Court. He stated on this basis, Chief Justice Warren had no alternative but to pat the FBI on the back.\n\nJustice Fortas inquired as to the Director's opinion concerning Ramsey Clark. I told him that the Director of course had enjoyed a very favorable friendly relationship with Justice Tom Clark for many years and that the Director had also enjoyed a fairly favorable relationship with Ramsey Clark, however, not anywhere near as close as the friendship with his father. I told the Justice that the Director had received information pointing out that despite the fact Ramsey Clark was known as a \"Johnson man,\" he nevertheless could see no wrong in Bobby Kennedy. Justice Fortas stated that he felt Ramsey was a good man but young, naive and one that constantly looked down into the deep waters and could see no wrong in anyone. He stated that Ramsey Clark was a \"dreamer.\" Justice Fortas then inquired as to whether or not there are any loyal Johnson supporters in the Department. I stated that the Director had mentioned on a number of occasions that perhaps the only one who could be declared a loyal supporter of the President's was Ed Weisl, Jr. The Justice expressed no surprise. He stated he thought this to be the case.\n\nCONTINUED.....OVER\nMemorandum to Mr. Tolson\n\nAt the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an \"arbitrator.\" He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.\n\nACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans.\n\n(2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an \"arbitrator.\"\n\nRESPECTFULLY,\n\nC. D. DE LOACH\n\n[Handwritten note: \"Certainly Royal would be impossible.\"\n\n[Handwritten note: \"I find it most unusual when a Secretary of War is so instrumental in moving an out of the way setting up a \"C. D. DE LOACH\"\n\n[Handwritten note: \"I have some idea of what can be another Warren Commission.\"\n\n[Handwritten note: \"Hoover\"]\nPage(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.\n\n\u2610 Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.\n\n| Section 552 | Section 552a |\n|-------------|--------------|\n| \u2610 (b)(1) | \u2610 (b)(7)(A) | \u2610 (d)(5) |\n| \u2610 (b)(2) | \u2610 (b)(7)(B) | \u2610 (j)(2) |\n| \u2610 (b)(3) | \u2610 (b)(7)(C) | \u2610 (k)(1) |\n| | \u2610 (b)(7)(D) | \u2610 (k)(2) |\n| | \u2610 (b)(7)(E) | \u2610 (k)(3) |\n| | \u2610 (b)(7)(F) | \u2610 (k)(4) |\n| \u2610 (b)(4) | \u2610 (b)(8) | \u2610 (k)(5) |\n| \u2610 (b)(5) | \u2610 (b)(9) | \u2610 (k)(6) |\n| \u2610 (b)(6) | | \u2610 (k)(7) |\n\n\u2610 Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request.\n\n\u2610 Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.\n\n\u2610 Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.\n\n\u2610 Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).\n\nPage(s) withheld for the following reason(s):\n\n\u2610 For your information:\n\nThe following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:\n\n65 - 6165 - 25, 26\nMarch 16, 1953\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nIn connection with a possible unauthorized leak of official Government information, it is believed desirable to institute a technical surveillance of Henry William Grunewald, a prominent figure in Washington, D.C.\n\nI therefore recommend that you grant authority to place a technical surveillance on the residence of Grunewald, Apartment 625B, The Westchester, 4000 Cathedral Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., telephone: Woodley 7-5700, or any other residence or office space which he might occupy in the future.\n\nRespectfully,\n\nJohn Edgar Hoover\nDirector\n\nThe Attorney General on February 13, 1953, requested that we cover the activities of Grunewald and asked that a technical surveillance be instituted on his residence. This memorandum is being submitted in accordance with the Attorney General's suggestion. (ERW/rh)\nOffice Memorandum \u2022 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT\n\nTO: Mr. Tolson\n\nFROM: L. B. Nichols\n\nDATE: April 28, 1953\n\nSUBJECT: TESTIMONY OF HENRY GRUNEWALD KEAN COMMITTEE\n\nI saw John E. Tobin, the General Counsel of the Kean Committee, on Monday evening, April 27th. Tobin pointed out that on the first day Grunewald testified in Executive session,\n\nTobin then outlined the following particulars:\n\n1. Tobin stated he had ascertained this was probably\n\n2. This was the point which Tobin stated caused him the most concern because there was such a reference in the report of Special Agent dated at New York on July 20, 1951, in the investigation on\n\n3. Tobin outlined this was\n\n4. Tobin stated that Grunewald had the habit of passing out ties at Christmas and that as late as 1951 Grunewald had sent ties to the Director, Clyde Tolson and Guy Hotel. I told Tobin if he was inferring that because Grunewald sent ties to these three individuals they might have furnished him the information, that he ought to be pretty cautious because I knew pretty well what the feeling was. I told him in the first place the Director had not seen Grunewald to my certain knowledge for a long period of time; the Director was not intimate with Grunewald; the Director has not appreciated the manner in which Grunewald has thrown the Director's\n\ncc: Mr. Ladd\nMr. Rosen\n\nRECORDED: 58\nINNOCENT: 58\n\n65-6165-147\nname around and I had my serious doubts whether the Director had ever seen the ties and I was certain the Director never reviewed the file on\n\nWith reference to Mr. Tolson, I told Tobin that Mr. Tolson was one of the most conscientious individuals in Washington and that certainly Mr. Tolson would not engage in any such activity. Thirdly, all he had to do was look at the record so far as Hottel was concerned; that a few years ago, Hottel was primarily responsible for leading to Grunewald's downfall when he was hiding out from the Senate District Committee.\n\nTobin was making quite a point about how Grunewald could have gotten the information. I told Tobin categorically I had reviewed the files on the five individuals he had mentioned and that I was absolutely certain Grunewald did not get any information from the Bureau. I further told him that with reference to the information on Grunewald was a fairly good investigator and it would have been a simple matter for him to find out that with reference to the information on that this itself was a matter of public record; that one of the first things an investigator would do in the investigation of a lawyer would be to check on his admission to the Bar and with the Grievance Committee; that anybody could have gotten this. Further, I inquired whether he had any information to the effect that Grunewald assisted Grunewald in the investigation. He stated Grunewald stated he assisted him. I told him undoubtedly knew personally; that was in the Department for many years himself and no doubt had friends in the Department. I asked whether he had any information indicating was close to McInerney.\nThe matter boiled down to the fact he was primarily concerned about [redacted] I told him the investigative reports on [redacted] went to the Attorney General and Vanech on November 9, 1951; Congressman King on August 9, 1951; photostatic copies were given to G-2 on December 26, 1951, and that the Attorney General requested a summary of our files on February 28th; that a summary memo was furnished the AG under date of February 29th on [redacted] and [redacted]. He then inquired as to why G-2 would want the information. I told him I could not answer this, but would endeavor to ascertain the answer.\n\nI asked him if he had any indication as to when Grunewald made his investigation. He stated it was shortly after the time when the committee first started checking on Grunewald, which would be in November or December, 1951.\n\nI further told Tobin a reputable news source had inquired regarding [redacted] and [redacted] stating he had heard there were a couple of Communists on the staff and that the evidence was supposed to be on the Director's desk. I told him obviously that was not the case and it would appear that the newspaper source was merely calling us to let us know what was being circulated around town, but obviously we furnished no information; that there was some indication from the source that [redacted] had been helping Grunewald and [redacted] might be in contact with McInerney.\n\nI told him he was at liberty to do so.\n\nI told him I would check for the reason why G-2 wanted the information and let him know, which is being done.\nIn my conversation with Tobin, he advised that there was information over in the Senate similar to that furnished by Grunewald. I asked him where in the Senate and he said it came out of Senator McCarran's Office. Inasmuch as [redacted] told me that a member of the King Committee had told the Senator about [redacted] and [redacted] I think it might be well the next time I see [redacted] to confidentially inquire as to whether she recalled what member of the Committee furnished them this information.\n\nI, of course, see no point in talking to [redacted] any further about this matter.\nMay 13, 1953\n\nThe Attorney General\n\ncc Mr. Ladd\nMr. Rosen\nMr. Valley\nMr. Pennington\n\nDirector, FBI\n\nPERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL\n\nJUNE\n\nHENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD\nINFORMATION CONCERNING\n\nThe following information concerning Henry William Grunewald was obtained by a confidential source of known reliability on May 11, 1953.\n\n[Redacted text]\n\nDECLASSIFIED BY\nON 12/24/71\n\n[Redacted text]\n\nMAILED 11\nMAY 14 1953\n\n[Redacted text]\nComplete details concerning the information developed in connection with the request of Deputy Attorney General Rogers will, of course, be furnished to him upon the completion of the investigation of these matters.\n\nNOTE:\n\nThis is a condensed version of information received from the Washington Field Office which has been set forth in as readable form as possible for the information of the Attorney General. It is to be noted an attempt has been made to furnish the Attorney General with only pertinent information which appears would be of interest to him.\n(5) Bureau file 67-322 also reflects that, in April 1929, the Bureau conducted an investigation entitled, \"William H. Vander Pool, Henry W. Grunewald, Application for Commission in Officer's Reserve Corps.\" It is noted that Vander Pool had served as an Agent of the Bureau of Investigation during World War I. At the time of the investigation, both were seeking to obtain a commission in the United States Army. The Bureau's investigation reflected that Grunewald was not trustworthy, possessed a bad reputation and had been indicted for violation of the National Prohibition Act, although he was not convicted of this offense. This information was furnished to the Military Intelligence Service by memoranda to the Department dated May 6, 1929, and September 10, 1929.\n\n(6) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that at the request of Mr. Stephen T. Early, Secretary to the President, the Bureau conducted an investigation in June and July, 1940, entitled, \"Harry H. Woodring; Henry William Grunewald, also known as Henry Grunewald, Frederick Wilhelm Grunewald, and Henri Grunewald; Misconduct in Office, Espionage.\" Mr. Early's request was based on allegations received from [redacted] that Grunewald was believed to be \"in cahoots\" with Senator Gerald P. Nye and that [redacted] had told [redacted] that Grunewald, on two occasions, had given the secretary a check in the sum of $4,000 for Senator Nye. It was alleged that Grunewald had intimated this money came from Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring and that the money was paid in connection with War Department negotiations. On June 25, 1940, the Bureau received a memorandum from the Military Intelligence Service reflecting that Mr. Smith K. Brookhart had informed that Service that he had learned through [redacted] an alleged employee of the French-English Intelligence Service in 1917-1918 that the head of Nazi espionage in Washington, D. C., was Frederick Wilhelm Grunewald, also known as Henry William Grunewald, Westchester Apartments, Washington, D. C. It is noted that McDonald at that time was also residing in the Westchester Apartments and during 1937 and a portion of 1938, Grunewald shared offices with McDonald and former Senator Arthur K. Robinson, in the Hansey Building, Washington, D. C. (1)\n\n(1) 65-6165-3\nMemorandum to Mr. Tolson\n\nAt the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an \"arbitrator.\" He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.\n\nACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans.\n\n(2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an \"arbitrator.\"\n\nRESPECTFULLY,\n\nC. D. De Loach\n\n[Special Intelligence Service, setting up a \"arbitrator\"\npracticality for the \"arbitrator\"\npractice.\"\n\n\"Warden Commission\" went in a \"taco.\"\n\n\"Hoover\"\n\n\"Certainly Royal\"\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR\n\nWith further reference to Henry Williams Grunewald, in whom we are presently interested, I am attaching a memorandum for Mr. Carson from\n\nFor your approval, there is attached hereto a letter for the Attorney General's signature, to the Secretary of the Treasury.\n\nRespectfully,\n\nP. E. Forsyth\nThe investigation in this matter, which was closed July 4, 1940, revealed that the original allegations were apparently based on surmise and suspicion and not on any definite knowledge of the complainants. Whether the conditions alleged nor any irregularity on the part of Grunewald or former Secretary of War Woodring were discovered. There was no evidence developed that Grunewald was engaged in any activity for the German government. The result of the investigation in memorandum form were furnished to Mr. Early on July 9, 1940. (1)\n\n(7) Bureau file 65-6165 also reflects that in May, 1941, the Military Intelligence Service advised the Bureau that information had been received by one of its informants that Grunewald was the pay-off man for German agents in the United States and was also contact man for various American peace and subversive organizations. Subsequently, the Bureau ascertained that the informant of the Military Intelligence Service was and it was felt that the Military Intelligence Service was merely resurrecting old information in view of the fact that the Bureau had previously investigated the same allegations made by . However, on May 15, 1941, a technical surveillance of Grunewald was authorized and from June 4, 1941 through August 1, 1941, such surveillance was maintained on his apartment in the Westchester Apartments. No definite information was developed, indicating that Grunewald had violated any specific Federal statute. (2)\n\n(8) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that on September 15, 1942, the Omaha Office of the Bureau received a complaint from the Military Intelligence Service that Henry William Grunewald had, on the previous evening, given $110.00 in currency to two Army Privates attached to Headquarters, Seventh Service Command, while Grunewald were drinking at a bar in the Fontenelle Hotel in Omaha. The two Privates were then engaged in studying intelligence work, and becoming suspicious of Grunewald's apparent generosity with his money, reported the matter to the Omaha Office. They indicated that had approximately $16,000 in her purse. This money was observed when she opened her purse in order to furnish currency to Grunewald to pass out to the crowd.\n\nGrunewald was interviewed by two Agents of the Omaha Office on September 15, 1942, regarding the matter and he identified himself as being connected with the Alien Property Custodian's office in Washington, D.C., by exhibiting travel authority $50, signed by James E. Kirkham, of the Alien Property Custodian's Office in Washington, D.C. Grunewald claimed to receive $8000 per year as salary from the Alien Property Custodian's Office. He admitted passing out money promiscuously in the bar and stated that he did not wish the matter reported to his superiors in Washington although he was willing to furnish information about the incident confidentially to the Bureau. He stated\n\n(1) 65-6165-8\n(2) 65-6165-22; 65-6165 Sub 1, Serial 1 to 122\nSubject HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD\n\nThis serial, the original memorandum from the FBI to the Attorney General dated 3/16/53, which was returned to the Bureau signed by the Attorney General authorizing FBI to conduct electronic surveillance, has been permanently removed for retention in the upper memorandum to dated 7/13/73. See 62-115687-1 for details and where maintained.\n\nRemoved By 343 Date 1/21/74\n\nComplete File and Serial Number 65-6165-124\n\nALL INFORMATION CONTAINED\nHEREIN DECLASSIFIED\nDATE 5/17/82 BY sp22apless\n12-27-89 sp3244t\nEnclosed is a copy of a letter dated April 7, 1953, from the Chief Counsel of the House Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws, requesting permission to inspect the Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the personal files relating to Henry W. Grunewald including his service with the Office of Alien Property and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.\n\nThe Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the Alien Property files have been obtained and will be made available, minus any FBI reports, in accordance with policy.\n\nAdvice would be appreciated whether the Bureau has a personal file on Grunewald, and, if so, whether the Bureau would have any objection to making it available, minus any investigative reports, for examination by a Subcommittee representative. If the Bureau has such a file and no objection to its examination, please advise whether the Bureau would prefer to make it available for examination in one of the Bureau's offices or in this office.\n14 May 1992\n\nNote For: David Pearline, OCA\n\nSubject: Suggested Qs & As for Hearing on JFK Assassination Documents\n\n(Dave Gries suggests additional Qs and As along the following lines)\n\nQ. Many of the Oswald documents transferred to the National Archives earlier this week were said to have been in the Archives previously. Is this correct?\n\nAns. Yes, but most of the documents were originated by other agencies, and we were not aware of what those agencies had previously released.\n\nQ. There appears to be little information of interest in the Oswald file that was released. Is this true?\n\nAns. Yes this is essentially accurate. But the objective in transferring the file was to demonstrate our good faith commitment to release as many documents related to the assassination as possible, and as expeditiously as possible.\n\nJohn Pereira\nx (76160)\nROBERT GATES (director, CIA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.\n\nI'm here to provide my views on House Resolution 454, the assassination materials disclosure act of 1992. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee, just as I did before your colleagues in the Senate last Tuesday.\n\nI can summarize my statement, I think. It is largely the same as the one I did earlier. Let me just say, as I have said, that I'm in complete agreement with the effort to underline the joint resolution, that is, the effort to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\nFurther, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with his murder.\n\nI have undertaken a number of efforts at CIA to accelerate the declassification of historical materials, creating a new organization to do that. It will be classified, or review for declassification, all documents over 30 years old, and Soviet estimates up to 10 years ago.\n\nI've asked them to take as their first priority the review for declassification a review of the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. And we have proceeded with that, without waiting for legislation.\n\nAnd I've indicated earlier this week, we've declassified the first set of these records, the pre-assassination Oswald file. And these have now been transferred to the National Archives for release.\nIt's a small fraction of what we have, but I want to do it right away as an earnest of our intention to move on, to declassify these documents and to get them before the public as quickly as possible.\n\nI've also made publicly available this week the agency's new guidelines for historical review and declassification.\n\nIn connection with these guidelines I have recently commissioned a task force to review agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act. I've instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I've described for historical declassification.\n\nAlthough the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents and those that are often requested under FOIA, and 30-year-old documents placed under historical review programs, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and the release of government or CIA records.\n\nThe chart that I've brought along with me describes the nature of CIA's collection of documents, about 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. And I don't need I think to go into any further detail on that.\n\nAs I indicated, only about 11 of the pre-assassination documents belong to CIA, and we have released those, and as I did earlier in the week, brought along that file simply to show how thin it was before that time.\n\nIt was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated most of the documents that it had; 33,000 pages on Oswald alone.\n\nThere has been some comment on the pre-assassination Oswald file, and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all the material we will review; merely an earnest of our intentions.\n\nAll of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the archives as they are completed without waiting for work on the entirety to be completed.\n\nMr. Chairman, you have asked about assassination materials that may be held by other intelligence community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records.\n\nThe National Security Agency and the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research report after a preliminary search that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations.\n\nThe Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be minimal, because its mission at the time of the assassination focused on foreign military order of battle.\n\nI've indicated in my statement for the record that CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally, because of limits in the privacy act, which protects the names of Americans against unauthorized disclosure; the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations; and\nthe fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA.\n\nHowever, we've already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification.\n\nAs I indicated earlier in the week, if necessary, and in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. And I hope that we can work together, Mr. Chairman, to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents.\n\nI also have indicated in my statement for the record that I assume there will be some materials that cannot be released, for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns, or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods.\n\nAnd let me again take a moment to give an example of this type of material.\n\nDuring the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that a number of security and personnel files of CIA employees were requested. These files contained fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers.\n\nAlthough irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of the disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping it confidential.\n\nSimilar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals, where the information is based on gossip or rumor.\n\nOur files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality, and we would not release their names in breach of such a promise.\n\nWhere we cannot disclose such information to the public, the agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent, or the privacy of an individual.\n\nAs I told your Senate colleagues earlier in the week, if legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the president regarding these papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relative to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified.\n\nAnd they would then issue an unclassified report on their findings.\n\nI believe that these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these documents declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside nongovernmental review.\n\nIt is against this background that I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result.\nFirst, vesting in a body outside\u2014in an outside body the determination whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.\n\nSecond, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the assassination materials review board or its staff.\n\nThird, I'm concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by the Congress or the Warren Commission.\n\nUnder the joint resolution documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the executive director of the assassination materials review board, without any review by the president or the executive branch.\n\nFourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies and departments to appeal decisions of the executive director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.\n\nFifth and finally, Section 6 of the Joint Resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of a public release of the documents, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain executive privilege, or deliberative process, attorney-client or attorney-work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest, and in fact are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly relating to the assassination, they would be unavailable in the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.\n\nThese are technical problems, and I believe they can be solved in ways that can expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. And further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the president to declassify this material.\n\nThat concludes my summary of my statement, Mr. Chairman.\n\n*****\n\n*****\nThe Reuter Transcript Report\nAssassinations/hearing\nMay 15, 1992\nMORE\n\nLLLEnglish\nREP. JOHN CONYERS JR. (D-MI): Thank you very much, Mr. Gates. We appreciate your statement. And I only have a couple of observations.\n\nPutting them altogether, I'm interested in how much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? Why the Lee Oswald file was opened at the CIA 14 months after his defection. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? And was that picture in his file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that that you can shed some light on?\n\nGATES: Well, at the risk of appearing appallingly ignorant, Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answers to any of those questions. But I will take them for the record and respond quickly to the committee.\n\nREP. CONYERS: Well, thank you so much.\n\nWe're here against the background of history and the fact that this is the murder of the century. A president of the United States, sitting president. And I thought it was exemplary of the CIA\u2014I never thought I'd be saying this this morning, either\u2014to find out that you had permitted your representatives to discuss the subject matter with various think tanks around the city, one of which was included was the Institute for Policy Studies, whose cofounder is Marcus Raskin.\n\nAnd I was told that there was a very candid exchange about this subject matter which was the purpose of the meeting. Some dozen or more of your representatives were meeting with them.\n\nAnd I think that that is a very healthy sign of the times. I never thought it would happen, so I never thought I'd say what I am saying today. But one of the parts of that discussion was that Oliver Stone, the producer of the movie, has been parading around the country saying that you will not meet with him.\n\nAnd as a conciliatory member of this Congress, could I facilitate such an arrangement so that it would help relieve the confusions and the disturbances of a lot of people, since he\nhas, as a result of this movie, become apparently an expert on this subject?\n\nGATES: Mr. Chairman, I would characterize him as a self-styled expert on this subject. I am no expert at all. I think I have moved very far in the direction of releasing these documents, as you indicated at the outset of the hearing. I think that the agency has in many ways set a standard in terms of its willingness to release these documents, and our determination to do so whether or not there is legislation.\n\nFrankly, I find that the allegations contained in the--that I have been told about in the movie; I have not seen it--are offensive to the agency, and to the American government, and to a number of people who were in office at that time from the President of the United States on down, President Johnson on down.\n\nIt is not entirely clear to me what particular purpose would be served by a meeting between myself and Mr. Stone.\n\nREP. CONYERS: Can you tell me about the sympathy and understanding that you may have for the American people's confusion and differences of view about whether Lee Harvey Oswald was alone the sole assassin of the president?\n\nGATES: Well, my view, and it's a very personal view, Mr. Chairman, is that--and I have never made a study of the assassination; I have not read the many books that have been written about it--but my personal view is that the enormity of the event and the sense of tragedy that the American people felt, and still feel, over that event, is so great that the idea of a single individual, a single irrational individual, committing an act of such enormous historical consequence is enormously difficult to--for them to accept at face value.\n\nAnd in many respects, it is similar to the continuing controversy over the assassination of President Lincoln, as more than 100 years later we still read books about conspiracies and so on in that respect.\n\nAnd by the same token, and with all due respect to his memory, there doesn't seem to any similar kind of controversy about the assassination of President McKinley.\n\nAnd so I think it is the inability of a lot of people to accept such an irrational act with such enormous consequences that has contributed to this. And I think that the--one of the concerns that grows out of this film is not that people accept it at face value but rather than particularly young people who may not read much history and may not read the reviews and may not read what historians have to say that is critical about the movie, but come out of it with the sense that there is some fire in all that smoke; that he may not have it right, but there must have been some sort of conspiracy.\n\nAnd I've had, as I indicated to you the other day, I had a conversation about this with a distinguished United States Senator who had sent some of his smartest young staff out to see the movie, and they came back and the reaction was not that they accepted what the movie said, but their concern that their government had in some way been involved. And frankly it was that more than anything else that prompted me to decide that it was imperative to get these documents out and try to dispel the\nsuspicions that had been created.\n\nREP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Schiff.\n\nREP. STEVEN SCHIFF (R-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Director Gates; I want to thank you for appearing personally here. I know that you have a heavy schedule, and I'm sure all the members of the committee do appreciate that.\n\nI have just a few questions, but I do have a couple of observations on your statement. The first is, I do not know personally whether Mr. Oliver Stone who testified before us at the last hearing is a real expert on the assassination of President Kennedy, or as you suggested a self-styled expert.\n\nI do know this, though. I do know that it's because of his movie that members of the Congress of the United States are discussing this matter publicly with the director of the CIA. And I'm quite-positive that his movie has caused all of that to happen today, and I personally give him the credit for that.\n\nSecond of all, I note your observation that there is not a lingering conspiracy theory involving the assassination of President McKinley. To your knowledge, anywhere in the government, your agency or elsewhere, are there any documents or information which for any reason are not being released with respect to the assassination of President McKinley?\n\nGATES: Well, I can't speak to that from direct knowledge, Mr. Schiff. But I will say that since it predated CIA's formation by 47 years, I imagine not.\n\nREP. SCHIFF: Well, you see, I think that's the central point here, is that there is--I'm not sure we'll ever resolve all the questions about the assassination of President Kennedy. You are correct that we have not resolved all the questions about the assassination of President Lincoln. On national TV I saw a program recently suggesting that John Wilkes Booth did not actually die as suggested, and gave reasons for that.\n\nBut the difference between the assassination of President Kennedy and these prior terrible assassinations in our country's history is, this is the one situation where the government, for whatever reason, and for whatever circumstances, still holds information which it considers to be confidential.\n\nAnd that's the root of this controversy now, and that's the root of this hearing, I think.\n\nAnd I made a note of items that you as director of the CIA would consider to be still--to still warrant confidentiality today. And I made notes of three. If there were more, I apologize that I missed them. I'm not talking about the procedures, which you made observations about, and which I think you'll find the committee willing to discuss with the executive branch.\n\nBut three classifications of records. The first is personnel records involving, I gather, government agents, perhaps CIA agents, fitness reports and credit reports, first of all.\n\nSecond of all, the privacy issue because government\nfiles often accrue totally unsubstantiated information which can be fairly characterized as gossip, but which do get into the files when a total investigation is done; and third, where we've made a specific promise of confidentiality to a particular informant.\n\nBefore I ask you about those three, can I just ask, are there any other areas of documents that you as director of the CIA believe should not be released in terms of a generic category like these?\n\nGATES: No, I would only include in the protection of sources also the protection of intelligence methods. But I think you've captured it.\n\nREP. SCHIFF: Let me just go back on each of these briefly.\n\nOn protection of personnel records, why would those have gotten\u2014I understand what you're talking about. I think we all do matters where there is internal monitoring of your own agents, which I understand is a necessity at times, why would those records have gotten into the assassination records on President Kennedy? Why are they mixed in there, do you know?\n\nGATES: I don't really know, Mr. Schiff. I think, as I understand it, from the materials that were prepared for me, a great deal of documents were swept up in the material that is kept, and as my statement indicates, I don't think I read this part of it: These files contain everything from the most mundane newspaper articles, which are obviously not classified, or shouldn't be, to the most sensitive intelligence sources.\n\nAnd so I think it's just a hodgepodge. As I also indicated, part of the problem that we have in going through these documents is that they are not indexed; they are not catalogued; and they really have no organization to them.\n\nSo when I started asking some months ago what was in the documents, what did we have, it actually took quite some time even to perform a survey to get some kind of idea of what kinds of records were in there.\n\nBut I assume that these kinds of things were just swept up with a lot of other material.\n\n*****\n\n*****\nThe Reuter Transcript Report\nAssassinations/hearing (first add)\nMay 15, 1992\nMORE\n\nLLLEnglish\nREP. SCHIFF: Well, let me go on to one of the other categories, and that is, where the government has given a promise of confidentiality, the government ought to keep that. Can't the information be released without revealing the informant? Because I think it's the information that is desired here, not necessarily the identity of who provided it.\n\nGATES: My own view, Mr. Schiff, is that that should be the case in almost every instance.\n\nREP. SCHIFF: Finally with respect to intelligence methods, I understand that there's a national security point there. But we are also talking about 30 years ago, approximately.\n\nAre our intelligence-gathering methods so unchanged in 30 years that you believe that revealing how agencies gather and collect and evaluation information would present a national security risk today if revealed?\n\nGATES: Well, first of all, if an intelligence method is no longer in use, then I think it no longer--and there's little prospect of it ever being used again, I see no reason to protect it.\n\nI think here again, though, that the focus should be on the information provided by these sources and methods, rather than the identification of the sources and methods themselves.\n\nThe only reason I would seek to protect them is in those instances in which those techniques are still being used, or we think there is a good chance they will be used again.\n\nWith respect to sources, I think that we have a much longer standing commitment to protect them. But again, I'm prepared, either under the legislation, through the board that would be established, or in the absence of legislation, through an outside panel, to let people who are not in the intelligence business review any of that material that we had held back to see that we had justifiable reasons for doing so.\n\nREP. SCHIFF: So your overall position, Director\nGates, is that everything that can be released should be released?\n\nGATES: Absolutely, Mr. Schiff.\n\nREP. SCHIFF: Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.\n\nREP. CONYERS: Thank you, Mr. Schiff. The chair recognizes Mr. Thornton.\n\nREP. RAY THORNTON (D-AR): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.\n\nAnd thank you, Director Gates, for a very forthcoming and positive testimony before this committee. I think that it is important to emphasize that we share an interest in disclosing all of the information related to the substance of this without jeopardizing the capacity of your agency to conduct its business.\n\nAnd in fact, Section 6 of the proposed resolution says that disclosure to the general public of assassination material or particular information in assassination material may be postponed if its release would\u2014and there's a whole list\u2014but among that list is, if an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the United States government is involved.\n\nAnd Director Gates, I believe that you're telling us, and I want to ask you directly, that if the standards that are contained in this resolution were adopted, and the CIA's records as you have suggested they should be, were released, with those safeguards, do you believe that any sensitive sources or methods would be revealed or compromise by the information which is released?\n\nGATES: I think that the provisions that provide for the protection of sources and methods and that allow us ultimately the president to have the final say would provide adequate safeguards.\n\nREP. THORNTON: The protections in the bill for intelligence-related information then are sufficient?\n\nGATES: Yes, sir. I've indicated in my testimony we would ask the Congress to consider I think two additional categories of information. I mentioned executive privilege, or deliberative process. Attorney-client kinds of information.\n\nAgain, we think that there would be very little information that would be withheld under those circumstances, but without mentioning it, that recourse would be denied.\n\nThe second is, I think it would be useful to pick up on the same protection that the Congress has granted in separate legislation in terms of not revealing the names of covert employees of U.S. intelligence agencies.\n\nREP. THORNTON: I appreciate those suggestions. But in summary the release of the CIA records in accordance with the general outline contained in this resolution would not damage any current CIA operations; is that correct?\nGATES: No, sir, not in keeping with those safeguards.\n\nREP. THORNTON: I know, Director Gates, that you've recently released, as you told us, some materials regarding Oswald. Can you make a commitment here to promptly release all of the files about the CIA's operations against Fidel Castro in the late '50s and early '60s?\n\nGATES: We certainly--the files concerning Operation Mongoose, AMFlash (phonetic), and so on, are included in the documents that will be reviewed in the--\n\nREP. THORNTON: That was my specific followup question as to whether those files would be included in the material.\n\nGATES: Yes, sir.\n\nREP. THORNTON: I want to thank you again for your testimony. Like you I have not seen the movie, and that is not the basis of my concern. The basis of my concern is to make sure that all of the information that is in government possession relating to this assassination be released. Because in addition to the movie, I believe there are some inferences drawn by the House committee on investigations, and by the Garrison jury, that while no showing of a government conspiracy, that there were allusions to the possibility of an external conspiracy, and whatever may have existed needs to be dispelled by having the light of full disclosure shown upon the events of that time.\n\nWould you agree with that, sir?\n\nGATES: I agree with that totally, Mr. Thornton.\n\nREP. THORNTON: Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.\n\nREP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Thornton. The chair recognizes Ms. Mink.\n\nREP. PATSY T. MINK (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I too want to commend the forthright position that you've taken as the head of the CIA in initiating steps to release important documents that will contribute to the better understanding of the public at large as to what exactly happened.\n\nI also agree with my colleagues that while the conclusions and inferences that were part of Oliver Stone's movie are under question, and perhaps totally negated by your agency, they are nevertheless, the basis for the renewed attention and concern as to exactly what happened on that day.\n\nAnd therefore, it seems to me appropriate that the chair of this committee asked you to direct your attention to the content of that movie, because what we need now is an informed basis upon which to look at it.\n\nI happen to have seen it, unlike some of my colleagues. And there are a number of very troublesome questions that the movie raises, and I am in no position to\nevaluate it, as most of the people in the country. And therefore, the disclosure of these documents are extremely important.\n\nLooking at your testimony, Mr. Gates, I notice that you indicate that some of the documents which are relevant to this inquiry cannot be released by the CIA because they are in fact documents which belong to other agencies.\n\nWould you comment on that and clarify that particular statement in your testimony?\n\nGATES: Yes, ma'am. In the course of the post assassination investigations, a great deal of information was shared among the agencies. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records that we have, approximately 40 percent of those documents originated with the FBI, and were simply made available for information to CIA.\n\nAbout 20 percent originated with the State Department or other agencies, immigration and naturalization and so on.\n\nUnder the third-agency rule, it is our obligation to leave it to those agencies to declassify their own documents. We cannot do that, and by the same token, they exercise the same practice with us.\n\nREP. MINK: Now, would the legislation that we are considering now make it possible for your agency, as the custodian of records that you have been given by other agencies, be included in your own disclosure? Can we make that possible?\n\nGATES: I don't think the legislation would do that, Mrs. Mink. I think that it would simply require those other agencies to undertake the same steps that we are in terms of reviewing for declassification the documents that they originated.\n\nWe don't hold the record copies of those documents. We simply have copies of them.\n\nREP. MINK: Now, in the materials that you have volunteered for disclosure, with reference to Oswald, how much of the materials in your possession, therefore, had to be excluded because they were documents that your agency had been provided by other governmental agencies?\n\nGATES: Let me answer, and then check with my colleagues to make sure I got it right, in this very thin file, of the 34 documents, I think only 11 were originated by CIA. My impression is that the others had all--belong to other agencies had all already been declassified. That's correct.\n\nREP. MINK: So that we have the total file with reference to Oswald now in the public domain?\n\nGATES: The total file that CIA had in its possession.\n\nREP. MINK: But you just said that all the other agencies have also already declassified, meaning that they are part of the public domain, and cannot be obtained, if not necessarily voluntarily released by those agencies, are now available public documents?\nGATES: I don't know whether that's the case or not. Only the documents that we had from them have been released as part of the file we released. They may have other documents pre-November 22nd, 1963 that we didn't have.\n\nREP. MINK: In other words, in reference to Oswald everything that you had in your possession, regardless of whether it belonged to other agencies, because you found them to be declassified, have all been released?\n\nGATES: That's my understanding, yes, ma'am.\n\nREP. MINK: Now, there is a Washington Post article of May 14th which suggests that the materials that have been disclosed with reference to Lee Harvey Oswald contain nothing new. Is that your understanding also of the documents that you released to the archives?\n\nGATES: As I indicated earlier, I am certainly no student of this material. I do not know the answer to that question.\n\n*****\n*****\nThe Reuter Transcript Report\nAssassinations/hearing (second add)\nMay 15, 1992\nMORE\n\nLLLEnglish\nx x x that question.\n\nREP. MINK: Does anyone in the room here from your agency have an answer to that question?\n\nGATES: Some of the documents had not previously been released, so would have represented new information.\n\nREP. MINK: Might we know today what exactly were new items that had not been released previously?\n\nGATES: This is David Grease (phonetic). He is the director of our center for the study of intelligence.\n\nDAVID GREASE (director, center for the study of intelligence): Mrs. Mink, some of these documents had been previously released. About half of those that are--originated at the CIA.\n\nAmong the documents of other agencies that were in our files, it's my understanding, but this would have to be verified, that almost all of them, if not all of them, had been previously released.\n\nREP. MINK: So what consisted of new information that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere?\n\nGREASE: Yes, I understand. We would have to respond to you separately from that. I cannot from memory tell you precisely which documents were new.\n\nI do know that the new ones are not of much consequence. They do not contain any information that is particularly enlightening. But we can tell you after the hearing what those are.\n\nREP. MINK: Can you explain a second, if the CIA had been alerted by the State Department by a cable dated October 31st, 1959, with respect to Oswald's defection, why the CIA did not open a file until 14 months alter?\n\nGATES: I don't think we have the faintest idea, Mrs.\nREP. MINK: There was no policy in effect in 1959 with reference to persons who publicly announced defection to the Soviet Union?\n\nGATES: I just don't know.\n\nREP. MINK: Has there been any inquiry made within the agency to determine that 14-month lapse?\n\nGATES: I don't believe so.\n\nGREASE: We did attempt to contact people who might have been involved at the time, and that largely failed, and in addition, we gained no information. We don't know.\n\nREP. MINK: Now, I don't know the basis of this conclusion in the news article, but it indicates that the materials that were turned over to the National Archives, did not indicate that they were originals, unexpurgated originals, as the article says, that the materials turned over had been altered, revised, in some way by the CIA before they were released to the archives. Is that a true statement?\n\nGREASE: It is not correct to say that they were altered or revised. Our effort was to furnish the file that we had. That file contained copies of original documents. Therefore we thought it appropriate to furnish precisely what we had.\n\nWhat might be characterized as alterations by some by us are redactions of the kind of material that Director Gates has described to you, meaning some numbers, some names, but I can assure you, nothing of any consequence.\n\nThese are Privacy Act considerations and things of that nature.\n\nREP. MINK: Mr. Gates, one final question: In your testimony you indicated that you did not support vesting in an outside body the determination of whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public, and to agree to that would be inconsistent with your statutory responsibility.\n\nI take it, then, that you oppose the provisions in this bill which call for such vesting in an outside body?\n\nGREASE: Frankly, my own view is that the provisions that provide that the president can have the final say, normally I would not shift to the president my burden for protecting sources and methods. But it seems to me that, given the unique circumstances of this case, it seems to me that that is one part of the bill that we could find a way to work around.\n\nREP. MINK: Then is it not somewhat inconsistent in your testimony in saying that if this bill didn't pass and didn't become law, you would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside the government to do the exact same function for your agency?\nGATES: No, ma'am, what I would appoint that panel to do is examine all the redactions that we had made, and to examine all of the documents that we decided could not be declassified, and then provide a report to the American people on whether or not any of those redactions or those withheld documents had a bearing on the assassination. They would not make the decision to declassify.\n\nREP. MINK: Now, would the establishment of such a panel of outside experts in effect also under your definition violate the Privacy Act?\n\nGATES: I don't know the answer to that. I would have to have\u2014I would have to have our attorneys look at it.\n\nREP. MINK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.\n\nREP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. You've touched on some very important areas. There are just two related considerations that I'd like to bring to your attention, Director Gates. One is in the Freedom of Information Act, where electronic data is a discretionary matter with the agency, and we would like you to review the problem with the release of CIA electronic data of previously released requests. It's a technical point, but I bring it to your attention for your future consideration.\n\nAnd finally, with regard to the Castro records, and AMLash and Gilverto Lopez (phonetic), it is my hope that you will elevate those as high up on your agenda for reconsideration for release as soon as appropriate. There are a number of members in the Congress that have asked me to bring this matter to your attention as well.\n\nGATES: I think we can do that, Mr. Chairman.\n\nREP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. And on behalf of the committee, we deeply appreciate your appearance before us today.\n\nGATES: Thank you, sir.\n\nEND GATES TESTIMONY\n\n*****\n\nThe Reuter Transcript Report\nAssassinations/hearing (third and final add)\nMay 15, 1992\nREUTER\n\nLLLEnglish\nJanuary 30, 1998\n\nThe Honorable Dan Burton\nChairman\nCommittee on Government Reform and Oversight\n2185 Rayburn House Office Building\nHouse of Representatives\nWashington, DC 20515\n\nDear Mr. Chairman:\n\nThis letter is the Assassination Records Review Board\u2019s sixth monthly progress report, as required by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight report on H.R. 1553 (now P.L. 105-25), that extended the authorization of the Review Board until September 30, 1998.\n\nAt the January 22 closed meeting, the Board processed for public release approximately 3,600 FBI records, 1,000 CIA records, and 350 records from other agencies. The nearly 5,000 records processed by the Board is its highest total for a single meeting. In addition, the Review Board recently released approximately 600 pages of military records regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-63. Additional military records related to U.S. policy toward Cuba in the early 1960\u2019s will be ready for public release in the coming months.\n\nThe 710 records that the CIA made available for Review Board action at the January meeting is the highest monthly number of records released to date. In addition, a total of 289 HSCA documents with CIA equities were opened in full pursuant to discussions with the CIA. Although the Review Board believes that the pace must continue to increase, the momentum is unquestionably in the right direction. The CIA also has advised us that it has added additional reviewers and indexers, which we believe should help it process more records during the upcoming months. We now are conducting weekly meetings with CIA for the purpose of evaluating the pace of the review process. The CIA also has increased its progress in responding to our requests for additional information and records. The requests that we had identified as priorities have now been answered either in whole or in part and the CIA has shown an increased\nThe Honorable Dan Burton\nJanuary 30, 1998\nPage 2\n\nwillingness to respond to follow-up requests more quickly. While there are a significant number of requests outstanding, the increased responsiveness of the CIA bodes well for the completion of these requests in a timely manner.\n\nSince our December report, the Board\u2019s FBI team has reviewed an additional 20,000 pages of records from the FBI\u2019s HSCA files. Included in these files are the names of individuals who have a prominent role in the history surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. Although this page count is higher than last month, we have advised the FBI that the volume must return to earlier levels to ensure that the review is completed in a timely manner.\n\nAs I reported in my January 16, 1998 letter to you, all of the agencies and offices to which you addressed letters in December have now contacted us and pledged to complete their work in a timely manner. In particular, recent meetings and communications with the Internal Revenue Service have been fruitful and provide reason to believe that the IRS will fulfill its obligations under the law.\n\nI would also like to take this opportunity to provide you with an update on the Board\u2019s federal compliance program. The State Department has submitted a draft final compliance statement and we expect that its obligations under the JFK Act will be completed and appropriately documented by early March. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has submitted its final compliance statement, and the Board has agreed that its compliance statement is complete. The Social Security Administration also has submitted its final compliance statement and has now received notification that its obligations under the law are fulfilled. We continue to work with the other federal agencies that have obligations under the JFK Act and the compliance program is proving to be an effective mechanism to document their progress.\n\nAgain, thank you for your continuing interest in the work of the Review Board and the support that you have provided in working with various federal agencies. Please do not hesitate to have a member of your staff contact me if you have any comments or questions. I can be reached at 724-0088, ext 226.\n\nSincerely,\n\nT. Jeremy Gunn\nExecutive Director\nT. Jeremy Gunn \nExecutive Director and General Counsel \nAssassination Records Review Board \n\nPrepared Statement for \nSenate Governmental Affairs Committee \nHearing on S. 712 \n\nMarch 25, 1998 \n\nMr. Chairman and Members of the Committee \u2014 I appreciate the opportunity to testify on S. 712 from the perspective of a person who has labored in the declassification trenches for the past three and one-half years. Although I serve as the Executive Director of the Assassination Records Review Board, I wish to emphasize that I am testifying here today not as a spokesman for the Review Board, but as an individual who has been involved in day-to-day interactions with numerous Federal agencies on issues related to declassification. The Review Board members, who were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, are Judge John R. Tunheim, Professor Henry F. Graff, Dean Kermit L. Hall, Dr. William L. Joyce, and Professor Anna Kasten Nelson. The Board members have provided the American people unparalleled access to information that has been held secret for more than a third of a century. The Review Board's official positions on matters related to declassification will be set forth in its Final Report to Congress and the President later this year.\n\nI applaud the efforts of Senator Moynihan, Senator Helms, and this Committee to reduce government secrecy. One of the tragic consequences of government secrecy has been the widely held belief that the government has known much more about the assassination than it has been willing to reveal to the public. Many of the assassination records that we have seen could have been opened to the public years ago without any harm to the national security. The efforts of this Committee could go a long way to help alleviate the suspicion of government \u2014 some of it being justifiable suspicion \u2014 that has festered since the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\nBecause my experience comes principally from the field of declassification, I will focus my remarks on that area rather than discuss the very important issue of initial classification.\n\nI. Background\n\nAlthough the word \"unique\" is over-used, it can fairly be applied to the work and accomplishments of the Review Board. The Board was created by Congress in an effort to release the government's still-secret files related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In accordance with the declassification standards articulated in Section 6 of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. \u00a7 2107, Pub.L. 102-526 (as amended) (\"JFK Act\"), the Review Board\nhas opened up previously classified records from numerous agencies and departments, including the CIA, NSA, FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice, as well as the Military Services, Secret Service, Senate and House Committees, and the National Security Council.\n\nUnder the JFK Act, agencies are required either to open assassination records in full, or to present to the Review Board proposed redactions and evidence in support of their proposed redactions. After receiving the agencies' evidence, the Review Board deliberates and makes \"formal determinations\" as to whether the records should be opened. The Board's determinations have been overwhelmingly in favor of opening records. If an agency disagrees with the formal determination of the Review Board, its sole recourse is to appeal the Board's decisions to the President. Thus far, only one agency, the FBI, has appealed Board decisions. (The appeals ultimately involved approximately 90 records and four different issues.) After extensive briefings had been submitted to the President -- with each side arguing why the records should or should not be released -- the FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and negotiated with the Review Board for resolution of the issues. Without exception, every formal determination ultimately made by the Review Board has prevailed and records have been released in accordance with Board decisions. It has now been almost two years since an agency has appealed a decision to the President. Thus, the Board's work has been a success. Although I do not consider the JFK Act to be the precise model for future government-wide declassification efforts, it nevertheless has provided valuable lessons that may be of use to you as you consider S. 712.\n\nII. The \"Four Noble Truths\" of Declassification\n\nIn my opinion, any legislation that would attempt to have a significant impact on the culture of secrecy must do more than articulate worthy goals and establish bureaucratic entities to reiterate those goals. Effective legislation must address the significant institutional impediments to declassification. Any conscientious effort to change the secrecy system should take into account what I will call the \"Four Noble Truths\" of declassification:\n\nfirst, an independent entity, not the classifying agency, should be the final decision maker on declassification;\n\nsecond, the independent declassification entity should be informed, committed, and skeptical;\n\nthird, in order for declassification to be successful, there must be internal institutional incentives to declassify information; and\n\nfourth, the key to successful declassification is not the articulation of the\nList of Exhibits\nStatement of T. Jeremy Gunn\n\nExhibit A.\nCable to the Mexico City Station from CIA Headquarters, November 27, 1963.\n\nThis document was released in full after a Board vote in 1995. The second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) \"RYBAT\" and \"GPFLOOR.\" These crypts appear in the \"slug line\" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. \"GPFLOOR\" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable.\n\nExhibit B.\nLetter to the Legal Attach\u00e9 in Paris from the Director of the FBI, October 12, 1960.\nSubject: Lee Harvey Oswald - Internal Security.\n\nThis document was one of several records exempted by the FBI because it contained foreign government information. The stamps on the page suggest that the document was reviewed in 1977 and stamped exempt from declassification. This document was re-reviewed in 1992 and severely redacted. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of the information. In December 1995, the document was released in full after a Board vote and with the concurrence of the Swiss Government.\n\nExhibit C.\nMemorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 1964. Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba.\n\nThe Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. This exhibit contains one page from a 58-page document formerly classified Top Secret--Sensitive. The document was excluded from automatic declassification and was unavailable to the public in any form. It was systematically reviewed in October 1989 and the classification was continued. This document and many similar documents were opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997 after review by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, the National Security Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.\n\nExhibit D.\n(a) Vietnam January-August 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 3. pp. 265-270.\n\n(b) Memorandum for the Record of the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference on Vietnam, May 6, 1963, Honolulu, Hawaii.\nIn May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam in Honolulu, Hawaii. Part (a) of this exhibit includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign Relations of the United States) and part (b) includes the title pages of the full 213-page Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic regrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989, and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at an ARRB declassification session in July 1997.\n\nExhibit E.\nMonthly Operational Report 1-30 September from the Chief of Station, Mexico City to Chief KURIOT, October 18, 1963.\n\nThe CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. This document is a CIA monthly operational report for Mexico City for September 1963, a period that includes Lee Harvey Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. The attached form discloses that this document was reviewed in 1993 and postponed in its entirety. It was opened in full in 1995 after a Board vote.\n\nExhibit F.\nNSA SIGINT product report, November 26, 1963.\n\nThe Review Board has had some success in releasing NSA records. This document discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from automatic declassification. This document was released with sanitizations by Board vote.\n\nExhibit G.\nMemorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Gordon Chase, June 15, 1964. Subject: Assassination of Castro.\n\nThis document from the files of the National Security Council was originally classified \"Secret\" and was exempted from declassification in 1976. The NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Review Board in 1993.\ncategories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the party that seeks to exempt information from release.\n\nBecause these four points are inextricably interconnected, I will discuss them in reference to our work and to a series of documents that are attached as exhibits to this testimony.\n\nDuring the past four years, I have spent hundreds of hours talking with officials from more than a dozen agencies and reviewing memoranda that argue against the release of certain types of classified information. It has been my general impression that the officials making such arguments are intelligent, conscientious, competent, and hardworking. (I also have had the general impression that they have sought to be cooperative with the Review Board and that they have made good-faith efforts to comply with the JFK Act.) One nevertheless cannot help but observe a deep-seated, institutional reluctance to release information -- particularly on the part of those institutions that were created for the purposes of collecting secret information and preserving secrets.\n\nIn order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example, Section 4(c)(2)(A) would require the agency to \"provide in writing a detailed justification for [an initial classification] decision.\" Similarly, with regard to the 30-year review, agencies would \"certify to the President at the end of such 30-year period that continued protection of the information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the national security of the United States . . . .\" (Sect. 4(d)(2)). The talented officials who are hired by the agencies will be able to provide such explanations and such justifications. The issue from my perspective is not whether agencies are able to articulate such justifications, but to what extent their justifications can withstand scrutiny. Let me provide some examples where initial justifications for withholding information did not withstand scrutiny.\n\nIllustration 1. See Exhibit A. The first illustration is a CIA cable dated November 27, 1963, that has now been released in full. As you can see, the second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) \"RYBAT\" and \"GPFLOOR.\" These crypts appear in what is called the \"slug line\" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. \"GPFLOOR\" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. The CIA originally advised that GPFLLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable. I had several discussions with agency officials as they tried to explain why GPFLOOR could be released in one place but not in the other. I could not understand their explanations. At that time I was new to the work and I did not know whether I was simply not bright enough or experienced enough to understand the explanation being offered. I again raised the question in a later meeting with several agency officials that\ncovered other topics. Finally, an official said: \"I don't see why it can't be released. This is an issue for COMMO [COMMO is the Communications Office.] Someone ask COMMO whether it cares.\" COMMO was subsequently asked \u2014 and it had no objection to the release. I now infer that protecting crypts in slug lines was an ingrained agency habit rather than a considered judgment. The disclosure came only after incessant questioning by a skeptical interlocutor.\n\nIllustration 2. During the course of our review of records from the Secret Service, the Board identified for the Secret Service a record it intended to open in full and the agency objected. The Board then advised that a copy of the record had actually been published in full in 1964 as an exhibit to the Warren Commission Report. The agency continued to object, arguing that even a subsequent release of an open document would again disclose matters that should be kept secret. The Board subsequently voted to open the record.\n\nIllustration 3. In several FBI documents that were subject to appeal to the President, the FBI argued that certain types of its electronic surveillance had not previously been disclosed. In our opposing memoranda, we showed that Director J. Edgar Hoover, in open testimony to Congress, had effectively disclosed the existence of the electronic surveillance. Those records are now open.\n\nIllustration 4. See Exhibit B. The Review Board was presented with a heavily redacted but provocative document pertaining to an FBI \"Internal Security\" inquiry into Lee Harvey Oswald in October 1960. The FBI declined to release the information, arguing that it contained the equities of a foreign government and that the government had refused to release the information. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, thereupon approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of information about the assistance that the Swiss Federal Police provided to the FBI to track down Oswald. The Swiss government agreed and the record is now open in full.\n\nIllustration 5. See Exhibit C. The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. Exhibit C contains one page from a 58-page document from this group that had been \"excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.\" The Review Board staff arranged for a group of declassifiers from several military and other national-security entities to meet at the Review Board offices in a joint-declassification session. The 58 pages of this document, and many other records from this group, have gone from being completely closed to completely open.\n\nIllustration 6. See Exhibit D. In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam. Exhibit D includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign\nRelations of the United States, 1961-63 Vol. 3) and the title page of a 213-page Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989 and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997.\n\nIllustration 7. See Exhibit E. Like the FBI, the CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. Exhibit E is a monthly operational report from Mexico City from September 1-30, 1963, a period that includes Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. In 1993, the document was postponed in its entirety. The Review Board voted to open the record in its entirety.\n\nIllustration 8. See Exhibit F. The Review Board has also had some success in releasing NSA records. Exhibit F is dated November 26, 1963, and discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from declassification. After Board action, the important information has been released.\n\nIllustration 9. See Exhibit G. Exhibit G is a National Security Council document that pertains to an alleged plot to assassinate Castro. Although it was originally classified \"Secret\" and was deemed to be exempt from declassification, the NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Board.\n\nI trust that these examples show that agencies are initially inclined to protect information that can and should be released. But the examples also show that, with a little prodding by an independent entity, agencies can and will participate in a cooperative spirit to declassify secrets. Under the current regime, outside of the JFK Act, agencies have little internal or external incentive to take an energetic approach to declassifying records. Agencies do not send the message to agency personnel that a fast track to career advancement lies with the release of more information than is absolutely necessary. Agencies have the natural disinclination to release information that has been painstakingly acquired. Ultimately, secrecy becomes a habit and declassification is mired in lack of attention and inertia. There is, however, an important and encouraging message that comes out of the Board's experience: once agencies come to the understanding that they must declassify records and that there is a presumption that records should be opened, the agencies will cooperate in good faith with the requirements established by Congress.\nIII. The Mechanics of Declassification\n\nDeclassification involves more than appropriate standards for the release of information. It also calls for the establishment of effective mechanisms to move records through the bureaucracy. Once again, the experience of the Review Board provides valuable lessons that should be of use to this Committee in considering legislation. I would like to draw attention to four important points involving the mechanics of declassification.\n\nFirst, the \"referral process\" is one of the most significant, government-wide bottlenecks to the declassification of records. Before an agency can release information in its records that was obtained from another agency, it must refer the record to the agency from which it derived that information. Although this procedure is a sensible arrangement that promotes the valuable goal of sharing information among agencies, it becomes a costly and time-consuming obstacle to declassification. Very frequently, records become trapped in the morass of the referral process.\n\nThe Review Board developed essentially three procedures to help expedite the referral process: (a) establishing joint-declassification sessions where several agencies convened at the Review Board offices (or sometimes at another site) and declassified records; (b) hand-carrying records from one agency to another and having them declassified on-site; and (c) giving agencies notice that unless records were reviewed by a certain date, the Board would simply vote to open the records without receiving the benefit of their input. In my opinion, any legislation designed to improve the declassification process must take into account this referral bottleneck by giving to the independent, supervising agency, the authority to set enforceable timetables.\n\nThe ability to bring agencies together, such as in the joint-declassification sessions, has important beneficial effects that extend beyond expediting the referral process. In our experience, agencies tended to lose some of their institutional inhibitions as they sat at a table with each other and discussed records openly. Surprisingly, agencies typically assumed that another agency would not release information when the other agency was in fact willing to do so. Frequently, it is the suspicion that one agency does not want to release information that inhibits other agencies from releasing information. Like the COMMO example from Illustration 1 above, the perception of unwillingness to open records is sometimes greater than the need to keep records closed.\n\nSecond, the Review Board profitted from the power, authorized by Congress, to \"direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board . . . additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities . . . .\" JFK Act, \u00a7 7(l)(1)(C)(ii). This power enabled the Review Board to obtain information about the basis for classifications, the existence of records relevant to completing its mandate,\nand the circumstances surrounding the creation of records. It is important that an agency with supervisory responsibility over declassification have the authority to obtain the information it needs to accomplish its work.\n\nThird, as with the referral process, a frequent bottleneck in the declassification process is the final transfer of records from the declassifying agency to the National Archives. An independent entity responsible for supervising this process should have the authority and responsibility of guaranteeing that once the declassification process is complete, the final step of making records available to the public is taken.\n\nFourth, although the start-up process is very time-consuming, it is a necessary prelude to more efficient and productive work. The start-up time for the Review Board, as I understand is also the case for Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), required education not only of the Board and staff, but also of the agencies. It is important that any future planning of an endeavor of this nature take into account the initial costs and, importantly, take advantage of the lessons learned by the Review Board. The initial cost can be recuperated in the long run.\n\nWhen an independent agency, such as the Review Board, has the authority to set the agenda (by establishing timetables), sponsor joint declassification sessions, require the production of evidence, and ensure the prompt transfer of declassified records from the agencies to the National Archives, declassification can be a success. I strongly urge this Committee to take advantage of the momentum created by the JFK Act and by ISCAP, and create an authority that will be able to bring independence, consistency, and energy to the process of making the government more open and accountable to the people who have paid for it.\n\nIV. Recommendations for Making S. 712 More Effective\n\nWith regard to S. 712, I wish to summarize the following recommendations that have been offered either explicitly or implicitly in the testimony above:\n\nFirst, the entity responsible for overseeing the declassification process (which, in the current version of the S. 712, is the National Declassification Center), must be genuinely independent of the agencies whose records it oversees. The Center should be staffed by persons who are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies, but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof.\n\nSecond, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable timetables by which an agency must complete the declassification review (or referral review). The Independent entity should be empowered to release information on its own authority if agencies do not comply with reasonable timetables. The independent agency should additionally be empowered to obtain information from the agencies that\nis essential for completing its work.\n\nThird, the legislation should incorporate a statutory provision that, at a certain point in time, records will presumptively be opened unless the agencies are able to articulate specific and persuasive reasons for continued redactions. Although it would be sensible to provide agencies with the benefit of the doubt regarding declassification for an initial period (e.g., between 10 and 25 years), once this period has passed the presumption should shift decisively in favor of releasing the information.\n\nFourth, agencies should be required to do more than provide mere \"detailed justifications\" (see, e.g., S. 712 \u00a7 4(c)(2)(A)) for classifying and refusing to declassify records. The written explanations must be more than \"justifications,\" they must be able to convince a skeptical reader who has sufficient information to evaluate the merits of the writing.\n\nFifth, it would be highly advisable to provide the declassification entity (the National Declassification Center), with the authority to make binding requests to agencies to search out records that may have been misplaced or misfiled.\n\nFinally, there is one additional recommendation that I would make that presumably goes beyond the scope of today's hearing and so I will raise it only in passing. I believe it would be advisable for future Executive Orders to break down the \"sources and methods\" exemption, inasmuch as it is used too casually and it covers a multitude of very distinct issues. To the extent that the Committee is interested, I would be willing to submit additional comments at a later point to develop this issue.\n\n* * * *\n\nI would like once again to thank the Committee for taking seriously the right of the American people to better understand how their government functions. I would be pleased to answer your questions.\nSTATEMENT OF STEVEN GARFINKEL\nDIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE*\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\n\nbefore the\n\nCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\nUNITED STATES SENATE\n\nMarch 25, 1998\n\nMr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:\n\nI am very pleased to appear before you today to report on our progress in implementing\nthe recently established system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying\nnational security information. On April 17, 1995, the President issued Executive Order\n12958, entitled \"Classified National Security Information.\" This Order took effect on\nOctober 14, 1995, only two and one-half years ago. While still in its early stages of\nimplementation, the Order clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance.\n\n*The Information Security Oversight Office, or ISOO, is responsible for overseeing Government-wide\nimplementation of the security programs under Executive Order 12958, \"Classified National Security\nInformation,\" and Executive Order 12829, \"National Industrial Security Program.\" ISOO is also\nresponsible for reporting annually to the President on the status of those programs. Created in 1978,\nISOO became a component of the National Archives and Records Administration in November 1995. In\naddition to reporting to the Archivist of the United States, the Director of ISOO receives policy guidance\nfrom the National Security Council.\n\nAmong its functions, ISOO: (1) develops implementing directives and instructions; (2) maintains liaison\nwith all agencies that create or handle classified information; (3) inspects agency programs and reviews\ntheir classified records; (4) receives and responds to public complaints, appeals and suggestions;\n(5) collects and reports to the President and Congress relevant statistical data about the security\nclassification program, including data about its costs; (6) serves as a spokesperson for information about\nthe security classification program; (7) provides program and administrative support for the Interagency\nSecurity Classification Appeals Panel and the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; and\n(8) recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Council.\nOn the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the interest of national security. On the other hand, the Order enables us to safeguard the information that we must in order to protect our nation and our citizens.\n\nAlready, this new system has achieved some rather remarkable results:\n\n- In the last two years, the agencies of the executive branch have declassified more than 400 million pages of permanently valuable government records.\n\n- Of the more than 650 million pages that the executive branch has declassified since 1980, more than 70% of that total took place in the past three years.\n\n- Agencies that never previously contemplated large-scale declassification, like the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, now have in place productive declassification units.\n\n- The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a new six member panel representing the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has declassified in their entirety more\nthan 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agency\ndecisions to keep those same documents classified.\n\n- Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have\ndecreased to historic lows.\n\n- Anecdotally, those of us who are exposed to a wide variety of classified information\nare noting more and more situations in which information that would have been\nroutinely classified in the past is now routinely unclassified, without any increased\nthreat to our national security.\n\nMr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I can state with total confidence that the\nUnited States Government stands far in the forefront among nations in the manner,\ntiming and extent to which it makes available to its citizens and the general public its\nrecords of governance, including its formerly classified records. In conversation after\nconversation that I have had over the years with foreign government officials, and with\nforeign students, researchers, and journalists, one visitor after another has expressed\ngreat admiration for the degree of openness offered by our freedom of information laws,\nand our security classification system, with its limitations on classification and its\nemphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so.\nThese indicators of progress do not mean that we have all the answers about our security classification system or that there aren't tremendous hurdles to clear. For example, the implementation of the new system has been uneven among the major classifying agencies, and a few are only now just getting started; the costs of implementing the system at some agencies are higher than we anticipated; and resource limitations are having a clear impact on agency compliance and oversight. To be sure, the standards and goals established within the new Executive Order are unparalleled. We are not yet certain that every agency, or perhaps any agency, can achieve them. However, only if the targets are difficult can reaching them be noteworthy.\n\nI recognize that the focus of today's hearing is the legislation before the Committee. I will try to answer any questions you may have concerning the similarities and differences between the security classification system that currently exists and the system that S. 712, as currently drafted, would impose. The Administration has serious objections to certain provisions of S. 712, particularly as they could impinge upon the President's authority and flexibility to manage the classification and declassification programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs.\nHowever, the Administration is prepared to work with the Congress to address these concerns and to establish an effective National Declassification Center. The Administration will identify the revisions that would be required to enable the Administration to support S. 712.\nStatement of\nSteven Aftergood\nDirector, Project on Government Secrecy\nFederation of American Scientists\n\nbefore the\nCommittee on Governmental Affairs\nUnited States Senate\n\nHearing on\nS. 712, The Government Secrecy Act\n\nMarch 25, 1998\nIntroduction\n\nMr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee on the subject of government secrecy.\n\nI believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee's agenda because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Government controls on information define the limits of American democracy. Limits on information mean limits on informed debate, limits on the ability of citizens to meaningfully communicate with their representatives, and on their ability to hold elected officials accountable.\n\nAt the same time, it is self-evident that some degree of secrecy is necessary in certain matters of national security, including the protection of advanced military technologies and the conduct of diplomatic and intelligence activities.\n\nA sound government information policy is therefore one that strikes a responsible and appropriate balance between the imperatives of open, accountable government and the requirements of national security secrecy.\n\nSuch a balance is precisely what has been lacking throughout the modern era of cold war secrecy, leaving us today with a grotesquely distended secrecy system that improperly withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often failing to protect genuine secrets.\n\nMy hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information policy that better serves the national interest.\n\nIn the following remarks, I will first present several assertions about secrecy policy by way of background, and I will then draw some specific conclusions concerning the Government Secrecy Act.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nI would like to emphasize several points that I believe should form the foundation for congressional deliberation on the future of the government secrecy system.\n\n1. Most Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive.\n\nOne might well suppose that public concern about official secrecy is limited to those who are most immediately affected by it, such as journalists and historians, as well as a small cadre of advocates and activists. But that is not the case.\n\nPublic surveys conducted for the Department of Defense in 1994 and 1996 consistently found that a majority (55%) of Americans believe that \"the government\nprotects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET.\\textsuperscript{1}\n\nIn other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply the province of \"special interest\" groups; it is shared throughout the general public. Reducing government secrecy truly is a matter of \"public interest.\"\n\nMuch of this public concern is latent and diffuse, but it crystallizes time and again around specific issues\u2014 the JFK assassination, POW/MIA's in Southeast Asia, UFOs, Nazi war crimes, human rights violations in Latin America, and so forth.\n\n2. Excessive classification is a fact. But independent review can overcome it.\n\nEven if the majority of Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive, they could conceivably be mistaken. But they are not mistaken. It is demonstrably true that government agencies classify too much and fail to declassify information that no longer warrants protection.\n\nThis problem is illustrated with particular clarity by the fact that agency refusals to declassify records are frequently overturned\u2014 within the executive branch itself\u2014 by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which receives appeals from members of the public for documents that agencies have refused to declassify.\n\nDeputy Assistant Attorney General Roslyn A. Mazer, who was appointed by President Clinton to chair the ISCAP, reported recently on the latest activities of her Panel, which includes representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, CIA, NSC and the National Archives:\n\nWe have taken final votes on appeals for declassification of more than 70 documents on a wide variety of subjects. Of these, we have voted to declassify more than 70 percent of them in their entirety, while declassifying significant segments of most of the remainder. This is significant in my view because, in each instance, we are voting to overturn an agency's decision reached at its highest level of appeal....\\textsuperscript{2}\n\n\\textsuperscript{1}Not inconsistently, a majority of those surveyed also favor \"a high level of secrecy\" for technology with military applications. \"Public Attitudes Towards Security and Counter-Espionage Matters in 1994 and 1996\" by Tom W. Smith, National Opinion Research Center, prepared for the Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, November 1996. .\n\n\\textsuperscript{2}Remarks by Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, before the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel, March 6, 1998, emphasis added. .\nThe fact that agency classification policies often cannot withstand scrutiny even within the executive branch points to the root of the problem. The problem is not that classifiers are dishonest or acting in bad faith; in general, they are doing a thankless job the best they can.\n\nThe problem rather is the natural and often unconscious tendency of all bureaucracies to limit the flow of information to outsiders. As Sen. Moynihan observed, \"The problem is that organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt for classifying as much as possible, and for as long as possible.\" If they go unchecked, agencies will hoard information beyond all reason, which is how we got to where we are today.\n\nFortunately, Ms. Mazer's remarks also reveal a solution to this unavoidable problem, and that is independent review of agency classification decisions. The record of the ISCAP demonstrates that unnecessary classification can be reduced or eliminated when contested classification actions are reviewed by \"outsiders\" who share the agency's commitment to national security, but who do not share its Weberian tendencies toward bureaucratic secrecy.\n\nOnly such independent reviewers are capable of separating the national security wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. I believe that this is a crucial principle which should inform Congressional action in this area.\n\n3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy.\n\nThe Justice Department \"strongly opposes a statutory framework for the safeguarding of national security information,\" arguing in effect not only that the President has the authority to set and implement classification policies, but that he has exclusive authority to do so.4\n\nThe Committee should recognize that this is a natural and predictable response from the executive branch, which seeks to preserve its prerogatives and to maximize its own freedom of action. But I believe the Justice Department overstates its case.\n\n---\n\n3Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (\"Commission Report\"), 1997, Chairman's Foreword, page xxxix. Available in searchable \"html\" format at .\n\n4\"Subjecting the protection of national security information to statutorily-required standards or procedures would raise constitutional concerns to the extent that it would limit the President's ability to discharge a core constitutional responsibility as he sees fit.\" Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General on the Government Secrecy Act of 1997, September 15, 1997.\nThere is no question that Congress has the right and, I would say, the obligation to legislate in this area, particularly since the executive branch has failed to manage the secrecy system in a way that best serves the national interest. As Harold Relyea of the Congressional Research Service has pointed out:\n\nPursuant to its constitutional authority \"To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces\" (Article I, Section 8, clause 14), as well as the \"necessary and proper\" clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 18), Congress has long established rules, regulations, and procedures of general effect for the government and the armed services.... These clauses would appear to empower Congress with authority to legislate policy and procedure comparable to that prescribed by presidential executive order to effect security classification.\\(^5\\)\n\nThe right of Congress to enact secrecy-related legislation has also been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court. Prior to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, the Court held in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) that Congress had not intended for the courts to examine the propriety of classification decisions or procedures. But, as Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies has noted, the Court also found that:\n\nCongress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its own procedures\u2014subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional ordering.\\(^6\\)\n\nAnd of course Congress has enacted legislation dictating classification policy on numerous occasions, including the statutory classification framework of the Atomic Energy Act and the National Security Act, in which Congress (not the President) assigned the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.\n\nFurthermore, Congress has also successfully enacted statutes requiring\n\n\\(^5\\)Statement by Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on \"A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information,\" March 16, 1994, page 48ff.\n\n\\(^6\\)410 U.S. at 83 (1973). See Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on \"A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information,\" March 16, 1994, page 66ff, for further elaboration of related Court rulings, and her conclusion that \"the only possible constitutional limitation would be that the Congress could not order disclosure of advice given to the President that would constitute a state secret.\"\ndisclosure of certain classified information, including the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act (P.L. 102-526) and legislation concerning the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series (P.L. 102-138). In addition, Congress has granted itself the authority to declassify any information in its possession.\\(^7\\)\n\nToday, several more bills mandating declassification are pending before Congress, including: S. 1220, \"The Human Rights Information Act\"\\(^8\\); S. 1232, a bill to declassify the private journal of Dr. Glenn Seaborg\\(^9\\); and S. 1379, \"The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.\"\\(^10\\) Each of these bills was introduced because the public had no choice but to turn to Congress in order to correct the failings of executive branch classification and declassification policies. If the Justice Department position were to be taken at face value, all of these bills\u2014 as well as the Freedom of Information Act itself\u2014 would be unconstitutional, and executive branch officials would have completely unchecked power to withhold whatever information they chose.\n\nIn short, while the executive branch is entitled to advise Congress to stay out of national security information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past.\n\n4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be.\n\nA statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself. In considering legislative changes to secrecy policy, Congress should aim to fix what needs fixing, but also to preserve what warrants preserving.\n\nIn particular, the Committee should recognize the changes that were inaugurated with President Clinton's executive order 12958, and which have already produced some impressive results.\n\nMost important, from my point of view, is the order's automatic declassification provision (section 3.4) which requires the declassification of most historically valuable 25 year old documents by April 2000. This provision has generated an unprecedented surge in declassification, reported at nearly 200 million pages in FY 1996 alone.\\(^11\\)\n\n\\(^7\\)See Senate Resolution 400, section 8.\n\n\\(^8\\).\n\n\\(^9\\).\n\n\\(^10\\).\n\n\\(^11\\)1996 ISOO Report to the President .\nSo Congress need not and should not consider classification policy in a vacuum. It must start with the reality of classification policy as it is today and \"first, do no harm.\" Legislative changes to the classification system should begin by affirming what is positive in current policy\u2014 and then building on it.\n\nTHE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT OF 1997\n\nThe Government Secrecy Act contains a number of important provisions which are derived from the two-year investigation of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. The Act's two most positive innovations\u2014 a \"balancing test\" and a National Declassification Center\u2014 are also the ones that have elicited the strongest opposition from the executive branch. I will comment briefly on each of these, and suggest one other area for Committee consideration.\n\n1. The balancing test and judicial review.\n\nSection 4(c)(1) of the Act would require officials to weigh or \"balance\" the potential benefit from disclosure against the need for protection in making classification and declassification decisions, and further dictates that if there is significant doubt about the need to classify the information, it shall not be classified.\n\nFrom the perspective of a non-governmental consumer of government information, this is the Act's single most important provision.\n\nIn the abstract, the idea of \"balancing\" is unexceptionable and is almost built into the practice of classification. Executive order 12958 includes a discretionary balancing test for declassification (sect. 3.2b) as well as a \"significant doubt\" standard (sect. 1.2b) for classification. (Interestingly, the CIA promulgated a balancing test during the Carter Administration which remains in effect today [32 C.F.R. 1902.13(c)].)\n\nThis provision of the Act has drawn agency opposition not because of its balancing requirement per se, but because it would allow judicial review of agency balancing decisions under the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that courts would presume to \"second guess\" agency classification decisions is profoundly unwelcome to classifiers, who warn of disastrous consequences if their judgment is questioned.\n\nThis warning is self-serving and needs to be taken with large grains of salt. Similar concerns contributed to President Ford's decision to veto the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether information had been \"properly\" classified.12 Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto and it turned out that the opponents' fears were not realized.\n\n12See President Ford's veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36243-4.\nTo the contrary, judicial review has been a potent factor in making the FOIA as useful a tool of democracy as it is. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the courts are not sufficiently diligent in reviewing agency classification decisions.\\textsuperscript{13}\n\nThe CIA has warned of \"costly legal challenges that risk second-guessing of DCI/CIA judgments.\" This is a considerable exaggeration since in practice, no judge would reject a sworn affidavit from the DCI that certain information must be withheld. But at the same time, CIA classification judgments are in need of the checks and balances that judicial review would provide, particularly when it comes to the invocation of \"sources and methods.\" Thus, the Secrecy Commission last year found that:\n\nthe sources and methods rationale has become a vehicle for agencies to automatically keep information secret without engaging in the type of harm analysis required by executive orders as a prerequisite to keeping other kinds of information secret. The statutory requirement that sources and methods be protected thus appears at times to have been applied not in a thoughtful way but almost by rote.\\textsuperscript{14}\n\nFederal court judges will never reject a \"thoughtful\" or even a merely plausible argument about the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the possibility of judicial review will serve to discourage indefensible \"rote\" classification.\n\nDire warnings of the consequences of judicial review of classification have not been borne out by the last 24 years of judicial review under the FOIA, and there is no reason to believe that courts would suddenly become reckless now when confronted with a balancing test.\n\nI would add that any suggestions of a \"flood\" of lawsuits resulting from this provision are certain to be exaggerated. For the typical FOIA requester, there are huge \"barriers to entry\" to the judicial system. Legal representation is absurdly expensive, and pro bono assistance is generally available only in cases of considerable national importance or when victory is all but assured. In the last twenty years I must have filed hundreds of FOIA requests, but have brought suit under the FOIA only once.\n\nThe absence of effective \"checks and balances\" on executive branch classification actions has helped to produce today's bloated and highly arbitrary classification system. A balancing test that is subject to judicial review is the most\n\n\\textsuperscript{13}\"National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial Enforcement,\" Boston College Law Review 25: 611-643 (1984).\n\n\\textsuperscript{14}Commission Report, Chapter III, page 70, emphasis added.\nappropriate solution.\\textsuperscript{15}\n\n2. A National Declassification Center\n\nThe proposed National Declassification Center is a response to the fragmented quality of declassification policy, and to the inadequacy of executive branch oversight, which the Secrecy Commission described as \"the critical missing link.\"\\textsuperscript{16}\n\nAs currently conceived, however, the Center risks becoming an extraneous bureaucracy that agencies are free to utilize or not, as they wish, and that has little or no independent authority. In order to fulfill its intended purpose, the Center should be assigned specific tasks and authorities. For example:\n\n- The Center could be assigned to perform independent review and approval of all agency declassification guides, so as to ensure their consistency and compliance with the provisions of the Act and the executive order.\n\n- The Center could be assigned to perform or to coordinate the declassification of all documents involving multiple agency \"equities,\" in order to optimize the efficiency of the declassification process.\n\nPerhaps most important, the Center could undertake in an expanded form many of the oversight responsibilities now assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).\n\nISOO, under Steven Garfinkel's leadership, has a profound understanding of the intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally demonstrated good judgment about what is appropriate and achievable and what is not. But ISOO's staffing and resource levels are laughably low when compared to its nominal responsibilities. This disparity between resources and responsibilities sends a message throughout the executive branch that \"we're not going to take secrecy oversight seriously.\"\n\n\\textsuperscript{15}The characteristic risks and benefits of information disclosure, and the mechanics of actually balancing them in practice are elucidated by Arvin S. Quist in Security Classification of Information, Vol. 2: Principles for Classification of Information, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, Report No. K/CG-1077/V2, April 1993, Chaps. 5, 6. Of particular interest, Quist discusses how legal standards for weighing evidence that are already part of the judicial process\u2014such as \"beyond a reasonable doubt,\" \"clear and convincing evidence,\" and \"preponderance of the evidence\"\u2014could be used in balancing and in any subsequent review (pp. 61-69).\n\n\\textsuperscript{16}Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 42.\nThe ISCAP, meanwhile, is doing a fine job, but on a tiny scale. And it is already operating at full capacity, although its tasks are expected to escalate sharply in coming years. As ISCAP Chair Roslyn Mazer has noted,\n\nWhen I consider what the next few years may hold for ISCAP, I fear that to a considerable extent we may become victims of our own successes\u2014 and the caseloads that these successes may engender. Unfortunately, ISOO [which also supports the ISCAP] is a very small organization that faces ever-increasing demands on its resources from the dramatic changes in the classification and declassification systems now underway.... the onus on the ISCAP\u2019s staffing structure may very well prove too much to bear.\\(^{17}\\)\n\nTherefore, one straightforward \u201cfix\u201d that Congress might consider, at least in the interim, would be to significantly increase the stature and resources available to these two organizations so as to help fill in the \u201cmissing link\u201d of executive branch oversight.\n\nBut whether Congress chooses to invigorate the existing oversight entities or to establish a new National Declassification Center, the goal should be one that has been clearly formulated by the Secrecy Commission:\n\nOversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization, independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also possess the means to compel agency compliance with established policies.... Equally critical is that such a body have adequate resources, whether through a budget line item or the reallocation of resources from the principal classifying agencies.\\(^{18}\\)\n\n3. What About the \u201cOther\u201d Classification System?\n\nIf the Government Secrecy Act became law, we would not just have a statutory secrecy system\u2014 we would have two statutory secrecy systems: one for national security information and one for atomic energy information, prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This may be too much of a good thing.\n\nThe existence of two parallel classification systems has proven to be a significant obstacle to efficiency in secrecy policy, as numerous records must undergo separate declassification reviews under each system.\n\n\\(^{17}\\)Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above.\n\n\\(^{18}\\)Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 44.\nEven the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the Atomic Energy Act. This is particularly absurd because, according to Ms. Mazer, information that is similar or identical to much of what we have seen designated as FRD [i.e. classified under the Atomic Energy Act] has been in the public domain for many years, often as a result of a prior Department of Energy declassification review. Moreover, there appears to be no system in place to get this information declassified, even though the Departments involved\u2014Energy, Defense, and State\u2014acknowledge that it is innocuous.19\n\nThe perpetuation of two distinct classification systems would represent a significant compromise of the Government Secrecy Act\u2019s goal of \u201ca more stable and cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and procedures.\u201d\n\nTherefore, I would suggest that the Committee consider the feasibility of consolidating both classification systems into one.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nAlthough the Cold War has officially been over for several years now, we still face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day. Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges.\n\nIt is only natural that any significant changes to the status quo will be resisted by the bureaucratic systems that are now in place. But the Committee should have confidence in the traditional American mechanism of \u201cchecks and balances.\u201d\n\nBy installing new checks and balances into a classification system that has long been allowed to function unilaterally, Congress can induce prudent changes that will advance the national interest in open and accountable government, while more efficiently protecting genuine national security information.\n\n19Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above, emphasis added.\nH.R. 1553, 1-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD\n\n[Page: E876]\n\nHON. DAN BURTON\n\nin the House of Representatives\n\nTHURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997\n\n- Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 1553, which amends the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992\u2014Public Law 102-526\u2014to provide 1 additional year for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. This legislation would extend the Review Board's September 30, 1997, termination date under current law to September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I am pleased that the Honorable Henry Waxman, the ranking minority member on the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the Honorable Louis Stokes, who sponsored the 1992 Act and who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations that was established in 1976, are original cosponsors of H.R. 1553.\n\n- The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release records relating to the Kennedy assassination at the earliest possible date. The Assassination Records Review Board was set up to review and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI, the Secret Service, the CIA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations have all held assassination records, and records have also been in the possession of certain State and local authorities as well as private citizens. When this legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of records compiled by official investigations of the assassination had not been made available to the public, some 30 years after the tragedy. Congress believed that simply making all relevant information available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the Kennedy assassination, and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992 law requires the Review Board to presume that documents relating to the assassination should be made public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. I believe that the release of this information is important to ensure accountability in the Government and to clearly demonstrate to Americans that the Government has nothing to hide.\n\n- As a result of the Review Board's efforts, over 10,000 documents have been transferred to the national archives and Records Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. At the end of 1996, that\ncollection totaled approximately 3.1 million pages and was used extensively by researchers from all over the United States. The Review Board was in the news last month when it voted to make public the Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination.\n\n- The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a 3-year timetable for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. Unfortunately, there were lengthy delays in the appointment of Board members, and as a consequence the Review Board was scheduled to cease operations before it even began its work. As a result, in 1994 Congress restarted the clock by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, until September 30, 1996. The Review Board subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1997. Because the review process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the Review Board's authorization.\n\n- I support the Assassination Records Review Board's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. I have always believed very strongly that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding for Federal entities that were clearly intended to be temporary in nature. The Review Board has informed me that it is confident that it will be able to finish its work and complete its final report if Congress will extend its life for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1998.\nTESTIMONY OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS\n\nPROFESSOR OF HISTORY\nMARQUETTE UNIVERSITY\nMILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN\n\non\n\nS.J. Res. 282\n\"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act\"\n\nBefore the\n\nSENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\n\nMAY 12, 1992\nSTATEMENT OF ATHAN G. THECHARIS\n\nI am a professor of history at Marquette University, specializing in U.S. intelligence and surveillance policy, and have published extensively on matters relating to the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a consultant in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (the so-called Church Committee), I researched classified and nonclassified records deposited at the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries and since 1978 have filed numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for FBI records.\n\nI welcome this opportunity to testify on S.J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and the question it raises: Should Congress create a special Review Board and authorize it to release or postpone the release of relevant Government records?\n\nThere are precedents for legislating procedures governing the release of \"Government records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,\" most notably the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, as amended in 1974, mandating the release of and stipulating the exemptions for withholding agency records. The congressional response to the so-called Nixon-Sampson agreement of 1974 offers a further precedent. Rejecting former President Richard Nixon's claimed right to retain exclusive control over the records pertaining to his presidency, including the right to destroy the so-called Oval Office tapes, Congress rescinded this agreement, created the Brownell Commission, and enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Presidential records were public records, and not a president's personal property, Congress affirmed when defining the criteria to govern the disposition and release of all presidential records.\n\nAs in the case of the Nixon presidential records, there exists widespread public suspicion about the Government's disposition of the Kennedy assassination records stemming from the beliefs that federal officials (1) have not made available all Government assassination records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House Assassination Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the records released under FOIA in order to cover up sinister conspiracies. S.J. Res. 282 effectively addresses these concerns first by creating an impartial body, the proposed Executive Director and Review Board, with the authority to review and if necessary subpoena all relevant records and then by establishing the criterion of full disclosure except in cases where \"clear and convincing justification exists for postponing\" the release of specified documents.\n\nThere is reason to believe that all relevant Government records pertaining to the Kennedy assassination have not been released and cannot be precisely identified by persons outside the executive branch. It might not be the case that all such records were filed under specific names and programs (Oswald, Ruby, Ferrie, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Warren Commission). The federal intelligence agencies, for example, had in the\nrecent past instituted separate records procedures to safeguard their most sensitive documents. CIA files, for one, are compartmentalized to limit access on the \"need to know\" principle. As one result, when responding in 1975 to the Church Committee inquiry into the Agency's drug testing program, CIA officials advised that the relevant program file had been destroyed in 1973. In 1978, however, CIA officials admitted to having discovered among the Agency's financial records extant documents which provided additional information about the scope of this program. During the Iran-contra hearings of 1987, moreover, CIA officials, at times, distinguished between official and informal records while NSC official Oliver North admitted to having employed a \"do not log\" procedure to ensure that his communications to his superior, John Poindexter, were not indexed in the NSC's central records system. Although the FBI maintains a central records system, FBI officials dating from 1940 had authorized a series of special records procedures to ensure that sensitive records were not serialized or filed in the Bureau's central records system or that sensitive information could be withheld if a FBI report was circulated outside the Bureau. These included: the Do Not File procedure for memos requesting and authorizing \"black bag jobs,\" blue/pink/informal memos for \"administrative\" matters in which case was \"to be destroyed after action is taken and not sent to files section;\" JUNE Mail for reported information received from \"sources illegal in nature\" or from \"most secretive\" sources such as \"Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such officials and their attitude;\" and administrative pages/cover letters for reporting \"facts and information\" which could \"cause embarrassment to the Bureau, if distributed.\" Do Not File and blue/pink/informal memos were to be maintained in \"office files\" of senior FBI officials (and were to be destroyed every six months), JUNE Mail was to be maintained \"under lock and key\" in FBI field offices or in the Special File Room at FBI headquarters, while administrative pages/cover letters were to be detached whenever the report to which they were appended was \"distributed to any agency outside the Bureau.\"\n\nS.J. Res. 282 addresses the inability of requestors to identify all relevant Kennedy assassination records and how and where they might have been filed. Executive agencies are mandated to make available to the Review Board \"all assassination materials\" even if \"uncertain if a record is assassination material\" and the Executive Director is authorized to \"inquire as to the existence of further records\" and then recommend that the Review Board \"subpoena such records in the event of denial.\" Properly placing the burden of ensuring the accessioning of all Kennedy assassination materials on agency officials who are most knowledgeable about their agency's records practices, S.J. Res. 282 further enables the Executive Director and staff to identify additional records learned through a close reading of cross references in the \"available\" documents.\n\nSection 6, moreover, addresses the companion obstacle to full disclosure, the discretion which the FOIA allows federal agency officials to withhold categories of information when releasing FOIA-requested documents. Particularly\nduring the 1980s agency officials have withheld information clearly relevant to an understanding of the relationship of the agencies to individuals identified directly or indirectly with the Kennedy assassination. Administrative and legislative changes encouraged such non-disclosure\u2014notably President Ronald Reagan's 1982 classification order, legislation of 1984 totally exempting CIA \"operational\" files from disclosure, and legislation of 1986 authorizing the FBI to withhold and deny the existence of FBI informant files. Section 6 dovetails FOIA's exemptive provisions but, at the same time, introduces a stricter non-disclosure standard to require release unless \"the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweighs any public interest in its disclosure.\"\n\nMy skepticism about agency practices in withholding documents, moreover, is based on my experiences as a frequent user of the FOIA. I recognize that this is not the proper forum for reviewing how federal agencies have processed FOIA requests but think the following examples shed light on whether the FOIA, and its provisions accepting agency discretion, can be expected to ensure full and reasonable disclosure.\n\nIn 1980, I filed an FOIA request for the Official and Confidential File of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and in 1983 received approximately 6,000 heavily redacted pages of this 17,700 page file. Exercising my right to appeal these withholdings, I eventually (in 1985) received approximately 2,000 additional documents. Granted the right of a second appeal, at this time I offered a detailed folder by folder challenge, arguing that much of the withheld information was already in the public domain and further that since the former FBI director had maintained in his office derogatory information on presidents, members of Congress, and other prominent personalities the question of what use had been made of this information required its release. These arguments proved somewhat convincing and in 1989 the FBI released approximately 15,000 pages including information formerly redacted in the earlier processed releases.\n\nThe enclosed Fortas document (see Appendix A) was one of the documents released to me in 1989, but withheld entirely both in 1983 and 1985. When withholding this document (and five others pertaining to the same matter), the FBI had originally claimed that its release would reveal FBI sources and methods and violate personal privacy rights. Yet, Fortas had not been acting as a FBI Criminal Informant or Security Informant when concerting with FBI Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach in 1966 and the withheld information records Fortas's willingness to service the political and bureaucratic interests of President Lyndon Johnson and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.\n\nThis example, because the FBI had evaluated the same document three times, offers insights into the criteria employed to deny the release of records. And while the agency ultimately decided to disclose, this\ndecision indirectly supports S.J. Res. 282's \"clear and convincing\" standard. For, my original 1980 request and receipt in 1983 of the heavily redacted Hoover file had become known to U.S. News and World Report which devoted its \"1984\" issue of December 1983 to summarizing the contents of the released Hoover file. The resulting publicity heightened public and media interest in the heavily redacted Hoover file. By 1989, if not 1985, FBI officials were no longer willing to risk FOIA litigation challenging their claimed interpretation of the FOIA's exemptive provisions.\n\nMy second example bears indirectly on how the FBI would process a FOIA request for still-unreleased wiretap records first disclosed by the House Assassination Committee. The House report had disclosed that FBI wiretap intercepts recorded critical comments of organized crime leaders, notably Carlos Marcello, regarding the Kennedys. Did the Mafia put a \"contract\" out on John Kennedy? Did FBI officials purposefully withhold this information from the Justice Department and the Secret Service in 1963 and then from the Warren Commission in 1964? The answers to these questions would require the release of the wiretap transcripts as well as other FBI memos recording how the FBI dealt with these transcripts. My experience involving how the FBI has processed my requests for other FBI wiretaps suggests that any FOIA-released Kennedy documents will be so redacted as to preclude answers to these questions. In describing one of my FBI wiretap requests, let me also outline for the Committee the considerably broader \"records universe\" sought by scholars and which distinguish our approach from those of journalists, congressional staff, and lawyers.\n\nThis case of FBI wiretapping involved Henry Grunewald, a Washington, D.C.-based investigator with close ties to New York insurance executive Henry Marsh, isolationist Republican congressman, former New Dealer Thomas Corcoran, and Washington bureaucrats. FBI officials were keenly interested in Grunewald's activities, confirmed by the inclusion in Hoover's office file of two folders containing the transcripts of two FBI wiretaps of Grunewald in 1941 and 1945. As in the case of the Fortas document, these two folders had originally been withheld in entirety on sources and methods and personal privacy grounds. The released 1941 wiretap transcript particularly interested me as I had learned from documents contained in former FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's still extant office file that Grunewald, as other conservative critics of the Roosevelt Administration, became the subject of FBI \"espionage\" investigative interest during the early 1940s. The Ladd file, however, did not resolve whether this 1941 wiretap had been known or authorized by the Attorney General or the White House. Accordingly, I filed a further FOIA request for the FBI's headquarters files on Grunewald. The released, redacted records confirmed the Roosevelt Administration's interest in Grunewald's activities in 1940 but (see Appendix B) either because of redactions or the Justice and Treasury Departments' failure to have processed as yet documents which they originated the\nwiretap authorization question cannot be resolved.\n\nThe heavily redacted Grunewald files further disclosed that Grunewald became the subject in 1953 of a third FBI wiretap. In 1952, a House Committee held public hearings on the subject of influence peddling that centered on Grunewald's activities, among others. This inquiry proved embarrassing to the Truman Administration and was exploited by the Republicans during the 1952 presidential and congressional campaigns. In 1953, the new Republican-controlled House revisited this issue. Particularly interested in Grunewald, the so-called Keen Committee sought assistance from the Justice Department. The heavily redacted records (see Appendix C), however, preclude answers to the questions as to why concurrent with this congressional inquiry Attorney General Herbert Brownell had requested and authorized this wiretap and whether the Justice Department's assistance to the Committee included information learned from this wiretap. (I have only appended a summary of one FBI report to the Attorney General, based on this wiretap. The released transcripts of this 1953 wiretap, in contrast to those released to me involving the 1941 and 1945 tapes, were heavily redacted\u2014the FBI withheld on personal privacy grounds the names and intercepted conversations of Grunewald's telephone partners, rendering the released transcripts virtually incomprehensible and of minimal research value.)\n\nI have gone into detail on the Fortas and Grunewald matters as I think they offer insights into the processing of FOIA requests, an issue central to these hearings. It has been my experience that the \"culture\" of the intelligence agencies encourages agency officials to interpret the FOIA exemptive provisions broadly but also that more senior agency officials will release even embarrassing information in those instances when their decisions are potentially subject to critical scrutiny. The Review Board procedure promotes this needed accountability. At the same time, the Board's independence can undercut public suspicions that claimed national security or privacy justifications are a mask to preclude full disclosure. Surely now, thirty years after President Kennedy's assassination and with the end of the Cold War, we should be able to assure the public that relevant Kennedy assassination records are neither secreted nor withheld for bureaucratic reasons.\n\nWhile I doubt that the release of the Kennedy assassination records will conclusively resolve the question \"Who killed Kennedy,\" I am convinced that the procedures outlined in S.J. Res. 282 will undercut suspicions that records documenting a government conspiracy are being purposefully withheld. Release of the Kennedy assassination records, moreover, will service other significant research interests of the scholarly community. Let me conclude by briefly list some of these non-assassination-related questions: (1) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the CIA before and after the assassination; (2) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the Secret\nService and the background to the FBI's revised delimitation agreement of 1964 with the Secret Service; (3) the politics of presidential commissions (the purpose for creation, the level of agency cooperation, and the responses of federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and the public to the Warren Commission's findings); (4) the paradox of the FBI's apparent disinterest in Oswald (Soviet defector and Fair Play for Cuba Committee activist) in contrast to the intensity of FBI interest in more respectable national leaders (Eleanor Roosevelt, Adlai Stevenson, Joseph Alsop, Ernest Hemingway, even John Kennedy); and (5) the FBI's and the CIA's relationships with and uses of informants and sources recruited to provide foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal, and \"subversive activities\" information.\nTESTIMONY OF SENATOR DAVID L. BOREN\n\nBEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\n\nON THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992\n\nMay 12, 1992\n\nThank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss with you Senate Joint Resolution 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992.\n\nThe purpose of this legislation is to provide for a comprehensive process ultimately leading to the release of all materials held by the United States Government regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Congressman Louis Stokes, the distinguished former Chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, has introduced identical legislation in the House of Representatives. I am particularly pleased, Mr. Chairman, to have you as an original cosponsor of this legislation.\n\nWe have had at least four substantial federal government investigations into the Kennedy assassination: the first conducted by the Warren Commission appointed by President Johnson in 1963; the second, by the President's Commission on CIA\nActivities -- the Rockefeller commission -- in 1975; the third by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence -- the Church Committee -- in 1975 and 1976 as part of its investigation of CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders; and finally, the extensive investigation of the House Assassinations Committee in 1978 and 1979.\n\nEach of these investigations, particularly the Warren Commission and House Assassinations Committee investigation, produced long, detailed public reports concerning the Kennedy assassination. In addition, literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on the subject.\n\nYet still, almost 30 years later, the questions remain.\n\nThe recent release of the controversial film \"JFK\" has raised them anew, suggesting that answers may well lie in the assassination records and other materials that remain sealed by our Government. Even prior to the release of \"JFK,\" in fact, there were diligent efforts made by researchers as well as concerned legislators to open these files for public review.\n\nMr. Chairman, I do not know what all of these files contain. Specifically, I do not know whether they contain information that would call into question or undermine the findings of the previous investigations or not.\nBut it seems to me the time has come to open these files to the public and let them speak for themselves. Let historians and journalists and the people read them, and draw the appropriate conclusions.\n\nAs a general principle, the Intelligence Community should make available its records after the passage of a reasonable amount of time when current sources and methods would no longer be compromised. The American people have a right to assure themselves to the greatest degree possible of the accuracy of the historical record of our government. The timely release of all documents of historic value and importance helps to assure that even the most secret programs of our government will be operated in accordance with basic American values. Current intelligence operations will be even more carefully conducted when it is recognized that they will be scrutinized by the public during the lifetime of many of those who administered the programs.\n\nThis is not to say that all of the files should simply be pulled from the vaults, turned upside down and dumped onto Pennsylvania Avenue for general consumption. Careful review is required to ensure responsible public policy and fundamental fairness. Even after almost thirty years, there remain governmental interests, as well as individual privacy interests, that we must consider. But these concerns must not stand in the way of disclosure unless they are shown in a given case to be especially compelling.\nWhat this Resolution proposes is a comprehensive, government-wide review of the Kennedy assassination records conducted under the auspices of an impartial, independent board.\n\nIt may be useful to state precisely what these records are. First, they encompass all of the records of the FBI, the CIA, Secret Service, military intelligence, and other Executive branch agencies which may pertain to the Kennedy assassination. They also include the records of the Warren commission, the Rockefeller commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Many of these records are now stored under seal at the National Archives, while many others remain in agency files. The Rockefeller Commission files were claimed by President Ford as part of his personal papers and then deeded by him to the Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There may be other relevant records at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries. These presidential library records are administered by the National Archives, and thus we envision that they would be subject to this Joint Resolution.\n\nI can report to you briefly on the status of one group of these records -- the Church committee files, which are now in the custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of the Church committee files are housed in some 500 boxes in a single small room at the National Archives. There is a rudimentary index, but it is not always sufficiently descriptive,\nand a file-by-file review is probably necessary. My staff has examined some of these files, and we believe the process of separating out J.F.K. assassination materials -- once that term is more precisely defined (as I will discuss in a moment) -- will not prove especially cumbersome or time-consuming. The Kennedy assassination investigation was only a small component of the Church committee's work and the investigation conducted concerned only the role of the intelligence community in investigating the assassination; it did not seek to determine who killed President Kennedy. In addition, many of the Church records are in fact copies of records originated by other agencies. However, the Church staff did interview numerous witnesses, both inside and outside of government, and the transcripts and notes of those interviews, among other materials originated by the Church committee, are an important part of the J.F.K. files.\n\nAlthough many government records on the J.F.K. assassination have previously been released by the Archives and as a result of Freedom of Information Act litigation, a great deal remains shielded from public view. Approximately twenty boxes of the internal files generated by the Warren Commission are still sealed. Experts estimate that a much greater volume of FBI and CIA files remain sealed. Many pages of documents that have been released have been so extensively redacted that their informational value is minimal. The extensive files of the House Assassinations Committee, some 848 boxes of materials on both the Kennedy and King assassinations, currently are sealed until the\nyear 2029.\n\nTo date, these records have been withheld from the public due to a variety of concerns: the fear of damaging foreign relations and military defense, the concern for disclosing the identities of confidential sources or informants, and the desire to protect the privacy of individuals. While these concerns may yet retain some validity in a very few isolated cases, it seems to me that with the passage of time, there should remain very few objections to full disclosure. I believe it is time to review these records, not in terms of the old assumptions, but rather in light of the need for openness and to encourage confidence in the Government. We need to assure ourselves of the facts, that there is not information lurking somewhere in the Government that would shed new light on what remains perhaps the most heinous and enigmatic crime of this century.\n\nThe Joint Resolution would make it much harder to justify the continued shielding of a document from public view. It would also create a process by which many records could be promptly released. Any arguments made for withholding any document or portions of it must be weighed against the strong public interest in disclosure. The resolution establishes this kind of balancing test -- with a strong presumption in favor of disclosure.\n\nIn addition, to address the problem of heavily redacted and therefore meaningless documents, the Joint Resolution borrows a\npage from the Classified Information Procedures Act, the law that covers the handling of secret information in criminal trials. Under that law, federal judges have discretion to permit introduction in evidence of summaries or substitutes in place of classified information. The Joint Resolution provides for creation of such summaries or substitutes where appropriate, so that the public can learn essential facts about the Kennedy assassination from a document even where references to private matters or crucial national security secrets would render the document itself mostly unreleasable at present.\n\nIn all cases, the Joint Resolution requires that the presumption be in favor of release. All records will be released unless there is clear and convincing evidence that postponing release is essential to a vital interest.\n\nNow let me briefly discuss the process established by the Joint Resolution for applying these disclosure standards.\n\nThe Joint Resolution creates a five-member panel called the Assassination Material Review Board. The members of this Review Board would be distinguished private citizens outside of government who have had no prior involvement with previous inquiries into the Kennedy assassination. This Review Board, aided by an executive director and staff, would play the central role in the release of the assassination materials. The Board would be required to complete its work within two years of its\nfirst meeting, although it is certainly expected that it could be completed much more quickly. The point is to proceed expeditiously, while still doing a careful job.\n\nWe faced a difficult choice in deciding who should appoint the Review Board, and I am aware your Committee is looking at other alternatives. I am certainly amenable to this, but let me give you some idea of why we came out as we did. Given the allegations of government cover-up and the potential for perceived conflict of interest, allowing the President or Congress to appoint the Board did not seem appropriate. We settled instead on the special three-judge federal court division that appoints independent counsels for criminal investigations.\n\nThe Justice Department, in an April 27, 1992, letter to Chairman Glenn, worries that \"it is not clear\" that our approach to appointing the Review Board is constitutional. In addition, some may feel that a judicial panel is ill-suited to make appointments for this task. The judges themselves, who have very small staffs and other concerns, might well prefer to avoid this assignment. In short, we recognized that this approach would raise possible constitutional objections, as well as practical ones, but, on balance, we felt the appointment authority should rest with an impartial source without no interest or stake in the outcome. I believe a strong argument can be made that the appointment process is constitutional under the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654\n(1988), which upheld the power of the same court division to appoint independent counsels to investigate executive branch misconduct.\n\nIf the Committee nevertheless concludes that this approach is undesirable, I would offer two alternatives for consideration, conceding that both are also susceptible to possible constitutional objection. The first would be for the President and the leadership of the House and Senate each to appoint a given number of Board members. Each body has interests in, and responsibility for, certain of the records at issue. I would not make these appointments subject to Senate confirmation, since they are not policy positions, and confirmation would only delay the task at hand. A second alternative would be the approach suggested by the ACLU: adopt some variant of the formula used last year by Congress in establishing the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation in the State Department, namely to have the President appoint based on specific criteria, i.e. background in particular disciplines, with most of the members coming from lists submitted by designated professional associations.\n\nOnce the Review Board, however it is appointed, is constituted, it would appoint an executive director, and the first step in the process would be to make available to the Executive Director all Government assassination materials. Where the Executive Director suspects that the agencies have failed to\nsubmit some of the relevant records, he or she has authority to question the agencies and to use the subpoena power of the Review Board to obtain any additional records.\n\nThe Executive Director, assisted by employees of the Review Board and, if deemed necessary, detailed from elsewhere in the Government, would undertake the initial screening of these records. If the Executive Director concluded that a particular record was appropriate for release, the record would automatically be released, unless the record implicated personal privacy or the Executive agency or congressional committee with responsibility for that record filed an appeal with the Review Board. In this manner, many records could be promptly released without formal Review Board deliberations.\n\nIf the Executive Director determined that a particular record was not appropriate for release under present circumstances or that the record implicated personal privacy concerns, he or she would automatically be required to refer that decision to the Review Board.\n\nThe Executive Director would also be permitted to refer particularly difficult decisions, or decisions requiring further investigation, to the Review Board.\n\nIn deciding on appeals and referrals from the Executive Director, the Review Board would have authority to conduct\nhearings and subpoena records and witnesses.\n\nThe Review Board would have final say as to the release or non-release of all materials, except that in the case of Executive branch materials, the President would have the authority to supersede the Board's determination and postpone release. But each time the President did so, he would be required to explain his reasons, both in a notice to the public and to the Congress. Decisions by the Review Board itself to postpone release of records would also have to be explained to the public and Congress.\n\nFinally, under the Joint Resolution, no item would remain permanently sealed. The Review Board, before finishing its work, would designate as to every item still withheld a specified time or a specified occurrence following which the item could be released. The files would then be transferred to the Archives, where the Archivist would have a continuing duty to reconsider them for release under the standards set by the Joint Resolution.\n\nMaterials released by the Archivist or the Review Board would be available in the Archives for public review and copying.\n\nOur Joint Resolution makes clear that an Executive branch agency or congressional committee retains its existing powers under the law to release a particular record even if the Joint Resolution does not require it to do so, and that the members of\nthe public can continue to use the Freedom of Information Act to request from the agencies documents related to the assassination.\n\nMr. Chairman, this Resolution may appear complicated, but the matter of disclosure is itself complicated. It cannot be accomplished arbitrarily or summarily. The process established by the Resolution, in my view, is logical and takes account of all the interests and equities in the disclosure of these documents. In the end, I think it will result in all of the pertinent information pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy being made public in a prompt and orderly way, and, in doing so, will help restore confidence among the public in our Government.\n\nSince the Joint Resolution was introduced, comments have been received from the Justice Department as well as others suggesting the need for change.\n\nWith regard to the reaction of the Justice Department, I must say I found it very unfortunate that the Department chose to take what I found to be an extreme, hard-line position in opposing many of the key provisions of the Resolution. Rather than showing the flexibility needed in this unique circumstance to deal cooperatively with the Congress on a matter that is a serious concern for many Americans, the Justice Department chose to reassert familiar claims of Executive privilege and all of the other reasons asserted over the years to block the release of government information.\nThe whole point of this legislation was to create new criteria and new procedures to maximize the release of information hitherto withheld by the Government. The old laws and old procedures have been tried for the last 30 years, and have not produced the type of disclosure needed to restore the confidence of the American people.\n\nIt seems to me that just this once, where the public policy interest in full disclosure of these records is so apparent, the Justice Department could dispense with its usual \"to-the-last-man\" defense of Executive branch prerogatives, and help us deal with solving the problem.\n\nI feel obliged to take special note of one point in the Justice Department letter, and that is their claim that the Executive branch must have not only increased safeguards over its own material -- but also have the ability to veto release of any congressionally-created assassination record. This strikes me as preposterous, particularly coming from a department that is ostensibly so concerned to preserve a separation of powers. If Congress wants to release information it has developed, the President should not be able to stand in the way.\n\nHopefully, the Committee will yet be able to obtain executive branch cooperation and move forward with this process. The public expects action on this matter, as the many letters, postcards, and\ntelephone calls to congressional offices demonstrate.\n\nHaving said this, there are, in fact, several points raised by the Justice Department's letter, and by private citizens in touch with me, which I believe merit further consideration by the Committee.\n\n1. Perhaps the most important matter involves setting the boundaries of \"assassination material.\" The Joint Resolution defines \"assassination material\" as \"a record that relates in any manner or degree to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy....\" But given the wide range of theories that have developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why, many types of records arguably relate in some manner to the assassination. What records regarding, for example, Cuba, Vietnam, and organized crime should be covered? This matter requires careful consideration.\n\nThe Justice Department urges a substantial narrowing of the definition of \"assassination material,\" apparently to only those records that on their face directly concern the assassination. I am concerned that this formulation may be too narrow. There is widespread public suspicion that some sort of conspiracy led to the murder of President Kennedy. If we go out of our way to avoid records that might shed light on activities linked to such an alleged conspiracy, we make little progress toward assuring the public that it has the full story. If we err on the side of\ninclusiveness, and as a result learn a bit more about the operations of our government and our foreign policy in the early 1960's, I think we will benefit. My only concern would be that the search becomes so broad that it delays action of the release of documents clearly germane to the assassination. But where records have already been segregated, such as the executive branch materials obtained by the House Assassinations Committee, full review is probably appropriate.\n\nI do, however, suggest that the Committee, either in the Joint Resolution itself or in report language, set more precise parameters defining \"assassination material,\" or else direct the Review Board to do so promptly after it is established. Otherwise, we may end with widely varying interpretations by the various records agencies and committees as to what documents should be forwarded to the Review Board executive director.\n\n2. As the Justice Department's letter to Chairman Glenn noted, the Joint Resolution, as drafted, would give an agency or committee control over release of a record it originated even if that record contained information obtained from another agency or committee. I agree that this provision should be changed to give agencies authority over release of their own information. However, the change suggested in the Justice Department letter may not by itself do the trick, because a record, for example a lengthy congressional report, may contain both information\ndeveloped by the body that created the record and information originated by an executive agency. Instead of letting either of these two \"originating bodies\" have veto power over the release of an entire document, we should work out language that give an agency or committee control over release of that portion of a document for which it was responsible even if other information in the document was originated elsewhere.\n\n3. On reflection, I think it would be best to amend the Joint Resolution to make the records of the Review Board itself subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and to make the Board's proceedings subject to the Sunshine Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. A law mandating increased government openness should not itself establish an exception from general standards for accountability. I still strongly believe, however, that we should avoid subjecting the Board to extensive court litigation over the release of the J.F.K. files themselves either under the standards set by the Joint Resolution or under the Freedom of Information Act.\n\n4. Section 11(a) should probably be amended to make clear that the Joint Resolution's provisions take precedence not only over other laws, but also over executive orders and regulations.\n\n5. A sentence might be added to Section 8(f) to ensure that the public is clearly informed when summaries or substitutes are released instead of actual records or information: \"Any such\nsummary or substitution shall be clearly labeled as such when released to the public.\"\n\n6. The Joint Resolution should probably be amended to recognize the records of the Rockefeller commission as a component of this effort. The Archives would be the appropriate custodian of Rockefeller commission materials for purposes of the Joint Resolution.\n\nI thank the Committee for this opportunity to express my views on this measure.\nStatement for the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,\n\nMay 12, 1992\n\nErnest R. May\n\nIt is an honor to be invited to testify on this bill. I am a professor of history at Harvard University, where I teach both in the history department and in the John F. Kennedy School of Government. While I have done research on the history of intelligence agencies and have served in Washington from time to time as a consultant, I do not speak as an expert on the matter before the committee. My comments are merely those of a historian looking at legislation designed to unearth historical source material.\n\nThe bill now under consideration seeks to clear doubts about President Kennedy's murder. The Warren Commission had the same aim. Its make-up was supposed to reassure the public. It failed. The Commission reported in 1964. Almost within months, books challenging its findings hit best-seller lists.\n\nOver time, other theories multiplied. Now, it takes whole books just to list books about the murder. Some of these books picture the CIA or FBI as plotters. This is not new. A number appeared in the 1970s. Recently, this particular set of theories has found new life. Two books of this genre reached best-seller lists in the spring of 1992, and Oliver Stone's film, \"JFK,\" became a box office hit.\nThe bill now under consideration would open records so that the public can be reassured that these theories are fantasies. The stated aim is to \"contribute to the trust of the people in their government.\"\n\nTo achieve this, the bill proposes to create a five-person Review Board. As reassurance against a cover-up in behalf of the President or Congress, the District of Columbia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals would appoint the Board. (The Supreme Court presumably is thought too partisan; besides, it might bring to mind Chief Justice Warren.)\n\nThe bill says that members of the Board are to be \"distinguished and impartial.\" Otherwise, it demands only that they not be currently in government employ and that they never have been involved in any investigation of the Kennedy murder.\n\nThe Board and its Executive Director would have wide powers. They would look at all materials relating to the murder. If they suspect any agency of withholding material, they would have a right to conduct a hunt. The bill gives the Board power to subpoena records and persons, to take testimony under oath, to grant immunity to witnesses, and to punish defiance.\nThe Board's decisions are to be final unless the President himself intervenes to insist that some piece of information not be released. The bill giving the Board its powers is to \"take precedence over any other law, judicial decision ..., or common law doctrine\" that might be in conflict.\n\nMy comments on this bill are mostly cautionary. I question whether any legislation can achieve all that this bill seeks to achieve. I question giving to a court-appointed Review Board such broad responsibilities and powers. I believe that a Review Board differently selected, with a more limited mandate, could do a better job.\n\nThe first cautionary point concerns the aim of clearing doubts about the Kennedy murder. Even if every bit of relevant documentation becomes public, it will not yield a story that all Americans will accept. Why should it? Though we now know just about everything about the Pearl Harbor attack, new conspiracy theories continue to be woven. One of the latest has Winston Churchill as the villain!\n\nDespite more than a century of research, new theories still appear about conspirators helping John Wilkes Booth kill Lincoln. The chances are that the same will always be true for Oswald and Kennedy. After another decade or so,\nhowever, Kennedy's murder will probably become, like Lincoln's, more an interest of buffs than of the public at large.\n\nThe chances of clearing away all doubts are lessened by the fact that every bit of relevant documentation will not be released. This bill itself speaks of protecting secret agents and intelligence sources and methods. It speaks also of privacy rights. CIA and FBI reports and National Security Agency intercepts contain much material that, by these criteria, would have to remain secret.\n\nIn fact, still more material may be kept from the public. This bill refers only to protecting the privacy of living persons. If the Review Board yields to human feelings, it may extend protection to families and friends. Suppose, for example, that it sees raw FBI files recording old accusations against some Cuban-American. Even if the person is dead, anyone ever connected with that person could suffer should the accusations become public. If the Review Board suspects that the accusations were malicious and false, will it not choose to leave the files secret?\n\nAlso, it has to be assumed that some files will turn out to have been lost or destroyed. The proposed Review Board would thus have to confess not only that it chose to\nleave some material under wraps but that other material was simply missing. Would spinners of conspiracy theories take the Board's word? Would they not instead accuse it of colluding in concealment of \"smoking guns\"?\n\nThe Review Board would meanwhile be under pressure not to let privacy rights or other considerations inhibit release of documents. Investigative reporters, writers, and docudrama producers would hammer at it. So would scholars, including many interested in subjects other than the Kennedy murder. So would others with axes to grind.\n\nSome material sought might have only a remote relationship to the murder. The clamor would be no less ferocious. How much of the central files of the FBI and CIA would have to be opened, for example, to persuade disciples of Mark North or Mark Lane or Oliver Stone that neither FBI nor CIA officers participated in a murder plot?\n\nThe Review Board would surely be urged to pursue data on the possible involvement of right-wing extremists. Obvious items would include not only FBI files but also tax returns. Imagine the scope of possible documentation if, in fairness, the Review Board also sought data on financial transactions by individuals associated with Vice President Lyndon Johnson!\nI forecast, in other words, that new evidence will not dispel conspiracy theories. At most, it will curb some of the more adventurous theorizing.\n\nI also forecast that, if release of the evidence is managed as this bill proposes, one of two results will follow.\n\nIf the Review Board yields to outside pressures, it will conduct a fishing expedition. Much embarrassing and possibly harmful information will be made public. Alternatively, the Review Board will resist pressure. It will define its mandate narrowly. It will be prudent in what it reveals. It will then be accused of a \"whitewash.\" The latter result could make matters worse rather than better. Suspicion could be fed, not allayed.\n\nThere may, however, be better means of doing what needs doing. The current bill would have the Review Board and its Executive Director examine all materials to be released. They would be charged with ferreting out undisclosed material, and they would have effective responsibility for deciding what would and would not be released.\n\nAn alternative would be a bill simply enjoining holders of records to identify and locate materials that, in the language of the current bill, \"relates in any manner or de-\ngree\" to the murder of President Kennedy. The injunction would apply to all congressional committees and all executive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the National Archives. The bill could direct these record-holders to make the materials public. It could specify that the only materials to be held back would be those itemized in the current bill \u2014 agents, intelligence sources and methods, etc.\n\nWhere legislative writ does not run or is disputable, a statute could urge voluntary action. The current bill asks such cooperation from state and local agencies and foreign governments. A statute that sought to avoid constitutional disputes could ask the same of the President regarding records of the White House and Executive Office.\n\nThis alternative bill could require or request public reports describing materials withheld from release \u2014 their characteristics and quantities, the general reasons for non-disclosure, and plans for eventual release.\n\nA Review Board could be created with a limited \u2014 and more workable \u2014 mandate.\n\nIts first duty could be to review record-holders' guidelines. These might well differ from agency to agency. Procedures for searching National Security Agency files of\ncommunications intercepts might not be the same as those for searching the much less voluminous files of CIA stations and headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to ensure comparative uniformity in the diligence of searches.\n\nThe Board could try also to ensure comparative uniformity in definitions of what is to be withheld. It might urge, for example, that the intelligence sources and methods criterion apply only to sources and methods in current use, not just to any ever used.\n\nThe Board's second duty could be to scan materials that record-holders proposed actually to withhold. The Board might question record-holders' decisions. If so, it could ask that the agency or committee think again. If differences continued, the Board could appeal to the President or, for Congressional documents, to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House.\n\nIn a final public report, the Board could describe any still unresolved differences. While the description would be in generalities, the issues would become publicly known. The broad purpose of the Board's report would be to validate the record-holders' non-disclosure decisions.\n\nSuch a Review Board could be selected by comparatively traditional methods. Nominations could be asked of the\nAmerican Bar Association, the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, or kindred bodies. Appointments could be made by the President, with advice and consent of the Senate.\n\nUnless the quantity of material withheld proved to be much larger than I would expect, the Review Board could be kept small. It could probably manage with minimal staff.\n\nI believe that this alternative statute would accomplish all that can be accomplished. It would leave the onus for release or non-release of records on those already familiar with these records. Committees of Congress would make rules for their files. The President, the heads of departments; the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI, and the Archivist of the United States would make rules for theirs.\n\nThis alternative statute would limit the powers and responsibilities to be thrust on an untried and potentially vulnerable Review Board. It would create a Board with the assignment only of checking the coherence and consistency of criteria for disclosure and non-disclosure.\n\nSince the invitation to testify included questions reaching beyond the current bill, I take the opportunity to respond to that concerning general declassification\npolicies. I believe the procedure just outlined could be applied much more widely. A statute could declare that all government records more than thirty years old would become public unless the originating agency showed specific cause for continued non-disclosure. A Board or Commission appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate could have authority to review all such materials and to question or appeal the non-disclosure. This approximates practice in the United Kingdom.\n\nIn conclusion, I repeat a warning against expecting any legislation to create consensus and thereby \"contribute to the trust of the people in their government.\" Inventors of conspiracy theories will always be more ingenious than assemblers of evidence. The immediate result of releasing records will be, moreover, to provide grist for the theorists' mills. Even if everything were released tomorrow, it would take at least a decade for researchers to sort the newly released materials. In the meantime, conspiracy builders would be picking out those bits and pieces of evidence that suited them. In the long run, release of documents will get us closer to truth; but, as Keynes observed, that long run probably stretches beyond any of our lifetimes.\nTESTIMONY OF JAMES H. LESAR\nPRESIDENT\nASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH CENTER\n\nON\nS.J. RES. 282\n\"THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992\"\n\nBEFORE\nTHE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\nOF THE UNITED STATES SENATE\n\nMay 12, 1992\nMr. Chairman and members of the Committee:\n\nI am honored to have this opportunity to testify before you on the legislation to require the government to release its records pertaining to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I appear on behalf of the Assassination Archives and Research Center (\"the AARC\"), of which I am President. The AARC is a private, non-profit organization which collects, preserves and disseminates information and materials on political assassinations. The AARC is funded by membership dues and donations from the public. I am an attorney specializing in Freedom of Information Act litigation, and have litigated well over 100 such lawsuits. Over the past twenty years I have represented nearly all of the major authors and researchers who have litigated their Freedom of Information Act requests for records pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy. To date, I have handled over fifty such lawsuits.\n\nI have carefully studied the proposed legislation. I have also read the letter which you received from the Department of Justice. I have heard that the Administration may seek to achieve its goals, particularly that of using more restrictive standards for release of Executive Branch records, by issuing an executive order rather than awaiting action by Congress. In my mind the only thing worse than seeing the Justice Department's wishes granted in legislation would be to see them set forth in a stand-alone executive order which goes unchallenged by Congress. Legislation is needed to bring each branch of government which holds records\non to the same playing field, and to create a process which is accountable, independent and credible. Incorporating the Justice Department's restrictive standards in an executive order would duplicate the devastating damage to the ideal of full disclosure which occurred when the Reagan Administration successfully sabotaged the 1974 amendments to Exemption 1 by drastically altering the standards for classifying information in the interests of national security.\n\nThe difficulty which researchers have had gaining access to Kennedy assassination materials amply demonstrates the need to alter the standards employed by the FOIA and the current executive order on national security classification. If you support release of the Kennedy assassination records, you cannot favor the Justice Department's recipe of simply mixing one part political will to three parts of existing standards and stir. You must substantially liberalize the existing standards and make it stick.\n\nA few illustrations from my practice will show the inadequacies of the FOIA and the enormous frustration which accrues to those who attempt to use it to obtain information about the Kennedy assassination. These examples reveal a pattern of delay, costly litigation, and untrue representations by the government. Cases brought in the 1980's also show that massive withholding of information, with little significant information being released.\n\nCase 1: In 1969 Harold Weisberg, a leading Warren Commission critic, made a simple request to the FBI. He wanted to see the results of the spectrographic tests which had been conducted on\nbullet(s), bullet fragments and items of evidence allegedly struck by bullets during the assassination of President Kennedy. Denied access by the FBI and the Attorney General, in 1970 he brought suit. A four-year legal battle ensued. First, the district court, relying on the Justice Department's representation that it was not in the national interest to release the results of these scientific tests, denied his request. A court of Appeals panel reversed, but the dissenting judge wrote a scathing opinion in which he referred to FOIA requesters as \"rummaging writers\" and characterized Weisberg as \"some party off the street.\" Stating that the FOIA \"forfend(ed) against\" Weisberg's proposed further inquiry into the Kennedy assassination, he concluded his dissent with a Latin phrase in capital letters, \"REQUIESCAT IN PACE.\" \"Rest in Peace.\" But the case did not rest in peace. The Justice Department sought a rehearing before the full court, which was granted. On rehearing en banc, the full court ruled that the files of the FBI were exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements. That case set a precedent so bad that when Congress first amended the FOIA in 1974, it specifically overturned the Weisberg case, requiring that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies demonstrate that allegedly exempt records fall within one or more of six enumerated harms.\n\nIn 1975, when the new amendments took effect, Weisberg again brought suit on his request for the spectrographic analyses, this time adding a request for neutron activation testing on the same evidentiary items. This new phase of the battle lasted eight years and involved three trips to the Court of Appeals. Ultimately,\nWeisberg obtained important records on these scientific tests, including records that the FBI had first said did not exist, then claimed were missing or destroyed. Other records were never located or were meaningless. From the date of the first request, the legal battles lasted fourteen years.\n\nCase 2: In 1980 another requester asked the CIA to release all of the records it had made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The CIA refused and the requester brought suit. In court the CIA stated that there were approximately 300,000 pages of records responsive to the request. I spent the first three years of this lawsuit litigating four threshold issues raised by the Government. Had my client lost any one of these four threshold issues, the CIA would not have had to release a single page from its 300,000 page collection.\n\nBy 1984 the CIA had begun to release a trickle of documents. Although the CIA told the court that it had assigned seven people to work on the request, it processed the documents at an incredibly slow pace. When it became evident that it would take the CIA several decades to process all of the documents, the requester had no choice but to drastically limit the scope of his request. Thus, he entered into a stipulation which restricted his request to some of the subjects discussed in the report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations and its supporting volumes. Although the CIA's job of reviewing documents was reduced by more than one-half, it took several more years for it to complete processing of the remaining documents. Moreover, the CIA continued to withhold\nvirtually everything. Only a few thousand pages were released, and most of them consisted of newspaper clippings, records that previously had been released, or documents that were heavily redacted.\n\nCase 3: In 1976, Dr. Paul Hoch requested two batches of CIA documents which had remained to be processed after the CIA had made its initial releases of Kennedy assassination documents. Many of the records responsive to this request related to the 1966-1969 investigation and trial of Clay Shaw by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, who charged that Shaw, David Ferrie and others had plotted to kill the President. The CIA repeatedly told Hoch that his request was being processed and that if he would only be patient the documents would be released in \"a few months,\" \"in six to eight weeks,\" \"in the near future.\" Indeed, Hoch received such assurances on no less than 11 different occasions over a six-year period. After having been strung-out for six years, Hoch retained counsel and filed suit. After the suit was filed, evidence was developed which indicated that all the CIA had done over the previous six years was to number the documents. It had numbered several documents one month, a few more another month, a couple more the next month. Then, in one month, it engaged in a veritable orgy of numeration, numbering, as I recall, nearly a hundred documents that month.\n\nA few months after Hoch filed his complaint in district court, the CIA produced 808 pages. It also continued to withhold a considerable volume of materials; mostly on grounds of national\nsecurity or because disclosure allegedly would identify intelligence sources and methods. The district court upheld all of the CIA's exemption claims save one. This one was an 11-page memorandum which the CIA swore must be withheld in its entirety under Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege. The judge ordered this anonymous, undated memorandum disclosed. Then things got really interesting. The CIA moved the judge to reconsider his order on this memorandum, asserting that it had claimed, albeit obscurely, that this document was also withheld in its entirety under Exemptions 1 and 3 in order to protect national security and intelligence sources and methods. But before the court could act on the motion for reconsideration, the CIA rushed to court with a new revelation: the eleven-page memo, which dealt with the CIA/Mafia plots to kill Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, matters exposed by the Church Committee in 1975, had been released nearly in full almost a decade earlier, by the CIA itself.\n\nCase 4: In 1969, Harold Weisberg made a request for FBI records on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. J. Edgar Hoover himself ordered that no response be made to this request. In 1975, when the amended FOIA became effective, Weisberg submitted a new request for King assassination records. He specifically included a request for crime scene photographs. After he filed suit, the FBI claimed that it did not have any crime scene photographs. This statement was false. Ultimately, the FBI released more than 150 crime scene photographs to Weisberg.\n\nDuring the same case, Weisberg picked up indications that an\nFBI supervisor named Long had kept a tickler on the King assassination. A tickler is a file containing extra copies of documents kept at hand so it can be immediately retrieved. The FBI first denied that such a tickler file had been kept. Then it claimed that it could not locate it. After a long period of resistance, the Justice Department finally located the Long tickler exactly where Weisberg had suggested they look for it. When finally located, most of the file had been gutted.\n\nWeisberg's suit for the King assassination documents lasted 15 years. He obtained approximately 60,000 pages. If the same suit were filed today, I believe that he would get about one-fourth of what he obtained in the late 1970's and early 1980's.\n\nThese stories that I have related are unusual only because the requesters actually went to court to fight the CIA and FBI. Most requesters cannot afford the time or the money of litigating their FOIA requests against these agencies. You might be tempted to conclude from the absence of litigation that the FOIA is working just fine. The opposite is true. The FOIA has been severely damaged by the 1984 amendments eliminating access to CIA operational files and by the 1986 amendments to Exemption 7, which applies to law enforcement records, as well as by a string of decisions in the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which have greatly expanded the amount of material which can be withheld from the public.\n\nLet me add that while it is important to have obtained the public pledges from CIA Director Gates and FBI Director Sessions\nwhich you heard today, if you support release of the records, you must also ensure that you have the support of other agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the State Department, and such divisions as the Secret Service and the National Security Agency.\n\nI wish to caution that while I think that this legislation will result in greatly enriching our fund of knowledge about the Kennedy assassination and the official investigations of it, at least if modified along the lines I suggest in the attachment to this statement, I do not believe that there is likely to be any \"smoking gun,\" which will \"solve the case.\" Rather, this legislation must be defended on the ground that the American people have a right to the fullest possible disclosure so they can make of it what they will. It will take much time to read, analyze, and understand the information released. Whether it will lead to the resolution of any controversies which beset this subject remains to be seen, but it is a course which cannot be avoided. The American people want to know the details of their history, however painful and puzzling it may be, and that is their right.\n\nThe proposed legislation has both strengths and weaknesses. I am attaching to this statement a detailed discussion of the joint resolution which includes a number of recommendations for changes. To briefly summarize, the major provisions of the bill include: a definition of \"assassination materials,\" the composition of the Review Board, and the standards for the postponement of the release of information. The standards for postponement are critical\nbecause they determine the amount of material which may be withheld.\n\nBefore discussing the limitations on the term \"assassination material\" as related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, I note that this section excludes records on the assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The House Select Committee on Assassinations (\"HSCA\") conducted an extensive investigation on Dr. King's assassination and concluded that his murder probably involved a conspiracy. Public belief that Dr. King was killed as a result of a conspiracy and that this crime remains unsolved is widespread. The alleged assassin, James Earl Ray, denies that he shot Dr. King. Unless the importance of historical issues is to be determined by whether a movie has been made about them, there is no justification for excluding the King assassination records from this legislation.\n\nThe assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy is equally the subject of profound controversy. Recently, a group of distinguished citizens have submitted a lengthy petition to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury to investigate evidence that the Los Angeles Police Department engaged in \"willful and corrupt misconduct\" in its investigation of Senator Kennedy's assassination. In support of these charges, the group submitted more than 800 pages of exhibits, mainly derived from the Los Angeles Police Department's own files, which document its charges that L.A.P.D. destroyed crucial items of evidence, ignored material evidentiary leads, cannot account for important missing evidence,\nengaged in a cover-up of its failures, and failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the crime. The records of federal agencies and congressional committees relevant to Senator Kennedy's assassination should also be included in this legislation.\n\nThe term \"assassination material\" is broadly defined, but it falls short of ensuring that scholars will have all of the documents which they need in order to properly study the subject. It should include policy documents which provide the context of decisions in the Kennedy Administration which may shed light on the assassination. It should include, as it presently does, all documents obtained or created by any previous official investigation. It should include materials on those persons who have figured in previous official investigations: state, Federal or local. Because no one can predict in advance where new avenues of study may lead, or what they may produce, the definition should be flexible enough to provide scholars with those materials reasonable calculated to shed light on the assassination or its investigations. Finally, it should also include information records on agency operations and functions which may be relevant to the study of the assassination.\n\nThe current provision defining assassination materials contains an exemption for \"personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of Government.\" I strongly oppose this exclusion. The Warren Commission records on this subject have been publicly available\nthrough the National Archives for many years and should not now be made secret. The work of prior commissions and committees is a perfectly legitimate subject, but it has been the subject of some secrecy which has impeded the public's right to know. In particular, the staff of the House Assassinations Committee, with the exception of its General Counsel and Staff Director, G. Robert Blakey, pledged an oath of secrecy about their work. Blakey has published a commercial book about the committee's work, and is quite public and outspoken about it. Because of the secrecy oath, others who are quite knowledgeable about the Committee's work have been silenced. The public has been denied their views and their information. In this regard, I would urge the insertion of an additional provision in this legislation which would rescind any secrecy oaths taken by the staffs of any previous congressional or executive branch commission or committee.\n\nThis provision would also be used to prohibit release of information regarding a very troubling incident in which the House Select Committee discovered that its most sensitive files on the Kennedy assassination had been rifled by a CIA liaison officer assigned to assist the committee. According to published accounts in the Washington Post, this officer, Regis T. Blahut, surreptitiously entered the safe reserved for physical evidence of President Kennedy's assassination, including autopsy photos, X-rays, and other articles, including the so-called \"magic bullet\" that wounded both Kennedy and Texas Governor John Connally. According to the Post, Blahut was given several polygraph\nexaminations. He was asked whether he did it, and according to one source, he flunked that. He was asked whether anyone had ordered him to do it, and he is said to have flunked that question too. Materials regarding incidents of this kind should be fully available to the public.\n\nA second problem with this legislation is that it proposes to exclude from the Review Board anyone who has had \"previous involvement with the investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.\" I believe this is too broad and should be limited to involvement in prior \"official\" investigations. Having a panel of Kennedy assassination agnostics might have some idealistic allure, but the public is unlikely to be persuaded that the government intends to disclose all pertinent materials if the panel does not include experienced and knowledgeable Kennedy researchers.\n\nA third and critically important area that needs refinement is the standards for postponement of disclosure. Particularly significant is the need to narrow the definition of the term \"intelligence source\" and the term \"intelligence method.\" Virtually all information an intelligence agency document can be withheld under these terms. \"Intelligence source\" must be defined to make clear that it does not include dead sources who have been the subject of widespread publicity that is tantamount to official acknowledgement, and sources who are willing to have their identities disclosed, and sources who cannot reasonably be expected to suffer death or serious bodily harm if their identities are\ndisclosed. Similar restrictions must be put on the term \"confidential source.\" With respect to intelligence methods, it must be made clear that this term does not include outmoded methods, methods which are known to the public or methods which may be commonly deduced. Nor should it include methods that are known to other hostile intelligence services.\n\nNew legislation is needed. Half measures will not do. If this legislation does succeed in substantially clearing the air, it does not convince the public that nothing of critical importance to our understanding has been withheld but for the very best of reasons, then public cynicism about government will continue to increase.\n\nI ask that additional comments be placed in the record.\nSec. 3. Definitions\n\n(2) \"Assassination material\" is broadly defined but still may fall far short of the documents which scholars need in order to properly study the Kennedy assassination. In essence, the present definition limits \"assassination materials\" to those records which have figured in previous inquiries by Congressional committees or Executive Branch agencies or commissions. Since these entities may not have asked for all of the relevant records, and may in fact not have asked for records on some relevant subject areas, the definition of \"assassination material\" needs further refinement. It should be modified to indicate that \"assassination material\" includes any material which any member of the Assassination Materials Review Board (\"AMRB\") or any individual seeking release under the Freedom of Information Act (\"the FOIA\"), can plausibly contend may shed light on the assassination or any of its investigations.\n\nThe definition also contains two explicit exclusions. The first of these excludes material to the extent that it pertains \"to personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of the Government. . . . \" This\nlanguage could be used to prohibit release of materials pertaining to Regis Blahut, the CIA employee suspected of tampering with autopsy materials pertaining to the Kennedy assassination.\n\nThe second exclusion relates to the autopsy materials donated by the Kennedy family to the National Archives. This assumes that the autopsy materials were those of the Kennedy family to give to the Archives. This legitimizes a bad precedent. The autopsy materials ought to be subject to public, not private, control. The remedy for abuse of autopsy materials should be a newly created right of legal action by family members rather than denial or public access.\n\nSec. 5. Assassination Materials Review Board\n\n(b) Court of Appeals division shall appoint \"5 distinguished and impartial private citizens, none of whom are presently employees of any branch of the Government and none of whom shall have had any previous involvement with any investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, to serve as members of the Review Board.\"\n\nQuery: Is this language designed to exclude private citizens who have written or spoken critically of the official investigations of President Kennedy's assassinations? Or only those persons who participated in official investigations or inquiries? If it excludes the former, then it will be difficult to find individuals who are sufficiently knowledgeable about Kennedy assassination matters to make the judgments called for by the Joint Resolution (i.e., defining what materials are related to\nthe assassination and whether the public interest in disclosure outweigh other concerns). Additionally, without such persons on the Review Board, it may be difficult to persuade the public that all pertinent materials will be disclosed, thus undercutting the objective of restoring trust in government. A committee of distinguished citizens who know nothing about the subject is not likely to inspire trust.\n\nSec. 6. Grounds for Postponement of Disclosure\n\nSubsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (A) reveal \"an intelligence asset.\"\n\nThis must be qualified. It should only apply to living, covert intelligence agents. Furthermore, if material in the public domain identifies or suggests the identity of an intelligence agent, the presumption should be that such material shall be disclosed unless the agency which employed the agent can show by clear and convincing evidence that serious damage to the agent can reasonably be expected to result from disclosure.\n\nSubsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (B) reveal \"an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government. . . .\"\n\nThis provision also must be modified. The first problem is that there is no limiting definition of \"intelligence source of method.\" Under this proviso, it would be possible to withhold such \"intelligence sources\" as newspapers, libraries, law enforcement\nagencies, etc., as well as the personnel affiliated with them. Research in a public library is an \"intelligence method,\" and it, too, is no doubt currently utilized. A fortiori would this definition include the surveillance techniques employed at the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.\n\nThe \"intelligence source\" definition should be limited to living sources in circumstances where disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in actual serious personal damage to the source. Where disclosure of the identity of the source will not cause serious actual damage to the current national defense or foreign policy interests of the United States or where the identity of the source has become publicly known or is likely to have become known to any hostile or formerly hostile foreign power or an agency thereof, it should be released.\n\n\"Intelligence methods\" must also be modified so that it applies only to methods that are unknown to the public or to foreign intelligence agencies.\n\nSubsection 1 states that disclosure maybe postponed if its release would (C) reveal \"any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States; and the threat to the military defense or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure.\n\nThe chief problem with this provision is that there is no standard for what constitutes a \"public interest\" of sufficient\nmoment to outweigh any of the putative threats. Is the general interest in the fullest possible disclosure a public interest which may be considered, or must a showing of public interest in the substantive content of the material at issue be shown?\n\nSubsection 2 provides that invasion of the privacy of a living person is a grounds for postponement of disclosure \"if that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure.\"\n\nThis exemption contains a phrase stating that it applies \"whether the person is identified in the material or not.\" This phrase should be stricken. With this phrase included this provision is significantly less liberal than current FOIA exemption 6, which covers only those invasions which result from the actual production of the materials themselves. Additionally, some content needs to be given to the invasion of privacy concept. One limitation would be that it must cause an actual as opposed to a theoretical invasion of privacy. A second that it relates only to intimate personal matters the disclosure of which would be likely to have profound adverse impact on an individual.\n\nSubsection 3 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would constitute \"a substantial and unjustified violation of an understanding of confidentiality between a Government agent and a witness or a foreign government. . . .\"\n\nThis provision needs to be amended to include only those promises of confidentiality--either to a witness or a foreign government--made in writing. Among the reasons for this are the\nfact that (1) if the promise of confidentiality is not required to have been made in writing, then there is seldom any effective means to counter the agency's claim of confidentiality and the agency wins by default; and (2) the agency's claim of confidentiality frequently reflects not the desire of the witness but its own desire for secrecy.\n\nThis provision needs to be amended to make it clear that it does not authorize withholding of the identify of, or information provided by, a deceased witness. Secondly, there should also be some time limitation on any understanding of confidentiality made with a foreign government. And perhaps there should be a requirement that the foreign government officially object to each such disclosure in writing.\n\nAdditionally, it should be made clear, either in the text or in the legislative history, that it is not a \"substantial and unjustified violation of a promise of confidentiality to disclose information supplied by a witness if the identity of the witness can be concealed.\"\n\nSection 8. Determinations by the Review Board\n\nSubsection (g) provides that any decision of the AMRB that a record is not assassination material or that disclosure should be postponed \"shall not be subject to judicial review.\"\n\nWhy not? Likely to pose less of a burden and expense than litigation under the FOIA.\n\nSubsection (h)(2) provides that the President may certify that material \"qualifies for postponement of disclosure pursuant to\nsection 6, in which case release of the material shall be postponed, and this decision shall not be subject to judicial review.\"\n\nThere is no limitation on the duration of postponement by the President. Suggest that the maximum period of time be that portion of the President's term which remains.\n\nSection 11. Rules of Construction\n\nSubsection (b) provides that nothing in the Joint Resolution shall be construed to eliminate any right to file requests with any Executive agency other than the Review Board or seek judicial review of the decisions of such agencies under the FOIA.\n\nOne problem here is that transferring all agency records to the Review Board may mean that they are no longer \"agency records\" within the meaning of the FOIA.\"\n\nA second problem is that this provision eliminates the AMBR from FOIA coverage. This sets a bad precedent and sets up circumstances of highest irony in which an agency whose overriding mission is openness will itself operate in secrecy.\n\nA provision should be added here stating that in any FOIA action involving assassination materials the court is to apply the standards for postponement set forth in the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act in lieu of the exemptions provided in the FOIA.\n\nAdditional Notes\n\nIt may be a good idea to expressly mention the Rockefeller Commission as subject to the Act.\nJudge John R. Tunheim \nChairman \nAssassination Records Review Board \n\nPrepared Testimony In Support of \nH.R. 1553, \nTo amend the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 \nto extend the authorization of the Assassination Records Review Board \nuntil September 30, 1998. \n\nBefore the \nNational Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, \nHouse Government Reform and Oversight Committee \n\nJune 4, 1997 \n\nI. Introduction \n\nMr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Assassination Records Review Board in support of H.R. 1553, which would extend the authorization of the Review Board for one final year. The Board acknowledges that all of the issues surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy will likely never be fully resolved, however, this additional time will allow us to complete our work, including the review and public release of critical FBI and CIA records, submit a comprehensive and complete final report to the Congress and the President, and make available to the American public as much information as possible on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. \n\nI would also like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Burton for introducing H.R. 1553, and Congressmen Waxman and Stokes for cosponsoring this bill. These Members have exhibited an admirable bipartisan spirit and an understanding that we as a government, and as a nation, must bring closure to a sad chapter of our history, and that we must seize this opportunity to do it now. In addition, we would like to express our appreciation to Chairman Hastert for chairing this hearing today. It provides an opportunity to explain what the Review Board has accomplished to date and discuss how we could finish our work in Fiscal Year 1998, if given the opportunity. \n\nPlease allow me to introduce the other members of the Review Board with whom I have had the professional honor and personal pleasure to work: Dr. Henry F. Graff, Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University; Dr. Kermit L. Hall, Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University; Dr. William L. Joyce, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University; and Dr. Anna K. Nelson, Distinguished Adjunct Historian in\nResidence, The American University. We have been honored to engage in this important effort to make the history of the Kennedy assassination available to the American public and I am pleased to be here today to testify before this Subcommittee and answer any of your questions.\n\nI would also like to describe briefly the professional staff that we are fortunate to have hired. The Executive Director is Dr. David G. Marwell, a professional historian who gained vast experience dealing with large numbers of important historical documents with the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice and later as the Director of the Berlin Document Center. He leads a staff of 28 full-time employees, who have varied backgrounds as historians, lawyers, analysts, investigators, and administrators. The members of the staff have approached their unique task with seriousness of purpose, creativity, professionalism, and competence, and have assisted us in shedding new light on the assassination through the release of thousands of Federal Government records, and the acquisition of records in private hands and local governments that were not previously available to the American public. I believe that we assembled exactly the type of professional and diversified staff that Congress envisioned would be necessary to accomplish this difficult assignment.\n\nII. Accomplishments to Date\n\nAs I know you are aware, the Review Board was created by The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) as an independent Federal agency to oversee the identification and release of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. I know that certain members of this subcommittee played a role in crafting and passing the JFK Act\u2014a unique piece of legislation designed to remove doubt and speculation about the content of government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a result of these lingering suspicions, Congress determined that an independent board was the most effective and efficient vehicle to make all assassination records available to the public.\n\nThe Review Board has accomplished much since we began releasing previously secret records in June of 1995. The Board has acted to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at the National Archives and Records Administration. We would not have been successful in our efforts without the significant assistance of the National Archives. The JFK Collection currently totals approximately 3.7 million pages and is used extensively by researchers from all over the United States.\n\nBy the end of Fiscal Year 1997, the Review Board will have reviewed and processed nearly all of the assassination records that have been identified by the more than 30 different government offices believed to be in possession of relevant records, with the\nimportant exception of the FBI and the CIA. I will elaborate on the status of records held by these two agencies later. The overwhelming majority of previously redacted information will have been made public by the Review Board.\n\nIII. Release of Government Records Related to the Assassination\n\nBefore discussing what we will accomplish with one final year, I would like to highlight for the Members of the Subcommittee some of the important records that the Board has made public. They include:\n\n* Thousands of CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy that made up the CIA's Oswald File and detail the agency's investigative activities following the assassination;\n\n* Thousands of once-secret records from the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, including the controversial Staff Report on Oswald's trip to Mexico City;\n\n* Thousands of records from the FBI's core and related assassination files that document the FBI's interest in Oswald from 1959-63, after he had defected to the Soviet Union, three years before the assassination; and\n\n* The extensive FBI files on its investigation of the assassination.\n\nThe important work in which the Review Board has been engaged can be best and most graphically demonstrated by showing you the \"before\" and \"after\" versions of one of the pre-assassination FBI documents to which I just referred and that the Board has released to the public. Prior to the Review Board's review, this FBI document (JFK Collection Record Number: 124-10023-10236, Attachment Number 1) was available to the public as you see it on the left. As you can see, it is heavily redacted. The only information that was not secret was the date of the memorandum, \"October 12, 1960,\" that it was to the \"Director, FBI,\" from \"Legat, Paris\" (the FBI representative in Paris), that the subject was \"Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security,\" and that it had to do with a \"Paris letter 9/27/60.\" The rest of the text was blacked out. Obviously, this version of the document left room for a great deal of speculation among historians and researchers regarding what was underneath the black ink on this document with the provocative subject title.\n\nThe Review Board aggressively pursued the release of the redacted information in this document and several others that relate to the FBI's interest in Oswald before the assassination. After protracted negotiations with the FBI, an initial FBI appeal to the White House in an effort to keep the document secret, and a direct appeal to the Swiss\ngovernment, we were able to release the information. The unredacted memorandum shows that the Swiss Federal Police had been enlisted by the FBI to try to locate Oswald and to determine whether or not he had enrolled at a school in Switzerland. Now the public is able to see the document in full and judge its importance. In its redacted state, the document could have meant anything that a researcher\u2019s imagination and speculation could invent. In its released form, it must be analyzed for what it says.\n\nIV. Identification and Location of Additional Assassination Records\n\nOne of the most important, most difficult, and most time-consuming responsibilities of the Review Board is to identify and locate additional records that are relevant to the assassination. This is a task that to some degree must logically come later in the process, after the Review Board has gained a full understanding of the records that have already been identified. Although the Review Board has made a significant number of requests for additional records and information, some of which I would like to outline, much remains to be done before it can be confident that it has completed this responsibility.\n\nI would like to highlight some of our efforts to identify and locate additional assassination records. Some examples:\n\n* **Medical Records Inquiry.** The Review Board has several ongoing efforts to identify and locate assassination records involving medical issues. As with any homicide, the medical records are among the most important pieces of evidence. As part of its attempt to ensure that the medical records are as complete as possible, the Review Board staff has deposed the principal pathologists involved in President Kennedy\u2019s autopsy, as well as other individuals who had knowledge of the autopsy and related photographic records.\n\n* **Identification and Location of Additional FBI Records and Information.** The Review Board has continued its efforts to locate additional FBI assassination records by making several requests for records and information. The FBI has assisted in this effort by giving the Review Board members access to requested files. The JFK Task Force at the FBI has, on the whole, been extremely cooperative and helpful to the Board and has provided the requested information.\n\n* **Identification and Location of Additional CIA Records and Information.** The Review Board has initiated a number of requests to the CIA for additional information and records. The Review Board expects that these requests will be promptly and fully satisfied during the upcoming year.\nIdentification and Location of Additional Secret Service Records and Information. Time consuming and careful review of Secret Service activities by the Review Board produced a series of requests for additional records and information that, in turn, led to the identification of additional relevant assassination records. For example, in response to the Review Board\u2019s first eight requests for additional information, the Secret Service has submitted more than 1,500 pages of material.\n\nIdentification and Location of Additional Military Records and Information. The Department of Defense (including its many components and the military services) (collectively \u201cDOD\u201d), identified few assassination records on its own initiative. DOD has nevertheless been cooperative with the efforts of the Review Board to locate assassination records. When such records have been located, DOD has been willing to release the records with few redactions.\n\nAdditional work would be required in our last year to ensure that all assassination records in the military archives have been made a part of the JFK Collection. Fortunately, the diligent efforts of the ARRB staff have set the stage for accomplishing this task.\n\nV. Release of Private and Local Records\n\nIn addition to the release of records in the Federal Government\u2019s vast files, and consistent with the Board\u2019s mandate to make the historical record of the assassination as complete as possible, we have been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records in the possession of private citizens and local governments, including:\n\n* The original personal papers of Warren Commission-Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin that give further insight into the operations of the Commission;\n\n* Copies of the official records of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison\u2019s investigation of the assassination;\n\n* The original papers of New Orleans attorney Edward Wegmann, from his work as a member of the legal team that successfully defended Clay Shaw in 1969 against a charge of conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.\n\n* Copies of records from the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans, including records on District Attorney Garrison\u2019s investigation and prosecution of Clay Shaw and records regarding New Orleans organized crime figures;\nLong-lost films taken in Dallas on November 22, 1963, that the public had never seen and that shed new light on the events of that day; and\n\nPrivate collections of records from individuals including Warren Commission attorney Wesley Liebler, author David Lifton, FBI Special Agent Hosty, Attorney Frank Ragano, as well as others.\n\nI am also pleased to announce today that the Review Board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who is the only person ever tried in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Shaw was acquitted by a jury in 1969 after being charged as part of District Attorney Garrison's investigation. The Shaw papers will surely add another dimension to this particular chapter of the assassination story.\n\nAll of these records will enrich the historical record of the assassination for future generations of Americans. Once these records are processed and described by the National Archives, they will be available for research.\n\nVI. The Need For Additional Time\n\nDespite our best efforts and significant accomplishments, some of which I have outlined, the Review Board will not be able to complete its work within the original three-year timetable set by Congress for the following reasons:\n\nFirst, the authors of the original legislation believed that our task would take three years. That estimate was based on the best available information at the time, but the legislation established an unprecedented process. There was no way of knowing the problems of scale and complexity that the Board would encounter, nor was there any way to factor in the comprehensive approach we have taken in fulfilling our mandate.\n\nSecond, the Board was not appointed until 18 months after the legislation was signed into law. As a result, without the guidance of the Board, Federal agencies initially defined for themselves the universe of records that should be processed under The Act and to speculate about the kind of evidence that would be needed to sustain the redaction of assassination-related information. Once the Board was in place, agencies needed to redo a considerable amount of work. In fact, many agencies have yet to complete their review and the Board is still seeking their compliance.\n\nThird, our enabling legislation imposed several restrictions on the manner in which the Board could operate. Unlike other temporary agencies, the Board\ncould not hire or detail experienced federal employees, but rather had to hire new employees who had to undergo background investigations and be cleared at the Top Secret level. Locating and renovating space that was suitable for the storage of classified materials was required. As a result, the Board could not begin an effective review of records until the third quarter of our first year.\n\nWe are pleased and proud that the Review Board and staff have been able to overcome these obstacles, and that we have developed an efficient and effective process for the review of records. All involved in this process want to see that the job is done, and do not want to cease now with a reasonable conclusion in sight. We want to finish the job we began, and with one additional year we can.\n\nVII. The Job Ahead\n\nThe additional year of operations will permit the Review Board to finish its task by completing several major areas of our work. Please be assured that these are identifiable projects that are critical to ensuring that the JFK Collection is as complete as possible, that relevant Federal agencies have been held accountable, and that all that we have done is documented in our final report. The Board would focus in our final year on the following:\n\n* **CIA Sequestered Collection.** The Review Board has completed its review of the Oswald \u201c201 file,\u201d the file created and maintained by the CIA on Oswald and the assassination. The Review Board is now faced with the task of reviewing the agency\u2019s \u201cSequestered Collection,\u201d the large collection of files that was assembled by the CIA in response to requests made by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, in the late 1970\u2019s. These records find their relevance to the assassination defined in part by the course of the HSCA investigation. The Sequestered Collection originally consisted of 63 boxes of CIA- and HSCA-originated records as well as 72 reels of microfilm. Unfortunately, these records are in a confused order, poorly described, and are replete with duplicates. Some of these records are clearly of great significance, some are of only marginal interest, and the relevance of others cannot be identified.\n\n* **FBI Sequestered Collection.** The FBI divides its assassination records into two general categories. The first is the \u201cCore and Related Files,\u201d consisting of nearly 600,000 pages of files collected in the course of the massive FBI investigation into the assassination. The Review Board will complete its review of this significant collection by the end of FY 1997. The second, which the FBI refers to as its \u201cHSCA records,\u201d is a large collection of records that were identified as being of interest to the HSCA and which remain to be reviewed by the Board. Like the\nCIA's Sequestered Collection, this voluminous body of records (approximately 280,000 pages) ranges widely in relevance to the assassination.\n\n* The Records of Some Federal Agencies and Congressional Committees. Additional time will allow the Board to finish its work with several agencies, including the Secret Service, the National Security Agency, and Congressional Committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee.\n\n* Search for Additional Records. With one more year of operations, the Board's search for additional records held by Federal agencies, private individuals, and local governments would be concluded with greater confidence. Some of these records have been identified, but not yet acquired by the Board.\n\n* Federal Agency Compliance. In November 1996, the Review Board initiated a compliance program to ensure that Federal agencies have fully cooperated with the Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the American public that the goals of the JFK Act have been accomplished to the greatest possible extent. The requests to document compliance with the JFK Act were sent to 27 U.S. government agencies and departments to confirm that the U.S. government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The agencies' statements of compliance will be included in the Review Board's final report to the Congress. The one-year extension will ensure that the compliance program is completed and fully documented in the final report.\n\nIt is important for the Review Board to complete these major projects. The Board believes that the completion of the task outlined above, the inclusion of these important records in the JFK Collection, and the documentation of Federal agency compliance as part of the final report will mark an appropriate point at which to conclude the Board's work. We are confident that all that remains for the Board can be accomplished in an additional year.\n\nVIII. An Approach to the Review of the Remaining CIA and FBI Records\n\nIt is clear to the members of the Review Board that there is much work to be done. The review of the remaining CIA and FBI records is a cumbersome and complicated task. However, the Board and staff have the benefit of our experience to date that sets the stage for an efficient and effective review of the remaining records. I would like to briefly describe our early experiences reviewing records and how the past two years set a firm foundation for the future and would work to our advantage in our last year.\nOur review of records in the early months was slowed by the complexities of the issues raised in the records. The unprecedented new standards of the JFK Act, which go far beyond those established under the Freedom of Information Act, required a time-consuming early phase.\n\nAt first, the review process proceeded slowly and the agencies were afforded ample opportunity to present their evidence. Over time, the Review Board began to standardize its interpretation of the relevant section of the JFK Act and the issues raised in the various documents. Now that the Review Board and the agencies are familiar with the rigorous demands of the JFK Act, the process has accelerated. In a progressively increasing number of cases, records that initially contained proposed postponements can be released through a \u201cconsent\u201d process. In this consent process, the ARRB staff notifies an agency that its proposed postponements are not likely to be approved by the Review Board and the agency thereupon voluntarily consents to the release of the information.\n\nIn our review of the FBI\u2019s \u201cCore and Related Files\u201d and the CIA\u2019s \u201cOswald 201 File,\u201d the records that have been the focus of our attention to date, we subjected every requested redaction to a rigorous test: did the evidence of the harm that would result from the release of the information outweigh the public interest in the information?\n\nIn considering our review of the CIA and FBI \u201cSequestered Collections,\u201d the Board recognized that it needed to develop a different approach, one that would take into account the varied degree of relevance of individual records to the assassination. Only in this way could the Board ensure that it would appropriately expend its resources in its last year. As a first step, the Board carefully analyzed each collection in order to determine what priority should be assigned to the category of records. In addition, the Board developed a set of guidelines for the review of these records which recognized that some categories of records did not require the intensive word-by-word review that had been the rule for the core collections that have been the subject of the Board\u2019s attention to date. The development of these guidelines began with the August 6, 1996 Board public hearing and culminated in their adoption at the October 16, 1996 Board meeting. The ARRB staff will distinguish between records whose relevance to the assassination is clear and those not believed to be relevant (or \u201cNBR\u201d). Applying these new standards will permit the ARRB staff to identify and review the most significant remaining records in order of priority.\n\nThese detailed guidelines will reduce the loss of valuable Review Board and ARRB staff time expended to review, on a word-by-word basis, those documents that have a remote relationship, at best, to the Kennedy assassination. Those documents that are identified as relevant to the assassination will continue to be reviewed word-by-word. These standards of relevance are designed to ensure that the greatest number of true\nassassination records is properly identified, reviewed, and made public in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.\n\nThe fruits of our labor from the first three years would be realized in our last year, one in which we would be reviewing some of the most difficult records, and potentially most important records, but with the benefit of our invaluable experience. I am happy to report that we have received assurances from the FBI and CIA that they will work with us in a final year to make sure that the necessary resources are applied so that our task can be completed.\n\nIX. Conclusion\n\nIn making our recommendation for a one-year extension, we, the members of the Review Board, are fully cognizant of the difficulties inherent in extending a temporary commission. We are aware of the concern that temporary bodies may have a self-preserving and self-perpetuating instinct, and want to assure you in the clearest and most unambiguous manner that our recommendation is motivated strictly by our desire to complete the job. My colleagues and I were appointed as private citizens and have many competing claims on our time and energy. It is our collective conviction that the additional time is necessary and our sincerest commitment that we will complete our task by the end of Fiscal Year 1998, if given the means.\n\nI would like to note that, as you may be aware, the Administration is supportive of the one-year extension for the Review Board and has submitted an FY 1998 budget amendment to allow us to complete our work, close out our operation, and submit our final report.\n\nSince the Review Board began this effort three years ago, we have witnessed the widespread and passionate interest that the American public has in the assassination of President Kennedy. We have received thousands of letters, telephone calls, faxes and e-mail messages from individuals who care deeply about our history. They come from all walks of life, from all over the country, and are of all ages. Their interest is of varying degrees and they do not all agree on what happened in Dallas on November 22, 1963. However, they do agree that the public has the right to see the files on the assassination.\n\nI believe that what the Review Board is all about can be summed up in a letter we received from a man from California just last week. The author is not a professional historian, not a student working on a paper for a history class, but simply a private citizen interested in learning about this tragic historical event. He wrote the following:\n\n\"In my humble opinion, it appears that the ARRB is having a healing effect\nupon the American public, who may be coming to realize that there may be closure in sight (in our lifetimes) with regard to the JFK assassination.\"\n\nThese words capture why the Review Board was created by the Congress and why we hope that the Review Board will have the additional year to complete our task.\n\nThe Assassination Records Review Board was conceived as a means of eliminating uncertainty and speculation about the contents of government files relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. We, the members of the Board, believe that a premature termination of the Review Board would surely generate intensified doubts within the general public about the commitment of Congress to release all information that relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, as well as renewed speculation about the conduct of our government and its institutions and personnel. If appropriate closure is not reached now, the identical issues will likely have to be addressed again in the future\u2014at even greater cost. The additional year that we recommend will allow for a confident conclusion of this important task.\n\nMr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the members of the Assassination Records Review Board, I thank you for allowing us this opportunity to discuss our work and our future. We urge you to favorably report H.R. 1553. I would be happy to answer any questions that the members of the Subcommittee may have for me. The Board and staff stand ready to provide the Subcommittee with any additional information that may be required. Thank you.\nJUNE 4, 1997, WEDNESDAY\n\nSECTION: IN THE NEWS\n\nLENGTH: 12335 words\n\nHEADLINE: HEARING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE\n\nSUBJECT: ASSASSINATIONS RECORDS REVIEW BOARD REAUTHORIZATION CHAIRMED BY REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS HASTERT (R-IL) 2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC\n\nBODY:\n\nREP. HASTERT: The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice will come to order. This hearing will focus on a very important piece of legislation, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. This bill was introduced by Chairman Dan Burton on May 8, 1997 and included in original cosponsors ranking minority member Henry Waxman and Congressman Louis Stokes, our first witness for today, also who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations.\n\nIn 1992, 30 years after the assassination, nearly one million pages of records compiled by official investigations still had been not made public. Congress decided to set up a process for reviewing and releasing to the public the records surrounding the Kennedy assassination. The result was that on October 26, 1992, President Bush signed into law Public Law 102-526, the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.\n\nThe original act provided a three-year timetable for the review board to complete its work. Unfortunately, extensive delays in the appointment of board members delayed the review board's work from the very beginning. In 1994, the Congress extended the 1992 law's termination date for one year, until September 30th, 1996. The review board subsequently exercised its authority into the statute to continue operating for one additional year.\n\nThe review process has proved to be more complex and time-consuming than\nanticipated. And although we believe that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding federal entities that were intended to be temporary, Chairman Burton and this subcommittee support the request for a one-year extension of the board's reauthorization. I believe that by releasing these documents to the public we serve an important public right to know and advance the cause of total accountability to the people of this country.\n\nAt this time I would like to recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.\n\nREP. THOMAS M. BARRETT (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to welcome my esteemed colleague, Representative Louis Stokes, to testify before this subcommittee. We are fortunate to be able to draw on your experience in this area.\n\nOver 30 years ago this country was shocked by the assassination of President Kennedy in a way that it had not been shocked since the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the bombing of Hiroshima. Yet today we are still prying papers out of the government about that assassination.\nThe legislation that created the Assassination Review Board broke new ground by establishing the principle that there should be a presumption of public access to government information. That legislation was necessary because administration after administration had failed to release documents. That should not be. The Assassination Review Board has released millions of pages that could have otherwise remained locked in government file drawers. We are here today to extend the authorization of this board because the process of making government information public has been more complex and time-consuming than anticipated. I am not criticizing the work of the board or the dedication of its members. I am, however, critical of the fact that we are still fighting with our government to allow public access to government documents. Congress has passed laws and resolutions reiterating the principles of public access that were laid down when this country was founded. Administration after administration has worked to thwart that access. I applaud President Clinton for his efforts to declassify xdocuments, but we need to do much more. I hope that every employee at the Office of Management and Budget, and every agency in the government will pay attention to what this board has accomplished. It is the refusal to allow public access that breeds suspicion of the government. It is the thwarting of public access that causes the public to mistrust government officials. If we are to turn the tide of mistrust and suspicion, it will be done by opening the doors of access. Today is one step in that process, but there is much more work to be done.\n\nThank you.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Are there any other members wishing to make an opening statement? If not, our first witness this morning is fellow Congressman Lou Stokes, who served as the chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations from 1976 to 1979, and is a cosponsor of this important bill.\n\nAnd, Mr. Stokes, we want to say welcome, and thank you for your fine work in this area. And please proceed with your opening statement.\n\nREP. LOUIS STOKES (D-OH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barrett, Mr. Turner, Mr. LaTourette.\n\nMr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my written testimony for the record, and if I may, I'd like to just summarize my testimony.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Without objection.\n\nREP. STOKES: Thank you.\n\nIt seems, Mr. Chairman, it was not as long as it is, but actually it's been 20 years; it was in 1977 when I was appointed as chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. We were authorized at that time and directed to complete an investigation surrounding the assassination and the death of President John F. Kennedy. We completed, as you've already stated, our\ninvestigation in 1979. And on March 28th of that year, we filed our final report. In addition to it, 12 volumes of evidentiary material, printed by the Government Printing Office, was made available to the American public. In addition to this, we conducted 18 days of public hearings and an additional two days of public policy hearings.\n\nPrior to the committee running out of both time and money, we had released everything that we had the time and resources to release. All of our other records were placed in the National Archives, under a House of Representatives rule which existed at that time, Rule 36, requiring such unpublished records routinely to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The records of our committee relative to this investigation consisted of 935 boxes, which we turned over to the National Archives. Then, over the years, a considerable public debate about these records has ensued, including accusations that these records, if released, would contain evidence of a government cover-up, or complicity of government agencies in the assassination of President Kennedy.\nA great deal of this was fueled in 1992 by a movie entitled \"JFK.\" That movie contained many distortions of the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of our president. As a result of that movie, my office was deluged with thousands of letters and telegrams by Americans calling for the release of these sealed files.\n\nAs a member of Congress, and a former chairman of that committee, I deemed it important not to have the good work of our committee impugned by such baseless accusations. Our committee had attempted to conduct its investigation into the assassination of the president, and to present the results of that investigation to the Congress and to the American people in a thorough and dignified manner in keeping with the memory of this great president.\n\nConsequently, in 1992, I introduced, and the House and Senate passed, PL 102-526, a bill entitled The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. That law created the Assassination Records Review Board, which mandated and authorized that board to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It was our intention, Mr. Chairman, that everything that could be released from every agency, every court record, anywhere they existed \u2014 that those records be released to the American people.\n\nUnder the law, the board had until October 1, 1996, to fulfill its mandate, plus an additional year, at the board's discretion.\n\nWe were very fortunate to have a very distinguished panel appointed. This panel was appointed by President Clinton 18 months after the law was enacted here by the Congress \u2014 a considerable delay in the appointment of this panel. But we were very fortunate to have persons such as Chairman Tunheim, Dr. Henry Graff, Dr. Kermit Hall, Dr. William Joyce, Dr. Anna Nelson, and an outstanding executive director, David Marwell.\n\nUnder this panel, they have now released more than 10,000 previously secret government documents.\n\nThey have released a report, which I would urge all the members of the committee to read, if they have an opportunity, because I think you will see the extensive amount of work in which they have been involved.\n\nThey now need one additional final year in order to complete their work. Their work during this period of time will be primarily to secure the release of documents from the CIA and the FBI. Those are the two main agencies left from which they still have a considerable number of documents to be released.\n\nMr. Chairman, in closing I think that it's important that we complete this work in an orderly manner with full and complete disclosure to the American people, that they will feel that they know everything that their government knows about\nthe assassination of their president. And I would urge the support and passage of this legislation sponsored by Chairman Burton, of which I am one of the original co-sponsors.\nI'd be pleased to answer any questions.\nREP. HASTERT: Thank you, Chairman \u2014 or, Mr. Stokes. And I really appreciate the work that you've done here. I have just two brief questions. Actually, three. Do you believe that the Ford Review Board is up and running smoothly now?\nREP. STOKES: Absolutely. In spite of the delay of 18 months they have done just a yeoman's amount of work. It's just been almost incomparable to realize how much they have done. And to their credit, they feel that if given just this one additional year that they will complete the work.\nREP. HASTERT: And do you believe that this process is consistent with the goals of your original legislation in 1992?\nREP. STOKES: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.\nREP. HASTERT: And then you are confident, as you said before, that the review board can finish its task by September 30th, 1998.\nREP. STOKES: I am just very confident that \u2014 in projecting the fact that they can do this work with one year. And when they say themselves as they will say to you when they appear, this'll be one final year.\nREP. HASTERT: Thank you very much, and thank you for your testimony.\nREP. STOKES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.\nREP. HASTERT: The gentleman from Wisconsin.\nREP. BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.\nI don't have a lot of questions, either. I just want to compliment you, Congressman Stokes, for the fine job that you have done.\nREP. STOKES: Thank you.\nREP. BARRETT: And just one question. Do you think in the unfortunate and hopefully unlikely scenario that there are future assassinations in the future that this was a good way to approach this problem, the panel that you served? Do you think that you have accomplished what you intended to accomplish?\nREP. STOKES: Mr. Barrett, at the time that we undertook this panel and Congress passed the act to create this panel, 85 percent of the American people believed that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald had participated in the assassination of President Kennedy. A national poll had told us that. There were boundless rumors and myths. People were writing numerous books and things of that sort. And as a consequence of it, I think that putting this panel together and permitting this type of investigation I think was very helpful. I think it allayed many of the rumors and myths that grew up and abounded around the assassination of our president.\nHowever, I don't think that it put to bed everything. We uncovered many things. For instance, we pointed up many of the things that the Warren Commission had not done properly. And we were able to destroy many of the myths, such as the umbrella man theory and things of that sort. But we couldn't put everything to bed. We had begun that investigation 15 years after the assassination of the president. I think had we been given this type of investigation immediately after it had occurred, it would have been a different result. But many of the witnesses had died. Evidence had disappeared. As you can see now, there were materials which we were not able to get even within that two-year period before we went out of existence.\nAnd so as a consequence of it, I think we did an outstanding job. No one has ever been able to refute any of the work that we did. No one has been able thus far to say anything was ever covered up from the American people. And so to that degree, I think that it performed a good service for the American people.\nREP. HASTERT: Okay, thank you very much.\nThe gentleman from Ohio.\nREP. STEVEN LATOURETTE (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having this hearing today and for also expediting the markup on 1553, and give praise to the co-sponsors, our chairman, Mr. Burton, Mr. Waxman, and also to Congressman Stokes.\nThe editorial comment I would make is I'm always amazed each succeeding day that I serve in Congress at the rich history that a number of our colleagues have, and to now have our fine colleague from Ohio, Congressman Stokes from Cleveland, here and talk about his previous work on the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Although many members in the House remember his service, I would venture to say there are a number of people back home that don't know all of the things that you've done during your many years of service to this Congress and this country.\nJust as an example, the other day I found out \u2014 and I don't know if you're a\nlawyer or not, Mr. Chairman, but I found out that Congressman Stokes -- well, you're lucky you're not a lawyer, but I am, and I'm proud to be a lawyer. I found out that Congressman Stokes was responsible for a ruling called Terry versus Ohio, and you might have heard of a \"Terry Frisk and Search,\" and I didn't know that till the other day, that Congressman Stokes had a hand in that, and so, again, we find Congressman Stokes showing up again, sharing his expertise with the country.\n\nLou, the one question I would have, deals with, in both your written testimony, and then also your observations to Congressman Baird's question. You talked about the \"JFK\" movie, and all of the rumors and innuendoes and the public polls. And you still run into people -- as I'm sure -- I still run into people that aren't convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone on that November day in Dallas.\n\nAnd part of it has to do, I think, with, after your commission met, and now the legislation in '92, and a little delay in getting everybody in place in the review board. Do you think it was necessary, after you've reviewed the documents in this case, that we waited, as a government, 34 years to make these documents available? Was there something impinging upon the national security that you found or discovered that made it necessary for the government to wait 34 full years before releasing this information, and hopefully dispelling some of those rumors?\n\nREP. STOKES: Thank you very much, Mr. LaTourette, firstly for your nice remarks. But it's a good question, because not many people realize that this was not -- when we sealed these records for the period 30 to 50 years, this was not done because of anything relative to this particular investigation. That was a House rule in existence at that time, that applied to any committee that, when it completed its work and filed its final report, if they had documents which had not been released publicly, under that House rule, they had to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The same applied to the other part of that investigation which we conducted, which was to investigate the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., which was a companion part of our investigation. So that applied to that one also.\n\nBut as a result of it, in compliance with the House rule, it just sort of sat there until things were stirred up by that \"JFK\" movie and it sort of brought things to the head.\n\nREP. LATOURETTE: Okay. The principles behind your '92 legislation, the Assassination Records Collection Act -- obviously, now we collect records differently than we did before. A lot of them are electronically stored. Do you think that we can use that act as a vehicle, should another tragedy -- God forbid we should ever have such another tragedy in this country, but should\nanother tragedy such as this occur, could we use the lessons learned in the model of this review board to prevent the significant time lag between the date of event and the eventual release of documents for public review?\n\nREP. STOKES: I would hope, Mr. LaTourette, that we have learned some lessons. Firstly, here in the Congress we'd no longer have such a rule in effect, and that will help us, I think, tremendously.\n\nBut also, I think, by the agencies now working with a review panel of this sort and realizing that many of the type of documents which they will cite to you in their testimony \u2014 for instance, there's a very interesting document that they will talk about, where the whole page, with the exception of just the date and the name of a country \u2014 everything was redacted. And under their work, that whole page has been released, and everyone can read that.\n\nWhat you do by that is that you're to allay all the suspicion as to what really has been redacted and people can really see. And then you can't have the kind of rumors and myths that grow up around it.\nAnd I think and hope that in the event of such an occurrence in the future \u2014 which all of us hope would never occur \u2014 that our agencies will realize that this has been a good example of how we could allay some of the fears and suspicions that the American people have around the manner in which we conduct this type of thing.\n\nREP. LATOURETTE: Thank you very much, Congressman Stokes, for your expertise \u2014\nREP. STOKES: Thank you.\nREP. LATOURETTE: \u2014 and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Thank you.\nAnd at this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas.\nREP. JIM TURNER (D-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.\nAnd all I would add is to also compliment you, Mr. Stokes, for your many years of work on this effort. I too stand somewhat in awe at the number of years of service and your contributions to this body.\nREP. STOKES: Thank you.\nREP. TURNER: And I know the Congress and the American people are grateful for the years of service you've provided not only on this issue, but on many other issues to which you've contributed.\nAnd I also want to thank those who've served on this panel, because I'm sure it is a time-consuming endeavor to carry out this task.\nThank you, Mr. Chairman.\nREP. HASTERT: Thank you, Mr. Turner.\nThank you, Mr. Stokes.\nREP. STOKES: Thank you.\nREP. HASTERT: The second panel, come forward, please.\nOur distinguished second panel includes four witnesses: Mr. John Tunheim, the chair of the Assassination Records Review Board; Mr. Steven Tilley, the chief of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National Archives. We also have Mr. Max Holland, the author and contributing editor of the Wilson Quarterly; and Mr. Bruce Hitchcock, an historian and teacher at Noblesville High School in Indiana, our distinguished chairman's home state.\nAnd I also would say that, at this time, Mr. Burton would have wanted to be here to make a few comments. He is not here yet. We may entertain that at any time. So, if you gentlemen would please stand, and \u2014 (witnesses are sworn in). Thank you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.\nAnd we start with you, Mr. Tunheim.\nJOHN TUNHEIM (Chair, Assassination Records Review Board): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to submit my written testimony for the record and\njust give a brief summary to members of the subcommittee today. I'd like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify today in favor of House bill 1553. And I'd also like to note our thanks to Congressman Stokes for his leadership on this issue and his guidance in the important effort to release the records relating to the tragic assassination of President Kennedy.\n\nThe review board is confident that the additional time requested and provided by Congressman Burton's bill will allow us to complete our work and submit a truly complete final report to the Congress, to the president and to the American public. I'd like to thank Chairman Burton for introducing the bill and Congressman Waxman and Stokes for co-sponsoring the bill that is before the subcommittee today. And I also appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your role in chairing this hearing today and assisting in this effort.\n\nOne of the other members of the review board is present with us today -- I'd like to introduce her -- Dr. Anna Nelson, who is the distinguished adjunct\nhistorian in residence at the American University and is seated in the row\ndirectly behind me. Dr. David Marwell, the executive director of the review\nboard, is also here, as are a number of staff members who are very professional\nand very dedicated and have done their work for us very well.\nThe review board, Mr. Chairman, began releasing records in July of 1995,\npursuant to the act passed by Congress. And thus far, the board has acted\nspecifically to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the JFK collection at the\nNational Archives. That collection, as Mr. Tilley will tell the subcommittee\nshortly, now contains more than 3.7 million pages' worth of material.\nI'd like to show one brief and rather dramatic example of the work that the\nreview board is doing. Congressman Stokes mentioned this issue in his\ntestimony. This involves one particular record. This is the \"before\" version,\nthe record that was available to the public up until several years ago. You\nprobably cannot see it from here, but it is a document that was sent from the\nFBI's representative in Paris to Director Hoover on October 12, 1960. That is\nindicated at the top of the memorandum. The subject, as indicated, is Lee\nHarvey Oswald: Internal Security. And then it says Re: Paris Letter 9-27-60.\nAnd the remainder of the entire document is blacked out. And not surprisingly,\na document like this dated three years prior to the assassination of President\nKennedy, a document sent to J. Edgar Hoover attracted a great deal of interest\namong researchers who saw it because everything was blacked out underneath. The\nspeculation that individuals had about this was great.\nWell, the board aggressively pursued the release of this information, initially\nordering its release. The FBI appealed that decision to the president.\nSubsequently we worked out with them, including an aggressive effort to contact\nSwiss authorities who were the subject of this particular document. I met\npersonally with the Swiss ambassador to the United States to ask for his\nassistance in obtaining Swiss approval to release it.\nAnd here is the record that is now released to the American public at the\nNational Archives. All of the material is released. And what it indicates was\nthe FBI was interested in whether Oswald was indeed attending a college in\nSwitzerland during that period of time. And the document tells about the\ninvestigation that Swiss authorities did to determine whether Oswald was,\nindeed, enrolled. He was someone who the FBI was following because of his\ninterest in defecting to the Soviet Union. That's a good example of the type of\nwork that the review board is doing: pursuing individual releases of information\nthat has long been redacted from the public.\nThe board has worked closely with federal agencies. The vast majority of the\nrecords are at the CIA and the FBI. We have completed the review of the core\ncollections in both of those agencies and significant numbers of materials have\nbeen released.\nThe board has also been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records that have been in the hands of private citizens and local governments. Just a couple of examples:\nThe papers of J. Lee Rankin, who was the chief counsel to the Warren Commission, have now been released through the efforts of the review board. Virtually all of the records of the prosecution in New Orleans of Clay Shaw was also released. And I'm announcing for the first time today that the review board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw. He was the individual prosecuted in New Orleans in 1969, the only individual prosecuted for the assassination of President Kennedy. That will add another dimension to this story. This is an example of his diary, which the board has just obtained, and will be released as soon as we can process the materials. It's very interesting. It's his diary from the day that he was arrested, on March 1st, 1967 and his feelings about Oswald on that particular day.\nDespite the best estimate, Mr. Chairman, that this job could be done in three years, we cannot finish our work by the end of this fiscal year. We're confident that in the additional year we will be able to get through the records, which will largely involve the sequestered collections at the CIA and at the FBI \u2014 records sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman, that you and the members have.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Thank you. We'll hold all the questions until the end of the testimony.\n\nMR. TUNHEIM: Very well.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Mr. Tilley?\n\nSTEVEN TILLEY (Chief, Access and Freedom of Information Staff, National Archives and Records Administration): Mr. Chairman, I am Steven Tilley, and I'm the chief of the Access and Freedom of Information Staff at the National Archives and Records Administration. And I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf \u2014 for the National Archives in support of HR 1553. I'm appearing today in my capacity of NARA's chief of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In that role, I am charged with implementing NARA's responsibilities under the act, and I serve as NARA's liaison to the Assassination Records Review Board. And it's my understanding that my written statement will be made part of the record, therefore, I'll be brief in my remarks.\n\nMr. Chairman, this month marks the 20th anniversary of the closing of the office of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. I oversaw the closing of that office and supervised the transfer of those records to the National Archives. Most of my career at the National Archives since then has been involved with working with sensitive records. And in 1993, I became the chief of the JFK Collection, and I've served in that capacity ever since.\n\nWhen the review board members were confirmed by the Senate in April of 1994, my staff and I began to work with the board, and later with the board staff, to provide information on the records in the JFK Collection, the development and use of NARA's data base, our contacts and discussions with other agencies involved in searches for assassination records, and the existence of assassination records in the custody of private repositories or individuals. The review board and NARA have maintained an excellent working relationship through the three years of the board's existence, and I'd like to think that this close relationship has in some way contributed to the success of the review board.\n\nNARA enthusiastically supports passage of HR 1553 to extend the review board's authorization.\nThe board needs the time designated in this bill to complete its important work in making available as complete a historical record as possible concerning the assassination of President Kennedy.\n\nI would like to briefly offer for your consideration some statistics and facts to demonstrate the success of the board. The JFK Assassination Records Collection has grown to more than 1,600 cubic feet of records, or approximately 3.75 million pages from more than 30 different government offices. These numbers are a testament to the work of the board in obtaining the cooperation of the entire federal government as well as private donors in this important task.\n\nFor the information of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I've attached to my testimony a copy of the register of the collection, which lists the major groups of federal records and private papers along with a supplemental listing of FBI records.\n\nNot only has the collection increased dramatically in size; the significance\nof the records in the collection cannot be underestimated. In addition to the records of numerous executive branch agencies and offices, the records of relevant congressional committees, related court cases, and records donated by private entities are also available in the collection. This rich documentation is searchable electronically, giving researchers the ability to seek out documents concerning a topic, person or event, or even individual documents, not only at NARA's College Park facility but from their own personal computer through the Internet.\n\nFinally, Mr. Chairman, public demand for these records is the ultimate evidence of the value of this collection. Reference requests have risen in number every year since the collection opened with new records in August of 1993. This year we have already received over 600 written inquiries, an increase of over 30 percent from this period of time last year. The number of inquiries on our computer Web site is also steadily increasing. Since March 1996, when the assassination records database was made available through the Internet, it has been accessed over 100,000 times by the public.\n\nDue to the exceptional work of the Assassination Records Review Board, great progress has been made on making available as complete a record as possible in the history of the assassination of John Kennedy. Without the focus, integrity and expertise of the review board, the collection would not have the size, quality or public demand witnessed today.\n\nHowever, there is still much to do. NARA supports passage of HR 1553 so this important work can be completed.\n\nThat concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to answer any questions.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Thank the gentleman.\n\nMr. Holland?\n\nMAX HOLLAND (Author, contributing editor of Wilson Quarterly): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make a brief statement summarizing my testimony.\n\nNearly 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination, a chemist-turned-author named Otto Eisenschiml provoked a national furor with his 1937 book, \"Why Was Lincoln Murdered?\" Eisenschiml claimed one of the most important events in American history was still a mystery. And Eisenschiml claimed to have uncovered the truth: President Lincoln was the victim of a conspiracy organized by his secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, who was allegedly opposed to the president's program for a charitable post-war reconstruction of the South.\n\nWhen pressed, Otto Eisenschiml openly admitted that he had no evidence to support his case. At the same time, it was precisely the documentary record that enabled critics to prove that Eisenschiml's book was just another in a long line of lunatic theories about the first assassination of an American president.\nHere lies, I submit, the long-term importance of the work being carried out by the AARB. The meaning of the raw data being unearthed by the review board will probably not be appreciated any time soon by the generations sentient when President Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, but if these generations cannot come to terms with history as it happened in their lifetimes, then at the very least, they have an obligation to hand over, insofar as possible, a complete and thorough documentary record. Citizens will need that record to rebut the Otto Eisenschimls of the next century, not that there is any dearth of them now. I strongly support without qualification extension of the review board for another year and full funding of its operations. Bringing its work to an abrupt end would not only diminish the investment of time and resources already made; in all likelihood, it would throw the whole initiative into chaos. Not least of all, gutting the effort now would surely create ineradicable suspicion about the federal government's intentions in the first place. I'd like to spend the balance of my time describing the three areas where I thank the review board\nhad made its greatest contributions. The first has to do with the Warren Commission. The review board's labors have resulted in many new documents that I believe will eventually remove the stigma that has been attached to the commission, which is probably the most unfairly reviled and/or ridiculed entity ever created by the federal government.\n\nThese records paint a sobering portrait of our federal government during a very traumatic time. It's not the idealized versions depicted in civics text books nor the demonized version featured on talk radio. It's the real federal government: imperfect, plodding, riven by ambition, distrust, rivalries, compartmentalized by secrecy, working at cross-purposes or in ignorance, simultaneously guided by the most banal bureaucratic instincts and the most elevated national concerns. Somehow, through all of that, it does struggle and manage to do the right thing.\n\nBesides the Warren Commission, I think the work of the review board has made a very substantial contribution towards understanding the operations of the intelligence community. The assassination necessarily caused what could only be termed a mobilization of the U.S. intelligence community's far-flung resources. The government had to determine that weekend who was responsible and whether the assassin or assassins had any co-conspirators either foreign or domestic. Consequently the records being released now constitute a gold mine of information about domestic and foreign intelligence operations at the midpoint of the cold war. These records not only shed new light on what the government knew 34 years ago; the release is an object lesson in why they were kept secret for all those years. They do not contradict the federal government's official conclusion at stated in the Warren report. Rather, the documents were kept secret because they disclosed or tended to disclose ongoing intelligence sources and methods.\n\nWith the release of these documents, the intelligence community's record in the wake of the assassination can finally be assessed with some fairness and thoroughness. The fact is that the information provided by the FBI, CIA and other agencies was instrumental to preventing the United States government from overreacting when the circumstantial public evidence was highly suggestive of a link between Lee Harvey Oswald and a foreign power.\n\nThe last area in which the review board has made a -- perhaps its greatest contribution has to do with whole issue of secrecy and disclosure. The balance between secrecy and disclosure has always been in favor of secrecy, especially since World War II, controlled by laws highly deferential to the equities of the interested government agencies. The five citizens who serve on the review board decided that if their mandate was to have any meaning it was imperative to pierce this veil. They had to get at categories that had been classified here\nbefore, including information derived from intelligence sources and methods. While some historians have been critical of the resources devoted to this particular effort, I like to believe that a breakthrough had to be achieved somewhere, and in fact, the records pertaining to President Kennedy's assassination make an excellent demonstration project of what can now be released. The lines drawn by the review board should prove helpful as the government undertakes to declassify the vast body of records generated during the Cold War.\n\nFinally, I'd like to say the entire history of the federal government's efforts in the wake of the assassination, including the experience of the review board, serves as a cautionary tale. Perhaps it will enable the government to strike a better balance between secrecy and disclosure in the future, for there exists no better example of the heavy wages of doubt, suspicion and public cynicism exacted by secrecy than the Kennedy assassination experience.\n\nThank you, Mr. Chairman.\nREP. HASTERT: I thank the gentleman.\nAnd now, Mr. Hitchcock, I'd like to welcome you especially. A gentleman from Ohio asked me a little while ago if I was an attorney. Indeed, I was not an attorney, I happened to be a history teacher for 16 years before I ever got into politics. So it's certainly a noble trade, and happy that you're here. I know the chairman wanted to introduce you personally, but he couldn't make it this afternoon.\nYou have contributed students, I understand, a clerk for this commission, and have been involved in it at a very high degree. So we welcome you and listen to your testimony.\nBRUCE HITCHCOCK (Teacher, Noblesville High School, Indiana): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would ask that my written statement be entered into the record and I will briefly summarize.\nREP. HASTERT: Without objection, all written statements will be entered into the record.\nMR. HITCHCOCK: Thank you.\nMy name is Bruce Hitchcock and I am a teacher at Noblesville High School located in Noblesville, Indiana, which is a community approximately 20 miles north of Indianapolis. I am currently completing my 28th year in secondary education. My teaching assignment has primarily been in the areas of United States history, American government, and international relations.\n\nAnd I want to express my appreciation to the committee for affording me the honor and privilege of being here today and permitting me to make some brief remarks concerning an issue about which I have very strong convictions not only as a citizen, but as an educator.\nIn the spring of 1994, I assigned my Honors United States history class a project studying the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This project culminated in the students placing the Warren Commission Report on trial. Half of the class represented the prosecution and half the class defended the Warren Commission Report. The class became quite interested in, and many would say obsessed with this subject. The project resulted in a trial which became quite intense and divisive, so much so that the class had to have a party at the end of the semester to rekindle friendships. They became so fascinated with the subject of the assassination that they requested an opportunity to travel to Washington, DC during the summer following their graduation to do additional research.\nFrom that modest class assignment developed an internship opportunity with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board. To date, four student groups from\nbelieve the government did conceal, continues to conceal, and will continue to conceal the truth. If the review board is permitted time to complete its work, it will assist in defusing the last two charges. We cannot prevent the speculation that someone did conceal the truth. But the argument that a cover-up continues, and will continue, can at least be defused, or discouraged. What has been lost cannot be replaced. However, what still exists can be made public. We should have access, and our students should have access to the information and documents still in existence. This is an opportunity for the United States government to provide a credible response to public interest. The review board established by the Congress, is actually a group of citizens telling the government what to do, and what to release. An opportunity exists, in this era of skepticism, to restore some credibility and trust in the government.\n\nIn his recent book, \"The Approaching Fury,\" author Stephen B. Oates quotes John Furling as saying, \"Events by themselves are unimportant. It is the perception of events that is crucial.\"\n\nPerhaps in 1997, the most important aspect concerning the assassination of President Kennedy, is the perception, shared by many, of a conspiracy involving individuals and agencies of the United States government. Do we not owe our young people the opportunity to form the most accurate perception possible? Do we not owe them the chance to see as much of the truth intact as can be assembled?\n\nIt seems to me that we owe this generation, and all succeeding generations, the opportunity to question, to study, and to form opinions on the basis of information they can view independently, without solely relying on the opinions of others. Oftentimes, while I'm in the classroom, I observe students who have opinions, but little to substantiate them. Congress has a chance before it in some small way -- or maybe in some large way -- to at least provide them with more information, so that they may have their turn in determining what the JFK assassination means.\n\nWe have been affected by this event. For 34 years we have been affected. The 56 students from Noblesville High School have, as have countless others, been affected by the events of November 22nd, 1963.\n\nThe study of this event has the public interest. It is an event to which the public and students can relate. It touches people.\n\nAs an aside, last week an article was published in the Indianapolis Star. I have a copy with me today. Regarding our school's ongoing JFK assassination project. Within a day of its publication I received phone calls from a gentleman offering 500 pages of documents for our use. And from a former teacher calling me with information regarding some scholarship opportunities. I also received a call\nfrom ABC News Nightline. And yesterday before leaving Noblesville High School received a call from Atlanta, Georgia offering information.\n\nThe subject of the call from Nightline was seeking information as to what Noblesville High School students were doing with regard to the study of the assassination. Together I think these calls reflect continued local and national interest in continuing the probe into what happened in Dallas. Congress has the opportunity to lay the facts before the American public and permit a more reasoned, rational and fact-based account and discussion of the assassination. I would hope that the committee would take into consideration the fact that the review board had a one-year delay before truly becoming operational, that it is making a one-time request for an extension, that the review board has been on task and on budget, that the review board has conducted its business in a professional and non-partisan manner, and in 1992, when the act was passed by this Congress and signed by President Bush, the enormity of the task was not\nNoblesville High School have interned with the review board, with the fifth scheduled for the week of June 16th of this year. When this group completes its work, a total of 56 of our students will have participated in this unique and truly educational opportunity.\n\nI might add that except for the first group, succeeding student groups have studied, researched and prepared for their internship on their own time, outside normal class meetings. The most recent group to participate did so over spring break. The fact that students wanted to spend their vacation working with government records reflects the interest that the JFK assassination has for students.\n\nIn my 28 years of teaching, I have never had a topic create as much interest as the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a mystery, and it provides an excellent research opportunity, as well as a chance for students to be actively involved in learning.\n\nSince November 22nd, 1963, there have been many who have believed, and still\nand could not be fully appreciated. An opportunity exists to complete a task which I believe is overwhelmingly supported by the American public, and it is important that this mission and mandate authorized by Congress be completed. I would like to end with just a couple of quotes, one from former Senator Bob Dole, who said in a different context, this is not about only who we are. It is about have we made a difference. This is a chance to make a difference. And as former President Reagan often said, if not us, who, and if not now, when? After 34 years it is time to let the public know the facts that remain. To do less would be a tragedy and a travesty. As an educator I believe that our most important task is to provide our young people the most complete story of who we are and why we are who we are. We have an opportunity to work towards the accomplishment of that goal. It is an opportunity, I believe, we cannot afford to miss.\n\nIn his last speech in Fort Worth on November 22nd, 1963, President Kennedy said, we would like to live as we once lived, but history will not permit it. History can only be served by permitting the public to see the evidence.\n\nMr. Chairman, as a further aside, if I might just have a few seconds. Reflective of our students' interest in this event, I have my honors government classes perform a project for the model Congress. One of the students this year \u2014 they could write a bill on whatever subject they wished, and one student who worked with the review board last year introduced House concurrent resolution 1 in support of the review board, and concludes, after all the whereas's, the Congress of the United States firmly supports the assassination records review board in all endeavors leading to the collection, review and release of the documents regarding the assassination of President Kennedy and supports the extension of the life of the ARRB for an additional fiscal year.\n\nThank you, Mr. Chairman.\n\nREP. HASTERT: We thank the gentleman and thank the panel. Now, I recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.\n\nREP. BARRETT: Mr. Hitchcock, can you give us the name of that student so we can make him or her an honorary co-sponsor? Might as well get the name in the record.\n\nMR. HITCHCOCK: Abigail Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.\n\nREP. BARRETT: Judge Tunheim, you mentioned that you were releasing some materials from Clay Shaw's diary and perhaps other things. Is there any information in here that you find particularly interesting?\n\nMR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Barrett, I've not had a chance to go through it. We've just gotten these materials in the last week through some aggressive efforts on our\nstaff. The page that I cited to you is interesting in that he made the notation in there and it's a portion of it in his own handwriting that it was perhaps unfortunate that he had never met Oswald because then he might have possibly been a tiny footnote in history, an ironic statement given the role that he played in the trial.\n\nWe've not had a chance to analyze it thoroughly yet. It does contain his reactions to events as they were going on around him during the course of the prosecution and certainly supports his view that he was not involved whatsoever in the assassination, which ultimately was the view of the jury that acquitted him.\n\nREP. BARRETT: For my benefit, as a person who has not been immersed in this issue at all. You just mentioned it took some aggressive work from your staff to get this released. Can you tell me what that entailed, where it was, why it was so difficult to get this information?\n\nMR. TUNHEIM: Certainly. Part of this, this is an investigation into where\nrecords are. The bulk of our work has been with federal agencies that hold assassination records. But we've also, at the direction of Congress in the bill that was passed, entertained a search for records wherever they might be. Records that are in private hands are not records that we can subpoena and take from people, so we have to find where they are. Staff members go out, talk to people, encourage them to donate those records to the American public, to the National Archives. That was done in this case. We received a tip that an individual had records that were left over from Mr. Shaw, and staff went and talked to the person, spent time with the person, encouraged them to share those records with the American public, and that's how it was developed.\n\nREP. BARRETT: How do you determine which assassination records you can disclose now and which just have to wait?\nMR. TUNHEIM: Well, there's a standard that's set up by the act. There's first of all a presumption that all records should be public. That presumption has governed what the board has done throughout the process. But then there's a standard where the board has to weigh the public interest in a particular record or information with the potential harm that might be caused by release of the material.\nThe standards that we look at are, are there national security interests such as disclosure of an intelligence agent whose name hasn't been disclosed and whether that person perhaps may be in some danger if that name was released publicly. Does it disclose a method of protecting the president that is not generally known today, so therefore it might be a threat to the president. Are there personal privacy considerations that are involved.\nI will tell you that when all is said and done, a very, very tiny percentage of information gets redacted under the standards that we are applying, and the process of going through the records has led the board to arrive at a number of policy decisions which the agencies by and large are now following in their own review of records, and therefore decisions that we had to make two years ago now we don't have to make because the agency is following the advice of the board made on earlier records.\nREP. BARRETT: As long as there are some records that are not being released, do you think that we will inevitably face criticism from some people in the American public that there is still some sort of cover-up? I make reference to Mr. Holland's comments about a book being written 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination.\nWill the time ever come, do you think, when all records will be released?\nMR. TUNHEIM: I think it will, Mr. Barrett. The board is releasing every record. The question is whether certain information on these records gets redacted or not. For every redaction we are attaching a specific release date. Some of the dates are five years in the future. The law that was passed which established the review board provided that all records that are redacted, all information redacted will be released in 2017 unless whoever is president at that time makes a specifics determination that the record cannot be released because of some continuing national security concern. So we expect that virtually all of the information by 2017 will be released but a very high percentage, in the 99.999 range is being released right now.\n\nREP. BARRETT: Mr. Tilley, in your written statement you indicate that the collections currently consist of 3.75 million pages. What's your estimate of how many more records need to be reviewed?\n\nMR. TILLEY: Well, it's hard to say because there is still a good deal of material that's being reviewed by agencies at this time. But we have located\nsome records at the National Archives that are still under review, such as the Secretary of Army's records dealing with Operation Mongoose, the campaign to destabilize the Cuban government in the period after the Bay of Pigs. Other records have been located at other agencies. I received a call from the Customs Bureau today and they will be turning over their assassination records to me hopefully this afternoon. After this hearing is over I'll be picking up the records they've located.\n\nSo it's tough to say how much is still out there but I think there's still going to be another considerable amount of material, probably will be added to the collection before this process is finished.\n\nREP. BARRETT: Millions of pages?\n\nMR. TILLEY: Oh, no. I would say probably, if we had another half a million pages, that might be the extent of it. But what's interesting and fascinating about this process is that we continue to turn up records where we did not know there were records before. As agencies are aware of this effort, they have come to the board. And the board is responsible for a lot of this by their aggressive work with federal agencies. But I don't see us ever doubling the collection again, but I think we will add a significant amount of material in the weeks and years ahead.\n\nREP. BARRETT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Mr. Tunheim, I have just a very short question. You mentioned the movie that came out, JFK, and Mr. Oliver Stone's work in there. Did Mr. Stone ever have any questions of your work at all, or did he do research?\n\nMR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Stone has been very supportive of the work of the review board. He testified before the Congress when this bill was passed initially, encouraging broad release of the records. He sent a representative to one of our public hearings who testified and spoke very favorably about the work of the board. So he's been strongly supportive and we've appreciated that support.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Why have you waited to this point in the process to begin reviewing the CIA and FBI records?\n\nMR. TUNHEIM: Well, we've been reviewing CIA records and FBI records from the very beginning, Mr. Chairman. The volume of records in those agencies is really significant. We have completed the entire review of the core collections of those agencies and those are numbers, between the two agencies, it's more than a million pages of records.\n\nWhat we are doing right now are delving into what's called the sequestered collection in both of these agencies. Within the CIA these are records that the House Select Committee on Assassinations asked to be sequestered, taken away from their files and kept in a secure place for future review. The House Select Committee did not have time to review these records carefully. Some of them are\nhighly relevant to the assassination, others are not. Within the CIA there are about 62 boxes of material and 72 reels of microfilm. In the FBI in the same kind of sequestered collection is about 280,000 pages of records. Those records are the focus of the review board's work over the next year, if we get the extension.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Let me ask the same question I asked the previous panel. Do you think that you can finish your work by the end of the fiscal year 1998?\n\nMR. TILLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'm confident that the board can complete its work. Members of the review board are confident. We will make every effort to ensure that it gets done. In fact, we intend to provide to your staff a timeline which sets out our anticipation of how we will review these records over the next year.\n\nWe have set up a review process that we're working on right now that's moving quickly and we are confident that the work can be done. We were set up to be a temporary board and no one on the board wishes this effort to take a long\ntime. We need to get the information to the American public.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Thank you very much. Mr. Hitchcock, I want to ask you, bringing students into the real realm of research and learning in that respect, how important is it that records like this be made available to the public so that folks like yourself can have the availability for students?\n\nMR. HITCHCOCK: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important for not only teachers of history and historians but also for future students and future generations. One of the things so special about our relationship with the review board has not only been an opportunity for students to travel to Washington, and they pay their own way and they do their own research on their own time. But it has helped change opinions in many cases by students about not only the assassination but about government, politics, agencies and people who work for the government.\n\nI cannot overstate the importance this has had for the 43 thus far, and soon to be 56, students from Noblesville High School who have had this research opportunity, that have been able actually to see, handle original documents, to work with documents, to see firsthand the evidence that exists. To have that opportunity is something that no teacher, no classroom, no film, no laser disk, nothing in the classroom can simulate such interest and focus as this trip to Washington DC, the review of documents, the working with people that we've had the opportunity to be with at the review board on a firsthand basis.\n\nIt is just something that cannot be duplicated, or as I said, simulated in any classroom anywhere in the country. It's just been a fantastic opportunity and will provide students in the future with a place to go to find those records, to look at the records, to look at the documents, and be at least assured that as much as is available and is in existence can now be made available to them as ordinary citizens of this country, whether they be students at a university, students at a high school, or in their just curiosity and interest as American citizens.\n\nI don't think it can be overstated the impact that this will have in helping bridge that gap of skepticism, if this is the correct way to say it, that exists. I just cannot imagine what the many conspiracy theorists out there would think if the review board has to finish its stay without completing its work.\n\nREP. HASTERT: Thank you. The gentleman from Ohio.\n\nREP. LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.\n\nAnd Mr. Chairman, I would begin by indicating that my earlier query about your legal training was not meant to be an affront, and I should have recognized that your learned demeanor was that of a --\n\nREP. HASTERT: Not at all.\nREP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Howe, I don't have a question but I'm glad you told the story of Otto Eisenschiml because somewhere in the back of my mind I remember a book or movie called the Lincoln conspiracy and I was certain that Secretary Stanton had something to do with the demise of our sixteenth president, so I'm glad you brought that up.\n\nMr. Tunheim, I do want to ask you a follow-up question to what we were talking to Congressmen Stokes about and I was fascinated by the document that you held up. When I was in the prosecution business and we had a public records law in Ohio which was new on the books, we found that law enforcement agencies always wanted to take a big black magic marker and redact everything. It was my view that that led to more conjecture, rumor, suspicion than not, and I think this document that you brought forward, knowing that it came from the Swiss federal police, that would give, I think, some cause to believe that Mr. Oswald had some Swiss bank account and was squirreling away money from foreign nationals as part of a conspiracy.\nWhen you un-redact it, if that's really a word, you find out like so many other people he apparently registered for the Albert Schweitzer College for the fall semester of 1960 and didn't show up. Nothing sinister or unusual in that at all. The question I have is, when you were testifying you indicated that the FBI originally appealed the decision to not\u2014or to withdraw the redaction of this particular document. You also indicated that the vast majority of documents that you have left to review during this renewal period are located at the CIA and the FBI in the sequestered section, I assume.\n\nAre you any unusual difficulties with either of those agencies in terms of cooperation as you attempt to get to a public release of what should be appropriately publicly released?\n\nMR. TUNHEIM: Well, Mr. LaTourette, the answer \u2014 the question is, no, we're not receiving any degree of difficulty with those agencies right now. They are committed to this process. They are supportive of the effort to keep the process going for one additional year.\n\nThe CIA has not appealed decisions that the review board has made. We've got a good working relationship with the people within that agency who are doing their work. The FBI appealed a significant number of our decisions, but now all of those appeals have been withdrawn. And we've got a working relationship with the FBI that I think has been constructive and professional and is working quite well.\n\nThe FBI initially opposed release of the document that I held up and appealed the decision because they had contacted, in a general way, the Swiss federal police and asked whether this record could be released, and the answer was no. Our follow-up through the ambassador is showing what really this document was all about, led to some wiser approach to the particular issue. And sometimes it takes additional work like that to accomplish the release of important materials.\n\nREP. LATOURETTE: And the last question I would have is Congressman Stokes expressed the view that perhaps the fine work of this review board \u2014 should another review board setting be required in the future to review another situation similar to this, that you may be breaking down some of the barriers in terms of suspicions that the intelligence community may have about do we need to, you know, stick to the script and have a page that has all black magic marker on it? Do you find that the lessons learned in this review board will be instructive to us as we move forward and think of ways of dealing with the release of documents in the future?\n\nMR. TUNHEIM: I think that's a very good question. And we have found through this effort, being the first group, an independent group outside of an agency, to have this degree of control over the declassification process. The process\nat first was rough and difficult and fraught with suspicion. That has changed. There's been a sea change as these agencies have realized that release of this information is not going to harm our national security, that perhaps it's time simply to trust the American people with access to important information about their government. And I think everyone has learned important lessons from this process. It's a process that, while time-consuming, has worked very well for this set of records.\n\nREP. LATOURETTE: And in that regard and in that vein, have you at the review board put together sort of an instruction or an operating manual to be left behind for future such endeavors?\n\nMR. TUNHEIM: Well, we certainly will. We have \u2014 virtually all of our work has been computerized so that we have an extensive record of exactly how we've approached all these issues. We do intend, in our final report, to make recommendations on how this effort can be extended in the future to other areas if the Congress so wishes.\nREP. LATOURETTE: Thank you for answering my questions. Thank you for your fine work. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.\n\nREP.: Thank you. I had a couple of questions. I read your testimony as I was listening to the other two. I'm sorry I was late. I wanted to ask Mr. Holland; were there credible historians who at this point were still questioning the assassination in the Warren Commission and the information that came out before this commission existed, before these documents came out?\n\nMR. HOLLAND: Basically, most historians have stayed away from it because they regard it as a tar baby. So there are actually surprisingly few. By historians, you mean professors at universities. Surprisingly few have written about it, because they just see it as a morass, and how are you going to possibly figure out what happened? So my answer would be -- and, you know, credible is in the eye of the beholder.\n\nBut there's actually remarkably few, and that's one of my arguments is that you have to -- it is time to insert it back into history. It did happen during the Cold War, and that exerted a tremendous influence over what the government did. Right after the assassination, it was a precipitating element of the formation of the Warren Commission that the Cold War was ongoing, and they worried about -- to be frank, they worried about congressional committees holding hearings and disclosure of sources and methods, such as the fact that Oswald had gone to Mexico City and been observed by photographic surveillance, and how was that going to be handled by a congressional committee? So I do believe it has to be inserted into historical context. That's probably been the element that's been missing all this time.\n\nREP.: So you believe one of the elements of this commission is it'll bring out of pulp -- pop culture -- pulp culture was a bad choice of words -- pop culture and in more mainstream because more documents are there, less questions. It can now be analyzed. And also, you seem to hint that we'll gain as much, not necessarily that there's a lot of new information on the assassination, but that we're going to learn a lot about how our government worked and a lot of the interrelationships, and that may be, in fact, more use to the historians than any questions they had remaining about the assassination.\n\nMR. HOLLAND: I think -- my own particular view is that besides, you know, being an investigation of three crimes -- the murder of President Kennedy, the assault on Governor Connally and the murder of Officer Tippett (sp), and then the murder of Oswald, so four crimes -- the Warren Commission is a fantastic lens to view the operation of the government circa 1963-64, because they had an overriding mandate.\n\nBut yet they were going up against agencies such as the FBI and CIA with\nentrenched interests, and especially Hoover's FBI was sort of a wonder to behold. You dealt with it very gingerly. So it's a great \u2014 and the FBI had not been second-guessed since Hoover became director. This was the first time. And you can't underestimate what that meant in terms of the difficulties it posed for the commission. Now, I maintain they still came to the right conclusion, but the fact is that they had a lot of trouble with the FBI.\n\nREP.: One of the questions here is it took so many years to get to this point. In looking at what future commissions might do, how much of that, do you think, can be overcome? In other words, how much of this was the Hoover FBI, say, and how much of this is institutional that in the first 10 years you'd have so many agents active in the field, ongoing operations, in the first 20 years there's still some \u2014 can we accelerate the process?\n\nWhat have we learned from this as to \u2014 obviously this is one that particularly anybody in the '60s era was a defining event, so it's an extraordinary assassination. But what have we learned for investigations in the future? Do\nyou believe the CIA and FBI will release information sooner? And if so, presumably they'll still be redacted, which still could lead to Oliver Stone movies and Lincoln conspiracy books and all sorts of things.\n\nMR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think that the fact that these records are 30 years old has helped in obtaining their release. It's not information about the assassination per se that agencies have objected to releasing. It's more who said what to who, who's an intelligence agent and who's an informant for the FBI, those kinds of issues. And there will still be institutional reluctance to release any of that information.\n\nI hope that through this process we can demonstrate to the public and to these agencies that this information can be released to the public, that the public can be trusted with information like this. There will still be a need for secrecy to a certain extent, but certainly not with the broad brush/black pen approach of the past.\n\nREP.: We first learned -- I was elected in '94, and our first experience in this committee was with Waco, where we had similar questions and still had some information that wasn't able to be released. We're certainly having that ongoing debate with the administration right now, because it gets far beyond the initial investigation. In the course of Travelgate we discovered the data bank. And, of course, with the data bank you discover the code, and then you find out that the code leads to this. Pretty soon you're off into other investigations. That's going to be an ongoing problem. Do you believe, in the end, that this will have silenced most critics?\n\nMR. HOLLAND: In my view, Mr. Chairman, it will silence some. It will perhaps provoke others.\n\nWe're many years after an event that was investigated in a different era. There were many mistakes made at the time that cannot be corrected at this stage in time. But I think when the review board is done with its work, one thing we should be able to prove to the American people is that the federal government is no longer keeping secrets from them relative to the Kennedy assassination. I think that will be a very significant development.\n\nWhether all the questions will be resolved or not, that's a question for historians in the future who will review these materials and will make their determinations. This is like a gigantic puzzle with a lot of pieces missing. We are putting some of those pieces in, small pieces and large pieces. But there's a lot of pieces of the puzzle that will never be found.\n\nREP.: I want to ask one last question, and that's options of dealing with acquiring the Zapruder film. Is that going to be a cost additional to what you're requesting? Do you have options on how to pay for that? What's the\nstatus of that?\n\nMR. HOLLAND: Well, the Zapruder film, as the chairman is aware, the review board designated that as an assassination record about a month or so ago. We felt that that decision was determined by the Congress in the passage of the JFK Records Collection Act when it said that all records in the possession of the National Archives are assassination records and should be included in this collection.\n\nRecognizing the potential cost of a film like this, we did set forth a 16-month period before the taking would take place, so that the Congress could address this issue and make appropriate determinations that the Congress wished to make those determinations. The board did feel that that decision had been made for it by the Congress in the earlier act and that it is the most significant piece of evidence of one of the most significant crimes in our nation's history. So, therefore, the original has an intrinsic value, and it should belong forever to the American public.\nWe are hopeful that the Zapruder family will agree eventually to donate that film to the American public. We have no assurances of that at this point. But we did set the time frame far out in the future so that the Congress can review this issue and make its own determinations if it so wishes. REP.: Do you have any additional questions? With that, I thank you all for \u2014\nREP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Chairman, if I could beg your indulgence and just ask one more question, if I may.\nMr. Tunheim, if I might, my previous question about difficulty with the CIA and FBI. Sometimes I don't make things broad enough. And I guess my query would be, it's been brought to my attention that perhaps there's been some difficulty in obtaining records from the other body. Is there any agency within the federal government that you're having difficulty in terms of cooperation that would impede your ability to complete your work in a timely fashion, as envisioned by this legislation?\nMR. TUNHEIM: Mr. LaTourette, I have not seen any evidence currently that anyone is deliberately stonewalling us, so that when we go away, they will put the records back into the files. We had some significant problems early in the process, just really because agencies didn't understand what this was all about and didn't understand what the law really provided for. So it took some time. It's taken some time, for example, with the Secret Service to get them to the point of realizing their obligations under the act. They do now, and they've been very cooperative and easy to work with. But this has been a learning process for all of the agencies, and I feel at the current time there are no impediments among any of the agency partners that we're dealing with to completing the review of the records on a timely basis.\nREP. LATOURETTE: Thank you. I thank the chair for your indulgence.\nREP.: I thank you all for your testimony and appreciate your coming today. For procedural purposes, I'll now close this hearing \u2014 the hearing is adjourned \u2014 and open a subcommittee markup on HR 1553, markup of the John F. Kennedy Record Review Board Reauthorization Act. The hearing is now open.\nIf there are no opening statements, the subcommittee will now proceed to the consideration of the bill as amended. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with and the bill will be considered for amendment at any point. Do any members wish to be recognized to offer an amendment? Hearing none, the question is on favorable reporting of the bill, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. All those in favor say \"Aye.\"\nMEMBERS: Aye.\nREP.: Opposed, \"No.\" In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. It goes fast. The question now comes, will the subcommittee report the bill to the full\ncommittee? All those in favor, say \"Aye.\" MEMBERS: Aye.\nREP.: Opposed, \"No.\" In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. The bill moves forward to the full committee. There is no other business before the subcommittee. We now stand adjourned. 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but HPSCI may want it sooner.\n\nJohn F. Pereira\nFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY\n\n26 August 1993\n\nCIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS\nRELEASE IN FULL\n2000\n\nJFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS\n\nI. Overview: CIA declassification program for JFK records\n - Sequestered files and Oswald 201 file\n - Total JFK records:\n Hardcopy documents: 162,000 pages\n Microfilm: 73 reels, 150,000 pages\n\nII. Resources devoted to JFK\n\n Number of people: 15 HRG (9 staffers, 6 retirees)\n 25 indexers (overtime, weekends)\n 10 DO for coordination\n\nIII. Documents Released:\n\n Oswald 35,000 pages \u2713\n Sequestered files 90,000 pages \u2713\n Total 125,000 pages \u2713\n\n Indexing and identification forms for each document\n Show example of iden form\n\n Withheld temporarily:\n HSCA-originated: 20,000 pages\n Third Agency 7,000 pages\n\n Denied-in-full\n - Continuing review of the DIF documents by HRG\n - Likelihood CIA will release a number (many ?) of DIF\n - Review Board's determination on DIF items\n\nSAN - review for panel\nIV. Identification forms provided to NARA for each DIF Document\n\nV. Types of information protected in DIF items\n - Grounds for postponement of information under JFK Law\n\nVI. Who made judgments on withholding documents\n - 15 reviewers\n - Followed procedures\n - Senior Reviewers provided guidance\n - Directorates coordinated\n - Third agency coordination\n\nVII. Issues for Review Board\nFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY\n\nCIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS\nRELEASE IN FULL\n2000\nJFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS\n\nHPSCI BRIEFING OUTLINE\n\nIntroduction: Discuss how CIA fulfilled requirements of the JFK Act.\nDiscuss the withheld documents\n\nGeneral Remarks\n\n1. Every JFK record will be seen by the Review Board.\n\n2. We have followed the JFK Assassination Records Act in determining which records will be postponed. (Section 6)\n - Our presumption was that a record would be released.\n\n3. We made every effort to meet the 22 August deadline established by the JFK Act. The Director was committed to this.\n\n4. This called for a major effort\u2014additional people, lot of overtime and weekend shifts.\n\n5. We are continuing to review the postponed documents, and expect to release a high percentage of them.\n23 January 1996\n\nCIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS\nRELEASE IN FULL\n\nMemo for Record\n\nSubject: - Status of JFK Records Review 2000\n\nReferences: Letter from Marwell to Pereira, dtd 15 Dec 96, (same subject);\nLetter from Pereira to Marwell, dtd 19 Jan 96, (response to above letter);\nPhone Conversation with Marwell, 22 Jan 96, (same subject).\n\n1. Marwell requested a figure for the number of records in the sequestered files that contained postponements. I explained that our review figures were based on pages and that there was no record count for the microfilm part of the collection. However, based on the HRG index unaudited record count (see below) of the Oswald 201 file and the JFK hardcopy boxes, I was able to give him an estimate of 28,000 records.\n\n2. Unaudited HRG Index statistics:\n\n| Total Records | Records w/Postponements |\n|---------------|-------------------------|\n| Oswald 4,349 | 1,871 |\n| JFK (63 boxes)| 28,532 |\n| 32,881 (154,724 pages) | 14,003 |\n\nThe page count for the hardcopy part of the collection is within 10,000 pages of the Microfilm (163,500). Given that the microfilm contains many duplicates and similar records as the hardcopy, the percentage of sanitized documents should be close to the same. I estimate the total number of records with postponements to be approximately 28,000.\nAs you requested, I called Susan Oullette, HPSCI Staff today to respond to her questions about JFK Assassination records. She said that the Committee was interested in the process used for declassifying the records, the status of our review, and what criteria we use for declassification.\n\nFollowing are among the main topics we covered during a discussion of about 10 minutes on the STU-III:\n\n- A description of the JFK records held by CIA\n- Process of declassification (review by retired senior officers, coordination with DO, OGC, others)\n- Criteria for redaction\n- Coordination with FBI, other agencies on third agency documents.\n- Presidentially-appointed JFK Assassination Records Review Board\n - Differences with the Board on release of certain information e.g., names of former employees, identification of stations\n - Current appeal to the White House of decision by Board to release certain information we redacted.\n - Efforts of the Board to identify additional records, including in other countries\n\nSusan said that she may have enough information for now, but she would let me know if more would be needed. I invited her to visit us if she wanted more details or to look at the records.\n\nCC: Brian S. Latell, J. Barry Harrelson, Fred Wickham @ DO\nCONFIDENTIAL\n\nEVENT: QUICK COM\nPLACE: 7BOO HQS\nFOR: HPSCI\nSUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS\n\nRESPONSIBLE OFFICER: RICHARD SCHROEDER - SECURE: 3-9940\n\n--- > (PARTICIPANTS) < ---\n\nASSOC NAME ROLE\n\nSTAFF OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI)\n\nCIA PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI) BRFR\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY:\n\nIn response to a request from HPSCI staffer Susan Ouellette, John Pereira, Chief of the Center for the Study of Intelligence's Historical Review Group, called her to discuss staff questions. Attached is his memo of that telecon.\n\nQUOTE:\nI called Susan Ouellette, HPSCI Staff today to respond to her questions about JFK Assassination records. She said that the Committee was interested in the process used for declassifying the records, the status of our review, and what criteria we use for declassification.\n\nFollowing are among the main topics we covered during a discussion of about 10 minutes on the STU-III:\n- A description of the JFK records held by CIA\n- Process of declassification (review by retired senior officers, coordination with DO, OGC, others)\n- Criteria for redaction\n- Coordination with FBI, other agencies on third agency documents.\n- Pr\u00e9sidentially-appointed JFK Assassination Records Review Board\n- Differences with the Board on release of certain information e.g., names of former employees, identification of stations\n- Current appeal to the White House of decision by Board to we redacted.\n\nrelease certain information\nEfforts of the Board to identify additional records, including in other countries\n\nSusan said that she may have enough information for now, but she would let me know if more would be needed. I invited her to visit us if she wanted more details or to look at the records.\n\nEND QUOTE\n\nSUPPORTING TEXT:\n\nno further text in this document (U)\n\n[Richard E. Schroeder]\nDCI/OCA/CLG\n28 March 1996\n\nDistribution: DCI/CSI\nDO/ORMS\nDDI\nOGC\nOCA\nRES chrono\n\nCL BY 620119\nCL REASON 1.5C\nDECL ON X1\nDRV FM HUM 4-82\nCONFIDENTIAL\nNOTE FOR: John Pereira\nFROM: Richard E. Schroeder\nDATE: 03/28/96 01:19:41 PM\nSUBJECT: HPSCI Request for staff brief on JFK assassination\n\nHPSCI staffer Susan Ouellette liked John Pereira's 27 Mar 96 telecon on the JFK assassination issue (see attached note) so much that she'd like to schedule a staff brief for sometime in the next two weeks. She'd like the brief to concentrate on two issues mentioned by John in the telecon:\n\n- Differences with the Board on release of certain info (names of former employees, identification of stations),\n- Current appeal to the White House of decession of Board to release certain info we redacted.\n\nDefer to John and DO addees to work out who'll brief (see separate note from DO/ORMS/Laurie Goodwin re Bill McNair.)\n\nOuellette suggests c. 1000 either Apr 2, 3, or 4, or Apr 9, 10, 11 since HPSCI recess schedule is pretty open.\nJohn, pls advise your timing preference. Thanks.\n\nC9605672.DOC\n\nCC: Brian Latell\n Barry Harrelson\n Fred Wickham @ DO\n William McNair @ DO\n Virginia B. OKUM @ DO\n Montgomery Rogers\n Charles Boykin\n Joyce Woodburn\n Jacqueline Mitchell\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\n\nAttendees at the meeting with HPSI Members on Wed:\n\n- Mike Sheehy\n- Christine Healey\n- Steve Nelson\n- Doug Bowman\n- Bill Lieser\n\nDate 4/96\nTO: John Pereira\n Laurie Goodwin @ DO\nFROM: Richard E. Schroeder-C.\nDATE: 04/03/96 12:57:18 PM\nSUBJECT: Re: HPSCI Request for staff brief on JFK assassination\n\nHPSCI staffer Susan Ouellette liked John Pereira's 27 Mar 96 telecon on the JFK assassination issue (see attached note) so much that she'd like to schedule a staff brief for sometime in the next two weeks. She'd like the brief to concentrate on two issues mentioned by John in the telecon:\n --Differences with the Board on release of certain info (names of former employees, identification of stations),\n and\n --Current appeal to the White House of decision of Board to release certain info we redacted.\n\nDefer to John and DO addres to work out who'll brief (see separate note from DO/ORMS Laurie Goodwin re Bill McNair.)\n\nOuellette suggests c. 1000 either Apr 2, 3, or 4, or Apr 9, 10, 11 since HPSCI recess schedule is pretty open.\nJohn, pls advise your timing preference. Thanks.\n\nC9605672.DOC\n\nI've now confirmed our briefing for HPSCI at 1030 Weds 10 April. Pls let me know who will attend for CSI and the DO.\nThanks. OCA van will depart from OHB Main Entrance at 1000. RES 1255/3Apr96.\n\nCC: Brian Latell, Barry Harrelson, Fred Wickham @ DO, William McNair @ DO, Virginia B. OKUM @ DO, Montgomery Rogers, Charles Boykin, Joyce Woodburn, Jacqueline Mitchell\nNOTE FOR: John F. Pereira \nJ. Barry Harrelson \nFROM: Linda C. Cipriani \nDATE: 04/09/96 01:51:24 PM \nSUBJECT: HPSCI talking points\n\nThought you may be interested in seeing in advance an outline of what I plan to say at the HPSCI briefing. Of course, I will be ready to alter this according to the circumstances of the meeting!\n\nTalking Points\n\nI. Statutory Authorities of the JFK Board\n\n1. The JFK Act states that all government records relating to the JFK assassination should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure and that all records will eventually be disclosed. Although the Act allows for the postponement of release of certain information, all records will be disclosed in full by 2017 unless the President certifies that protection is still necessary.\n\n2. Under the JFK Act, the JFK Board determines what is an \"assassination record\" and whether an assassination record qualifies for postponement. The Board has the power to direct a government agency to make available to it, not only assassination records, but additional information which it believes is necessary to fulfill its duties under the Act. It has the power to request the Attorney General to subpoena private persons, records and other information relevant to its responsibilities under the Act.\n\nII. Appeal Procedures set out in JFK Act\n\n1. Once Board has determined whether a record shall be released or postponed, it must send a \"Notification Letter\" to the head of the agency (DCI)\n\n2. Only recourse for an agency that disagrees with Board determination is to appeal to the President.\n\n3. The President has 30 days from the date of the Notification Letter to reply to appeal\n\n a. White House asks that agencies submit any\nappeals within 7 days of receiving Notification Letter\n\n4. CIA has never before presented an appeal to the President; FBI presented an appeal last year but the White House told the parties to work out their difficulties.\n\nIII. February 8th Appeal\n\n1. In November and December of 1995, the JFK Board notified DCI of the release of documents that would:\n - implicate high-ranking Mexican officials in a joint tel-tap operation against foreign embassies - Mexican liaison (December 7)\n - reveal station in Helsinki (December 27)\n - identify sensitive unilateral source in the Nicaraguan service (November 28)\n\n2. On February 8, DCI submitted an appeal to the President on these issues.\n a. Admittedly, CIA did have problems getting appeal out on time. The JFK staff was very understanding of our time problems and arranged to give us more time. They too have recognized that the time periods set out in the Act are too short to bring an appeal.\n\n b. The reason for CIA's delay was simply because the decision to appeal a Board determination to the President of the US is very difficult one to make, both on a procedural and a substantive level. As CIA never did an appeal before, it did not have an efficient system worked out.\n\n c. Today, the procedure is as follows: Once HRG is notified of Board decisions, they immediately pass this on to OGC and the DO. The appropriate components within DO are asked whether the release would cause current damage to the national security or intelligence operations or sources. If so, they are tasked to provide a written assessment of that damage.\n\n d. An appeal package is then prepared by OGC and the DO. This package must then be approved by GC, DDO, EXDIR, DDCI and DCI.\n\n e. Although CIA's turn around time is improving, it can take several weeks to task the appropriate people, have them gather the information needed to prepare an appeal and then get this up to the DCI.\n\n3. Despite our time problems, the JFK Staff was cooperative in the process of bringing this appeal to the President:\na. Before submitting appeal to the President, I faxed copy of appeal to JFK Board's General Counsel with the idea that if it presented new and convincing evidence, he would present it to the Board during its session.\n\nb. Shortly after submitting the appeal to the President, I spoke with White House Counsel and Counsel to JFK Board. We agreed to put the appeal on hold until the Board could review CIA's submission to the White House and possibly reconsider its determinations in light of additional information presented in the appeal.\n\nc. I talked with JFK Board's Counsel and Executive Director regularly about the best way to handle the appeal. I arranged with them to have the General Counsel of CIA to come to the Board's February meeting and present new information regarding the issues on appeal.\n\nd. On February 29, the General Counsel of CIA and I met with the JFK Board and their staff. We discussed issues on appeal as well as 3 other stations recently released (Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen).\n\ne. Based on the information presented by CIA at this meeting, the Board reconsidered and agreed to protect all of the issues on appeal as well as 3 other stations.\n\nIV. Future appeal procedures\n\n1. Both JFK Board and CIA agree that we should never have to appeal something to the President and we should try to work out difficult issues on our own.\n\n2. In the last 2 months, when CIA believed that a release would damage the national security, the Board has invited us to their meetings to present additional evidence on the issue. In some cases, they have reconsidered their decision and protected the information.\n\n3. The Board also recently released [Tokyo] station - we are arranging to meet with them at the end of this month to present stronger arguments for protecting this station.\n\n4. The Board is now considering the release of names of CIA employees who retired under cover. It is very important for CIA's mission that the names of its employees, especially those who remain covert, be protected even after retirement. In the spirit of cooperation and in the hopes of getting the Board to understand this, CIA helped arrange a meeting between the JFK Board's General Counsel and a retired CIA covert employee.\ncurrently living in Europe. CIA hopes that after hearing from the employee about his objections to having his name released and the harm that may come to him, the Board will agree to protect his name, and others like him, from release.\n\nCC:\nSECRET\n\nHPSCI BRIEFING - JFK DECLASSIFICATION 10 April 1996\n\n1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered\n - Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working files\n - Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries\n\n2. Pages released (227,000)\n - Percentage of pages redacted; 70%\n\n3. Process of declassification\n - Former senior officers in HRG review\n - Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG)\n\n4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 1992\n - Records related to the assassination or investigation into the assassination\n - Cuban or U.S. activities\n - Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of records\n -- \"Clear and convincing evidence\" must be presented to the Board\n E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring protection\n - Source or method currently utilized\n - Foreign government relationship currently requiring protection\n\n5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there is \"clear and convincing evidence\" to support a postponement\n - Board then has to justify on the record each redaction with which it agrees\n - Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in Federal Register within 14 days\n- Options available: substitute language e.g., \"Northern European station\"\n\n- Also, summary of a record\n\n- Board has access to every document in full\n\n6. Issues raised by Board's decisions:\n\n- Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of information that is 30 years old with damage to current intelligence operations\n\n- Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki Jan 1961 - Sept 1964\n\n- Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover\n\n- Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US\n\n- Liaison, joint operations in Mexico\n\n- Briefing of the Board by Dave Edger, Jeff Smith, Central Cover, DO desk officers, others\n\n- Problem of accumulative effect of releases\u2014eroding cover, ability to conduct operations\n\n7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree with Board's determination\n\n- President has sole authority to require postponement of a record or information\n\n- President required to advise the Board within 30 days of the Board's determination\n\n- This is published in the Federal Register\n\n8. Current appeal (now resolved)\n\n- Issues: identification of Agency asset\n\n- Potential appeal: Tokyo station\n\n9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g., history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff records\n\nNotes:\n- Board does not accept \"principle\" as justification for postponement\u2014requires evidence\n- Even if agreement to protect (even in Mex) disagreements over specific / sub language at times\n- Precedent set by JFK -> re FCIA etc.\nWTC/Memorandum for the Record\n\nEVENT: STAFF BRIEFING\nPLACE: H-405 CAPITOL\nFOR: HPSCI\nSUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS\n\n--- (PARTICIPANTS) ---\n\n| ASSOC | NAME | ROLE |\n|-------|-----------------------|------|\n| STAFF | BARTON, CHRISTOPHER | |\n| STAFF | DUPART, LOUIS H. | |\n| STAFF | EBERWEIN, CATHERINE D.| |\n| STAFF | HEALEY, LOUISE CHRISTINE | |\n| STAFF | LOWENTHAL, MARK M. | |\n| STAFF | OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY| |\n| STAFF | SHEEHY, MICHAEL WILLIAM | |\n| CIA | CIPRIANI, LINDA | BRFR |\n| CIA | HARRELSON, BARRY | BRFR |\n| CIA | PEREIRA, JOHN | BRFR |\n| CIA | SCHROEDER, RICHARD | SPRT |\n| CIA | WICKHAM, FRED | BRFR |\n\n--- (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) ---\n\nFollowing a telephone conversation with HPSCI staff in which HRG/CSI noted a number of JFK assassination declassification issues (see OCA C/96-05672 of 27 Mar 96), CSI, DO, and OGC briefed staff on the status of the JFK declassification effort, the 1992 law which established the JFK Assassination Records Review Board and the scope of the Board's authority, and the details of some current declassification issues we have been addressing with the Board. We noted the close working relationship between the Agency and the Board, and said that the Board staff is trying to understand the Agency's equities and perspectives. Some staff expressed concern about the Board's broad powers and authorities under the 1992 law, particularly regarding declassification of intelligence material bearing on identities, sources, and methods. (S)\n\n--- (ADDITIONAL INFORMATION) ---\n\n1. C/CSI/Historical Review Group Pereira opened by briefly describing the nature of the CIA JFK material. The open-ended \"Oswald 201\" also includes material gathered after the assassination, and the \"sequestered file\" is that material that was assembled for the JFK assassination investigations. The material was originally sanitized and released to the National Archives in 1993. We are now reviewing the 227,000 pages and attempting to justify the material we withheld. Some seventy percent of the released material contains redactions, although later in the briefing we noted that as our experience has grown the redaction standards have evolved and now most material (up to eighty percent) is being released whole. Some 25 senior annuitants, working closely with a DO team led by Wickham, have been performing the initial review. Pereira pointed out that we are not only reviewing the assassination records, but those records bearing on the House Assassinations Committee's investigation of the assassination. Pereira identified the five academic historians who make up the Board, and said they are supported by 30 full-time Board staffers headed by former Berlin Documentation Center chief David Marwell.\nWTC/Memorandum for the Record\n\nPereira said that the 1992 Act specifies that the Board must have \"clear and convincing evidence\" if we want to postpone release, and said that the Board requires \"current justification\" if we want to protect agent identities, sources and methods, or liaison identities. Under the law, the Board has the authority to release all information, and must justify in the Federal Register within 14 days any redactions. The Board sees the full text of all documents. Pereira said that we negotiate with the Board the use of summaries or generic descriptions (such as substituting \"a northern European station\" for Helsinki) and that the Board is making an \"honest effort\" to see the connection between 30 year old information and current damage to Agency equities. Dupart asked rhetorically whether the Board understood the concept of ongoing liaison, with Wickham saying that the Board clearly had a different perspective from the DO, and that the ADDO, General Counsel, Cover Staff and others have briefed the Board in detail to address this \"problem.\" Harrelson pointed out that our joint teltaps had recorded Oswald himself, although we assured the clearly unhappy Dupart that we are trying to protect the fact that liaison cooperated in the teltaps. We also noted our effort to protect the identities of covert Agency employees, although we are working particularly hard in cases where the Agency employees now reside overseas. Pereira said we are concerned about the cumulative erosive effect on our cover and our ability to conduct operations. He noted that the Board tends to focus on individual specific cases without always focusing on the broader cumulative impact of their discrete decisions. (S)\n\n2. Cipriani described the appeals process specified in the 1992 JFK Act. She also lent Sheehy a copy of the act, which he studied carefully during the briefing. Under the 1992 act, documents related to JFK carry the \"presumption of release,\" with the Board defining which records fall under the act. We have to justify any redactions or postponements, and Board decisions can only be appealed to the President himself (which, as Cipriani dryly noted, tends to inhibit appeals.) The act also specifies very short deadlines, with only 30 days for the President to make his decision. (This means we have only about seven days to get our appeals out of Hqs and to the White House\u2014a practical impossibility.) Our only appeal to date involved three issues: (i) a cable implicating senior Mexican officials in our joint teltaps, (ii) the identification of the very sensitive Helsinki Station, and (iii) the identity of a Nicaraguan source. In fact our appeal took several months, with the Board being very accommodating about the delay, and we finally were able to give the Board enough justification and explanation that they changed their position and spared the White House the decision. Healey noted that the Agency declassification team includes a DO team (as noted above,) and asked why we hadn't been able to head off the problem. Cipriani responded that new information arises for the Board to consider in making its determination, and Wickham elaborated by noting that the DO is reluctant to reveal sensitive current information to protect old material. He characterized this as a problem of \"DO culture.\" At the same time, he cited the specific example of the Mexicans declining to meet the DCI on his recent Latin American trip as illustrative of Mexican sensitivity to the liaison issue. We later noted that the only other appeal thus far involves the FBI, and the White House has told the Bureau to resolve the matter with the Board. (S)\n\n3. Pereira noted to the staffers that we're dealing with very short deadlines involving enormous volumes of material, and illustrated by showing the staff a bulky recent Board declassification notification which we must review to confirm we have no problem with the material involved. In response to a Sheehy question, Harrelson reminded staff that the original redaction and submission to the Board took place in 1992-3, and as noted above, our redaction standards and judgements have evolved since then. Further, we have to double-check each release to confirm we concur, and in some cases compare substitute language. Sheehy asked why we would object to such a thing as the acknowledgment of Tokyo Station, and seemed impressed and persuaded when Wickham patiently explained that both the Japanese and Ambassador Mondale have strongly recommended against confirming the existence of the Station. The Japanese are very sensitive to any public acknowledgment of our liaison relationship. Wickham noted that the Board is trying to document Oswald's travels, and wants to identify stations reporting such travel. Pereira said that we recognize the need to report the facts, but want to protect details\nWTC/Memorandum for the Record\n\nthat do not add to the story but harm our equities. In response to a Healey question, Pereira said we are making progress in giving the Board staff the context and framework necessary to appreciate and support our concerns. He said the staff tries very hard to give the Board necessary background, and Wickham seconded Pereira's assessment that we have a very good working relationship with the staff. Under the provisions of the Act, the Board will be working until October 1997, dealing with CIA, FBI, DepState, as well as private individuals and even foreign governments. They are interviewing people, and as Pereira noted, \"getting theories.\" (S)\n\n4. Staff, even those who asked pointed questions like Healey and Sheehy, seemed satisfied. Majority Staffer Eberwein, perhaps reflecting concerns voiced by Deputy Majority Director Dupart about protecting Agency sources and methods, however, expressed concern later about possibly amending the '92 act to moderate the act's bias toward release. Indeed, she contacted OCA lawyer Cindy Ellis and asked her to draft language amending the act. It had not been my impression during the briefing that staff had been especially concerned about the act to the point of intending to modify it, and its also unclear whether Eberwein was acting on behalf of senior majority staff or the membership in asking OCA to suggest modifications to the act. (S)\n\nRichard E. Schroeder (C)\nCIA Liaison Group\nOffice of Congressional Affairs\n\nDCI/OCA/CLG/RESchroeder/dms/39940 (15 Apr 96)\n\nDistribution:\nOriginal - OCA Records\n1 - D/OCA\n1 - DCI/CSI\n1 - DO/IMS\n1 - DO/ORMS/CAG\n1 - DCI/OGC\n1 - RESchroeder Chrono\n\n--- (FOLLOW-UP ACTION ITEMS) ---\n\nThere were no Action Items on file for this event.\nSECRET\n\nEVENT: STAFF BRIEFING DATE: 04/10/96 TIME: 1030\nPLACE: H-405 CAPITOL STATUS: X - KEY: C/96-05677\nFOR: HPSCI\nSUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS\n\nRESPONSIBLE OFFICER: RICHARD SCHROEDER - SECURE: 3-9940\n\n--- > (PARTICIPANTS) < ---\n\n| ASSOC | NAME | ROLE |\n|-------|-----------------------------|------|\n| STAFF | BARTON, CHRISTOPHER (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | DUPART, LOUIS H. (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | EBERWEIN, CATHERINE D. (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | HBALEY, LOUISE CHRISTINE (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | LOWENTHAL, MARK M. (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | SHEEHY, MICHAEL WILLIAM (HPSCI) | |\n| CIA | CIPRIANI, LINDA (DCI/OGC) | BRFR |\n| CIA | HARRELSON, BARRY (DCI/CSI) | BRFR |\n| CIA | PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI) | BRFR |\n| CIA | SCHROEDER, RICHARD (DCI/OCA) | SPRT |\n| CIA | WICKHAM, FRED (DO/IMS) | BRFR |\nSECRET\n\nEVENT: STAFF BRIEFING\nPLACE: H-405 CAPITOL\nFOR: HPSCI\nSUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS\n\nRESPONSIBLE OFFICER: RICHARD SCHROEDER - SECURE: 3-9940\n\n--- (PARTICIPANTS) ---\n\n| ASSOC | NAME | ROLE |\n|-------|------|------|\n| STAFF | BARTON, CHRISTOPHER (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | DUPART, LOUIS H. (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | EBERWEIN, CATHERINE D. (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | HEALEY, LOUISE CHRISTINE (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | LOWENTHAL, MARK M. (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI) | |\n| STAFF | SHEEHY, MICHAEL WILLIAM (HPSCI) | |\n| CIA | CIPRIANI, LINDA (DCI/OGC) | BRFR |\n| CIA | HARRELSON, BARRY (DCI/CSI) | BRFR |\n| CIA | PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI) | BRFR |\n| CIA | SCHROEDER, RICHARD (DCI/OCA) | SPRT |\n| CIA | WICKHAM, FRED (DO/IMS) | BRFR |\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY:\n\nFollowing a telephone conversation with HPSCI staff in which HRG/CSI noted a number of JFK assassination declassification issues (see OCA C/96-05672 of 27 Mar 96,) CSI, DO, and OGC briefed staff on the status of the JFK declassification effort, the 1992 law which established the JFK Assassination Records Review Board and the scope of the Board's authority, and the details of some current declassification issues we have been addressing with the Board. We noted the close working relationship between the Agency and the Board, and said that the Board staff is trying to understand the Agency's equities and perspectives. Some staff expressed concern about the Board's broad powers and authorities under the 1992 law, particularly regarding declassification of intelligence material bearing on identities, sources, and methods. (S)\n\nSUPPORTING TEXT:\n\n1. C/CSI/Historical Review Group Pereira opened by briefly describing the nature of the CIA JFK material. The open-ended \"Oswald 201\" also includes material gathered later, and the \"sequestered file\" is that material that was\nassembled for the JFK assassination investigations. All is being processed for declassification, with some 227,000 pages already released. Some seventy percent of the released material contains redactions, although later in the briefing we noted that as our experience has grown the redaction standards have evolved and now most material (up to eighty percent) is being released whole. Some 25 senior annuitants, working closely with a DO team led by Wickham, have been performing the initial review. Pereira pointed out that we are not only reviewing the assassination records, but those records bearing on our own investigation of the assassination. Pereira identified the five academic historians who make up the Board, and said they are supported by thirty full-time Board staffers headed by former Berlin Documentation Center chief David Marwell. Pereira said that the 1992 Act specifies that the Board must have \"clear and convincing evidence\" if we want to postpone release, and said that the Board requires \"current justification\" if we want to protect agent identities, sources and methods, or liaison identities. Under the law, the Board has the authority to release all information, and must justify in the Federal Register within fourteen days any redactions. The Board sees the full text of all documents. Pereira said that we negotiate with the Board the use of summaries or generic descriptions (such as substituting \"a northern European station\" for Helsinki) and that the Board is making an \"honest effort\" to see the connection between thirty year old information and current damage to Agency equities. Dupart asked rhetorically whether the Board understood the concept of ongoing liaison, with Wickham saying that the Board clearly had a different perspective from the DO, and that the ADDO, General Counsel, Cover Staff and others have briefed the Board in detail to address this \"problem.\" Harrelson pointed out that our joint teltaps had recorded Oswald himself, although we assured the clearly unhappy Dupart that we are trying to protect the fact that liaison cooperated in the teltaps. We also noted our effort to protect the identities of covert Agency employees, although we are working particularly hard in cases where the Agency employees now reside overseas. Pereira said we are concerned about the cumulative erosive effect on our cover and our ability to conduct operations. He noted that the Boards tends to focus on individual specific cases without recognizing the broader cumulative impact of their discrete decisions. (S)\n\n2. Cipriani described the appeals process specified in the 1992 JFK Act. She also lent Sheehy a copy of the act, which he studied carefully during the briefing. Under the 1992 act, documents related to JFK carry the \"presumption of release,\" with the Board defining which records fall under the act. We have to justify any redactions or postponements, and Board decisions can only be appealed to\nthe President himself (which, as Cipriani dryly noted, tends to inhibit appeals.) The act also specifics very short deadlines, with only 30 days for the President to make his decision. (This means we have only about seven days to get our appeals out of Hq's and to the White House--a practical impossibility.) Our only appeal to date involved three issues: (i) a cable implicating senior Mexican officials in our joint teltaps, (ii) the identification of the very sensitive Helsinki Station, and (iii) the identity of a Nicaraguan source. In fact our appeal took several months, with the Board being very accommodating about the delay, and we finally were able to give the Board enough justification and explanation that they changed their position and spared the White House the decision. Healey noted that the Agency declassification team includes a DO team (as noted above,) and asked why we hadn't been able to head off the problem. Cipriani responded that new information arises for the Board to consider in making its determination, and Wickham elaborated by noting that the DO is reluctant to reveal sensitive current information to protect old material. He characterized this as a problem of \"DO culture.\" At the same time, he cited the specific example of the Mexicans declining to meet the DCI on his recent Latin American trip as illustrative of Mexican sensitivity to the liaison issue. We later noted that the only other appeal thus far involves the FBI, and the White House has told the Bureau to resolve the matter with the Board. (S)\n\n3. Pereira noted to the staffers that we're dealing with very short deadlines involving enormous volumes of material, and illustrated by showing the staff a bulky recent Board declassification notification which we must review to confirm we have no problem with the material involved. In response to a Sheehy question, Harrelson reminded staff that the original redaction and submission to the Board took place in 1992-3, and as noted above, our redaction standards and judgements have evolved since then. Further, we have to double-check each release to confirm we concur, and in some cases compare substitute language. Sheehy asked why we would object to such a thing as the acknowledgement of Tokyo station, and seemed impressed and persuaded when Wickham patiently explained that both the Japanese and Ambassador Mondale have strongly recommended against confirming the existence of the station. The Japanese are very sensitive to any public acknowledgement of our liaison relationship. Wickham noted that the Board is trying to document Oswald's travels, and wants to identify stations reporting such travel. Pereira said that we recognize the need to report the facts, but want to protect details that do not add to the story but harm our equities. In response to a Healey question, Pereira said we are making progress in giving the Board staff the context and framework necessary to appreciate and support our concerns. He said the staff tries very hard to give the Board necessary background, and\nWickham seconded Pereira's assessment that we have a very good working relationship with the staff. Under the provisions of the act, the Board will be working until October 1997, dealing with CIA, FBI, DepState, as well as private individuals and even foreign governments. They are interviewing people, and as Pereira noted, \"getting theories.\" (S)\n\n4. Staff, even those who asked pointed questions like Healey and Sheehy, seemed satisfied. Majority staffer Eberwein, perhaps reflecting concerns voiced by deputy majority director Dupart about protecting Agency sources and methods, however, expressed concern later about possibly amending the '92 act to moderate the act's bias toward release. Indeed, she contacted OCA lawyer [Cindy Ellis] and asked her to draft language amending the act. It had not been my impression during the briefing that staff had been especially concerned about the act to the point of intending to modify it, and its also unclear whether Eberwein was acting on behalf of senior majority staff or the membership in asking OCA to suggest modifications to the act. (S)\n\nRichard E. Schroeder\nDCI/OCA/CLG\n15 April 1996\n\nDistribution: DCI/CSI\nDO/ORMS\nDO/IMS\nOCA\nOGC\nRES chrono\n\nCL BY 620119\nCL REASON 1.5C\nDECL ON X1\nDRV FM HUM 4-82\nSECRET\nTO: Richard E. Schroeder\nFROM: Linda C. Cipriani\nDATE: 04/15/96 05:30:04 PM\nSUBJECT: Re: DRAFT-OCA MFR on 10 Apr 96 HPSCI JFK Docs Brief\n\nLooks OK to me - I was especially pleased to read that the staff was concerned about the presumption for release in the Act and asked Cindy Ellis to draft language modifying the act. If Cindy needs any help, I would be very happy to give her some suggestions!!\n\nI would greatly appreciate being kept informed as this progresses.\n\nThanks, Linda\n\nCC: John Pereira, J. Barry Harrelson, Fred Wickham @ DO, Linda Cipriani\nTO: Richard E. Schroeder\nFROM: John F. Pereira\nDATE: 04/16/96 02:40:06 PM\nSUBJECT: Re: DRAFT-OCA MFR on 10 Apr 96 HPSCI JFK Docs Brief\n\nThe MFR looks basically fine.\n\nTwo minor suggestions:\n\nPar 1. - change \"our own investigation\" to the House Assassinations Committee's investigation\n\nPar 1, last sent. - change last part of sent to read without always focusing on the broader cumulative impact of their discrete decisions.\n\nCC: J. Barry Harrelson", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10337-10002.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 27, "total-input-tokens": 31416, "total-output-tokens": 10623, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 861, 1], [861, 1807, 2], [1807, 2201, 3], [2201, 2981, 4], [2981, 4339, 5], [4339, 5602, 6], [5602, 7032, 7], [7032, 7543, 8], [7543, 8667, 9], [8667, 8823, 10], [8823, 10153, 11], [10153, 11862, 12], [11862, 13911, 13], [13911, 16139, 14], [16139, 16380, 15], [16380, 17621, 16], [17621, 19175, 17], [19175, 21991, 18], [21991, 26872, 19], [26872, 28628, 20], [28628, 29526, 21], [29526, 31414, 22], [31414, 34370, 23], [34370, 37426, 24], [37426, 38688, 25], [38688, 39243, 26], [39243, 39691, 27]]}} +{"id": "0e8914ffbd20d25e6082d34b2943b6e2571a1854", "text": "Memo for the Record\n\nSubject: JFK Records Review - Lessons Learned\n\nThe CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.\n\nI. The JFK Act\n\nMandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed unrealistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.\n\nUnrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today.\n\nMandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example:\n\na. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a \"unique\" assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication.\nFor example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection.\n\nb. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100).\n\nInflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required documentation of \"current harm\". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story.\n\nThree times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99.\n\nII. The Process\n\nThere are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:\n\n* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive.\n\n* We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of \"official release\" in the context of each project.\n\n* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be\nreleased. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.\n\n* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.\n\n* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.\n\n* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A \"declassification guide\" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.\n\n* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).\n\n* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.\n\n* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.\n\nIII The Requests\n\n(being drafted)\n\nAttachment I. [incomplete draft attached]\n\nDescription of the JFK Collection\n\nAttachment II. [being drafted]\n\n[statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANS, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]\nMemo for the Record\n\nSubject: JFK Records Review Project and Lessons Learned\n\nThe CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.\n\nI. Background (1992-1995)\n\nThe setting up of the Historical Review Program by DCI Gates in early 1992 coincided with growing interest in Congress to require federal agencies to declassify records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. DCI Gates decided to start declassification process before Congress passed legislation:\n\n* testified before Congress on 12 May 1992 about CIA's new openness policy and announced the declassification of the first folder of Oswald's 201 (also known as the pre-assassination file).\n\n* six boxes of the Oswald's 201 were reviewed and transferred to NARA by Oct. 1992.\n\nThe John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) was signed 26 October 1992:\n\n* it called for Presidential-appointed Assassination Records Review Board composed of non-government individuals;\n\n* established \"a presumption of immediate disclosure\" for records relating to the assassination.\n\nFor first two years of its existence, the Historical Review Program focused primarily on the review of JFK assassination records:\nthere were two major releases of Agency records (August 1993 and August 1994) of approximately 227,000 pages;\n\njoint HRG/DO teams reviewed additional assassination related collections at National Archives (Warren Commission), the SSCI (Church Committee and the Ford Presidential Library (Rockefeller Commission) plus numerous referrals from other federal agencies (FBI, State, Army, etc.).\n\nDue to delays in the appointment of its members and the time required to hire and clear a staff, the ARRB did not actually begin reviewing documents until May 1995. It became clear in immediately that the ARRB would require the release of far more information than the Agency had released in the 1992-94 review. In mid-1995 HRG began a re-review of the previously released sanitized documents:\n\n* approximately 80% of the 227,000 pages release in 1993-94 contained deletions\n\n* resources were taken from other projects and added to JFK project to meet Board's monthly deadlines.\n\nII. The JFK Act and the ARRB\n\nMandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed unrealistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.\n\nUnrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today.\n\nMandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by\nboth the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example:\n\na. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a \"unique\" assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication. For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection.\n\nb. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100).\n\nInflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required documentation of \"current harm\". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story.\n\nThree times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99.\n\nIII. The Process and Lessons Learned\n\nThere are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:\n\n* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive.\n* We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of \"official release\" in the context of each project.\n\n* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.\n\n* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.\n\n* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.\n\n* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A \"declassification guide\" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.\n\n* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).\n\n* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.\n\n* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.\n\nIV ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records\n\n(see attached draft)\n\nAttachment I. Description of the JFK Collection\n\nAttachment II. [being drafted-will be available 17 Dec a.m.]\n\n[statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANS, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]\nDRAFT: Section 7, ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records\n\n1. Unlike most declassification projects, the Agency's involvement in the JFK Project was governed by the dictates of a Federal statute, the JFK Act, and the powers it vested in the Board it established -- the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). In particular, under Section 7, the Act armed the ARRB with the authority to dig for records and information, specifically:\n\n...(1) The Review Board shall have the authority to act in a manner prescribed under this Act, including authority to --\n\n* * *\n\n(C)(ii) direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board, and if necessary investigate the facts surrounding, additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities;\n\n* * *\n\n(F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena witnesses and documents.\n\nThis substantial authority provided the ARRB and its staff with almost unlimited access to Agency records and personnel. It also was the basis for a number of specific requests from the Board to the Agency for additional information, document searches and explanatory papers. HRP designated this ARRB activity, \"Special Requests.\" During its existence the ARRB sent to the Agency fifty-three special requests, CIA 1-16 and CIA-IR 1-37.\n\n2. Categories of Requests:\nAlthough each request had unique characteristics, all began as a request by the Board or an ARRB staff member on behalf of the board for information. The requests fell generally into five broad categories as follows:\n\na. Requests for access to basic information which would help the board understand the CIA, its organizational structure and how it operated around the time of the assassination which included: Requests for organizational charts, briefings, mission statements, etc.; review of over ___ histories of CIA offices and projects; a review of the so-called \"Breckinridge files;\" and, a search for an IG index of Oswald reports.\n\nb. Requests about methodologies which included: How cable traffic was handled at HQ during the relevant time period; the existence and use of the inter-agency source registry; and, the assignment and use of alias's pseudonyms, crypts, etc.\n\nc. Requests for subject specific matters which included: The Mexico City Station annual reports; the existence of DRE monthly reports; Oswald's pre assassination files; and, a search for any documents or information detailing the Agency's involvement in transporting and processing the Zapruder film.\n\nd. Requests for project specific information and files, which included: Requests for information and files on AMWORLD, QKENCHANT, an index to the HTLINGUAL materials, and the Mexico City electronic surveillance tapes.\n\ne. Requests for individual specific information and files, which included both CIA and CIA associated individuals and non-CIA individuals: Information on individuals with JMWORLD; detailed information on Sylvia Duran; a determination of the identify of a particular \"George Bush;\" and, the files on William Pawley.\n3. How a Request was Worked Following receipt of a request and HRP tasking the responsible Agency component(s) to conduct a search, the materials found were first reviewed by HRP staff members before access was provided to the ARRB staff. ARRB staff then reviewed the documents and materials and identified those which it believed were relevant to their inquiry and these materials were placed in the normal queue to be reviewed and processed for release. However, the mere identification of materials did not equate to automatic release. Rather, if particularly sensitive information was involved, negotiations took place and, on occasion, a written statement about the materials was provided for release vice the actual document(s).\n\n4/3. The Agency's written responses to each request - either a letter or memoranda - included, of course, the fact the materials designated were to be processed for release according to then current guidelines. The ARRB staff then wrote its own version of the request, search, and response. Both of these are a part of the public record on this project.\n\n5/4. Lessons learned: A number of things surfaced as HRP worked to complete these requests which required considerable explanation, negotiation, and resolution.\n\na. First among these was the fact there existed an outside Board which asked for information and carefully monitored the responses (a very powerful external Board with subpoena authority), without doubt caused documents and information to be found and made available that would not have been provided to an internal declassification project.\n\nb. Second, for any large project such as JFK to be successful, there is an absolute requirement that each directorate and independent office identify two responsible persons -- a senior management official who can ensure that deadlines (particularly deadlines established by an external\nauthority) are met; and, a senior focal point officer who has the substantive knowledge and background to both locate all relevant material and make decisions on its sensitivity.\n\nc. Third, the individuals identified and appointed in sub-paragraph \"b\" next above must be fully versed in the guidelines which pertain to each specific project. They cannot rely on FOIA or other guidelines as to the depth of their searches or the conditions governing release/redaction/denial of materials.\nATTACHMENT #1\n\nCIA'S JFK ASSASSINATION RECORD COLLECTION\n\nOswald Files\n\nPre-assassination \"201\" file\u2014approximately 40 documents that existed at the time of the assassination. Released in 1992 with minimal deletions.\n\nDO 201 File (Approximately 26,000 pages): Agency's primary file for documents dealing with the assassination or mentioning Oswald; the file is still active. Contains pre-assassination documents; materials collected after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation; Mexico City files, Garrison investigation materials plus other documents related to the assassination or Oswald received over the years. A microfilm copy of file, as it existed in 1978, was sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassination (HSCA).\n\nThe DO's original (record copy) 201 was transferred to HRG in early 1992; a declassified version was released in August 1993; it was re-released with fewer deletions in 1996 under the authority of the ARRB. Additional documents, filed into the 201 after the its transfer to HRG, were released in September 1998.\n\nOffice of Security File (2041 pages): Contained key Oswald documents, FBI investigative reports, newspaper clippings. This file, primarily duplicative of the 201, was reviewed by the HSCA, but a copy was not sequestered with the rest of the Agency's \"JFK\" collection. The file surfaced as a result of an ARRB request in 1997. A declassified version of the file was released in 1998.\n\nDCD \"A\" File (41 pages): A microfilm copy of this Oswald file was in the sequestered collection. The ARRB requested that the original file by reviewed for release.\n\nMarina Oswald's 201 file. A copy of this file from the sequestered microfilm collection was reviewed and released in 1994. The ARRB requested that the original file be reviewed for release by September 1999.\n\nThe ARRB directed that the classified originals of all documents from the Oswald files be transferred to NARA for secure storage. These documents were transferred to NARA in October 1998.\n\nThe Sequestered Collection\n\nAt the end of its investigation, the HSCA directed that all materials (files, documents, memos, notes, tapes, etc.) collected or prepared in response to its investigation be sequestered. This included files made available for review, but not reviewed by the HSCA staff.\n\nJFK boxes 1-63 (hardcopy): These boxes are the core of the Agency's JFK collection. They are the working files/materials of the HSCA staff and reflects the wide range of issues pursued by the Committee. In addition to Agency documents, they include\napproximately 30,000 pages of notes, letters and memos created by the HSCA or its staff. The boxes are a combination of files on subjects and persons of interest to HSCA including documents prepared by the Agency as a result of the investigation, eight boxes of security files and Mexico City cable chrono files. The boxes contain a significant amount of duplication (most of the Oswald 201 documents appear multiple times in this part of the collection). A declassified version was released in August 1993, then re-released under ARRB in 1997.\n\n**JFK Microfilm (72 reels):** These reels are copies of Agency files that were made available to HSCA staff. Although the HSCA interest usually focused on a small portion of a file, the Committee sequestered the complete file. The microfilm includes approximately 25 reels of 201 files, 6 reels of Office of Personnel files, 14 reels of Anti/Castro - Cuban exile material, extensive files on Nosenko and operational and production files from Mexico City. The microfilm also contains copies of all the Oswald files except for the security file.\n\n**DCI Morning Meeting Minutes**\n\nThis file contain 442 excerpts from the minutes of the DCI's Morning Meetings that refer to JFK assassination and related issues and investigations. The initial search for the minutes was in response to an FOIA. The material was turned over to HRG in 1993 for review and inclusion into the Collection.\n\n**Russ Holmes' Working Files (19 boxes)**\n\nRuss Holmes was a DO officer initially assigned to work on JFK assassination records in the mid-70s. He was one of the Agency's liaison officers with the HSCA during its investigation and subsequently became custodian of HSCA sequestered collection. He continued in this role until 1992.\n\nAs the focal point for JFK related requests, Russ Holmes created a JFK reference file know as the \"Ancillary Collection\" (13 boxes). The contents are primarily duplicative (approximately 80%) of material found in Oswald's 201 and in the sequestered collection, but organized by subjects and requests. The collection contains some non-related material reflecting Holmes' involvement in other FOIA, etc. requests. There were an additional six boxes of unorganized reference material and files from his office transferred to HRG when he retired. These 19 boxes became know as the \"Russ Holmes Working Files\" and were declared assassination records as a collection by the ARRB. Non-duplicative records from this collection were released in September 1998. The duplicative material is currently being reviewed and will be transferred to NARA in early January 1999.\n\n**LA Division JFK Task Force Files**\n\nThe survey undertaken in response to Executive Order ###### located seven boxes of DO Latin American Division continuing JFK Task Force files and related Cuban material. The ARRB staff reviewed the boxes; the non-duplicative JFK Task Force\ndocuments and selected documents from the Cuban material were designated as assassination records. 1637 pages from these boxes were transferred to NARA in October 1998.\n\nNew assassination Records -- \u201cM\u201d [Miscellaneous] Series\n\nThe ARRB submitted 53 numbered \u201cRequests for Additional Information and Records\u201d (CIA-# and CIA-IR-# series) plus many informal requests on individuals and subjects in their search for additional assassination records. Theses requests generated several 100 additional assassination records including 185 audio tapes from the Mexico City telephone taps. Additional material related to the JFK Act including DO cables to the field and working files of the HRP project officer were declared assassination records in the final actions of the Board. Over 4500 pages and 17 tapes have been reviewed and prepared for transfer to NARA. The remaining records and tapes are scheduled for completion by September 1999.\nJFK Assassination Records Collection Act\n\n- Five year Effort; Estimated 100 person years expended\n- Extraordinary Authorities/ Access/ \u201cnon Precedent Setting Releases\u201d\n- Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.\n- Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection.\n- Prepared a Declaration of Compliance with the Act, with a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Board\u2019s requests.\n- Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.\n- \u201cThe Review Board considered the CIA\u2019s compliance with the JFK Act\u2026.to be one of [the Board\u2019s] highest priorities.\u201d It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency\u2019s Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency\u2019s activities in response to the Board.\n\nDuring FY 1998, compliance with the legal requirements of the JFK Act absorbed the preponderant portion of HRP resources. HRP completed necessary coordination with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board on behalf of the Agency, an ongoing process since FY 1994. HRP provided a central Agency focus for a process which:\n\nCoordinated with Board Staff on relevancy and classification on roughly 250,000 pages (many duplicates)\n\nProcessed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.\n\nTransferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection.\n\nPrepared CIA\u2019s Declaration of Compliance with the Act, a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Boards requests.\n\nNegotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.\n\nThe Board\u2019s report of 30 September 1998 states that \u201cThe Review Board considered the CIA\u2019s compliance with the JFK Act\u2026.to be one of [the Board\u2019s] highest priorities.\u201d It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency\u2019s Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency\u2019s activities in response to the Board.\nJFK Act -- Process\n\n- Scope/Deadlines/Decisions defined by law and outside Board.\n- Focal Point (HRP) Serves Primarily as: (1) Moderator between Board and Components, (2) Bookkeeper, (3) Consistency Keeper.\n- Everything reviewed by Focal Point (HRP) and the appropriate component (Often many times).\n- Components often take strong initial position but recede in face of strong arguments.\n- Senior Agency Managers unaware of intricacies of the Process unless problems come up.\n- Exceptions: Issues Taken to Board by senior management: Cover, Employee Names, Facilities Stations.\n\nWithout making a value judgment on the merits of the JFK Act, it is possible to characterize the process which the Act dictated for CIA.\n\nThe scope/deadlines and decisions were defined in the law and by the Assassination Records Review Board, an outside body. Over the course of the history of this effort (5 years), CIA, as did other agencies, developed (and redeveloped) processes and responses to the Board. For the most part the detailed work by the Staff was at a level which did not involve senior managers unless a major problem arose.\n\nWhen problems did arise, Senior Agency officials were asked to make presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board.\nJFK Lessons Learned\n\n- Statutory Mandates are Not Efficient\n - Requirements to declassify all drives out focus on important\n - Standards for Declassification are Invariably Different\n - Projects of equal merit without a statute are orphaned\n\n- Structure and Planning\n - Good Communications with Oversight Body\n - Expertise in Subject matter and Information Management\n - Strategy, Concepts and Policy known and Understood:\n - Guidelines (flexible),\n - Deadlines (reasonable),\n - Responsibilities\n - Understanding of Final Product Desired:\n - Media, Databases, indexes, etc.\n\n- Support of Senior Management\n\n- Our experience is that statutory mandates such as the JFK Act are very inefficient. The specific requirements of the act, including Board administrative decisions, required us to:\n - Address all possibly related documents, no matter how insignificant.\n - Engage in lengthy negotiation processes over an almost endless number of documents.\n - Establish databases for management of the documents and workflow\n - Treat documents in ways different from all other release programs.\n - Postpone plans for systematic declassification on other programs for which we had no legal mandate.\n\n- Our expectation is that there will be more of such mandates, including the recently enacted Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. Similar proposals are under consideration for human rights violations in central america. What we have learned from our JFK experience is that:\n - We need to remain in very close coordination with the Oversight body to assure that we are not going down the wrong street and will have to repeat efforts.\n - We have found that annuitants \u201cwho know the territory\u201d can be extremely valuable as a resource for finding and understanding the sensitivity of material.\n - We know that we have to organize within the Agency and to gain agreement early on with regard to strategies for managing the effort, including agreement on what the final product is to be and how we are to get there.\n - We also need to keep senior management attention on what we are doing so that they are not surprised at the end, which not only causes delays in an orderly process but can lead to significant misunderstandings between senior participants.\n\n- We are trying to apply these lessons learned to our planning for the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM\n\nFROM: Charles A. Briggs\nJFK Declassification Project, OIM\n\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\n1. My assumption in preparing the attached is that I was asked because: a) for seven-plus years I've been involved in the project; and b) my past Agency assignments, including being the first DO Information Review Officer, gave me the opportunity to see declassification from many vantage points: from a legalistic directorate-oriented, either-or standpoint (taking full advantage of allowed exemptions), to a \"corporate\" Agency-wide strategy to foster credibility while protecting secrets that should remain secret. My comments and conclusions reflect that experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of HRP management.\n\n2. Historically, the Deputy Directors have not paid much attention to information management - unless there's a problem. Then the approach has been: what went wrong; who's to blame; how can we ensure that this doesn't happen again; what lessons have we learned? What this JFK experience reiterates is the need for a proactive, not just reactive, flexible strategy, with corporate Agency direction through the Deputies to their Information Review Officers. And the IROs, who, in essence, determine credibility and resource impact, should be supergrades, with experience in at least two directorates. Because information release has become a major management issue, the Executive Director is the obvious officer to ensure consistent and informed implementation of release policy.\nSUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE\n\n3. Considerable skepticism in the public, the media, and, unfortunately, the Congress results from the in-house conclusion that denial is justifiable in the absence of \"official acknowledgment\" of Executive Branch information, even though such information is already in the public domain, from senior Agency officials' publications, Congressional investigations, books by former Cabinet-level NSC members, even Presidents. This inflexible legal strategy may win the battle and lose the war. Lawsuits are a lot more expensive than negotiation.\n\n4. The Agency Task Force that in 1992 considered some of the aspects of DCI Gates' \"openness\" philosophy did not have the benefit of the JFK experience. I suggest that a senior-level panel be established to consider an objective look at the need for continued classification of generic versus specific sources and methods information, particularly that already in the public domain and when dealing with matters of high public or historic interest. HR 70-14, referring as it does in paragraph e.(4) to \"Guidelines for Declassification\" in Executive Order 12356, does not promote the tactical approach which is suggested in the Comments section on page eight of the attached.\n\n[Signature]\nCharles A. Briggs\nSUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE\n\nDA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99)\ns:/oim/fo/jim/hrp/jfk/C.B. JFK Declass Exp.doc\n\nDistribution:\nOriginal - Addressee, w/atts\n 1 - C/IRG/SCD, w/atts\n 1 - IRG/SCD/HRO, w/atts (Harrelson)\n 1 - SCD Chrono, w/atts\n 1 - SCD Subj, w/atts\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM\n\nFROM: Charles A. Briggs\nJFK Declassification Project, OIM\n\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\n1. (AIUO) BACKGROUND: The impact of the JFK declassification law on Agency resources and information release decisions was dramatic and to the DO, traumatic. The resource trauma stemmed from the unanticipated number of years required to complete the project. In a memorandum for the DCI dated 11 June 1993, the then-Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence outlined a plan for implementing the \"openness philosophy\" espoused by both DCIs Gates and Woolsey through a series of \"Cold War Declassification\" projects. He noted that priority, by virtue of a Congressionally-mandated deadline of 22 August 1993, had been given to declassification of the JFK collection; however, he said, \"with the end of the JFK activity in sight,\" resources could be applied to the other projects. Six years later (actually seven since the project got underway), we are almost finished.\n\n2. (AIUO) The substantive, versus administrative, trauma stemmed from the fact that the JFK Act superseded all other existing laws, including FOIA, the Privacy Act, the DCI's authorities, as well as Executive Orders and Regulations. The Act presumed release. It did allow for appeal but only to the President from the DCI. It allowed \"postponements\" but only if clear and convincing evidence was presented for each requested postponement and that release would demonstrably impair the national security. The net effect was the release of names, crypts, pseudos, methods, station locations (within specified dates), file identifier numbers, and tradecraft generally, which are protectable under the other laws - and which the Agency had\n\n---\n\n1 See OGC-92-5325, 14 Dec 92 and OGC-94-52916, 19 Sep 94 (Attachment B)\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\nlearned to live with (See Appendix A for the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) \"Standards For Review\" and \"Key Distinctions Between Those Under FOIA, Executive Order 12356 and the JFK Act,\" with examples).\n\n3. (U) Finally, a Presidentially-appointed assassination review board (the ARRB) had the final say both on postponement and on relevance, subject only to a successful DCI appeal to the President. Although a few appeals were considered, particularly in the early period, none was made.\n\n4. (U) The JFK Act called for each agency to review and transfer its relevant material to NARA by 22 August 1993. Thus, a significant set of materials was transferred from CIA to NARA in 1993, reflecting CIA's then-current judgment on the redactions permitted. Subsequent Board reviews and ARRB staff inquiries resulted in the addition of material to that original set of documents, as well as adjustments to the original set, to reflect Board actions - generally to release more information. Although many documents have been adjusted or added to the collection, requiring substantive HRG and DO reviews as well as administrative actions, the net number of pages in CIA's JFK Collection at NARA is about 260,000.\n\nSIZE AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION\n\n5. (U) The material requiring line-by-line review included 17 boxes called the Oswald 201 File; 64 boxes called the \"Segregated Collection\" File, containing those documents made available to the House Subcommittee on Assassinations (HSCA) during its 1978 investigation; 23 boxes of HSCA referrals - staff notes in longhand and type, draft sections of the HSCA final report, correspondence on HSCA letterhead, trip reports - anything referred to us by the National Archives (NARA) for review of possible Agency equities; 19 boxes called \"The Holmes Collection\" - a reference collection used by the then-DO focal point for FOIA and other JFK queries, Russell Holmes; Presidential libraries material, Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission testimonies, National Security Council papers, PFIAB Minutes and other Community papers made available through the ARRB staff; and 13 boxes called \"Miscellaneous,\" including follow-on questions from the ARRB, a previously overlooked Latin American Division working file, DCI calendars, some DI/OCI\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\n\"Dailies.\" Box 64 of the \"Segregated Collection\" consisted of 72 reels of microfilm of complete files from which the material reviewed by the HSCA staffers was drawn: CIA staff personnel and security files; a duplicate Oswald 201 file; 26 reels of 201 files on Cubans, Russians, and Americans linked with Oswald, the JFK assassination, and the several investigations; DO project history files, and so on.\n\n6. (AIUO) Included were printed text, almost illegible Thermofax, photographs, computer listings, typed 3X5 cards, buckslips, routing sheets, handwritten scraps - every imaginable form of documentation, with a tremendous amount of duplication, in one instance, 54 copies of a Mexico City cable. Every one of these pieces of paper had to be handled according to NARA instructions, as a unique document for inclusion in the NARA collection for public access and with an Identification Aid for research assistance and retrieval. Among other things, the collection reflected little attention to procedures propounded by NARA itself for Records Management, including destruction of duplicate copies.\n\n7. (AIUO) The pressure to meet an initial Congressionally-mandated release date of 22 August, 1993 with the NARA-required Research Identification Forms, resulted in a crash effort at indexing done, mainly, by individuals on loan from the directorates on an overtime basis and generally unfamiliar with the collection and the subject matter. Thus, a major factor in inconsistent redacting of multiple copies of the same document in different boxes was a function of the quality of the indexing and the effort of the reviewers to cope with constantly changing guidelines. Inadvertent release was inevitable.\n\nTHE REVIEW PROCESS\n\n8. (AIUO) The majority of the reviewers were independent contractors with many years of experience, in some cases senior management experience in at least two directorates. Two HRG reviewers had been Information Review Officers themselves as supergrades, one in the DO, the other in the DA. After the HRG review with suggestions for release in full or with redactions, the documents went to a DO review team. The DO agreement or disagreement was reflected on each document, and the package was returned for a senior-level HRP review prior to forwarding to the ARRB.\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\n9. (AIUO) As complicated and frustrating as the process was, it wouldn\u2019t have worked at all without the on-site presence of the DO team with their link to DO/IMS and the area divisions in Headquarters. Not surprisingly, the DO Headquarters tended to use the familiar FOIA standards, under which much more information could be withheld than was defendable under the JFK law. A major part of the JFK story was Oswald\u2019s trip to Mexico City; it took several months for the DO to agree to allow acknowledgment of the existence of a station in Mexico City and many more months to release the name, pseudo, and tenure of the chief of station - information, except for the pseudo, long since in the public domain.\n\n10. (AIUO) Another long time debate concerned acknowledgment of teletap and photo surveillance by the Mexico City Station on the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates - both discussed in open literature but disguised as unidentified sensitive source materials in the Warren Commission report, along with a cropped photo and transcripts of telephone conversations that came to the station from somewhere. One issue, for a long time, was acknowledging that the teletaps were station activities. The ARRB insisted on nearly total release of Mexico City Station traffic, history, personnel, and project approvals because Oswald\u2019s trip to Mexico City remained one of the most controversial conspiracy theory aspects of the JFK story. Proof of Oswald\u2019s presence there, of his contact with the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates, and the reasons therefore, of the station\u2019s unfamiliarity with him prior to the assassination became evident through release of the detailed information on the teletap and photo operations.\n\n11. (AIUO) After the ARRB staff received the Agency reviewed material, discussion of the validity of the deletions (the \u201cpostponements\u201d) occurred. In the early stages there was a tendency for the Agency Information Review Officers in the directorates to deny rather than release, to test using FOIA standards until challenged, then back off. In a couple of instances, assertions were made that the information that the ARRB said should be released was so sensitive that an appeal to the President would be made - but it wasn\u2019t. The net result of the deny-until-pushed approach was an absence of credibility, leading the ARRB to include the following statement in its Final Report to the President on 30 September 1998:\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\n\"A small number of CIA staff officers, almost exclusively in the Directorate of Operations, unnecessarily impeded the process and damaged the Agency's interests by resisting compromise with all-or-nothing positions.\"\n\n12. (AIUO) As time passed and both Agency and ARRB staffers became better educated in attempting the balance between the public interest and the legitimate need for secrecy, credibility improved, the ARRB members delegated the negotiation process to the staff. Previously, every postponed word, phrase, or paragraph had to be approved by the Board. Toward the end, only remaining disagreements were passed by the staff to the Board.\n\nTHE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE\n\n13. (AIUO) The ARRB, under the law, determined relevance of file material - the Agency could not do so although it could and did, eventually quite successfully, negotiate. Because of the impact of the Oliver Stone movie \"JFK,\" reflecting a 70-80% public view that the Warren Commission conclusion that Oswald acted on his own was wrong, the ARRB pursued all the major conspiracy theories. Thus, Agency files on the USSR's handling of American defectors, entry and departure controls on foreigners, alien employment and marriage with Soviet citizens, and, particularly, KGB interest in Oswald, and Nosenko's claim to have reviewed Oswald's KGB file in Moscow were declared relevant - as was the whole Nosenko bona fides issue. Agency contact with the Mafia to arrange for Castro's assassination, not known to the Warren Commission, were obviously relevant and, by extension, assassination as an Agency activity was considered relevant - hence, all such testimony before the Church Committee had to be reviewed. Of particular interest was the plot against Lumumba because of the involvement of the former Chief of the Technical Services Division, which division was also involved in the Castro assassination planning.\n\n14. (U) The major conspiracy theory of interest to the Board concerned Cubans: either alleged Castro involvement because of his awareness of plotting against himself or Cuban exiles, furious with JFK for the Bay of Pigs failure. Thus, all files on Agency support to the many Cuban\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\nexile groups and CIA involvement in Project MONGOOSE were declared relevant. Hundreds of JM WAVE cables, Mexico City Station documents, and Cuban names, and many with their crypts, were released.\n\n15. (U) Those records that the Board concluded \"truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination\" were designated \"not believed relevant\" (NBR). Cooperative negotiation resulted in about 50,000 pages being declared NBR.\n\nINADVERTENT RELEASES/FOREIGN LIAISON CONCERNS\n\n16. (AIUO) As noted above, inadvertent releases were inevitable. The contributing factors included: guidelines that changed almost continuously as negotiations with the ARRB reduced the claims of current sensitivity; inaccurate and incomplete records on the cover status of retirees; an initial tendency, consistent with FOIA practices, to deny crypts but to release true names- the crypt implying an Agency relationship- if the text did not imply same. (Later: duplicate copies plus mosaic pattern analysis made linkage of some crypts and true name quite easy.); and a surge of inexperienced reviewers loaned during the closing days to meet the agreed NARA deadline for the remaining files.\n\n17. (S) The inadvertent releases of former employees names resulted in a few individual complaints but no known foreign government or liaison service complaints. Four foreign governments opposed release of their information when queried, but no inadvertent releases were involved. (See Appendix C.) The worst slip appears to have been the name of a former NOC, living abroad, who, upon being informed, demanded and received compensation for the violation of his confidential relationship with CIA and the FBI. The other outraged former employee, also living abroad, threatened to contact the President if it became known in his adopted country that he had been CIA. His true name, on a great many documents, is the only redaction; he was of considerable interest to the Board as a key player in the HSCA investigation because he was the Mexico Branch chief and was initially appointed by the DDO to be the focal point for JFK assassination information and briefings. The HSCA allowed him to testify in alias, and the ARRB allowed the substitution of his alias wherever his true name appeared; however, the Board ruled that his true name should be\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\nreleased in May 2001 or on his death if before that date. Given the volume of the documents in which his name appeared, there were inadvertent releases of his true name.\n\nIMPACT OF THE JFK RELEASES ON FUTURE DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS\n\n18. (AIUO) Whether the JFK Act is, or should be considered, precedent-establishing has been argued since its passage. It addresses a unique, highly emotional event, of obvious interest to the public; and it should serve as a catalyst for future declassification policy discussion. But it should not be considered to have set a legal precedent. What should result is what the ARRB directed in the case of exact duplicate documents: that they all be handled consistently, with the same, or no, redactions. Other documents concerning the same or a similar event, not exact duplicates but relevant to the issue, and not subject to the tight legal demands of the JFK legislation, could be reviewed in accordance with the exemptions allowed under the FOIA or the Executive Order. However, the basic factor in deciding on release or denial should not be the avoidance of embarrassment through inconsistent or inadvertent release. It should be the current need for protection of sources and methods.\n\n19. (U) The JFK experience did demonstrate that a traditional generic sources and methods denial is not always necessary, defendable, or smart. Instead of being negatively reactive, it may well be tactically smarter to be proactive to better ensure protection of important secrets. More on that below.\n\n20. (AIUO) LESSONS LEARNED:\n\n- Don\u2019t cut costs on indexing. Use experienced indexers. Aim for indexing all materials before review and processing begins. A key focus should be identification of duplicate documents.\n\n- Use retirees with broad Agency experience under staff supervision. Because the most common release problems usually involve DO material, seriously consider an on site-DO team.\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\n- Develop and keep updating written guidelines, including those for coordinating third-agency documents.\n\n- Establish early what is already in the public domain. Take a fresh look at the \"official release\" philosophy, particularly as concerns former DCIs, Cabinet Officers, Presidents, and Congressional investigations.\n\n- Develop better information on the cover status of retired employees.\n\n- Avoid confrontation on marginal or non-relevant information. Avoid stonewalling on relevant information.\n\n- Because the Information Review Officers are the key implementers of information release policy, ensure that the guidance given them by their Deputy Directors has Agency corporate equity.\n\n21. (AIUO) COMMENTS: Information Management, Information Warfare, Information Handling, Information Declassification: at least three of these terms have elicited groans from senior Agency management and a preference to have someone else, some staffer, deal with the subject, keeping the boss out of trouble and minimally informed. But inflexible insistence on continued classification of dated information, particularly that known to the public, ignorance of what has already been declassified and released, and counterproductive stonewalling - these factors have caused trouble and will cause more trouble as the \"Information Age\" matures.\n\n22. (C) In 1976, then DDI Ed Proctor wrote to the DCI, citing \"the need to rationalize the classification process.\" A 1977 memorandum for the Agency's Executive Committee by two of the current HRG contract reviewers urged the development of an O/DDCI level (the Executive Director position having been abolished) policy review of flap potential in information release and a computer-supported index to released documents. At various times in the 1970s, consideration was given to establishing a fifth Directorate of Information Handling. After a good bit of internal agonizing, DCI Gates in April 1992 signed off on HR 70-14 to make \"significant historical information available without\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\ndamage to national security.\" Subsequently, a central management focal point was established in the Office of Information Management and a system that addresses part of the indexing goal and, with its mandatory declassification \"metrics\" (millions of pages of released documents), modulates some of the outside criticism alleging that CIA is reneging on \"openness.\"\n\n23. (AIUO) What is missing is a Year 2000 look at secrecy. When the FOIA law was passed and the Agency was traumatized by receipt of 150 public requests a day for information, we were able to make case law in the courts and protect sensitive sources and methods by non-arbitrary and non-capricious use of allowed exemptions. It is obvious today that a more forward-thinking strategy than the \"no comment\" of the 1950s and the \"answer the question only as asked\" of the 1970s is needed - the JFK experience demonstrated both the counterproductive result of an all-or-nothing defense and that credibility and compromise can be gained without current sensitivity loss. And the fact that Chairman Porter Goss has joined with Senator Moynihan in proposing the existence of an outside group on the model of the JFK Assassination Review Board as arbiter in the government declassification arena is a very clear signal.\n\n24. (AIUO) In my view (and as was the case, briefly, in the past), this extremely complicated, frustrating, and ubiquitous topic requires the personal attention of the Executive Director with \"corporate\" Agency focused guidance to the Deputies for their personal attention and policy guidance to the IROs. And because the IROs, as the implementors of their Deputies' policies, determine the credibility and resource impact levels, they should be supergrades and experienced in at least two directorates.\n\n25. (AIUO) The eventual development of a credible association with the JFK ARRB was a function of: (1) the patience and diplomacy of the HRP/JFK Project Officer, Barry Harrelson and (2) the presence, on site, of the DO team, without whom this exercise could not have been completed. Ironically, as is so often the case when an individual or group is between a rock and a hard place, as the DO team was between the DO desk officers, the DO/IRO, and the HRP reviewers, there were allegations of their having\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\nbeen co-opted. Both the DO team and HRG were seen, at times, as \"the enemy.\" That kind of in-house idiocy needed instant quashing.\n\n26. (AIUO) CONCLUSIONS: The JFK Project cost far too much, took far too long, produced no information to change the conclusion that Oswald acted alone. But it did make available to the public previously withheld operational material to negate what DCI Gates had called the most heinous of the conspiracy theories: that CIA was involved in the assassination of the President of the United States. The resource impact was a function of: the unique requirements of the law; the crash nature of the initial release; the National Archives decision that every duplicate must be reviewed and indexed as a unique document; less than satisfactory indexing, contributing to inadvertent releases and time wasted in checking for consistency in the handling of duplicates; problems in determining the cover status of retired employees; and stonewalling.\n\n27. (AIUO) Although there was inconsistency and inadvertent release and some resultant retiree anger, we know of no significant national security breach. Previously withheld information from the Church Committee hearings and from the Presidential libraries declared relevant by the ARRB will be titillating and may stimulate FOIA requests, but the variance from FOIA rules was not a legal justification for withholding under the JFK law.\n\n28. (U) If this experience leads to a serious objective look at the theory and practice of secrecy in this changed world, perhaps the cost will have been worth it.\n\nAttachments:\nA. Excerpt from Final Report of the ARRB (Standards)\nB. OGC Memorandum\nC. Foreign Government Information\nSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience\n\nDA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99)\ns:/oim/fo/jim/hrp/jfk/C.B. Memo The JFK Declass Exp.doc\n\nDistribution:\nOriginal - Addressee, w/atts\n1 - C/IRG/SCD, w/atts\n1 - IRG/SCD/HRO, w/atts (Harrelson)\n1 - SCD Chrono, w/atts\n1 - SCD Subj, w/atts\nclosure-oriented than President Reagan\u2019s order. The current Executive Order applies to all Executive branch records and, unlike the JFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a systematic declassification of all records more than 25 years old. The Executive Order gives agencies five years\u2014until April 2000\u2014to declassify all classified information that is (1) more than 25 years old, and (2) is of permanent historical value unless the \u201cagency head\u201d determines that release of the information would cause one of the nine enumerated harms. The Executive Order provides for continuing protection for sources and methods where disclosure would damage the national security. It also protects, inter alia, information that involves diplomatic relations, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plans that are still in effect, and protection of the President.8\n\nThe JFK Act guidelines that governed the disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy were detailed in section 6 of the JFK Act.9 The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone the release of assassination records only where the agencies provided clear and convincing evidence that one of five enumerated harms would occur if the Review Board released the record and that the harm outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The statute allowed protection of intelligence agents and intelligence sources and methods if the agency could show that the agent, source, or method currently required protection. The statute further allowed the Board to protect the identity of living persons who provided confidential information to the government if the agency could show that disclosure of the person\u2019s identity would pose a substantial risk of harm to the person. The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone release of information if release would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or if release would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality between a government agent and a cooperating individual or foreign government. Finally, the JFK Act allowed the Review Board to protect current information concerning protection of government officials.\n\n2. Key Distinctions Between Standards of Release Under the FOIA, the Executive Order, and the JFK Act\n\nIn considering whether the JFK Act was necessary to guarantee public access to assassination records, Congress evaluated the effectiveness of both the FOIA and the then-current Executive Order 12356. Both the House and the Senate concluded that the FOIA and the Executive Order, as administered by the executive branch, had failed to guarantee adequate public disclosure of assassination records.\n\nAt the time that the JFK Act became law, the largest collections of records concerning the assassination were under the control of the FBI, the CIA, and the Congressional Committees who investigated the assassination. The FOIA provides special protections for each of these entities, and thus could not serve as the mechanism for maximum disclosure of assassination records. First, the FOIA exempts CIA operational files from disclosure.10 Second, the FOIA provides broad-based protection for law enforcement files and therefore allows the FBI to protect a substantial amount of its information from disclosure.11 Third, the FOIA does not apply to unpublished Congressional records.12 Congress found that the FOIA did not require adequate disclosure in those records that it did cover. Thus, Congress believed that the FOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism for guaranteeing disclosure of assassination records.13\n\nPresident Clinton did not sign Executive Order 12958 until April 17, 1995\u2014over two years after Congress passed the JFK Act. Clearly, the terms of the Executive Order applied to most assassination records since they were of permanent historical value and were over 25 years old. Even if President Clinton\u2019s Executive Order had been in effect prior to 1992, it could not have achieved the maximum disclosure accomplished by the JFK Act. The problem with the Executive Order is that it allowed \u201cagency heads\u201d to make the decision to exempt records from automatic declassification provided that the \u201cagency head\u201d expected that disclosure of the records would result in one of the nine enumerated categories of harm. As many sections of this Report explain, the Review\nBoard found that \"agency heads\" tended to be quite reluctant to release their agencies' secrets. The Executive Order, while well-intentioned, failed to provide for any independent review of \"agency heads'\" decisions on declassification. Thus, although the Executive Order's standards for declassification appeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Executive Order failed to hold agency heads accountable for their decisionmaking.\n\nThe JFK Act did require agencies to account for their decisions. To ensure such accountability, Congress included four essential provisions in the JFK Act: first, the JFK Act presumed that assassination records may be released; second, the JFK Act stated that an agency could rebut the presumption of disclosure only by proving, with clear and convincing evidence, that disclosure would result in harm and that the expected harm would outweigh any public benefit in the disclosure; third, the JFK Act created an independent agency\u2014the Review Board\u2014whose mandate was to ensure that agencies respected the presumption of disclosure and honestly presented clear and convincing evidence of the need to protect information; and fourth, the JFK Act required agencies to provide the Review Board with access to government records, even when those records would not become part of the JFK Collection. Without these accountability provisions, the JFK Act would not have accomplished its objective of maximum release of assassination records to the public. So, while the FOIA and the Executive Order each expressed the goal of obtaining maximum disclosure, the JFK Act ensured that the goal would be met. The two accountability provisions that relate directly to the Section 6 grounds for postponement\u2014the presumption of release and the standard of proof\u2014are discussed in detail below. The third provision discussed below is the Review Board's obligation to balance the weight of the evidence in favor of postponement against the public interest in release.\n\na. JFK Act presumes disclosure of assassination records.\n\nThe most pertinent language of the JFK Act was the standard for release of information. According to the statute, \"all Government records concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure.\" The statute further declared that \"only in the rarest cases is there any legitimate need for continued protection of such records.\"15\n\nb. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence.\n\nIf agencies wished to withhold information in a document, the JFK Act required the agency to submit clear and convincing evidence that the information fell within one of the narrow postponement criteria.16\n\nCongress selected the clear and convincing evidence standard because \"less exacting standards, such as substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence, were not consistent with the legislation's stated goal\" of prompt and full release.17 The legislative history of the JFK Act emphasized the statutory requirement that agencies provide clear and convincing evidence.\n\nThere is no justification for perpetual secrecy for any class of records. Nor can the withholding of any individual record be justified on the basis of general confidentiality concerns applicable to an entire class. Every record must be judged on its own merits, and every record will ultimately be made available for public disclosure.18\n\nWhen agencies did present to the Review Board evidence of harm that would result from disclosure, it had to consist of more than speculation.\n\nThe [Review] Board cannot postpone release because it might cause some conceivable or speculative harm to national security. Rather in a democracy the demonstrable harm from disclosure must be weighed against the benefits of release of the information to the public.19\n\nThe Review Board's application of the clear and convincing evidence standard is covered in more detail in Section B of this chapter.\nSection B includes a discussion of the \u201cRule of Reason\u201d that the Review Board ultimately adopted with regard to receiving evidence from the agencies.\n\nc. JFK Act requires the Review Board to balance evidence for postponement against public interest in release.\n\nAssuming that agencies did provide clear and convincing evidence that information should be protected from disclosure, the terms of section 6 required that information not be postponed unless the threat of harm outweighs the public interest in disclosure. As used in the JFK Act, \u201cpublic interest\u201d means \u201cthe compelling interest in the prompt public disclosure of assassination records for historical and governmental purposes and for the purpose of fully informing the American people about the history surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.\u201d The Review Board interpreted the balancing requirement to mean that agencies had to provide the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence of the threat of harm that would result from disclosure. However, to the extent that the JFK Act left room for discretion in evaluating the historical significance, or public interest, of particular assassination records, it was the Review Board\u2014not the agency that originated the document\u2014that was to exercise this discretion. The burden was on the agencies to make the case for postponement, not to judge the level of public interest in a particular document. The JFK Act established the Review Board as a panel of independent citizens with expertise as historians and archivists precisely in order to secure public confidence in such determinations.\n\nd. Segregability and substitute language.\n\nWhen the Review Board determined that the risk of harm did outweigh the public interest in disclosure, it then had to take two additional steps: (1) ensure that the agency redacted the least amount of information possible to avoid the stated harm, or \u201csegregate\u201d the postponed information, and (2) provide substitute language to take the place of the redaction.\n\n3. Federal Agency Record Groups and the Standards Applied to Them.\n\nThe JFK Act defines \u201cassassination records\u201d to include records related to the assassination of President Kennedy that were \u201ccreated or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the possession of\u201d the following groups: the Warren Commission, the four congressional committees that investigated the assassination, any office of the federal government, and any state or local law enforcement office that assisted in a federal investigation of the assassination.\n\nWhen it passed the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Collection to include the record groups that it identified in section 3(2), but it also intended for the Review Board to consider carefully the scope of the term \u201cassassination record\u201d and to issue an interpretive regulation defining this crucial term. The Act requires government agencies to identify, organize, and process those assassination records that are defined as assassination records in section 3(2). Chapter 6 of this report explains how the Review Board interpreted its responsibility to define and seek out \u201cadditional records and information.\u201d Set forth below is a description of some of the core government holdings on the assassination which were released under the standards of the Review Board.\n\na. The FBI\u2019s \u201ccore and related\u201d files.\n\nThe FBI\u2019s \u201ccore and related\u201d files consist of those records that the FBI gathered in response to FOIA requests that it received in the 1970s for records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The \u201ccore\u201d files include the FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby, as well as the FBI\u2019s Warren Commission files and the JFK assassination investigation file. The \u201crelated\u201d files include FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald\u2019s wife Marina and mother Marguerite, Oswald\u2019s friend George DeMohrenschildt, and the Oswalds\u2019 Dallas friends Ruth and Michael Paine. The FBI began its processing of the core and related files in 1993. The Review Board applied strict standards to its review of postponements in the core and related files.\nb. CIA\u2019s Lee Harvey Oswald \u201c201\u201d file.\n\nCIA opens a 201 file on an individual when it has an \u201coperational interest\u201d in that person. The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee Harvey Oswald in December 1960 when it received a request from the Department of State on defectors. After President Kennedy\u2019s assassination, the Oswald 201 file served as a depository for records CIA gathered and created during CIA\u2019s wide-ranging investigation of the assassination. Thus, the file provides the most complete record of the CIA\u2019s inquiry in the months and years immediately following the assassination.\n\nc. The FBI\u2019s \u201cHouse Select Committee on Assassinations\u201d (HSCA) Subject Files.\n\nDuring the HSCA\u2019s tenure, the Committee made a number of requests to the FBI for records that the Committee believed might be relevant to their investigation of the Kennedy assassination. In response to the HSCA\u2019s requests, the FBI made available to the HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pages of FBI files. The FBI began its processing of the \u201cHSCA Subject\u201d files in 1993. The Review Board applied its \u201cSegregated Collection\u201d guidelines (explained below) to the HSCA subject files.\n\nd. The CIA\u2019s \u201cSegregated Collection\u201d files.\n\nHSCA investigators gained access to CIA files. Upon completion of the HSCA\u2019s work, the CIA kept separate the files that it had made available to the HSCA and retained them as a segregated collection. This collection is divided into two parts: paper records and microfilm. CIA made 63 boxes of paper records available to the HSCA staff. The paper records consist, in many cases, of particular records that CIA culled from various files. The 64th box of the CIA\u2019s segregated collection contains 72 reels of microfilm and represents the entire set of files from which records were made available to the HSCA. Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed files contain material well beyond the scope of the HSCA investigation and may, for example, cover an agent\u2019s entire career when only a small portion of it intersected with the assassination story.\n\ne. FBI records on the congressional committees that investigated the assassination.\n\nThe JFK Act defined \u201cassassination record\u201d to include records relating to the Kennedy assassination that were used by the congressional committees who investigated events surrounding the assassination.\n\nBefore President Clinton appointed the Review Board, the FBI collected and began to process its administrative files relating to its involvement with each of these committees. In large part, the records contained in the Bureau\u2019s administrative files related to topics other than the Kennedy assassination. To the extent that the Review Board found records in these files that concerned topics other than the Kennedy assassination, it designated the records not believed relevant (or \u201cNBR\u201d as that acronym is defined infra) and removed them from further consideration.\n\nf. Requests for Additional Information.\n\nCongress included in the JFK Act a provision that allowed the Review Board to obtain additional information and records beyond those that were reviewed by previous investigations. Chapter 6 of this report explains the requests that the Review Board made and the assassination records designated as a result of those requests.\n\nB. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS\n\nThe Review Board\u2019s primary purpose, as outlined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was to determine whether an agency\u2019s request for postponement of disclosure of an assassination record met the criteria for postponement set forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted of an introductory clause, which established the \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d standard, and five subsections that set forth the criteria under which the Review Board could agree to postpone public disclosure of assassination-related information.\n\n1. Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence\n\nText of Section 6\n\nDisclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records\nto the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if [agencies provide] clear and convincing evidence that [the harm from disclosure outweighs the public interest in release.]\n\na. Review Board guidelines. For each recommended postponement, the JFK Act requires an agency to submit \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d that one of the specified grounds for postponement exists. The Review Board required agencies to submit specific facts in support of each postponement, according to the Review Board\u2019s guidelines for each postponement type.\n\nb. Commentary. Although the agencies argued that the clear and convincing evidence standard could be satisfied by a general explanation of those agencies\u2019 positions in support of postponements, the Review Board determined that the clear and convincing evidence requirement was a document-specific one. Thus, the Board required agencies to present evidence that was tailored to individual postponements within individual documents.\n\nThe JFK Act clearly required agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence in support of their postponements, but it did not establish a mechanism for when and how such evidence should be presented. The legislative history provides a clue as to Congress\u2019 intent: \u201c[T]o the extent possible, consultation with the government offices creates an understanding on each side as to the basis and reasons for their respective recommendations and determinations.\u201d The Review Board did consult with government offices to determine fair, efficient, and reasonable procedures for presenting evidence.\n\nThe Review Board began its review of assassination records by considering pre-assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, the Board asked the staff to present the records on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, with FBI records, the Review Board first scheduled a group of FBI records for review and notified the FBI of the meeting date at which it intended to vote on the records. The Review Board invited the FBI to present its evidence. Second, the FBI requested that it be allowed to brief the members of the Review Board. At the briefing, the FBI presented its position to the Board\u2014both in an oral presentation and in a \u201cposition paper.\u201d The FBI\u2019s \u201cposition papers\u201d summarized the FBI\u2019s general policy preferences for continued classification of certain categories of information. Third, the Review Board staff researched existing law on each of the FBI\u2019s \u201cpositions\u201d and determined that the arguments that the FBI put forth in support of its JFK Act postponements were essentially the same arguments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIA cases. Of course, in legislating the declassification standards of the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Act standards\u2014and not the FOIA standards\u2014to apply. Aware of congressional intent, the Review Board rejected the FBI\u2019s general policy preferences on the basis that the arguments did not constitute the clear and convincing evidence necessary to support a request for a postponement under section 6. The FBI did appeal the Review Board\u2019s decisions to the President, but the Review Board\u2019s document-specific interpretation of the clear and convincing evidence standard ultimately prevailed when the vote was withdrawn.\n\ni. \u201cRule of Reason.\u201d Of course, some assassination records are of greater interest than others. With regard to records that had a close nexus to the assassination, the Review Board strictly applied the law. For example, the Review Board voted to release in full nearly all of the information in the FBI\u2019s pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and the bulk of the information in the HSCA\u2019s report on CIA activities in Mexico City\u2014the \u201cLopez\u201d report\u2014because of the high public interest in that material. With regard to the FBI files, the FBI believed that its arguments were compelling enough to merit appeals to the President on nearly all of the Review Board\u2019s decisions on the pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald records. The FBI, the Review Board, the White House Counsel\u2019s\nOffice, and ultimately the Department of State spent a substantial amount of time resolving the issues that arose in the appeal process, and for those important records that were at issue, the Review Board considered its time well-spent. The Review Board similarly dealt with other key records and spent as much time as was necessary to deliberate and decide upon those records.\n\nThe postponement-by-postponement review at each early Review Board meeting proved to be a slow and careful process. The postponement-by-postponement review proved to be a necessary educational process for the Board members. The Board members were a group of five citizens who were selected not for their familiarity with the subject of the assassination, but for their professional competence in history and law. Thus, through reviewing individual documents at its early meetings, the Board essentially educated itself about the assassination.\n\nWhile the Review Board did need time to educate itself and to develop its policies, the Board\u2019s pace eventually increased. In an effort to streamline its work, the Review Board consulted with federal agencies such as the CIA and FBI to work out an approach for review of records that would allow the Review Board to make informed decisions, but not require agencies to spend hundreds of hours locating evidence for and providing briefings on each postponement within an assassination record.\n\nThe first step to developing a reasonable approach was for the Review Board to formulate general rules for sustaining and denying postponements. The Review Board\u2019s \u201cguidance\u201d to its staff and the agencies became a body of rules\u2014a Review Board \u201ccommon law.\u201d Once the Review Board notified an agency of its approach on a particular type of postponement, the agency learned to present only those facts that the Review Board would need to make a decision. For example, with regard to FBI informants, the Review Board notified the FBI of what it considered to be the relevant factors in its decisionmaking. In other words, it defined for the Bureau what it considered to be \u201cclear and convincing\u201d evidence. Then, the Review Board worked with the FBI to create a one-page form titled an \u201cInformant Postponement Evidence Form\u201d that the FBI could use to provide evidence on an informant. (See illustration.) The form allowed the FBI to simply fill in the answers to a series of questions about the informant in question, which in turn allowed the Review Board to focus on those facts that it deemed to be dispositive in a particular document. This approach had the added benefit of providing consistency to the Review Board\u2019s decisionmaking.\n\nA large number of records that the JFK Act defined as \u201cassassination records\u201d proved to be of very low public interest. The JFK Act required the Review Board to process all records that were \u201cmade available\u201d to the Warren Commission and the Congressional Committees that investigated the assassination, whether or not the records were used by the Commission or the committees. Many of these records, while interesting from a historian\u2019s perspective, are not closely related to the assassination. For those documents that were of little or no public interest, the Review Board modified its standards in the two ways described below.\n\nA. \u201cNBR\u201d Guidelines: Records that Review Board judged were \u201cnot believed relevant\u201d to the assassination. For those records that truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination, the Review Board designated the records \u201cnot believed relevant\u201d (NBR). The \u201cNBR\u201d Guidelines allowed the Review Board to remove irrelevant records from further consideration. Records that the Review Board designated \u201cNBR\u201d were virtually the only groups of records that the Review Board agreed to postpone in full. Thus, the Review Board was always extremely reluctant to designate records \u201cNBR\u201d and rarely did so.\n\nB. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For those records that were not immediately relevant, but shed at least some light on issues that the congressional committees that investigated the assassination explored as potentially relevant to the assassination, the Review Board created the \u201cSegregated Collection Guidelines.\u201d The segregated collections records, although marginally relevant, were not appropriate for \u201cNBR\u201d designation, as the \u201cNBR\u201d Guidelines would have resulted in withholding records in full. Instead, the Board passed the \u201cSegregated Collection\u201d Guidelines, which ensured that the Review Board staff would review every page of the\nmarginally relevant records, but would not require agencies to present the same amount of evidence in support of postponements. The regulations that the Review Board adopted on November 13, 1996, define \u201cSegregated Collections\u201d to include the following: (1) FBI records that were requested by the HSCA in conjunction with its investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy, the Church Committee in conjunction with its inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedy assassination, and the Pike Committee and Rockefeller Commission that investigated issues related to the assassination; (2) CIA records including the CIA\u2019s segregated collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records (box 64) and several boxes of CIA staff \u201cworking files.\u201d The Review Board adopted revised guidelines on April 23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline the review process of postponements in the segregated collections, and ensure a page-by-page review of all documents in the segregated collections. The guidelines state, \u201c...even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of review.\u201d Where the Review Board\u2019s standards differed between core files and segregated collection files, the guidelines set forth below note the distinction.\n\nThus, throughout its tenure, the Review Board sought to be vigorous in applying the law, but, in order to complete its work, found it necessary to employ a \u201crule of reason.\u201d\n\n2. Intelligence Agents\n\nText of Section 6(1)(A)\n\n...clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal\u2014\n\n(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection...\nThe CIA, however, was reluctant to produce name-specific evidence and, on occasion, CIA failed to furnish evidence when it promised to do so. CIA\u2019s initial refusal to supply evidence on individual names was met, not with the wholesale release of names by the Board, but with a firm insistence that the Agency meet the requirements of the Act. The Review Board released the names of a few individuals who were of central importance to the assassination story early in the process, but gave the Agency a number of additional opportunities to provide specific evidence on other names.\n\nFor example, in December 1995, the Review Board designated one day of their meeting \u201cname day,\u201d and invited CIA to provide evidence for names the Review Board had encountered in CIA records during the previous six to seven months. On that day, CIA again requested the Review Board to sustain the postponement of all CIA names. The Review Board did not want to jeopardize the personal safety of individuals and gave CIA more time to provide evidence. The Board set other \u201cname days\u201d in May 1996 and May 1997. As deadlines for submission of evidence approached, CIA agreed to release some names, but in most cases, continued to offer less than satisfactory evidence on those they wished to protect. Gradually, the CIA did begin to provide supporting evidence of the postponement of individual names.\n\nBy May 1996, the Review Board had decided what evidence would meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. If the CIA provided evidence that the individual retired under cover or abroad, or evidence that the individual objected to the release of his or her name when contacted (CIA agreed to attempt to contact former employees), the Review Board would protect the CIA officer\u2019s name. Moreover, where the CIA specifically identified an ongoing operation in which the individual was involved or CIA could demonstrate that the person was still active with CIA, the Review Board would protect the name. Because the JFK Act required the Review Board to balance the potential harm from disclosure against the public interest in release, there were cases in which the Review Board determined that, even though the CIA had provided the required evidence, the Review Board believed that the individual was of sufficiently high public interest that it would require the CIA to provide additional evidence before it would consider protecting the name. In these cases, the Review Board asked CIA to provide information on the employee\u2019s current status, his or her location, and the nature of the work he or she did for the CIA.\n\nThe Review Board determined that names were of high public interest when the CIA officer at issue had a substantive connection to the assassination story or where the CIA officer\u2019s name appeared in CIA\u2019s Oswald 201 file. By July 1997, the Review Board had determined that where CIA officer names did not fit within one of the \u201chigh public interest\u201d categories, it would require CIA to provide significantly less evidence in support of its requests for postponement. Given the large number of CIA officer names in the CIA records, the Review Board determined that it had to adopt the practical high public interest/low public interest approach, particularly since it had limited time and resources available to complete its own review of CIA records. The Review Board would have preferred to review each name at the same high level of scrutiny that it used to review names of high public interest. Nevertheless, the Board\u2019s approach compelled the CIA to release many more names than it would have desired.\n\nb. \u201cJohn Scelso\u201d (pseudonym).\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the true name of the individual known by the pseudonym of John Scelso until May 1, 2001 or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever comes first.\n\nii. Commentary. The CIA employee who was head of CIA\u2019s division \u201cWestern Hemisphere 3\u201d during the period immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy testified before the HSCA and the Church Committee under the \u201cthrow-away\u201d alias John Scelso. His true name appears on hundreds of documents in the JFK collection, many of which were the product of the Agency\u2019s extensive post-assassination investigation that spanned the globe. In reviewing this particular name, the Review Board\u2019s desire to satisfy the public\u2019s interest in release\nclashed with the CIA's strong evidence in support of postponement. Initially, the Board was inclined to release Scelso's true name, but the Agency argued convincingly against release. CIA provided evidence on the current status of the individual, shared correspondence sent by him, and even arranged an interview between him and a Review Board staff member. As an interim step, the Review Board inserted his prior alias \"Scelso\" as substitute language. (See illustration.) Then, at its May 1996 meeting, Board members determined to release \"Scelso's\" true name in five years or upon his death.\n\nii. Commentary. Whenever the Review Board voted to protect the identity of an individual throughout federal agency assassination records, it had to be realistic enough to realize that some information about individuals is so specific that release of the information would reveal the individual's identity. Examples of specific identifying information include home addresses, birth dates, job titles, names of family members, and other less obvious, but equally revealing pieces of information.\n\nd. Names of National Security Agency employees.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the names of all National Security Agency employees that it encountered. The Review Board would have considered releasing names of National Security Agency employees if it determined that a particular name was extremely relevant to the assassination.\n\nii. Commentary. Due to the nature of NSA information, few NSA employee names appeared in NSA's assassination records. Even though the Review Board did not often encounter NSA employee names, it did have to vote on those names that it did confront. NSA's policy of not releasing the names of its employees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act that presumed release of such information unless NSA could prove that individual NSA employee names required protection. NSA argued that the release of any names, other than those of publicly acknowledged senior officials, jeopardized the potential security of U.S. cryptographic systems and those individuals. As it did with the names of other intelligence agents and officers, the Review Board considered the names of NSA officers on a document-by-document basis. Given the nature of NSA information, the Review Board members agreed that none of the few names which appear in the documents, and for which NSA requested protection, was of high enough public interest or central to an understanding of the assassination story. Thus, it protected the names.\n\nc. Information that identifies CIA officers.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. For specific information that, if released, would reveal the identity of an individual CIA officer that the Board had voted to protect, the Review Board protected the information.\n\n3. Intelligence Sources and Methods, and Other Matters Relating to the National Security of the United States\n\nText of Section 6(1)(B) and (C)\n... clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal\u2014\n\n(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or\n\n(C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;\n\na. CIA sources.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board handled CIA sources, assets, informants, and specific identifying information under standards similar to the Board\u2019s decisions for CIA officers. Where the Review Board believed names held a high level of public interest, either because the name was central to the story or because assassination researchers expressed interest in the name, the Review Board subjected them to close scrutiny. The Board generally protected the identity of foreign nationals unless they were of high public interest and then the Review Board required CIA to provide specific evidence in support of its claimed postponements. The Review Board protected domestic sources, assets and informants where CIA demonstrated that release would jeopardize ongoing operations or harm individuals. If CIA did not provide evidence of one of the two above-referenced harms, the Review Board released the name at issue. In addition, where the public already knew the names of individuals who were connected to the CIA, especially if the government had previously released the information, the Review Board released the information.\n\nii. Commentary. The Review Board addressed the issue of whether to postpone or release source names at the same time that it considered CIA employee names, and encountered the same problems as it had in the review of CIA employee names. As with CIA employee names, CIA was reluctant to provide name-specific evidence to the Review Board, opting instead to offer general principles supporting CIA\u2019s request that the Review Board redact all names.\n\nThe Review Board ultimately decided to protect the names of sources, assets, and informants in cases where the identity of the source is of reduced public interest because CIA sources live in countries other than the U.S. and were more likely to face harm if the Board disclosed their relationship with CIA. In those records where the source\u2019s identity was of possible public interest in relation to the assassination story or was important to understanding information related to the assassination, the Review Board required the CIA to provide additional evidence to support the protection of the source\u2019s identity.\n\nWhen the Review Board postponed release of source names, it did so for ten years except in cases where a foreign government might accuse the source of committing treason for assisting the CIA. In those cases, the Review Board protected the source\u2019s name and identifying information until 2017.\n\nb. CIA pseudonyms.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. With only a few exceptions, the Review Board released the pseudonyms of individuals. In some instances, the Review Board used pseudonyms as substitute language for the individual\u2019s true name.\n\nii. Commentary. Very early in the review process, the Review Board determined that, since pseudonyms were a sort of \u201cthrow away\u201d identity for individuals who were under cover, the Review Board could release\nthe pseudonym without harming the individual. The CIA did not object to the Review Board\u2019s policy to release pseudonyms. The CIA did identify several pseudonyms that it believed to be particularly sensitive, and demonstrated to the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence that release of those pseudonyms would do irreparable harm.\n\nc. CIA crypts.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released some CIA \u201ccrypts\u201d\u2014code words for operations and individuals. The Review Board also generally released CIA \u201cdigraphs\u201d\u2014the first two letters of a crypt that link a particular crypt to a particular location. CIA often created crypts to refer to other U.S. government agencies; for example, the FBI was \u201cODENVY.\u201d The Review Board made a blanket decision to release all U.S. government crypts. The Review Board nearly always released CIA crypts where those crypts denoted operations or individuals relating to Mexico City or Cuba. (The digraph for Mexico City was \u201cLI,\u201d and for Cuba, it was \u201cAM.\u201d) For all other crypts, the Review Board protected the digraph and released the remainder of the crypt. The Review Board established a few exceptions, and where exceptions applied, the Board required CIA to provide crypt-specific evidence of the need to protect.\n\nii. Commentary. The Review Board had to determine whether it believed that release of CIA crypts would harm CIA operations and individuals. Section 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement of CIA crypts. The Review Board required the CIA to provide crypt-specific clear and convincing evidence that CIA currently used, or expected to use the crypt and that CIA had not previously released the crypt. Thus, in order to convince the Review Board to sustain postponements, the Board required CIA to research each crypt to determine whether CIA still used the individual or the operation and provide that evidence to the Review Board.\n\nAs it did with CIA agent names, CIA initially requested the Review Board to sustain postponements of all CIA crypts\u2014even \u201cODENVY\u201d\u2014the CIA\u2019s old crypt for the FBI that CIA had already released in other CIA records. CIA argued that its use of crypts was an operational method that should remain secret, even though CIA had replaced most of the crypts at issue years earlier. CIA believed that if the Review Board released the crypts, researchers would be able to piece together the records and determine the identity of operations and individuals. CIA further argued that the burden of locating evidence on each crypt was too heavy.\n\nThe Review Board, conversely, believed that CIA conceived crypts as a code to hide the identity of an operation or an individual, and so the Review Board could release the crypts and not compromise the operation or the individual. As with CIA agent names, the Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to locate evidence on each crypt. Finally, the Review Board released a group of CIA crypts from Mexico City with the \u201cLI\u201d digraph. CIA eventually agreed to release its crypts and digraphs in assassination records, and the Review Board eventually agreed to protect certain sensitive crypts.\n\nThe Review Board recognized that it could not conduct a crypt-by-crypt review for every CIA record that it encountered. CIA records contain hundreds of thousands of crypts. Given the need to finish its work, the Review Board decided that, for all crypts except the \u201cLI,\u201d \u201cAM,\u201d and \u201cOD\u201d series crypts, it would agree to postpone the location-specific digraph and release the actual crypts. Thus, the Review Board released most crypts in the collection and the most relevant digraphs. The Review Board did make three exceptions to its general rule: it protected the digraph in non-core files when (a) the crypt appeared next to a true name that had been released, (b) when the crypt appeared next to specific identifying information, and (c) when CIA provided clear and convincing evidence that the Review Board should protect the digraph.\n\nd. CIA sluglines.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. \u201cSluglines\u201d are CIA routing indicators, consisting of two or more crypts, that appear above the text in CIA cables. (See illustration.) The Review Board released CIA sluglines according to the same criteria it applied to crypts and digraphs.\nii. Commentary. The Review Board released CIA sluglines because the Agency never offered the Review Board any evidence to explain why the Board should not release them. An example of a CIA slugline is \u201cRYBAT GPFLOR.\u201d \u201cRYBAT\u201d is a CIA crypt that meant \u201csecret,\u201d and GPFLOR was the crypt that CIA gave Lee Harvey Oswald during its post-assassination investigation. CIA initially asked the Review Board to postpone the CIA slugline even where CIA had released the individual crypts that made up the slugline elsewhere. For example, in the case of \u201cRYBAT GPFLOR,\u201d the CIA agreed to release the crypt \u201cRYBAT\u201d in two places elsewhere in the document at issue, and the CIA agreed to release the crypt GPFLOR when it appeared in the text. CIA told the Review Board that it could not, however, release the slugline \u201cRYBAT GPFLOR.\u201d CIA offered no substantive arguments to support its request for postponement of the slugline. Given the statute\u2019s demand that CIA provide clear and convincing evidence in support of its requests for postponement, the Review Board voted to release CIA sluglines.\n\nf. CIA surveillance methods.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board generally released CIA surveillance methods, the details of their implementation, and the product produced by them where the Review Board believed the methods were relevant to the assassination. The Review Board sustained postponements of CIA surveillance methods where CIA provided convincing evidence that the method still merited protection. Where the Review Board sustained the CIA\u2019s requests for postponement of surveillance methods, it substituted the language \u201csurveillance method,\u201d \u201coperational details,\u201d or \u201csensitive operation.\u201d\n\nii. Commentary. As with all its sources and methods, CIA initially requested the Review Board to postpone all of its surveillance methods since, CIA argued, CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. The Review Board, on the other hand, believed that it was not a secret that CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. Moreover, the Review Board did not believe that its votes to release CIA surveillance methods in Mexico City in 1963 would jeopardize current CIA surveillance operations. Finally, the Review Board recognized that certain CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City in 1963 were already well-known to the public because the U.S. government had disclosed details about those operations. CIA surveillance, particularly telephone taps and photo operations, was a major element in the story of Oswald\u2019s 1963 trip to Mexico City. (See illustration.)\n\nThe Board, therefore, concluded that the public interest in disclosure far outweighed any risk to national security and directed release of the information. However, in records that CIA proved did contain information about current operations, the Review Board voted to postpone the information.\n\nf. CIA installations.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board used date \u201cwindows\u201d within which it released the locations of CIA installations where the location was relevant to the assassination. Specifically, the Review Board released the location of CIA installations relating to Mexico City during the time period 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review\nBoard generally released the location of all CIA installations that were relevant to the assassination during the time period between the date of the assassination\u2014November 22, 1963\u2014and the date that the Warren Commission issued its report in September 1964. Finally, the Review Board generally released the location of all CIA installations that appeared in Oswald\u2019s 201 file during the time period January 1, 1961 through October 1, 1964. The Review Board did grant CIA a few exceptions to its general rule, and except for the specific time windows described above, the Review Board protected all information that identified CIA installation locations.\n\nThe Review Board created substitute language for its postponement of CIA installations to enable researchers to track a particular CIA installation through the JFK collection without revealing the city or country in which it is located. To accomplish this, the Review Board divided the world into five regions: Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Northern Europe, East Asia/Pacific, and Africa/Near East/South Asia. Then the Board added a number to refer to each different location in the region. Thus, \u201cCIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1\u201d serves as a place holder for a particular installation in all CIA assassination records.\n\nii. Commentary. Initially, the Review Board released CIA installation locations in CIA documents relevant to Oswald\u2019s visit to Mexico City. CIA did not raise significant objections to the Review Board\u2019s release of its installations in these records.\n\nWhen the Review Board began to vote to release the location of additional CIA installation locations, the CIA did object, but did not offer evidence of the harm to national security that it believed would result from disclosure of the information. The CIA\nthreatened to appeal to the President to overturn the Review Board\u2019s votes, but the Review Board\u2019s position was that the JFK Act required release of information where CIA did not provide convincing evidence to support their postponements. The Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to gather and present its evidence to support its requests for postponements as both the CIA and the Review Board hoped to avoid a CIA appeal to the President.\n\nUltimately, the CIA determined that it would trust Review Board members with the information that the Review Board required to postpone the release of the location of a small number of CIA installations. In an effort to balance high public interest in the location of CIA installations and the need to protect certain installations, the Review Board decided to establish date \u201cwindows\u201d within which it would release CIA installation locations.\n\nThe CIA never appealed a Review Board vote to the President.\n\ng. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report).\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. CIA cable, dispatch, and field report \u201cprefixes\u201d are identifiers that CIA uses on its communications to indicate the installation that generates a particular message. Where the Review Board had voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board also voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes that the installation generated. Likewise, the Review Board protected cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes where it voted to protect the location of the CIA installation.\n\nThe Review Board replaced the prefixes that it protected with substitute language similar to that used for CIA installations. An example of substitute language for CIA prefixes is: \u201cCable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1.\u201d\n\nii. Commentary. Once the Review Board voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board and CIA did not disagree that the Board should release cable, dispatch and field report prefixes.\n\nh. CIA job titles.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board voted to release CIA employees\u2019 job titles except when the Board\u2019s disclosure of the title might reveal the identity of an individual or CIA installation requiring protection.\n\nii. Commentary. Although the Review Board did not believe that it should vote to protect CIA job titles, standing alone, it sometimes voted to protect titles if they revealed other information that the Review Board had voted to protect.\n\ni. CIA file numbers.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. CIA organizes many of its files by country and assigns \u201ccountry identifiers\u201d within particular file numbers. The Review Board released nearly all CIA file numbers that referred to Mexico City. The Review Board protected the \u201ccountry identifiers\u201d in CIA file numbers for all other countries with the exception of country identifiers \u201c15\u201d and \u201c19.\u201d The Review Board generally released all CIA \u201c201\u201d or \u201cpersonality\u201d file numbers where the files related to the assassination.\n\nii. Commentary. The CIA rarely objected to the Review Board\u2019s release of its file numbers.\n\nj. CIA domestic facilities.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released references to domestic CIA facilities where the CIA has previously officially disclosed the existence of the facility. The Review Board did not release information that would reveal the location of domestic CIA facilities where the CIA provided evidence that the facility was still in use.\n\nii. Commentary. The Review Board rarely encountered the issue of whether to release the location of CIA domestic facilities in assassination records, as CIA officially acknowledges most of its domestic facilities. When the Review Board did vote to postpone the location of CIA domestic facilities, it required the CIA to provide extensive evidence as to why the CIA had to keep the location of those facilities secret.\nk. CIA official cover.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. CIA \"official cover\" is a means by which a CIA officer can operate overseas in the guise of an employee of another government agency. In congressional documents, the Review Board released general information about official cover but protected specific details. With regard to executive branch documents, the CIA convinced the Review Board that, while Congress might reveal information about official cover, the executive branch does not generally reveal information about official cover because to do so would damage the national security. Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA's postponements regarding official cover in executive branch documents unless the U.S. government had previously officially disclosed the information at issue.\n\nThe Review Board inserted the phrase \"official cover\" as substitute language when it postponed such information.\n\nii. Commentary. The Review Board initially considered the issue of official cover to be an \"open secret\" that was well-known to the public. Thus, they were loathe to withhold such obvious information. The CIA, however, supported its strong objections in briefings and negotiations with the Board, and eventually convinced the Review Board that the harm in releasing information about official cover outweighed any additional information that assassination researchers might gain from knowing details about official cover.\n\nl. Alias documentation.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. CIA employees and agents use aliases and the CIA creates documentation to support its employees' and agents' aliases. The Review Board released information that revealed that CIA employees and agents used aliases. The Board protected specific details about how CIA documents particular aliases.\n\nii. Commentary. The CIA argued that it currently uses alias documentation and that aliases are vital to CIA's performance of its intelligence operations. The CIA also argued that the Review Board's release of specific information about alias documentation would not be useful to assassination researchers. The Review Board members accepted CIA's arguments, primarily because they agreed that the public interest in the specific details about alias documentation was low. The Review Board determined that it did not want the CIA to spend a large amount of time gathering evidence in support of postponements that were of low public interest and, thus, it did not require the CIA to provide evidence in support of every postponement relating to alias documentation.\n\nm. Foreign intelligence cooperation.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board postponed references to foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA.\n\nii. Commentary. The Review Board vigorously debated the issue of foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA and demanded extensive evidence and multiple briefings from the CIA on the subject. Though in some instances Board members judged that the information might add to the historical understanding of the assassination, the Review Board, with some dissent, determined that the evidence to postpone the information outweighed this potential value.\n\nn. Human sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence (assets).\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board evaluated the need to postpone the identity of human sources in foreign counterintelligence operations on a case-by-case basis. Where the human source was a foreign national, the Review Board generally agreed to protect the individual's identity unless the individual's connection with the FBI was already known to the foreign government at issue. Where the human source was a United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials, the Review Board sometimes released the identity of the individual if the public interest in the name of the asset was high. Where the human source was a United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens, the Review Board tended to evaluate the release of the source's name more like other domestic informants.\n\nii. Commentary. In its position paper, the FBI defined \"intelligence source\" as \"any\nindividual who has provided or is currently providing information pertaining to national security matters, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in damage to the FBI\u2019s intelligence and counterintelligence-gathering capabilities.\u201d\n\nThe FBI offered the following arguments in support of its request to keep intelligence sources\u2019 identities secret: (1) Review Board disclosure of intelligence sources would harm the FBI\u2019s ability to develop and maintain new and existing sources, because sources would reasonably believe that the government would reveal their identities, and (2) disclosure of intelligence sources may subject the sources, their friends, and their families to physical harm, ridicule, or ostracism.\n\nThe Review Board\u2019s interpretation of the \u201cclear and convincing\u201d evidence standard required it to reject the FBI\u2019s general policy arguments, and instead required the FBI to present asset-specific evidence that explained the particular harm that the FBI expected the asset to face if the Review Board voted to disclose his or her identity. As a general rule, the Review Board usually protected the identities of foreign nationals who could be prosecuted in their home countries for espionage. Likewise, where the asset was a United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials, the Review Board considered whether the individual was in a position of trust with the foreign government and whether he or she might be in danger if the Review Board disclosed his or her relationship with the FBI. Unlike the above-referenced scenarios, the source who was a United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens was generally evaluated according to the Board\u2019s domestic informant standards.\n\na. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities.\n\ni. Review Board guidelines. As a general rule, the Review Board believed that most aspects of the FBI\u2019s foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries during the cold war period were well-known, were of high public interest, and were not eligible for postponement pursuant to \u00a7 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act.\n\nii. Commentary and overview of foreign counterintelligence appeals. The FBI\u2019s assassi-\n\nnation records contain information that reveal many of the FBI\u2019s foreign counterintelligence activities during the cold war period. Beginning in late 1995, the Review Board considered how it could release as much information as possible in the records without jeopardizing operations that still require protection.\n\nIn spring 1996, the Review Board considered and voted on a group of FBI records relating to the FBI\u2019s foreign counterintelligence activities. In response to the Review Board\u2019s requests for evidence on the foreign counterintelligence records, the FBI had provided its \u201cposition paper\u201d on foreign counterintelligence activities. In its paper, the FBI defined \u201cintelligence activities\u201d as \u201cintelligence gathering action or techniques utilized by the FBI against a targeted individual or organization that has been determined to be of national security interest.\u201d The FBI\u2019s primary argument in support of its request for continued secrecy of intelligence activities was that disclosure of specific information describing intelligence activities would reveal to hostile entities the FBI\u2019s targets and priorities, thereby allowing hostile entities to develop countermeasures.\n\nSections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement. In addition, the JFK Act\u2019s legislative history instructed the Review Board to consider a variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, including the age of the record, whether the use of a particular source or method is already well-known by the public, whether the source or method is inherently secret, or whether the information collected was secret.\u201d\n\nThe Review Board considered the FBI\u2019s evidence and weighed it against public interest in the records. After careful consideration, the Review Board decided to release some foreign counterintelligence information. The Board\u2019s primary reason for releasing such\nrecords was its belief that the FBI\u2019s evidence did not enumerate specific harms that would result from disclosure.\n\nA. The FBI\u2019s May 1996 Appeals to the President. On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBI appealed to the President to overturn the Board\u2019s vote on 17 records relating to the FBI\u2019s surveillance of officials and establishments of four Communist countries\u2014the Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Poland\u2014during the 1960s. The FBI\u2019s overarching arguments were that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods that would compromise the national security of the United States, and that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance\u2014the four Communist countries\u2014would harm the foreign relations of the United States.\n\nThe FBI sought to postpone five types of source and method capabilities: tracing of funds, physical surveillance (lookout logs), mail cover, electronic surveillance, and typewriter and fingerprint identification. The Review Board\u2019s response briefs to the President dealt with each source or method in turn. Specific details regarding the appeal of each issue are discussed below.\n\nIn response to the FBI\u2019s overarching argument that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods and compromise the national security, the Review Board responded that if the national security would be harmed by release of this information, the harm would have already occurred, since the FBI had already released both the identities of the target countries and the sources and methods that the FBI used in its operations.\n\nIn response to the FBI\u2019s arguments that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance would harm the foreign relations of the United States, the Review Board responded in three parts. First, the information that the FBI sought to protect is widely available in the public domain, from both official government sources and secondary sources, so if foreign relations are harmed by disclosure of the information, then the harm has already occurred. Second, the FBI simply did not prove its argument that it may have violated international law or \u201cdiplomatic standards\u201d by employing the sources or methods at issue since the FBI did not cite the laws or treaties to which it referred and the Review Board could not locate any laws or treaties that were in effect at the time that the records were created. Third, despite the FBI\u2019s assertion to the contrary, the Review Board had evidence that other governments do acknowledge that, in past years, they conducted foreign counterintelligence operations against other countries.\n\nThe Review Board believed that the FBI had not provided evidence of a \u201csignificant, demonstrable harm\u201d to current foreign relations or intelligence work. Thus, the Board asked the President to deny the FBI\u2019s requests for postponement. The White House did not expressly rule on the appeals. Instead, after several meetings involving representatives from the Review Board, the FBI, and the White House, the White House directed the FBI to provide the Review Board with specific evidence in support of its postponements. The White House requested the Review Board to reconsider the Bureau\u2019s specific evidence. The FBI, in turn, withdrew the first two of its pending appeals, including some records in which the Review Board voted to release information obtained from a technical source.\n\nB. Post-appeal decisionmaking. After further negotiations, the Review Board and the FBI agreed to release most information regarding its foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries as \u201cconsent releases.\u201d In those few cases where the Bureau believed that foreign counterintelligence activity against Communist Bloc countries still required protection, the Bureau submitted for the Board\u2019s determination postponement-specific evidence.\n\nTo the extent that the information in the FBI\u2019s proposed redaction did not meaningfully contribute to the understanding of the assassination, the Review Board allowed the FBI to postpone direct discussions of foreign counterintelligence activities against non-Communist Bloc countries. With regard to the FBI\u2019s \u201csegregated collections,\u201d the Review Board stated in its segregated collection guidelines,\n\nIt is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal stan-\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group\n\nVIA: W. George Jameson\nAssociate General Counsel\nLitigation Division, OGC\n\nFROM: Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.\nAssistant General Counsel\nLitigation Division, OGC\n\nSUBJECT: Declassification Guidelines Established by the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992\n\n1. The enactment of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (\"the Act\") has created declassification guidelines that are to some extent different from the Historical Review Program guidelines established by the Director of Central Intelligence. In the continuing review of material related to the assassination of President Kennedy, the guidelines established by the Act must be used.\n\n2. The Act's most fundamental changes are the burden it creates on agencies to justify continued classification of information, and a requirement that agencies balance the national security concerns against the public interest. Under the Act, information must be declassified unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security.\n\n3. The Act's guidelines for declassification are found in its Section 6 and are as follows:\n\nSec 6. GROUND FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.\n\nDisclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is clear and convincing evidence that--\n\n(1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination is of such gravity that\nit outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal--\n\n(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;\n(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or\n(C) Any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;\n(2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity of a living person who provided confidential information to the United States and would pose a substantial risk to that person;\n(3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest;\n(4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest; or\n(5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protective procedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret service or another Government agency responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest.\n\n4. The Act therefore superseded the guidelines established for the Historical Review Program to the extent the Historical Review Group (HRG) is processing information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The specific changes are as follows.\n\na. The most basic change is that you must apply a balancing test before maintaining the classification of any information. You must balance continued classification against the public interest in the information. Therefore, the greater light disclosure of the information would shed on the assassination of the President, or on the\ngovernment's investigation into that assassination, the more serious must be the need to continue to withhold the information for classification to be maintained.\n\nb. HR 70-14.e(2) states the reviewers of information advocating continued classification of information will bear the burden identifying any damage that disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to the national security. The Act defines that burden as one of \"clear and convincing evidence.\" Further, the Act changes \"reasonably could be expected to cause\" to \"demonstrably.\" Therefore, unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security, the information must be declassified.\n\nc. HR 70-14.e(4) addresses the standards for maintaining the classification of foreign government information, the identity of a foreign source, and intelligence sources and methods. It notes that Executive Order 12,356 presumes that this information is classified. Under the Act, with respect to these categories of classified information found with records related to the assassination of President Kennedy, you must still find demonstrable damage by clear and convincing evidence regardless of the presumption in the Executive Order. Further, with respect to intelligence sources and methods, the Act requires that they--\n\n(1) be either currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the U.S. Government; and\n\n(2) that they not have been officially disclosed; and\n\n(3) that their disclosure would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities.\n\nAll of these factors must be met by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.\n\nd. HR 70-14.e(4) also discusses CIA personnel and organizational information. The Act only permits the continued withholding of the identity of an \"intelligence agent\" if, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the person's identity requires protection. Further, the Act does not permit the withholding of organizational information unless, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the disclosure of the organizational data would demonstrably impair the national security.\n\ne. HR 70-14.e(7) states that the HRG will determine whether information warrants continued protection pursuant to statutory or other requirements. The Act supersedes all other statutory authority for withholding information except\nfor a provision of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with tax return information. This means the Act takes precedence over 50 U.S.C. \u00a7 403(d)(3) and \u00a7 403g, as well as the Privacy Act, when determining whether to release records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Act also makes no provision for protecting information on the basis of executive privilege, such as deliberative process and attorney-client communications.\n\n5. Certain categories of information may fall into more than one of the grounds set forth in Section 6 of the Act. We recommend that you review all of the grounds when determining whether to release or withhold specific information. For example, a human intelligence source may fall into grounds (1)(A) (\"intelligence agent\"), (1)(B) (\"intelligence source\"), (2) (\"living person who provided confidential information to the United States\"), and/or (4) (\"understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual\"). At this point, we do not know how the Assassination Records Review Board will interpret each of these grounds. Therefore, if you determine the standards of the Act are met to permit withholding of certain information, you should assert as many grounds as may arguably apply as authority for that withholding.\n\n6. Although the Act severely limits what information may be withheld from disclosure, it may be possible to protect information not expressly covered by the Act. However, such information may be withheld only with the personal authorization of the President. When the President signed the Act, he issued a statement that included the following:\n\nMy authority to protect [executive branch deliberations, law enforcement information of the executive branch, and national security information] comes from the Constitution and cannot be limited by statute. Although only the most extraordinary circumstances would require postponement of the disclosure of documents for reasons other than those recognized in the bill, I cannot abdicate my constitutional responsibility to take such action when necessary.\n\n7. The Act provides individuals the ability under the Administrative Procedures Act to challenge in court final decisions of the Assassination Records Board. We can expect, then, court challenges to the Board's decisions to uphold any of our determinations that certain information meets the criteria for postponement of release. Additionally, as you know, there are FOIA litigations for this same material. Plaintiff's counsel has indicated in court pleadings and orally that he wants the court to review our redactions not under FOIA standards, but under the standards of the Act. Thus, you should apply the Act's standards knowing your judgments may be questioned by the Board,\nsubsequent court challenges to the Board's action, and the FOIA cases.\n\n8. If you have any questions concerning the application of the Act to your review of the assassination records, please call me on secure extension 76105.\n\nRobert J. Eatinger, Jr.\nDCI/OGC/RJE:ig 76105/ 15 Dec 1992\n\nOGC-92-53256\n\nDistribution:\n\n1 - Addressee\n1 - DO/IRO\n1 - DI/IRO\n1 - DS&T/IRO\n1 - DA/IRO\n1 - DCI/IRO\n1 - PCS/PGG\n1 - ERR\n1 - DPH\n1 - Lit file\n1 - EC\n1 - WGJ\n1 - RJE Soft file\n1 - OGC Chrono\n1 - RJE Signer\nMEMORANDUM FOR: David P. Holmes \nDeputy General Counsel\n\nFROM: Robert J. Eatinger, Jr. \nAssistant General Counsel \nLitigation Division, OGC\n\nSUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records\n\n1. Per your request, I have attached a copy of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (ARCA), Pub. L. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443-3458, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. \u00a7 2107 note. For your convenience, I have highlighted the pertinent provisions that will aid in responding to an inquiry regarding the statute's effect on the DCI's statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.\n\n2. The clear language and intent of the law is to supersede statutes that prohibit disclosure of information, except for some irrelevant subject areas, such as tax records. The statute provides that \"it shall take precedence over any other law (except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial decision construing such law, or common law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit\" the disclosure of information subject to the Act. ARCA \u00a7 11(a). This language, taken with the provisions discussed below which limit the intelligence sources and methods that may be protected and set a strict procedural scheme by which information is to be reviewed under the ARCA, effectively supersedes the DCI's National Security Act authority with respect to intelligence sources and methods information subject to the ARCA.\n\n3. Section 6 of the ARCA provides the grounds for which the release of information may be \"postponed.\" The statute contemplates that all information will eventually be released. Indeed, it specifies that all information will be made available to the public no later than 25 years after the passage of the ARCA (which occurred in October 1992) unless the president certifies that continued postponement is necessary. ARCA \u00a7 4(g)(2)(D). With respect to intelligence-related information, ARCA allows postponement if:\n\n\"(1) the threat to ... intelligence operations ... is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal--\nSUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records\n\n(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;\n\n(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or\n\n(C) any other matter currently relating to ... intelligence operations ... the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States.\"\n\nARCA \u00a7 6(1) (Emphasis added.)\n\n4. The originating agency is to make the first review to identify information that meets the standards for postponement. ARCA \u00a7 4(c)(2)(D)(i). For CIA, this effort is being undertaken by the Historical Review Group, in consultation with the Directorate of Operations and other appropriate Agency components. Information the originating agencies identify for postponement must be transmitted to the Review Board. ARCA \u00a7 4(c)(2)(E). The Review Board \"shall consider and render decisions on a determination by a Government office to seek to postpone the disclosure of assassination records.\" ARCA \u00a7 7(i)(1). Specifically, the \"Review Board shall consider and render decisions on ... whether an assassination record or particular information in a record qualifies for postponement of disclosure under the Act.\" ARCA \u00a7 7(i)(2)(B).\n\n5. If the Review Board determines to order the disclosure of information that the originating agency felt met the criteria for postponement, it \"shall notify the head of the originating body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination in the Federal Register within 14 days after the determination is made.\" ARCA \u00a7 9(c)(4)(A). If the information contained in an assassination record is \"obtained or developed solely within the executive branch, the President shall have the sole and nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement of ... the information under the standards set forth in Section 6.\" ARCA \u00a7 9(d)(1) (emphasis added). The President's decision must be certified to the Review Board within 30 days of the Review Boards determination. Id. Records postponed by the President must be re-reviewed every 5 years. ARCA \u00a7 9(d)(2).\nSUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records\n\n6. I would be happy to discuss this further if you so desire. You might also want to contact John Pereira (x30373) since he has met with some or all of the Review Board members.\n\nAttachment\nSUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority w/Respect to JFK Assassination Records\n\nOGC-94-52916\n\nDCI/OGC/RJEatinger:76135 (19 Sept 94)\n\nOriginal - Addressee w/attach) (hand delivered)\n1 - OGC Registry (w/attach)\n1 - Lit File\n1 - RBB (OGC/ILD)\n1 - C/HRG (J.Pereira-404 Ames)\n1 - RJE - Soft File (w/attach)\n1 - RJE - Signer\n1 - PDP\n1 - KK -fyi\n1 - PAS-fyi\nForeign Government Information Contained in JFK Collection\n\nCIA\u2019s JFK Collection includes Foreign Government Information (FGI) in a number of forms:\n\nFirst, some CIA documents in the collection contained FGI but, by general agreement with the Assassination Records Review Board, the source could be protected by redaction even when CIA and the Board agreed that substantive information could be released.\n\nSecond, documents were provided by foreign governments in the aftermath of the assassination in response to requests from the US Government for information about the assassination or individuals whose names may have been associated with it. Such documents subsequently became a part of CIA\u2019s \u201csequestered collection\u201d and thus were automatically designated by the JFK Board as \u201cAssassination Records,\u201d subject to declassification review. A number of such documents were released in full in the early years of the project (1992-1994), with the concurrence of the DO/IRO, but OIM has no documentation regarding coordination with liaison.\n\nThird, in a number of documented cases, the DO consulted with liaison services regarding documents that were clearly identifiable as from a liaison service, and handling of both the substance and the sources was discussed with the liaison services and their views obtained. In all such documented cases, the BOARD agreed to protect the foreign government source and, as appropriate, to postpone the release of redacted portions or entire documents until the year 2017, reflecting the language of the JFK Act.\n\nThe information below reflects those instances of coordination with liaison services that are reflected in OIM records:\n\n1. (S) A 1968 letter from Charles C. F. Spry, on Australian Security Intelligence Organisation letterhead, to DCI Richard Helms objected to the proposed release of a Warren Commission document in which reference is made to the \u2018Australian security service.\u2019 [The Warren Commission document (CD #97) was a memorandum to Mr. J. Lee Rankin from DDP Helms dated 22 May 1964 reporting an anonymous caller -- who described himself as a Polish chauffeur for the Soviet Embassy in Canberra -- to the US Embassy there. That memo was sanitized to delete the \u2018Australian security service.\u2019] The Board did not accept the Agency\u2019s initial action to \u201cdeny in full\u201d Sir Spry\u2019s letter and the Board\u2019s acceptance of substitute text provided only additional time to pursue the possibility of full release. Consultations between and among EA/PAMSI, OGC, and others and queries to the Australian desk, and, in turn, the Station and the Australian Government brought an acceptable compromise. ASIO authorized the release of a redacted and retyped version of Sir Spry\u2019s letter that did not reveal Sir Spry as the writer and that did not reveal an ASIO/CIA relationship, and ASIO further stated \u201cthis . . . should not be seen as setting any precedent in releasing ASIO documents.\u201d The Board postponed release of the original until 2017.\n\n2. (S) Helms\u2019 response to Sir Spry and two related CIA documents were released in sanitized form that protected the liaison relationship. The release of the redacted portions are postponed until 2017.\n\n3. (S) Cables exchanged between Headquarters and Canberra over the issue in Item 1 were declared assassination records, but release of the cables was postponed until 2017.\nBritish\n\n1. (S) The BOARD wanted to release the 1963 British Security Service\u2019s (BSS) interview of the spouse of a West-East defector (Sloboda). The BSS advised the Station that release would be a violation of privacy rights in the UK. The BOARD agreed that the document was \u201cnot intrinsic to assassination story\u201d and that the document could be postponed until 2017.\n\n2. (S) Another British document in the collection provided information that as of 1982 \u201cKOSTIKOV . . . was posted in Beirut in 1978 . . . and may still be there.\u201d (The author EPSTEIN in Legend claims KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey Oswald\u2019s KGB case officer in Mexico City.) The British desk accepted the release of the one pertinent paragraph (one of five paragraphs in the document), and the Board agreed to postpone until 2017 the release of all other text and source originating information.\n\n3. (S) The BOARD learned of the existence of a British document that the CIA possessed from the BOARD\u2019s examination of FBI files. One member of the BOARD reviewed the entire document and declared one portion of the document as relevant to the JFK assassination. The four-page section of the document regarding KGB Active Measures was released in full and further noted that it was from a foreign government that specifically requested not to be identified.\n\nCanadian\n\n(S) A report received through Canadian liaison channels on West-East defectors (Martin and Mitchell) is in the collection. As consultations with the Canadian desk were underway, the BOARD determined the document as not believed relevant and postponed its release until 2017.\n\nDutch\n\n(S) The BOARD wanted to release two attachments (teltap transcripts) to a dispatch from the Dutch Station. The matter was coordinated with the Dutch desk, the Dutch Station, and the Director General of the Dutch National Security Service. As a result, translation substitutions provide the information from intercepted conversations on the topics of \u201cMr. Lee (sic)\u201d and Richard Gibson, but redactions obscure the source of the transcripts, according to guidelines in a letter from the service. Release of the redacted portions is postponed until 2017.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10337-10014.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 63, "total-input-tokens": 73341, "total-output-tokens": 30908, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 2286, 1], [2286, 4619, 2], [4619, 6254, 3], [6254, 8004, 4], [8004, 10295, 5], [10295, 12618, 6], [12618, 14627, 7], [14627, 16048, 8], [16048, 17765, 9], [17765, 19649, 10], [19649, 20137, 11], [20137, 22707, 12], [22707, 25605, 13], [25605, 26540, 14], [26540, 28762, 15], [28762, 30169, 16], [30169, 32539, 17], [32539, 34106, 18], [34106, 35402, 19], [35402, 35695, 20], [35695, 37547, 21], [37547, 39884, 22], [39884, 42225, 23], [42225, 44722, 24], [44722, 46942, 25], [46942, 49297, 26], [49297, 51268, 27], [51268, 53334, 28], [53334, 55671, 29], [55671, 57413, 30], [57413, 57707, 31], [57707, 57707, 32], [57707, 62054, 33], [62054, 66014, 34], [66014, 70142, 35], [70142, 74104, 36], [74104, 78188, 37], [78188, 82715, 38], [82715, 84718, 39], [84718, 89123, 40], [89123, 92077, 41], [92077, 95864, 42], [95864, 100142, 43], [100142, 103366, 44], [103366, 105165, 45], [105165, 109066, 46], [109066, 113185, 47], [113185, 117342, 48], [117342, 121684, 49], [121684, 121684, 50], [121684, 123413, 51], [123413, 125725, 52], [125725, 128136, 53], [128136, 130949, 54], [130949, 131200, 55], [131200, 131441, 56], [131441, 133578, 57], [133578, 135907, 58], [135907, 136183, 59], [136183, 136537, 60], [136537, 136537, 61], [136537, 139899, 62], [139899, 142058, 63]]}} +{"id": "ecb30ec62e33db787ca11e4eff91c603c5bc6775", "text": "| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | OFFICIAL'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |\n|---------------------------------------------------|------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1. DCI / FIO | | | Becky, For your review, FBI memorandum dated 12/23/63 (Brennan to Sullivan) containing CIA information. We are proposing \"Release-in-Full\" for this document. |\n| 2. | | | Barry, No objection to full release of this document. |\n| 3. | | | |\n| 4. Barry Harrelson, Reviewer CS1/HRG 402 Ames | | | |\n| 5. | | | |\n| 6. | | | |\n| 7. | | | |\n| 8. | | | |\n| 9. | | | |\n| 10. | | | |\n| 11. | | | |\n| 12. | | | |\n| 13. | | | |\n| 14. | | | |\n| 15. | | | |\nMemorandum\n\nTO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan\n\nFROM: Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.\n\nSUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)\n\nReference is made to memorandum dated 12/19/63, from Mr. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan. Pursuant to instructions, Agent Papich met with John McConne, Director, CIA, on 12/23/63, to confront the CIA Director with false statements attributed to him by Mr. DeLoach's sources. The Liaison Agent is reporting this meeting in some detail so that you may have full appreciation of all aspects.\n\nAgent Papich advised McConne that he had a piece of business which needed ironing out before the end of the year. The Agent explained that since the assassination of President Kennedy, there have been various types of stories circulated concerning the case and the evidence collected; that some of these stories could immediately be discounted; and that there was certain information received by the Bureau which very directly affected relations between the Bureau and CIA. The Agent stated that certain information had reached such proportion to be most alarming and that the Agent had requested permission from Mr. Hoover to discuss the matter with the CIA Director.\n\nMcConne was then told that he was charged with being the source of information conveyed to a high Government official and to Drew Pearson in that he, McConne, had stated that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received $6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy. The Agent elaborated by stating that if this were true, McConne had endeavored to leave the impression with certain people that CIA had developed information not known to the Bureau and, in essence, made the Bureau look ridiculous. The Agent advised that if McConne had made such statements, we could only assume that he was employing vicious and underhanded tactics since he and officials of his agency fully knew that the story concerning the $6,500 had been proved to be absolutely false. McConne's attention was directed to the Alvarado interrogation, Alvarado's admission that he had fabricated the information and the subsequent...\nTo Mr. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan\nRe: RELATIONS WITH CIA\n\nSECRET\n\nCorroboration of the polygraph.\n\nMcConne was very visibly incensed and left the impression that he might at any moment ask the Agent to leave. After pausing a few moments, he made the following statements:\n\n1. He stated that he has never talked to Drew Pearson in his life; that he has never sent any kind of message to Pearson directly or indirectly and that he does not have any intention of communicating with Pearson. He briefly referred to the fact that he has been the target of attacks by Pearson, one of these occurring within the last two weeks.\n\n2. With regard to the \"$6,500 story,\" McConne advised that as soon as the original report was received from his people in Mexico City, he contacted President Johnson and informed him of the development. He explained to the President that this was a matter which required intensive interrogation of Alvarado and that CIA had coordinated very closely with the FBI. He told the President that Alvarado would be kept in a safe house by CIA until the FBI was satisfied that all necessary investigative action had taken place.\n\n3. McConne advised that he has not been critical of the Bureau; that if he had any criticism he would confer directly with the Bureau and not get involved in malicious gossip. He commented that in connection with the Oswald case, he has encountered people who have been critical of the Bureau and the Secret Service and he, McConne, has gone to the defense of both agencies.\n\nMcConne was left in an angry mood but he did retain his composure throughout. Before the Agent left, McConne inquired about the status of FBI - CIA relations in general and the Agent replied that they were satisfactory. He also asked about the Director's health to which the Agent answered that the Director was in excellent health.\n\nAs indicated above, no statement was made which in any way might jeopardize the security of Mr. DeLoach's sources.\n\nACTION:\n\nFor information.\n\n[Signature]\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Grant P. Harmon\nUnit Chief, JFK Taskforce\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\n\nFROM: Barry Harrelson, Senior Reviewer\nHistorical Review Group\nCenter for the Study of Intelligence\nCentral Intelligence Agency\n\nSUBJECT: Authenticity of Document\n\n1. This is in response to your request to this office to review the attached document and advise if it is a valid Agency document or something made up using an Agency reports format and information either entirely made up or from other sources. The 3 August 1962 document purports to tie Dorothy Kilgallen, Marilyn Monroe and former Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, together with knowledge of an number of matters, including the plot to kill Castro.\n\n2. Those Agency officers who have reviewed the document consider it to be fraudulent. While the format resembles a \"reports\" form used in the 1960's, the substantive information and presentation is foreign to normal presentation or collection efforts. Also, the control stamps and other administrative items are not typical of CIA reports written during the 1960's.\n\n3. If you have any further questions in this regard, please call me directly at (703) 351-2909.\n\nBarry Harrelson\n\nBH:gb\n3 August 1962\n\nRothberg discussed the apparent break up with Kilgallen and the break up with the Kennedys. Rothberg told Kilgallen that she was attending Hollywood parties hosted by the \"inner circle\" of Hollywood's elite and was becoming the talk of the town against Rothberg indicated in so many words, that she had secrets to tell. No doubt arising from her trials with the President and the Attorney General. One such \"secret\" mentions the visit by the President at a secret air base for the purpose of inspecting things from outer space. Kilgallen replied that she knew what might be the source of visit. In the mid-fifties Kilgallen learned of secret effort by US and UK governments to identify the \"wings\" of crashed spacecraft and dead bodies from a British government official. Kilgallen believed the story may have come from the \"New York\" in the late forties. Kilgallen said \"if the story is true, it would cause terrible embarrassment\" to Jack and his plans to have NASA put men on the moon.\n\n2. Subject repeatedly called the Attorney General and complained about the way she was being ignored by the President and his brother.\n\n3. Subject threatened to hold a press conference and would tell all.\n\n4. Subject made reference to \"bases\" in Cuba and knew of the President's plan to kill Castro.\n\n5. Subject made reference to her \"diary of secrets\" and what the newspapers would do with such disclosures.\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Ellie Neiman\nDO JFK Review Team\n\nFROM: Barry Harrelson\nSenior Reviewer, CSI/HRG\n\nSUBJECT: FBI Request For CIA's Opinion\nOn Proposed FBI Release Of Agent\nSpecific Data\n\n1. The FBI has asked for an Agency response on the\nfollowing matter.\n\n2. HRG counterparts at the FBI are engaged in serious\ndiscussions with representatives of the Review Board\nconcerning withholding the identities of FBI confidential\ninformants. In the course of those negotiations, FBI\nofficers advise they are increasingly concerned about being\nable to withhold the crypts and, possible even the true\nnames, of three former Soviet agents. Given that view, they\nbelieve it would assist their overall efforts and\nnegotiating position if they could release additional\ninformation on one or more of the three Soviet agents.\n\n3. The three former Soviet agents are:\n\n a. \"TOPHAT\" also encrypted as BOURBON;\" true name\n is provided on separate attachment.\n\n b. \"SHAMROCK\" true name on attachment.\n\n c. \"FEDORA\" also encrypted or known as \"IRONCLAD\"\n \"SCOTCH\" AND \"JADE;\" true name on attachment.\n\n4. Attached are seven documents that the FBI is\nconsidering for release. Two of them are CIA documents\nfound in the FBI JFK file. HRG has been unable to locate\nthese documents in the CIA JFK collection.\n\n5. Please provide DO views on the FBI proposal.\n\nBarry Harrelson\n\nAtts: A/S\nIDEN ATTACHMENT TO 10 MAY 1995 MEMORANDUM\n\nThe following names and descriptions are keyed to paragraph 3 of the 10 May memorandum:\n\na. Dmitriy Fedorovich POLYAKOV; reportedly died as a result of Ames disclosure.\n\nb. [Nikolay Romanovich MAKAREVICH] whether he is dead or alive is not known.\n\nc. Aleksiy Isadorovich KULAK (Kulyak ?); reportedly died of natural causes.\nPassed this revised portion of 00's 7 June 85 memos to the FBI.\n\nGWS\n\nNote: Got Lee Carter's concurrence to do so beforehand.\n\na. [SHAMROCK's] real name, Nikolay Romanovich MAKAREVICH, may not be released. His identity has remained a secret for 30 years. We do not know if MAKAREVICH is alive or dead, and believe that exposure could damage him and his family.\n\nb. Tom RYAN's name should be deleted from the front cover of the [SHAMROCK] debriefing. Mr. RYAN retired under cover, and is employed as an intelligence contractor on a sensitive project.\n\nc. The name and cover name of [NARKULYANI (\"Greta\") should be deleted.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10338-10005.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 8, "total-input-tokens": 9255, "total-output-tokens": 2752, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 3152, 1], [3152, 5270, 2], [5270, 7276, 3], [7276, 8474, 4], [8474, 9888, 5], [9888, 11265, 6], [11265, 11632, 7], [11632, 12253, 8]]}} +{"id": "54ec4b0b1cdcf05d3549bc20b039c4c3ea0c5ad1", "text": "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM\n\nSUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America\nSince July 1963\n\n1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when Havana evidently believed a \"second Cuba\" was likely in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevitability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however, Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to violence and have emphasized other policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in Latin America remains high.\n\n2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro recaptured much of the militant tone of his speeches in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin America. He claimed that what has been done in Cuba can take place \"exactly the same way in many Latin American countries.\" The hemisphere's militants, he said, must take advantage of conditions presently favoring revolution and \"open the breach.\" On 28 September, Castro said that while \"imperialists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution,\" the Cubans believe that before that could be accomplished \"many other revolutions like ours will appear on the continent.\" On 24 November, Che Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the hemisphere \"is also our responsibility and it is part of our daily preoccupation.\"\n3. What emerged from these and other Cuban pronouncements was the apparent conviction of Castro and his aides that further Communist revolutions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be initiated wherever possible and as soon as possible. It is logical to assume that despite recent official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders continue to believe that the very presence of their regime will inspire other Latin American revolutionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue to give assistance to these efforts.\n\n4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemisphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example, OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending; despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign, constitutional government in Venezuela was successfully transferred following President Leoni's dramatic election victory last December; and the outbreaks of violence in Panama last January failed to upset constitutional processes there. The April revolt in which President Goulart of Brazil was overthrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This year has been designated \"the year of the economy.\" This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed commercial and industrial goods from West also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its public expressions of support for revolution. Moreover, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy on revolution now may pay dividends after the US elections in November. He probably assumes that conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his terms--will be more favorable then.\n\n5. Nevertheless, evidence presented in the accompanying country-by-country index shows that Cuba has continued since the first of the year to promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (before the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British\nGuiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In an interview published in an Italian newspaper in March, Guevara reiterated that the road to \"national liberation\" in Latin America must take a turn to violence. He emphasized that violence would be \"necessary\" in \"almost all\" Latin American countries, for \"there is no other way.\" In an April interview in Algiers, Guevara said: \"It is very, very, very, very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin America by employing peaceful means.\"\n\n6. A number of reliable clandestine sources have provided information on the many facets of Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most serious form of subversion from Havana is its training of other Latin Americans in the practical arts of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received such training in 1962. It is estimated that several hundred Latin Americans who traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such training. It has been learned that \"scholarship students\" who go to Cuba ostensibly to study \"agriculture\" receive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction encompasses the use and management of communications equipment; the techniques of military intelligence, including methods of establishing intelligence networks to obtain information from peasants; training in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small arms, which are readily available in most Latin American countries; training in explosives, and training in guerrilla tactics, including instruction on how to operate independently in the countryside for extended periods of time. A separate training school reportedly trains Communist youth from other Latin American countries. The school's one-year course is divided between the study of Communist theory and practical training in political agitation and subversive activities. Reports from returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are developing extensive files on most Latin American countries on subjects pertinent to the planning and development of further subversive activity. Detailed questionnaires submitted to all incoming trainees requested comments on possible air drop zones, weather conditions, locations of military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar questions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge.\n7. Latin Americans returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba often take a round-about route to conceal the fact that they have been in Cuba. They then go through Europe to some other Latin American country, from which they enter their own. Cuba gives these travelers documents which show no indication that they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments and are given special training in clandestine communications, which permits them to maintain a contact with Cuba after they have returned home.\n\n8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive guerrilla warfare and other types of training in Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are known to have been conducting such training in Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and elsewhere. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary effort in Latin America has a potential for steady growth even if there should be a lessening in the actual training program in Cuba.\n\n9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central and South American-based extremist groups. Only in the case of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela on 1 November, however, has there been incontrovertible proof of Cuban complicity in such efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-established patterns of arms smuggling between nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo planes which are well-suited to gun-running or air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have always stressed the importance of Latin American revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from local sources. Moreover, some financing from Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.\n\n10. Another important aspect of Havana's efforts in Latin America is centered on supporting and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide\nlabor organization which could serve as a platform for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its constituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's support for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now is attempting to organize another hemisphere \"solidarity-with-Cuba\" congress in Montreal, Canada in July. This proposed congress\u2014which, however, is being officially discouraged by the Canadian government\u2014would be modeled on a similar effort staged in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.\nSECRET\nNO FOREIGN DISSEM\n\nANNEX\n\nCountry-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion\n\n1. Argentina\n\nClandestine reporting for the past year confirms that the Cubans are cooperating with small extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to establish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina. Extreme-left wing Peronists such as John Wilkes, Jorge Amado, and Hector Villalon have been in close liaison with Cuban agents in Havana, Montevideo, and elsewhere. Villalon appears to be the principal support agent of a group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peronists believed to be directed and supported by the Cuban embassy in Montevideo.\n\nLast January, Villalon traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be \"Commandante Segundo\" and is probably in charge of the small guerrilla bands discovered in northern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas possessed the same specifications as those found in the November Venezuelan arms cache. It is believed to be of Cuban origin.\n\n2. Bolivia\n\nCuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice\nPresident Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in La Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his supporters some arms and money to aid his bitter struggle with President Paz Estenssoro for political domination of the country.\n\nCuban Charge Roberto Lassalle said the Cuban government believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups. He said Havana was prepared to supply the required arms.\n\ngave him two boxes of arms to be distributed among the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time were in revolt against his government. In March 1963, the Cuban ambassador to Lechin said that the Cuban government was willing to provide financial and material support to Lechin for his campaign to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban agents in early April to discuss his financial needs and to determine what he was prepared to offer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.\n\nIn addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which aspires to establish a terrorist organization on the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation, was organized last year with the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force and near the residence of the US Ambassador.\n\nThe Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia as a staging area from which to send trained subversives into neighboring countries. It is possible that some Cuban support for guerrillas in northern Argentina may have come across the border from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long been a favorite transit area for terrorists returning to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led\npolice to an arms cache which was to be used to support guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authorities have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year.\n\n3. Brazil\n\nBefore the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operating primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately described Brizola as having the best prospects for starting a Castro-style revolution in Brazil. The ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao from late 1963 until the April overthrow.\n\nCuba usually relied on its sources in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City to finance his expanding press and radio activities and to \"buy some arms\" from his Popular Mobilization Front. The same source reported that Cuba supplied Brizola's forces with arms. In addition, a usually reliable source in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City reports that about 10 days before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Havana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster the Brizola forces. Four Cuban couriers reportedly took the money to Brazil.\n\nCuba also maintained a substantial propaganda operation in Brazil, primarily through the local office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba. The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institutes\nhad increased to the point where they covered all major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar organizations existed at the national level, such as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.\n\nBrazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)\u2014which is planned to replace the moribund Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL)\u2014was held in Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delegation to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on 9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew, who brought a letter from the President warmly supporting the conference. Brazil was also used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba.\n\nIn late April, the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line, was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged by their Cuban comrades\u2014many have been trained in Cuba\u2014but Havana is not known to have given them direct support.\n\n4. British Guiana\n\nThe government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Guiana, in contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to bring down the existing regime.\n\nClinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP). Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.\nNumerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these ships also transport arms to British Guiana which allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.\n\nThe vehicle for British Guianese trade with Communist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Export (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment of $300,000 to the manager of GIMPEX in September, ostensibly for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable source. It is unclear, however, whether the money was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds in the past both to the government and to the PPP publishing house. Another source reports that the publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan for PPP salaries and expenses.\n\nGeorgetown officials believe Cuban-trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic violence which has occurred during the months-long strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is attempting to gain an official endorsement by the Guianese sugar industry. A senior official has told the US Consul General that six or eight Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support for this group's growing terrorist efforts in Georgetown. Another source reports some Guianese were receiving guerrilla training in the interior of the country in November 1963, presumably for the newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army.\n\n5. Chile\n\nThe Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on support for the presidential campaign of Salvador Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist-dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP), and he has a chance of being elected in the September presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba on several occasions; his campaign manager was in Havana in January. While there, he was promised financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently said: \"Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin American country to enter our camp.\"\nA clandestine source reported in February that a recently returned student said some 40 Chileans would soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The source said these Chileans had received political training in Cuba and were returning with funds from the Cuban government for Allende's presidential campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identified 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the past three years as \"subversives,\" but we have no evidence of any organized guerrilla training of Chilean groups in Cuba.\n\n6. Colombia\n\nCuba has been providing funds to subversives in Colombia since 1960. The pro-Castro, Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)\u2014whose members are building up the newly activated National Liberation Front (FLN), and the recently organized National Liberation Movement have been the principal recipients of Cuban funds. A fairly reliable source reported that a Cuban team of two officers went to visit Colombia to evaluate the FLN and its prospects and to pass funds for further activity.\n\nCuba has established some contact with bandit gangs infesting the Colombian countryside. Army troops who are fighting the bandits have found Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits. Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had substantial success so far in directing bandit activity for political ends.\n\n7. Costa Rica\n\nThe Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) continues to send members for subversive training in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have\nbegun training small groups of party members, but they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-government action. Much of the pro-Castro activity in Costa Rica appears to have been directed against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on occasion crossed into Nicaragua. The police inspector at a town in the Pacific banana zone reported in early February that two unidentified Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica attempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in support of Panamanian charges against the US.\n\nThe Costa Rican Society for Friendship with Peoples, a small Communist-front group designed to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution and pro-Castro \"revolutionary movements\" in other Latin American countries, is an important Havana asset in San Jose.\n\n8. Dominican Republic\n\nThe country's two militant pro-Communist organizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faithful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence of Cuban material support for this effort. The quick response from Radio Havana suggests, however, the existence of a communications link with one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country. Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican Republic also was reflected during the transit workers strike in early May.\n\nOne Dominican who has received guerrilla training in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new organization is to promote urban terrorism. A terrorist captured by police in mid-March is said to have told police that this group is receiving arms and guidance from Castro.\n9. Ecuador\n\nSince the 11 July 1963 military coup, the Ecuadorian government's careful monitoring of anti-government activities has hampered Cuban efforts there. When the junta began to exile Communists and pro-Castro extremists last fall, several took up residence in Havana. A clandestine source in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving guerrilla warfare training before returning to Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities. Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction of the Ecuadorian Communist Party (PCE), is reportedly planning a trip to Havana in late May to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by then so that he can \"prove his good faith\" to the Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.\n\nOther clandestine sources report Cuban aid has been offered to supporters of former president Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being offered to followers of former president Arosemena.\n\n10. El Salvador\n\nThere has been little evidence of direct Cuban-supported subversion in El Salvador during the past 10 months. The Castro government probably helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for guidance and training. Havana radio, heard clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda line which can be echoed in locally published Communist publications.\n\nHavana has at least one well-trained Salvadoran intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on selected targets. He was trained in Cuba for a year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare but in clandestine communications. Like many other Cuban agents, he is not actually working in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from which he deals with Salvadoran operations across the border on direct instructions from a Cuban intelligence officer.\n11. Guatemala\n\nCuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for over two years. While we have no firm evidence of substantial Cuban assistance in 1963, two clandestine sources reported in September that extremist guerrillas and terrorists had been trained and supplied by Cuban agents. In addition, another source reports one of the persons killed in October by the pre-emptive explosion of a homemade bomb was acknowledged by the State Department as a Cuban-trained extremist explosives expert. Mexican Marxist journalist Victor Rico Galan, often used by Castro as an agent in Central America, saw Von Sosa in October and is said to have urged him to work more closely with the Guatemalan Communists.\n\nStrong anti-subversive measures by the Peralta Government have curtailed, but have by no means eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala. The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guerrillas are still at large in the mountainous areas of the country. They maintain reliable communications and contacts and have the capability to stage damaging raids on carefully chosen targets.\n\nAt least 64 Guatemalans are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandestine reporting, it is estimated that another 50 traveled secretly and that these received training in guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination.\n\n12. Haiti\n\nKnown Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.\nA French-language transmission is aimed at the educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed to the masses. The speaker has been identified as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broadcasts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier. Some Haitians may have received guerrilla training in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any such trainees have returned to Haiti. The long-time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so desire.\n\n13. Honduras\n\nMuch of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras appears to be directed toward support of similar activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala. The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence of long-established routes for smuggling into neighboring countries make Honduras well suited for such a role.\n\nTwo recent clandestine sources report the Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of the Honduran Communist Party to establish an effective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are said to favor the establishment of a new organization with no direct ties to orthodox Communist groups. The Cubans are said to have selected Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to begin making contacts with \"liberal\" leaders to investigate their readiness for armed action against Honduras' military government.\n14. Mexico\n\nThe Castro regime has been careful in the past to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico. The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico City as well as individual Mexican nationals and exiled Central American residents there to support subversive activities elsewhere in Central America. The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan are a case in point.\n\nHavana may find it difficult, however, to avoid exploiting the endemic peasant unrest which is increasing in northern Mexico. A clandestine source reported to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City that the Communist underground organization, the Communist Revolutionary Union (UCR), which has been behind much of the peasant unrest. The US consul general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban consul there was openly preaching revolution and distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he had stepped up the tempo of his activities considerably in recent months.\n\nAt least 100 Mexicans traveled to Cuba in 1963; 150 have traveled to Cuba from January through April of this year.\n\n15. Nicaragua\n\nCuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua have been channeled principally through the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revolutionary organization. Most of this group's guerrilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along with members of various other Nicaraguan revolutionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the form of financial support, training, and guidance, but details are lacking regarding its current size or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organization some of its key personnel. Since then, the FLN has been the object of harassment by both Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has shown no capability to make another move soon.\n16. Panama\n\nPro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11 January incidents, Havana had been increasing its pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as the threatened banana workers' strike in October 1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government campaign. Planning quickened after the early November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly other Castro agents. Some of the approximately 100 Panamanians believed to have received training in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare courses in December and again in May.\n\nClandestine reporting also discloses Cuban efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May 1963 national elections. Havana is reliably reported to have provided some funds for campaign assistance to selected deputorial candidates of the Radical Action Party (PAR).\n\nSeventeen Panamanian extremists arrived in Panama in late March 1963, having spent varying periods of time training in Cuba. Four of these were VAN members. Another group of recently-returned trainees was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama and to launch revolutionary activities in the near future.\n\nSixty-one Panamanians traveled to Cuba in 1963.\n\n17. Paraguay\n\nCuban subversive efforts directed against Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and training Paraguayan exiles based for the most part in Montevideo, Uruguay. The Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and\nattention, which is given through the Cuban embassy. Some FULNA members have received guerrilla training in Cuba.\n\nA once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.\n\nSix Paraguayans traveled to Cuba in 1963. However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled to Havana.\n\n18. Peru\n\nThe primary recipient of Cuban assistance for armed revolution against the Belaunde government is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a militant pro-Castro organization composed of some 1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 450 and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla training abroad, most of them in Cuba. Police raids in January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable for initiating anti-government action, but the movement is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized. It has the potential for carrying out a subversive campaign of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.\n\nCuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of lesser importance, but such assistance has been limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN) is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba for subversive training. Principal FLN leader Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September.\n\nCastro-inspired extremists have exploited recurring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past several months and they have been behind much of the illegal peasant land incursions which have occurred there.\n19. Uruguay\n\nWe have no evidence of Cuban support for revolutionary activity directed at subverting the Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighboring countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans, and Brazilians. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been particularly useful as a transit point for air travel to Cuba of travelers wishing to conceal their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban propaganda for neighboring countries. Cuban propaganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.\n\nAt least 155 Uruguayan are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963, 222 traveled to Cuba through April of this year.\n\n20. Venezuela\n\nThe current level of Cuban activity in Venezuela is considered fairly low. International repercussions stemming from the unprecedented discovery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist campaign to disrupt the December national elections, and the presently increased capabilities of the Venezuelan military and security forces will probably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the short run. There is no reason to believe, however, that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high priority on Cuba's target list for subversion. Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly will continue, and may even increase.\n\nThe FALN gives signs of stepping up its activities, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963. The decision in late April of the central committee of the Communist party to continue using violence\nas a political instrument probably presages a gradual increase of terrorist incidents. Riots in mid-May led by Communist-dominated students took place in Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same time, one successful student-led robbery of a post office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery of the university payroll.\n\nRobberies have been the FALN's favorite means in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist activities.\n| NATIONALITY | January To From | February To From | March To From | April To From | May To From | June To From | July To From | August To From | September To From | October To From | November To From | December To From | 1963 To From |\n|------------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|\n| ARGENTINA | 18 27 47 34 | 12 21 13 14 | 57 12 | 4 5 6 0 | 4 0 37 0 | 4 9 5 3 | 15 1 | 222 126 | | | | | |\n| BOLIVIA | 1 7 4 3 | 3 5 6 0 | 2 5 | 3 2 14 0 | 5 3 21 5 | 1 17 2 1 | 7 0 | 69 48 | | | | | |\n| BRAZIL | 11 19 22 13 | 9 6 18 7 | 10 5 | 1 6 25 0 | 0 24 121 0 | 2 162 0 | 0 0 | 219 242 | | | | | |\n| BR. GUIANA | 0 4 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 17 1 | 0 7 10 0 | 0 1 0 10 | 0 26 25 | 5 1 | | | | | | |\n| CHILE | 31 44 26 20 | 13 42 20 8 | 9 14 | 3 8 20 1 | 22 47 175 1 | 9 70 9 54 | 18 7 | 355 316 | | | | | |\n| COLOMBIA | 54 39 7 12 | 13 9 23 5 | 7 15 | 3 7 29 1 | 6 14 17 1 | 8 14 5 1 | 10 4 | 182 122 | | | | | |\n| COSTA RICA | 9 0 0 29 | 1 0 11 1 | 0 8 | 0 3 12 0 | 0 8 0 5 | 0 1 4 1 | 10 0 | 47 56 | | | | | |\n| DOM. REPUBLIC | 0 2 0 0 | 0 6 2 1 | 1 2 | 0 2 37 0 | 1 8 19 0 | 11 0 0 | 3 3 | 74 24 | | | | | |\n| ECUADOR | 20 0 20 5 | 10 1 31 1 | 24 1 | 4 6 2 0 | 0 2 7 0 | 3 4 4 0 | 1 0 | 121 20 | | | | | |\n| EL SALVADOR | 7 2 0 0 | 0 0 5 4 | 0 0 | 0 4 4 1 | 1 1 0 3 | 0 6 0 1 | 0 0 | 26 12 | | | | | |\n| GUATEMALA | 30 18 0 5 | 15 0 2 0 | 1 0 | 0 6 0 3 | 2 0 3 0 | 1 0 1 0 | 1 0 | 64 23 | | | | | |\n| HAITI | 0 0 4 4 | 0 18 18 | 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 1 0 | 23 22 | | | | | |\n| HONDURAS | 11 12 20 0 | 0 0 11 0 | 1 8 | 0 11 0 0 | 0 8 0 0 | 0 0 7 0 | 0 0 | 50 39 | | | | | |\n| JAMAICA | 1 0 0 0 | 0 0 1 0 | 1 1 | 0 1 33 1 | 0 2 1 0 | 0 1 0 1 | 0 1 | 38 6 | | | | | |\n| MEXICO | 100 81 22 0 | 26 38 37 18 | 34 54 | 14 42 65 | 28 34 63 | 84 36 24 | 71 23 27 | 49 72 512 530 | | | | | |\n| NICARAGUA | 4 7 0 0 | 0 0 2 0 | 0 0 | 0 5 0 0 | 0 0 0 1 | 1 0 0 1 | 0 1 | 12 9 | | | | | |\n| PANAMA | 4 1 20 0 | 2 1 2 3 | 2 0 | 3 0 15 0 | 6 0 6 13 | 1 3 0 0 | 0 3 61 24 | | | | | | |\n| PARAGUAY | 2 3 0 4 | 0 2 0 0 | 0 0 | 1 0 3 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 | 6 9 | | | | | |\n| PERU | 6 2 2 4 | 3 1 5 8 | 5 3 3 5 | 4 0 2 9 | 1 2 0 1 | 2 1 2 33 | 38 38 | | | | | | |\n| URUGUAY | 19 19 16 14 | 8 8 8 0 | 5 12 9 | 0 17 15 10 | 16 56 6 3 | 27 1 0 | 6 13 | 158 130 | | | | | |\n| VENEZUELA | 26 9 2 3 | 9 9 8 0 | 4 4 8 0 | 22 0 3 0 | 37 0 11 10 | 6 0 3 0 | 139 35 | | | | | | |\n\nMONTHLY TOTALS 354 296 212 150 124 149 223 88 163 144 73 103 319 47 104 214 587 64 76 380 69 99 126 132 2430 1863\n\nThe peaks in January, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batista and of the \"26 July\" movement, and to the international architects' congress in October.\n| NATIONALITY | JANUARY TO | FROM | PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA |\n|----------------|------------|------|------------------------|\n| ARGENTINA | 9 | 3 | 1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba. |\n| BOLIVIA | 3 | 1 | 1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, I will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school. |\n| BRAZIL | 0 | 0 | 29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown. |\n| BR. GUIANA | 1 | 0 | Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution. |\n| CHILE | 14 | 15 | An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations. |\n| COLOMBIA | 4 | 0 | 3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration. |\n| COSTA RICA | 11 | 13 | 1 attended Architects Congress |\n| DOM. REP. | 0 | 1 | 5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico. |\n| ECUADOR | 8 | 0 | |\n| EL SALVADOR | 0 | 0 | |\n| GUATEMALA | 0 | 0 | |\n| HAITI | 0 | 0 | |\n| HONDURAS | 0 | 1 | |\n| JAMAICA | 0 | 0 | |\n| MEXICO | 87 | 45 | |\n| NICARAGUA | 0 | 1 | |\n| PANAMA | 1 | 1 | |\n| PARAGUAY | 0 | 0 | |\n| PERU | 5 | 3 | |\n| SURINAM | 0 | 0 | |\n| TRINIDAD | 0 | 0 | |\n| URUGUAY | 0 | 7 | |\n| VENEZUELA | 5 | 0 | |\n| TOTALS | 148 | 91 | |\n| NATIONALITY | JANUARY TO | FROM | PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA |\n|----------------|------------|------|------------------------|\n| ARGENTINA | 9 | 3 | 1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba. |\n| BOLIVIA | 3 | 1 | 1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, I will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school. |\n| BRAZIL | 0 | 0 | 29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown. |\n| BR. GUIANA | 1 | 0 | Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution. |\n| CHILE | 14 | 15 | An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations. |\n| COLOMBIA | 4 | 0 | 3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration. |\n| COSTA RICA | 11 | 13 | 1 attended Architects Congress |\n| DOM. REP. | 0 | 1 | 5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico. |\n| ECUADOR | 8 | 0 | 0 |\n| EL SALVADOR | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| GUATEMALA | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| HAITI | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| HONDURAS | 0 | 1 | 0 |\n| JAMAICA | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| MEXICO | 87 | 45 | 0 |\n| NICARAGUA | 0 | 1 | 0 |\n| PANAMA | 1 | 1 | 0 |\n| PARAGUAY | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| PERU | 5 | 3 | 0 |\n| SURINAM | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| TRINIDAD | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| URUGUAY | 0 | 7 | 0 |\n| VENEZUELA | 5 | 0 | 0 |\n| TOTALS | 148 | 91 | 0 |\n| NATIONALITY | MARCH-APRIL TO | FROM | PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA |\n|----------------|---------------|------|------------------------|\n| ARGENTINA | 11 | 10 | 1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party leader in Buenos Aires Province. 1 - UNESCO delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban Construction Ministry. |\n| BOLIVIA | 8 | 2 | 3- Attending May Day Celebration. |\n| BRAZIL | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| BR. GUIANA | 2 | 2 | 0 |\n| CHILE | 14 | 37 | 4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. 16-Returning are members of delegation from School of Economy of University of Chile. |\n| COLOMBIA | 7 | 0 | 0 |\n| COSTA RICA | 3 | 3 | 1- En route to East Germany. 2- In attempt to obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara. |\n| DOM. REP. | 1 | 7 | 4- Returning from 26th July Celebration. |\n| ECUADOR | 5 | 2 | 0 |\n| EL SALVADOR | 3 | 8 | 2- Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning from military training in Cuba. |\n| GUATEMALA | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| HAITI | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| HONDURAS | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| JAMAICA | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| MEXICO | 32 | 24 | 3- Attending May Day Celebrations. |\n| NICARAGUA | 2 | 1 | 0 |\n| PANAMA | 2 | 14 | 3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action |\n| PARAGUAY | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| PERU | 9 | 0 | 0 |\n| SURINAM | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| TRINIDAD | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| URUGUAY | 14 | 11 | 0 |\n| VENEZUELA | 17 | 0 | 0 |\n| **TOTALS** | **130** | **121** | 0 |", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10338-10018.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 24, "total-input-tokens": 27765, "total-output-tokens": 11893, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 1530, 1], [1530, 3815, 2], [3815, 6243, 3], [6243, 8386, 4], [8386, 9260, 5], [9260, 10803, 6], [10803, 12756, 7], [12756, 14462, 8], [14462, 16330, 9], [16330, 18282, 10], [18282, 19877, 11], [19877, 21713, 12], [21713, 23540, 13], [23540, 25067, 14], [25067, 26539, 15], [26539, 28516, 16], [28516, 30321, 17], [30321, 32186, 18], [32186, 34029, 19], [34029, 34470, 20], [34470, 40206, 21], [40206, 42108, 22], [42108, 44042, 23], [44042, 46240, 24]]}} +{"id": "d1fe8917a4e391b7d79d3d06ca8f24c2bfc20c6d", "text": "SECRET 1517052 JAN 76 STAFF\n\nCITE LONDON 68796\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT PLKMBALL\n\nNELSON FROM MEYER\n\nREF: ROGER CHANNEL 09548\n\n1. REFERENCE FROM DEPARTMENT INFORMS EMBASSY THAT SENATOR HART OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WILL BE ATTENDING CONFERENCE AT DITCHLEY 30 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY. HE HAS REQUESTED THAT EMBASSY ARRANGE WITH DEREK TONKIN FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES OF SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO HIM AND SELECT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN A. SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. IN ADDITION HE WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND COORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS. SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW IT WORKS.\n\n2. TONKIN HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY EMBASSY OFFICER AND TONKIN HAS\n\nSECRET\n\n*Not renewed.*\nADvised that Brits will do their best to provide information. Senator Hart wants but that some of the information could not be made available. He is proposing a joint meeting with Sir Leonard Hooper and Richard Sykes for general discussions on the intelligence community and with Mr. Robert Armstrong at the Home Office on the workings of the Official Secrets Act. There will be changes in the schedule and Embassy will be advised by Mr. Tonkin at a later date.\n\n3. There is no indication in the Department traffic that CIA has been informed but we presume that officials of the agency have or will be contacted by Senator Hart of his staff on the matter.\n\n4. No file. E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT TAPPER PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO\n\n1. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE CODEL ON THE EVENING OF THE 12TH GEORGE CARY CONTACTED COS AND ARRANGED FOR STATION BRIEFING AT 0630/13TH (THE CONTRY TEAM BRIEFING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 0930). CARY MENTIONED THAT THE INTEL BRIEFS HAD BEEN GIVEN \"TAIL END\" TREATMENT AT PREVIOUS STOPS, AND CONGRESSMAN ADDABBO HAD INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO BE SURE AND REMEDY THAT ON THE CANBERRA STOPOVER.\n\n2. CONGRESSMEN ADDABBO, ROBINSON AND EDWARDS, ACCOMPANIED BY STAFFERS SNODGRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY AT 0630, WITH CUNNEELY PRESENT, COS GAVE THEM DETAILED BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY HEADQUARTERS. DISCUSSION COVERED THE MAKE-UP OF THE STATION AND BASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN AUSTRALIA, THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME USED BY HOS IN MANAGEMENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF LIAISON, STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES, OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO SECRET.\nPRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE: SPECIFIC DETAILS OF HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OPS TASKING- SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT WITH TARGETS AND USE OF LIAISON - STATION BUDGET, ETC., ACTUAL EXAMPLES WERE USED WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE POINT.\n\nFOR EXAMPLE, THE PDWHIZ CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUAL, PRIMARY TARGET. IT WAS A LIVELY SESSION, WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASS' THE \"LIVE WIRES\" OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE PRIMARILY RELATED TO INCIDENTAL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT HE FELT IT RATHER EASY TO IDENTIFY THE SENIOR AGENCY OFFICERS OF A MISSION BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY HAPPEN TO BE INTERFACED ADMINISTRATIVELY WITHIN AN EMBASSY.\n\nCO'S RESPONSE WAS THAT SUCH IS OFTEN TRUE, BUT THAT STATIONS AND HQS MANAGEMENT ARE FOCUSING ON THAT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND THAT THE WELCH INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS IN THAT REGARD.\n\n3. ALL BUT A FEW MINUTES OF THE ENTIRE HOUR WAS SPENT IN DISCUSSING STATION OPS. GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED THAT THE GROUP WAS \"WITTING\" AND A FEW QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.\nSNODGRASS WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THAT EXCHANGE, AND IT IS REPORTED IN SEPARATE CABLE (CANBERRA 21027). AT SNODGRASS' REQUEST STATION HAD ARRANGED A SPECIAL MEETING WITH A SELECT GROUP OF GOV OFFICIALS. THE DETAILS OF THAT MEETING AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE ARE ALSO DETAILED IN CANBERRA 21029. ON BECAUSE OF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THESE MEETINGS, SUGGEST CEA AND C/EA/PMI REVIEW REFERENCED CABLE. THE CABLE WAS GIVEN RESTRICTED HANDLING BY STATION BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF ITS CONTENT.\n\n4. THE MEETING LASTED THE FULL HOUR AND THE CONGRESSMEN INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WELL-SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN CONVERED. COS STRESSED THAT WE WERE AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE ON THE SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE DAY WAS COMPLETED, BUT THEY INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS NO FURTHER STATION CONTACT WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VISIT. THE STAFFERS DEPARTED ON THEIR \"VISIT\" IN THE EMBASSY CONVAIR ON SCHEDULE, AND WILL RETURN DIRECT TO SYDNEY BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH, ARRIVING AT ABOUT 2300. E2. IMPDET.\n\n--\nSECRET\nSECRET 122040Z JAN 75 STAFF\n\nCITE CANBERRA 21007\n\nTO: JAKARTA INFO DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT PLMHGUNGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO\n\nREFS: A. JAKARTA 35606 (1W787635)\n\nB. JAKARTA 35661 (1W790579)\n\nCANBERRA STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING\nON CODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE\nWILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL. REGARDS. E2 IMPDET,\nSECRET 1209392 JAN 76 STAFF\n\nCITE JAKARTA 35674\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYJAT PLMHCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO\n\nREF: JAKARTA 35661 (790599)\n\n1. AT RECEPTION AT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF 11 JANUARY, REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT STATION BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS \"DAMN GOOD\" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE FRANK ANSWERS TO THE DELEGATION'S QUESTIONS.\n\n2. MR. SNODGRASS ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED AND PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS. HE ADDED THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY AGENCY OFFICERS THAT THEY HAD BEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR TEN YEARS OR MORE AND HAD NOT YET RECRUITED ONE. HE ALLUDED TO THIS AS THE BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY PAID FOR SEEKING THE HOLY GRAIL WITHOUT EVER FINDING IT. COS POINTED OUT TO MR. SNODGRASS THAT SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK OF ONE STATION WHICH MIGHT NOT RESULT IN RECRUITMENT WOULD BE THE VERY BASIS ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION IS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL SECRET\nRECRUITMENT APPROACH, IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF A SINGLE SOVIET COULD AND DOES RESULT IN A MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A MORE REALISTIC ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO MEET IT. MR. SNODGRASS ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS OPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN LESS CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT WITH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN JAKARTA WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER FEEL FOR OUR ENDEAVORS AND PROBLEMS.\n\n3. MR. CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT APPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD GONE DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT THEY WERE BEING GIVEN AN ACCURATE AND INTERESTING INSIGHT.\n\n4. THUS IT SEEMS THAT STATION DID GET THROUGH TO THE DELEGATION DESPITE THE INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY LETHARGIC ABOUT IT.\n\n5. NEW SUBJECT: DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING OF COLEL DIGGS? E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET 1122202 JAN 76 STAFF\n\nCITE CANBERRA 21000.\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD\n\nREF: WELLINGTON 15837 (12787572)\n\n1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT 0800 AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL.\n\n2. HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT 45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC.\n\n3. HE HAS A MINOR HEARING PROBLEM, SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO BRIGADIER GILBERT.\n\n4. BEST REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET 1123052 JAN 75 STAFF\n\nCITE CANBERRA 21001\n\nTO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)\n\nSUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT\n\n1. COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE. HE MET WITH SQUASH DIRECTOR GENERAL, D/J10 AND SOTERN/44, EACH FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL. ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.\n\n2. INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON, DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH. JACK MAURY'S PRESENCE WAS AN ASSET.\n\n3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET.\n\nSECRET\nSECRET 1109372 JAN 76 STAFF\n\nCITE JAKARTA 35661.\n\nTO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA, SYDNEY.\n\nNIAC CANBERRA\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO\n\n1. COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE. ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET, ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS VS INTERNAL TARGETS, RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT, STABILITY AND INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORMATION, MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF COVER WORK PERFORMED BY OFFICIALLY COVERED OFFICERS, MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY, INDONESIAN REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING BASES, DIA ROLE IN INDONESIA, AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING.\n\n2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS, A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE\n\nSECRET\nCONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).\n\n3. THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL.\nNONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH\nPOLITICAL PERCEPTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE\nHELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THEIR\nOUTLOOK.\n\n4. OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY\nPROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THEIR TRIP.\nE2, IMPDET.\nSECRET 090033Z JAN 76 STAFF\n\nCITE CANBERRA 20992\n\nTO: WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT PLMHCUNGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD\n\nREF: WELLINGTON 15837 787572)\n\n1. COS WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP\n\nARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE.\n\n2. REGARDS, E2, IMPDET.\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nTO: PRIORITY JAKARTA INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA\n\nREF: JAKARTA 35600 IN 787573\n\n1. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS HERE.\n\n2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS. OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF IN JAKARTA SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT WITH INDONESIAN LIAISON AND WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT PLUS CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. FURTHER, STATION ACTIVITIES IN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN INDONESIA WILL, IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE US DAMAGE IN INDONESIA. ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL PROTECT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM. MEETING WITH YOGA, IF PUBLISHED, WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH.\n\n3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD \"NON-CLASSIFIED\" VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE. HEADQUARTERS\n\nDATE:\nORIG:\nUNIT:\nEXT:\n\nRELEASING OFFICER\nCOORDINATING OFFICERS\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\n\nCLASSIFICATION: SECRET\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY: 058913\nWILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED.\n\n4. FOR CANBERRA, WELLINGTON: IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITH/ BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION AS JAKARTA MATERIAL. E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET 0803522 JAN 76 STAFF\n\nCITE JAKARTA 35606\n\nTO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA ROUTINE WELLINGTON.\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA\n\nREF: JAKARTA 035600 (N 787573)\n\n1. CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON BRIEFED AT COS RESIDENCE NIGHT 7 JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUATION IN INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ROLE OF INDONESIAN MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION, TARGETS, PERSONNEL OR BUDGET OF STATION. THEY WERE OPENLY CRITICAL OF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED EARLIER IN THE DAY AS PER REF, AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE. THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD SAID, COS'S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE TOTAL INDONESIAN \"NATIONAL RESILIENCE\" PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENT. THE CONGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC MESSAGE, SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES.\n\nSECRET\nRATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS,\n\n2. THE TWO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN INDONESIA. THEY APPEARED HIGHLY INTERESTED WHEN COS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY. NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN A SHORT BRIEFING ON IT. BOTH MADE MENTION OF INDONESIA'S CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION CONDEMNING U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GUAM. ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IS REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO WONPAT, WHO IS THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM. THEY SAID MR. WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE OF DIPLOMACY NOT TO BRING UP THIS MATTER DURING THE VISIT, BUT THAT HE HAD CONFESSIONED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF IN THIS MATTER. COS REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT REGRETTED THAT MR. WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE SINCE WE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TO LET OUR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS KNOW THAT WE WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIS GRATUITOUS REBUFF. IT WAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATION HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO, WHO HAD REACTED BY INSTRUCTING THE INDONESIAN U.N. DELEGATION TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM JAKARTA.\nBEFORE ACTING ON ANY SUCH ISSUE AGAIN, WE ALSO NOTED THAT PRESIDENT SUHARTO HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE INDONESIAN UN. DELEGATION VOTE ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD MADE HIS DISPLEASURE KNOWN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.\n\n3. DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT MAN\u00c7OS AND \"THE KING OF THAILAND\" DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF U.S. MILITARY BASES FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED THAT THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND DID NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAI AND PHILIPPINE LEADERSHIP. AS YOGA PUT IT, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY. BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NA\u00cfVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S. AND NATURALLY AFFECTED CONGRESS. CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIGHT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT. HE ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO. HE ASKED FOR COS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER TO KEEP QUIET ON THIS OR LET HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN. COS SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO\nDISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD FOR CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT.\n\nCOS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS THAT IT DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEY DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY PUBLICLY SINCE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE ONES WERE NOT.\n\n4. THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS, GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE U.S. IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION, AND THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY, CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN SUKARNO ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED, \"LOOK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED) DID TO US!\" THEY EXPRESSED VERY LITTLE OF THEIR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH BOTH SEEMED TO ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL OF MR. HELMS. IN THIS, OF COURSE, THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. BOTH EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE CONDOR OF MR. COLBY.\n5. Generally it appeared they were satisfied with their conversation with COS, although generally disappointed with the results of their visit up to that time, since they said they had not found out much from the Indonesians that they didn't know before. Strongly endorse Headquarters advice to treat with these gentlemen separately from Congressman Milford, whose interests seem quite different from theirs'. E2, IMPDET.\n\n*Advised of contact with Congressmen Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on 7 January.\nSECRET 070944Z JAN 76 STAFF\n\nCITE JAKARTA 35600\n\nTO: DIRECTOR INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.\n\nRYBAT PLMMCONGA\n\nREF: A. DIRECTOR 788143\n B. DIRECTOR 788139\n C. DIRECTOR 788390\n D. DIRECTOR 785722\n\n1. MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED TO BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY. ALSO CONTACTED CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON AND LATER MR. TED LUNGER, AND WILL BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT 7 JANUARY.\n\n2. MILFORD BRIEFING COMPRISED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLINED REF/D. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WERE VERY CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES.\n\n3. MILFORD WAS SERIOUS, ATTENTIVE AND INTERESTED LISTENER. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY AND MORALE OF STATION PERSONNEL. HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS OF STATION PERSONNEL, OVERALL BUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL. HE WAS VERY INTERESTED.\nIN STATION'S LIAISON PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELIEVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES WERE LARGELY BASED ON IGNORANCE. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LOOKING AT THE AGENCY'S \"OLD CATS\" AND THAT EVEN SOME OF THE \"RAVING LIBERALS\" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW OF THE AGENCY IF THEY TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY BY THE DDO. HE ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CO'S OUTLINED A FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE HIM.\n\nOFF THE RECORD, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SAID HE HAD IN MIND PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED. THIS COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND\nTHE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE, UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS, ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROM THE NORM AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. ALSO, UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT ON A STRICT BIGOTED BASIS AND MCWD NRLNYE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE PRESENT CONGRESS. HE POOH-POOHED THE IDEA OF A JOINT COMMITTEE SEEING THAT IT WOULD HAVE NO LEGISLATION AUTHORITY AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER DOG BITING AT OUR HEELS.\n\n5. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED FOR COS' VIEWS ON THIS LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH COS WOULD CARE TO MAKE ON OR OFF THE RECORD. COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO AVOID RESPONSIBLE OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRESS, BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST HAVE SOME SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WE WOULD BE OUT OF BUSINESS. COS OFFERED NO RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BASIS THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT SECRET\nTIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION.\n\n6. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATION ACTIVITIES. COS POINTED OUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.\n\n7. FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, COS ACCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, TOGETHER WITH CHARGE RIVES AND THE ENTIRE DELEGATION, TO A MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED GENERAL YOGA IF HE FELT HE WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD ANY CRITICISM OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN INDONESIAN AFFAIRS. GENERAL YOGA REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED TO DEVELOP BAKIN SOMEWHAT FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF BAKIN ARE CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT. IN CERTAIN CASES IT IS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. YOGA CONTINUED THAT BAKIN AND CIA COOPERATION IN CASES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH AS THE SOVIETS. THIS IS A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC GOAL. YOGA ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON\nRELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BRITISH, THE AUSTRALIANS, THE JAPANESE, WEST GERMANS, AND ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS. HE SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH RIA WERE EXCELLENT. HE DID NOT ADDRESS HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.\n\n8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED MARY WHO WAS WELL TAKEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO EMILY PERREAULT. SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI-TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT IS WELL TO SPEAK DISTINCTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM.\n\n9. MILFORD ASKED FOR A NON-CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION BRIEFING AND OF MEETING WITH ZOGA TO BE SENT TO AGENCY AND PASSED ON TO HIM. THIS WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED IT HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD GO INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD. I WILL PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST.\n\n10. OVERALL BELIEVE THIS WAS A PLUS. MILFORD EXPRESSED COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEFING AND AGAIN REPEATED THAT IF OTHERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES THEY TOO WOULD BE IMPRESSED.\n11. WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON WILSON/DICKINSON BRIEFING WHEN IT IS COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT. E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET 0721002 JAN 76 STAFF\n\nCITE CANBERRA 20980\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT PLMMCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD\n\nREF: DIRECTOR 787555\n\n1. APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY ARRANGED. CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH SOUTHERN REP (PROBABLY SOUTHERN/44, D/JIO AND SQUASH/D-G).\n\n2. COS AND BONHAM DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY SET FOR 0830-1000. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES MEETING WITH EACH LIAISON OFFICER, SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES. CAN EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET 0702402 JAN 76 STAFF\n\nCITE WELLINGTON 15837\n\nTO: CANBERRA INFO DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD\n\nREFS: A. DIRECTOR 787959\n\nB. DIRECTOR 787555\n\nPLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS WELLINGTON CAN ARRANGE 15 JANUARY 0800 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING WITH NZ SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR, BRIGADIER H. E. GILBERT, AT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH EMBASSY WELLINGTON BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY PREFER TO MEET WITH COS AND BRIGADIER GILBERT. AMBASSADOR SELDEN CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT. TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR FLIGHT TO MT. COOK WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH GILBERT. PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PREFERENCE SO COS CAN CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT WITH BRIGADIER GILBERT. E2IMPDET\n\nSECRET\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nSECRET\n\nSTAFF\n\nCONF: CEA 3 INFO: FILE DCI REVIEW STAFF\n\n000, CSIF SAY DO\n\n000/00 0/0\n\nTO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON-Y\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y\n\nREF: DIRECTOR 787555 [*]\n\nCONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH LIAISON. E2, IMPDET-H\n\n*TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE.\n\nOLC\n\nCEA/PMI\n\nDATE: 2 JAN 76\nORIG: B.J. HOUSTON\nUNIT: DCEA\nEXT: 9373\n\nTHEODORE G. SHACKLEY CEA\n\nBILL J. HOUSTON DCEA\n\nRELEASING OFFICER\n\nCOORDINATING OFFICERS\n\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\n\nCLASSIFICATION\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nSECRET\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nTO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON INFO TOKYO, Y\nRYBAT PLMHCONGAY\n\nREFS: A. DIRECTOR 785722 (NOT NEEDED TOKYO) [*]\nB. DIRECTOR 787555 (NOT NEEDED TOKYO) [**] Y\n\n1. BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, HE EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDRESSES AS FOLLOWS: Y\n JAKARTA - MORNING 7 JANUARY\n CANBERRA - 10 JANUARY\n WELLINGTON - EVENING 14 JANUARY Y\n\n2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING, MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (PIKE COMMITTEE), HAS BEEN MOST INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI, ONLY MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEE DRAWS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED HAS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS. HE RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES\n\nDATE:\nORIG:\nUNIT:\nEXT:\n\nRELEASING OFFICER\nCLASSIFICATION\nSECRET\n\nCOORDINATING OFFICERS\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\nE 2\nIMPDET\nCL BY:\nAS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST HIM WRITE MINORITY REPORT. ACCORDINGLY, HE WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR IMPORTANCE THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURES. RECOGNIZE SHORT NOTICE, BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSES MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT ARRANGE LIAISON CONTACTS.\n\n3. FOR JAKARTA: PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND WILSON/DICKINSON CONTACTS SEPARATELY AND AVOID OBVIOUS SITUATION OF SINGLING MILFORD OUT FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT.\n\n4. FOR CANBERRA: MILFORD DOES EXPECT MEET AND DISCUSS HIS ACTIVITY WITH MR. BONHAM IN CANBERRA. HE WILL DEVOTE DAY OF 10 JANUARY TO STATION AND NASA. REQUEST STATION COORDINATE WITH NASA REP WHO PLANS TAKE MILFORD VISIT FACILITY AT TIPENBIL. IF SO, SUGGEST STATION ARRANGE HAVE MRS. MILFORD TOUR NEARBY ZOO. IF ANY CONFLICT SCHEDULING WITH NASA, MILFORD SAYS HE WANTS AGENCY TO TAKE PRIORITY.\n\n5. FOR WELLINGTON: MILFORD UNDERSTANDS HIS STAY WELLINGTON SHORT AND WILLING DEVOTE EVENING TO STATION.\n\n6. FOR TOKYO: TOKYO IS REST STOP AND MILFORD EXPECTS NO\nCONTACT.\n\n7. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSES COORDINATE STATION PLANS WITH EMBASSY SCHEDULING FOR GROUP TO GIVE MILFORD OPPORTUNITY MEET SENIOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IF CONFLICT CAN BE AVOIDED. MILFORD HAS STRESSED, HOWEVER, AGENCY BUSINESS HAS PRIORITY. HAS PROVIDED MILFORD NAMES COS'S IN JAKARTA, CANBERRA, AND WELLINGTON. REQUEST STATION'S CONTACT MILFORD AS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL AS POSSIBLE SO MILFORD CAN PLAN NON-AGENCY PART OF SCHEDULE. SUGGEST STATION OFFICER ASSIST MRS. MILFORD SINCE SHE MAY NOT WISH TO TAG ALONG WITH LARGER GROUP WITHOUT HER HUSBAND. E2 IMPDET.\n\n*GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.\n**CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REVISED SCHEDULE.\n\nDEP. DIR/DDS&T - C. DUCKETT {DRAFT}\nOLC - R. CHIN {DRAFT}\n\nDATE: 3 JANUARY 76\nORIG: R. CHIN\nUNIT: OLC\nEXT: 9010\n\nTHEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA\nBILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA\nCLASSIFICATION\nSECRET\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY: 058088\nSECRET\n\nTO: DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT PLM CONGA CONGRESSMAN\n\nREFS: A4 DIRECTOR 787555\n B4 DIRECTOR 785722\n\n1. CHARGE MIKE RIVES HAS BEEN ADVISED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST FOR STATION BRIEFING PER REF A. WILL ARRANGE BRIEFING AFTER CONGRESSMAN'S ARRIVAL.\n\n2. ON 2 JANUARY MAFAWN/1 TELEPHONED STATION TO SAY THAT CABLE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY BAKIN FROM HACLUSE/1. WE PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT AND CALL ON PRESIDENT SUMARTO. HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT GENERAL MURDANI BRIEF THE GROUP ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION. BAKIN HAS SENT CABLE TO MURDANI TO RETURN TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK TO PARTICIPATE IN BRIEFINGS. BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR STAFF MEMBERS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT BAKIN HQS ON 7 JANUARY. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS BRIEFING. STATION ARRANGED BAKIN BRIEFINGS BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHARGE.\n\nSECRET\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nSECRET\n\nSTAFF\n\nCONF: 9693 INFO: FILE DCC (REVIEW STAFF)\n\nCSIAF 000 81000\nD00100 D00100\n\nTO: PRIORITY JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, Y\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y\n\nREF: DIRECTOR 785722 |*| Y\n\n1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REVISED SCHEDULE:\n\nETD JAKARTA 1200 8 JAN FOR BALI Y\nETD BALI 0800 9 JAN FOR CANBERRA Y\nETA CANBERRA 1740 9 JAN Y\nETA WELLINGTON 1515 14 JAN Y\nETD WELLINGTON 1000 15 JAN FOR MT. COOK Y\nETD MT. COOK 1400 15 JAN FOR CHRIST CHURCH Y\nETA CHRIST CHURCH 1500 15 JAN Y\nETD CHRIST CHURCH 09 16\n\nNOTE: THIS SEPARATE TRIP TO THAT OF SNODGRASS, PRESTON, CARY\nMENTIONED DIRECTOR 778574 |*| Y\n\n2. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED MEETING WITH\nCOS, JAKARTA 10 JANUARY, COS, CANBERRA 13 JANUARY AND WITH COS,\nWELLINGTON, 15 JANUARY. REVISED SCHEDULE WILL ALTER HIS DESIRES\nTHIS CASE. MEETING WITH HIM ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL FORWARD NEW\n\nDATE:\nORIG:\nUNIT:\nEXT:\n\nRELEASING OFFICER\n\nCOORDINATING OFFICERS\n\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\n\nCLASSIFICATION\nSECRET\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY: 054893\nSCHEDULE FOR MEETINGS WITH COS' AT THAT TIME.\n\n3. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS CEA AND OLC {MR. ROBERT CHIN} BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 19 DECEMBER 1975:\n\nA. NINETEEN DECEMBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD COULD BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW TERMS ON WHAT THE CIA STATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND INDONESIA WERE DOING IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS.\n\nB. AUSTRALIA: THERE WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRA, MELBOURNE AND SYDNEY. THIS REPRESENTATION CONSISTED OF ABOUT SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC MISSION OF PURSUING SOVIET, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE IN AUSTRALIA. IT WAS STRESSED THAT THESE DENIED AREA TARGETS WERE PURSUED BOTH UNILATERALLY AND IN JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN LIAISON SERVICE. THERE WERE 53 SOVIETS IN AUSTRALIA, 66 CHINESE, 8 HUNGARIANS, 22 CZECHS, 3 BULGARIANS, 59 YUGOSLAVS, 9 RUMANIANS AND 17 NORTH KOREAN STUDENTS. IT WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT BRIEFING THAT PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN BOTH UNILATERAL AND JOINT OPERATIONS WAS THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST\nEUROPEAN TARGETS AS IN-PLACE AGENTS WHO WOULD WORK FOR US NOT ONLY IN AUSTRALIA BUT UPON THEIR RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. ALSO STRESSED CIA'S INTEREST IN OBTAINING NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FROM RECRUITED PENETRATIONS OF THE SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN AUSTRALIA. HE WAS INFORMED OF OUR DESIRE TO RUN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR ARRANGE THE DEFECTION OF KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES. OUR INTEREST IN BUILDING UP PERSONNEL INDICES ON THOSE INDIVIDUALS FROM TARGET COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN AUSTRALIA BUT WHO WERE NOT RECRUITABLE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT ALSO WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS UNDERSCORED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO NOT RECRUITABLE TODAY MIGHT BE RECRUITABLE IN FUTURE IF WE CAN LEARN TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MOTIVATES THE TARGET AND WHAT MAKES THEM TICK AS HUMAN BEINGS. THE BRIEFING OF REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD ON AUSTRALIA ALSO TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE BROAD ASPECTS OF CIA'S LIAISON WITH ASIO, ASIS AND JIOY.\n\nC. NEW ZEALAND: HE WAS ADVISED THAT CIA HAD THREE PEOPLE IN WELLINGTON WHO WERE FOCUSED ON RUNNING JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AGAINST THE SOVIET, PRC.\nAND EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN NEW ZEALAND. HE WAS GIVEN RUNDOWN ON NUMBERS OF SOVIETS, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN WHO WERE CURRENTLY IN NEW ZEALAND. THE SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS WAS ALSO DISCUSSED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS OUTLINED IN PARA 3B ON AUSTRALIA.\n\nD. INDONESIA: CIA MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN JAKARTA, MEDAN AND SURABAYA. CIA HAD APPROXIMATELY 28 PEOPLE IN INDONESIA. THESE FIGURES WERE COMPARED AGAINST THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN INDONESIA. A DISCUSSION OF THE PRC TARGET AS SEEN FROM PERSPECTIVE OF INDONESIA FOCUSED ON LEGAL TRAVEL OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA AS WELL AS SCREENING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL FROM CHINA TO INDONESIA. THERE WAS ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN AND VIETNAMESE TARGETS IN INDONESIA. THE BRIEFING ALSO FOCUSED ON INDONESIA AS AN INTELLIGENCE TARGET IN TERMS OF HOST COUNTRY ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF INDONESIA. A BRIEF COMMENT WAS ALSO MADE ON TOPIC OF CIA LIAISON WITH BAKIN, THE INDONESIAN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE TOTALITY OF\nSTATION'S EFFORTS IN INDONESIA WAS DESCRIBED IN BROAD MANAGEMENT TERMS AND SOME EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM CIA ACTIVITIES IN INDONESIA. CEA ALSO FOCUSED BRIEFLY ON OUR ABILITY TO USE AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO PURSUE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN INDONESIA.\n\nE. COMMENT: REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD TOOK NOTE OF ABOVE BRIEFINGS, ASKED LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE VARIOUS STATIONS AND INDICATED THAT BRIEFINGS HAD COVERED ALL OF THE ISSUES THAT HE HAD WANTED TO DISCUSS.\n\nF. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD EXPRESSED GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ASKED THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA, HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH MEMBERS OF AUSTRALIAN LIAISON SERVICES. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD MADE POINT THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE COMMITTEE DUTIES BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON LIAISON SERVICES' REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD WAS ADVISED THAT ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS.\nPARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA, WITH ONE OR TWO SENIOR LIAISON PERSONALITIES.\n\n4. REGARDING REFERENCE PARA THREE F, SINCE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SPECIFICALLY WISHES DEAL WITH LIAISON SERVICES ATTITUDES IN HIS MINORITY REPORT, HAVE NO OBJECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OUR DEALINGS WITH LIAISON SERVICES. STATIONS CAN ALSO ARRANGE MEETING WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS ON DISCREET BASIS IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REQUESTS. E2, IMPDET-H\n\n* GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nTO: PRIORITY CANBERRA, JAKARTA, WELLINGTON\n\nRYBAT PLNHCONGA Y\n\nREFS: A. CANBERRA 20866 [IN 774560] [RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON]\n\nB. DIRECTOR 784159 [**] [RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON]\n\n1. THIRTEEN MEMBERS OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, ACCOMPANIED BY WIVES, WILL BE MAKING TRIP TO JAKARTA, CANBERRA, SYDNEY, AND WELLINGTON. GROUP WILL USE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIP. THEREFORE, NO NEED FOR STATION TO MAKE HOTEL OR RELATED TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS. TWO REPRESENTATIVES, PRICE AND WILSON, ARE MEMBERS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WHO ARE GOING AT THIS TIME. NONE OF ABOVE HAVE ASKED TO MEET WITH STATIONS. IF LATER REQUESTED, CHIEF COUNSEL OR COMMITTEE STAFF MAY CONTACT YOU IN HEADQUARTERS TO MEET WITH GROUP. CONTACT CAN BE MADE THROUGH STAFF ASSISTANT SLATINSHEK WHO IS TRAVELLING WITH GROUP. INTEREST DEVELOPS.\n\n2. HOWEVER, CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD [DEMOCRAT, TEXAS] WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE [HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE] WILL ACCOMPANY THIS GROUP AND DOES DESIRE BRIEFINGS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WIFE WILL TRAVEL WITH HIM. CONGRESSMAN\n\nDATE: 24 DEC 75\nORIG: B.J. HOUSTON\nUNIT: EX:\n\nRELEASING OFFICER\nCOORDINATING OFFICERS\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\nCLASSIFICATION\nSECRET\nREPRODUCTION, BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY: 058913\nMILFORD'S INTEREST AS STATED BY HIM WILL BE IN SEEING HOW THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS WORKS FROM THE GROUND UP. HE WANTS TO ACQUIRE BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ON THIS PROCESS SO THAT WHEN THE FINAL COMMITTEE REPORT IS MADE HE CAN USE HIS INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT IT IS A BALANCED ONE. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES NOT LIKE FORMAL BRIEFINGS AND DOES NOT WANT CHARTS.\n\n3. SINCE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS VERY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW THE AGENCY FUNCTIONS, IT IS LIKELY THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL FOCUS ON THIS ASPECT OF STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT.\n\nA. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES: STATIONS PROBABLY CAN DEAL WITH THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS FROM THE GROUND UP BY BRIEFING HIM ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS. STATION CAN OUTLINE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., HOW STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HEADQUARTERS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION.\nDOWN TO AG'S OF SPECIFIC INTEREST. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING OF FAN'S, ETC.\n\nB. AGENT ACQUISITION: STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ARE CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS.\n\nC. AGENT AUTHENTICATION: DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHORIZED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION: SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC.\n\nD. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED.\nFOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT COLLECTION ON INTERNAL TARGET IS BY PRODUCT ACQUIRED THROUGH ELICITATION FROM LIAISON, FOREIGNERS AND AMERICANS. (FYI: OBJECTIVE K HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM CANBERRA OD AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEFING.) THRUST OF PROGRAM IS RECRUITMENT OF SOVS AND CHINESE, USING LIAISON AS\nEXTENSION OF CIA, FOR COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRC AND USSR. POINT OUT DO NOT RECRUIT AUSTRALIANS OR NEW ZEALANDERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF GOVTS CONCERNED.\n\nE. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM: STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRO PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON.\n\nF. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR STATIONS.\n4. WHERE APPLICABLE {SUCH AS JAKARTA} BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS.\n\n5. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. HE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN STATION'S ESTIMATE OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES, VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES.\n\n6. FOR JAKARTA: IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF SUHARTO REGIME THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION AND HOW THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF THE REGION.\n\n7. THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS, CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574.\n\n8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.\n\n9. SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF VISIT. THE FOLLOWING ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS:\n\nDATE:\nORIG:\nUNIT:\nEXT:\n\nRELEASING OFFICER\nCLASSIFICATION: SECRET\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nCOORDINATING OFFICER\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\nCLASSIFICATION: SECRET\nCL BY: 058913\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nSECRET\n\nMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR\n\nCONF: INFO: FILE\n\nDATE-TIME GROUP\n\nDIRECTOR\n\nMESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER\n\nINDEX DISSEM BY:\nNO INDEX\nRETURN TO PER\nIP FILES #\n\nJAKARTA 6 JAN, ETD 9 JAN Y\nCANBERRA 9 JAN, ETD 11 JAN Y\nSYDNEY 11 JAN, ETD 14 JAN Y\nWELLINGTON 14 JAN, ETD 16 JAN E2, IMPDET A\n\n* INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION.\n\n** HAS CONTACT WITH D. MILFORD ON TRIP TO AUSTRALIA.\n\nDATE: 24 DEC 75\nORIG: B. J. HOUSTON\nUNIT: ACEA\nEXT: 9373\n\nDAVID BLEE, A/DDO\n\nBILL J. HOUSTON, ACEA\n\nCLASSIFICATION\nSECRET\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY: 050913\nSECRET 280348Z NOV 75 STAFF\n\nCITE SEOUL 25948\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA\n\nREF: SEOUL 25761 (73 6898)\n\n1. FOLLOWING LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD G. STILWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, AND FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST TO BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT. GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH, COMMANDER, I CORPS, CAMP RED CLOUD, FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER. GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH WAS REWORKED INTO THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS. THE LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO COS BY GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH.\n\n2. QUOTE \"DEAR MR. MILFORD:\n\nSECRET\nGENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED AT THE INTEREST YOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA. I AM ONLY SORRY THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WE FACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER DETAIL. THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND MY VIEWS.\n\nAS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OF INTELLIGENCE - AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT, SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RECURSES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE.\n\nORGANIZATIONALLY, THE US INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA IS Viable. THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, I.E., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA), AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) WORK EFFECTIVELY IN CONCERT WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTS WHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED AND EFFICIENT FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE. WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED WITH THE DEDICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THOSE NATIONAL AGENCIES; AND WE HAVE EQUALLY HIGH RESPECT FOR OUR SECRET\nOWN PEOPLE. THIS TEAM IS RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEAL OF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE.\n\nLIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE PRIMARY NEED IS FOR RELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE. BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY TO THE ENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHIN THE RANGE FANS OF HIS EMLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WE MUST CONSTANTLY BE ALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD TIP US OFF TO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE OF HIS READINESS AND THE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONING OF SUPPLIES, WE DO NOT HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS, IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THIS, US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES OF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE AN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING.\n\nNATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE US INVALUABLE INTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY. YET WE\nSTILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE ACTUAL LOCATIONS AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THE EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPLY A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING WOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE CLOSED NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF INFORMATION.\n\nTHE PREPONDERANCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMAN SOURCE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND THAT AGENCY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED, LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ON STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS NATURE IS THE TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED CONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DMZ. THIS IS A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE TECHNIQUES WOULD BE A MEANS OF SECRET\nDISCOVERING THE TUNNELS BEFORE THEY ARE USED AGAINST US.\n\nIN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED A HIGH ALTITUDE PLATFORM TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND MASS TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REQUESTED SYSTEM INCLUDES A DOWN LINK CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA COLLECTED. OUR PROPOSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE DOWN LINK ACCESS TO NATIONALLY MANAGED OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL.\n\nWE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES. NONETHELESS, GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE, AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND HELP TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.\n\nSECRET\nSINCERELY YOURS, \"UNQUOTE\nE2, IMPDET.\"\nSECRET 1003222 NOV 75 STAFF\n\nCITE SEOUL 25761\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA\n\nREF: SEOUL 25730 (N 732787)\n\nFOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE 264362 (ROGER CHANNEL)\n\n10 NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT: LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. REF: SEOUL 8531. 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARD TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED PARA 5 REFER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE; OWING TO SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO \"CLANDESTINE OPERATION\" IN LETTER LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE,\n\n* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.\nSECRET 3103142 OCT 75 STAFF\nCITE SEOUL 25687\nTO: DIRECTOR.\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA\nREF: SEOUL 25649 (724591)*\n\n1. REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION\nWITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY\nONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. DCOS\nBROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED\nHIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZI (SEOUL 25657).\n\n2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE\nDEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY\nTO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION\nWITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AEZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL\nPROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY\nOBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.\n\n3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED\nCOPY OF SEOUL 25388 LESS THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN\nDISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY\nREPORT AROUND THIS TYPE 1-83 94 23 78B REVIEW\nSECRET\nSTUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE. THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOW FOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS. COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA.\n\n4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL. HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE.\n\nE2, IMPDET.\n\nCS COMMENT:*COS forwards a resume of points covered during more than six hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (D-Texas) on 25 October 1975.\nSECRET 2803002 OCT 75 STAFF\nCITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 1 OF 4\nTO: DIRECTOR.\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA\nREF: A. SEOUL 25646 (723/38)\nB. DIRECTOR 759641\n\nFOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURING\nMORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONS\nWITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (D-TEXAS) ON 25 OCTOBER 1975.\nBECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL AND\nDISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFORE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTING\nROOM.\n\n1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION\nBY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON.\nIN ADDITION TO HIS REFERENT A ASSESSMENT, HE STATED\nTHAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE\nREPORT WILL STATE THAT:\n\nA. DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED IN\nMULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION.\n\nB. BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYS\nSECRET\nIN FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE,\n\nC. NEW LEGISLATION AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLE\nJOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED.\n\n2. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE\nINQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN HIS OPINION\nTHERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBJECTIVITY. TIME FACTORS\nDID NOT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS TO PERSONALLY\nOR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SO\nTHAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE \"PRISONERS\nOF THE COMMITTEE STAFF\". HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH\nTHIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACH\nCOMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECT\nONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE.\nHE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THIS\nAPPROACH, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECT\nONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIP\nOF THIS PROPOSAL, HE AGREED, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD AS\nYET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE.\nHE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYED\nLIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES. HE IS\nSECRET\nACTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AS HIS STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEAR SANGUINE THAT HE WOULD COME UP WITH THE RIGHT MAN.\n\n3. CUS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR COLBY WOULD BE THOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HE WAS NOW OBLIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES. CUS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THAT A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED. HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY IN AN UNDERDOG POSITION AND IS GOOD COPY, HOWEVER, OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP SCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SO THAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THE ASSIGNMENT.\n\n4. THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES IT IS TO FORM A COMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF THE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVE\nOVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECURE MANNER. THE CONGRESSMAN IS PUSHING A PROPOSAL THAT THE HOUSE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONE MEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE, ONE FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTED BY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEE TO BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BY THE HOUSE MEMBERS.\n\n5. THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) IS TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WHETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE SHOULD BE EXTENDED. IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR \"BAD\" LEGISLATION. IF CONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPIRED MANIPULATION OF THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL HEADLINES. HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW WHICH WAS WORSE.\n\n6. THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT, WHICH HE SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILE\nA dissenting minority report focusing in a positive manner on the contemporary situation rather than the historical issues that the committee has focused in a non-objective manner, however, since December is for practical purposes not a working month, this gives him only thirty days to put together a report. Since he is a member of three House committees and chairman of one sub-committee with not even one staff assistant on the select committee he is finding it almost impossible to develop a minority report. He turned aside the suggestion that favorable witnesses be called as impractical. He said, for example, that if he asked General Walters or prestigious and knowledgeable personalities with intelligence backgrounds to appear, they would not be permitted to make an objective and balanced presentation. The committee's line of questioning would be confined to their knowledge of the \"dead cats\" of ten to fifteen years ago. He also foresaw no possibility of modifying the majority views or the majority report, he was clearly concerned that Sam Adams'\nALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL PERMITTED. HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE COULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT. IF NOT, HE INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.\n\n7. THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING A MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HE\nSECRET 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 OF 4\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA\n\nHAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A CRITICAL AREA (KOREA) AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELL, AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE \"ALL THE WAY TO THE FORTY COMMITTEE\". HE STATED THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME \"VEHICLE\" TO TIE THIS ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT TO IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER REMEDIAL ACTIONS, COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN A THOROUGH IN-COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER TO ASSURE HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS. THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEAL\n\nSECRET\nWITH \"UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS\" OF THE REVIEW. (HOW ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF FOCUS AND THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT HIS INABILITY TO FIND A \"HANDLE\".)\n\n8. THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL MUST NOT BE RELEASED BUT THESE RESTRICTIONS DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED, HOWEVER, SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE HSC'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLENGED (ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITY).\n\n9. COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF REFERENT B GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION, GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAD\nDEVELOPED, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS BELIEVED\nBEST TO GIVE THE CONGRESSMAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHART\nTHE COURSE. IN SO DOING IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR\nTHAT HIS INTEREST LAY IN THE AGENCY'S ROLE VIS-\u00c0-VIS THE\nINTEL COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW\nCOORDINATION AND CONTROL WAS EXERCISED IN THE FIELD.\nCOS EXPLAINED THE CHIEF OF STATION'S RESPONSIBILITY\nAND AUTHORITY IN THE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE\nCOLLECTION PROGRAMS. IN DISCUSSING COORDINATION OF\nMILITARY COLLECTION AGENCIES COS IN DUE COURSE\nSUGGESTED THAT MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT\nPROFITABLY BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION.\nTELEPHONE CALLS BROUGHT THE 8TH ARMY J-2, CAPTAIN ALBERT\nM. HUNT, THE DEPUTY J-2 COLONEL ARTHUR W. LONG AND\nTHE SENIOR NSA REPRESENTATIVE MR. DELMAR C. LANG INTO\nTHE DISCUSSION. THE COMMAND AND COORDINATION CHANNELS\nWERE OUTLINED, AND THE STATION'S ROLE WAS ENDORSED BY\nTHE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE.\nCOS EXPLAINED THE DCID'S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE\nDCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARANCE,\nSECRET\nREGISTRATION, APPROVAL AND IF NECESSARY, RECLAIM OR\nPROCESS WORKS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN\nOBTAIN COPIES OF THE DCID'S UPON HIS RETURN TO\nWASHINGTON. NOT SURPRISING, THE CONGRESSMAN HAD\nNEVER HEARD OF THE DCID'S, HE NOTED THE SUGGESTION\nAND WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY FOLLOW UP UPON HIS\nRETURN.\n\n10. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE\nWAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND INTENTLY QUESTIONED\nTHE MULTICHANNEL NATURE OF REPORTING WHEN ONLY ONE\nDECISION COULD BE TAKEN. COL. LONG, THE DEPUTY\nJ-2, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN DEFENSE OF\nMULTIPLE REPORTING CHANNELS, POINTING OUT THE\nSPEED AND ASSURANCE OF COVERAGE WHEN SUCH WERE\nEMPLOYED. HE ADDED THAT PLACING A UNIFYING LAYER\nOF BUREAUCRACY ON TOP WOULD TEND TO DELAY THE\nMORE RAPID TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE; TO STIFLE\nDISSENTING VIEWS; AND TO CREATE A MONSTROUS SIZED\nSUPER-AGENCY WHICH MIGHT PROVE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE\nTO CONTROL AND REVIEW. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS PARTICULARLY\nSECRET\nSTRUCK WITH THIS LATER POINT WHICH HE CONSIDERED\nA PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR MULTICHANNEL\nREPORTING, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE PERSUASIVE\nON HIS \"WILD-EYED\" LIBERAL PEERS.\n\n11. COS REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SYSTEM AS A DEVELOPMENT\nWITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND DEVELOPED BY THE\nDCI TO FURTHER REFINE THE COMMUNITY EVALUATION\nSYSTEM AS WELL AS TO ENSURE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE\nCOORDINATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.\nIT WAS NOTED THAT THE NIO FOR NORTH ASIA AND THE\nPACIFIC, MRS. EVELYN COLBERT, IS A SENIOR CAREER\nSTATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, WHILE COL. LONG'S PREVIOUS\nASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN AS THE DEPUTY NIO FOR LATIN\nAMERICA. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE SYSTEM PERMITS\nTHE DCI TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES\nAND TO EXAMINE THE PRODUCT OF AN ENTIRE MISSION, AN\nINTELLIGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE\nHOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE\nQUESTIONS, THE EVALUATIONS OF THE NIO SYSTEM REPRESENTS\nSECRET\nA MAJOR ADDITIONAL STEP IN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY.\n\nCOS ALSO NOTED THAT PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT\nSTEP TAKEN BY THE DCI IN EFFECTING COMMUNITY CONTROL\nWAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-AGENCY RESOURCES\nALLOCATION COMMITTEE (IRAC) WHICH PERMITS THE DCI\nTO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BUDGETS OF THE\nRESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THE CONGRESSMAN\nWAS QUICK TO PERCEIVE THE USEFULNESS OF IRAC.\n\n12. COS REVIEWED THE AGENCY SYSTEM OF\nMANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND THE FIELD INTEL\nPROCESS IN SOME DETAIL NOTING THE AUTOMATIC\nSIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO CUSTOMERS IN WASHINGTON\nAS WELL AS THE FIELD. LOCAL COORDINATION WAS\nEXPLAINED AND THE ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY OF STATION'S\nREPORTING WAS STRESSED. COS STATED THAT HE WAS\nUNAWARE OF A SINGLE INCIDENT DURING HIS CAREER\nIN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR OR GENERAL OR ANY OFFICER\nHAD PREVENTED THE DISSEMINATION OF A SINGLE REPORT\nFOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS. LOCALLY, COS\nSECRET 2803002 OCT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 3 OF 4\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA\n\nNOTED THAT WE DO NOT PRECLUDE REQUESTING THE AMBASSADOR'S OR THE CINCUNC'S OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIST OPINION OR COMMENTS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A NATURE THAT THEIR COMMENTS WOULD PLACE THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT AND THEREBY MATERIALLY ADD TO THE VALUE OF THE REPORT. IT WAS NOTED THAT SUCH COMMENTS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN THE REPORT AND SUCH REVIEW IS NOT PERMITTED TO DELAY ITS TIMELY DISSEMINATION, E.G., THE OFFICE OF THE CINCUNC IS PERMITTED 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO COMMENT ON CERTAIN MILITARY REPORTS IF THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND THE TIMELINESS OF THE INFORMATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY A 24-HOUR DELAY. COS EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE REPEAT NO ONE IN THE FIELD CAN PRECLUDE A CHIEF OF STATION FROM EXERCISING HIS RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE TO DISSEminate SUCH SECRET\nINTELLIGENCE AS HE, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT, CONSIDERS WORTHY OF DISSEMINATION INTO THE NATIONAL LEVEL SYSTEM.\n\n13. THE COS'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR COORDINATION OF MILITARY CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WERE ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY J-2, COLONEL LONG, WHILE DEFENDING THE SERVICES SEPARATE NEED FOR A COLLECTION CAPABILITY, STRONGLY ENDORSED THE NEED FOR THE COORDINATION PROCESS UNDER DCID 5/1.\n\n14. THE CONGRESSMAN NOTED THAT ONE PROBLEM THAT HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION AND WHICH HAD SURFACED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT FOUR DIFFERENT INTEL ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN USING THE SAME SOURCE IN VIETNAM. COS NOTED THAT IF TRUE THE INCIDENT WAS THE EXCEPTION NOT THE RULE AND EXPLAINED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER AGENCY SOURCE REGISTRY AND HOW IT SERVES THE NEEDS OF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY, THE PROBLEM OF FABRICATION WAS DISCUSSED AND THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF BURN NOTICES.\nTO IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED.\n\n15. ALTHOUGH COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET. HE ALSO STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED U-2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED MARKHAM AND SWAMP COVERAGE AND ADDING A DF CAPABILITY TO THE AUTOMATED VHF/HF ADVENTURER COLLECTION SITES. LANG ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF DSA, THE KOREAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION.\n\nTHE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA. COS ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD.\n\nCOS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIBILITY AND FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER SECRET\nEFFICIENCY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS BY COMBINING THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS, INDEED THE UNIQUE NATURE OF NSA RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SOMewhat ESOTERIC ARGUED AGAINST FUNCTIONAL MERGER OF THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESULTANT SPAN OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL COULD IN FACT RESULT IN A LESS COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION, BOTH COS AND MR. LANG NOTED THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES PRECLUDE UNDESired DUPLICATIVE TASKING AND ENSURED MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY EXPLOITATION IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH AGENCY HAD THE LOCAL COMINT RESPONSIBILITY. MR. LANG COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WORKED CLOSELY WITH CIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AND SAW NEITHER MAJOR PROBLEMS NOR ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD NECESSARILy ACCRUE IF THE AGENCIES WERE COMBINED.\n\n16. DCOS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING OF 25 OCTOBER ON THE NATURE OF THE CONGRESSMAN'S INTERESTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DAY'S DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY. THE AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN SECRET\nMILFORD THAT NIGHT AT DINNER AND INVITED HIM TO THE RESIDENCE AT 1100 HOURS ON THE 26TH. THE CONGRESSMAN LATER STATED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE QUITE HELPFUL AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED TO FORWARD A LETTER ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT WHICH WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.\n\n17. IN A STATION-ARRANGED ONE HOUR MEETING WITH LT. GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH ON 26 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, THE CONGRESSMAN RESTATE THE NATURE OF HIS CONCERNS IN SEEKING POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO A MINORITY REPORT, HE THEN ASKED GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH WHAT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT HE NEEDED AS A FIELD ARMY COMMANDER AND HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SUPPORT HE WAS CURRENTLY OBTAINING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. HOLLINGSWORTH RESPONDED WITH A CRUSTY BUT IMPASSIONED LECTURE ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO CIA AND NSA. HOLLINGSWORTH TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN THAT HE NEEDED MORE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND HE NEEDED IT IN A TIMELY FASHION, WHICH WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD SECRETARY\nSCHLESINGER WHO HAD POSED THE SAME QUESTION, THE GENERAL STATED THAT HE WANTED MORE NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL, PHOTO, AND EVEN ECONOMIC COVERAGE AND HE DEPENDED ON NSA AND CIA TO GET IT FOR HIM. HE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS SAYING THE ARMY DID NOT PUT HIGH CALIBER MEN INTO INTELLIGENCE AND DID NOT DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS.\n\nHE NOTED THAT HIS SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER HAD JUST BEEN TRANSFERRED TO DIA IN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT. HE SAID HE WAS A GOOD SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER BUT NO INTEL OFFICER, WHEREAS HIS FORMER G-2 HAD BEEN REASSIGNED TO HONOLULU IN A PERSONNEL SLOT, AND THEN THE ARMY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED COLONEL AS A REPLACEMENT, HE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST CIA AND NSA HAVE CAREER PROFESSIONALS WITH WHOM THE FIELD COMMANDER CAN WORK, AS HE FORMERLY DID IN VIETNAM AND AS HE IS NOW DOING IN KOREA. HOLLINGSWORTH ALSO ADDED KUDOS FOR STATION MILITARY REPORTING, NOTING THAT KOREA IS A MILITARY-ORIENTED SOCIETY.\nSECRET 2803002 OCT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE SEOUL 25649 FINAL SECTION OF 4\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT PLMMCONGA\n\nAND THAT HE HAD FOUND OUR MILITARY/POLITICAL\nREPORTING QUITE HELPFUL. THE GENERAL DECLINED\nTO BE SPECIFIC AS TO THE NATURE OF ADDITIONAL\nTECHNICAL SUPPORT HE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF\nUNCERTAINTY REGARDING ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION,\nBUT HE VOLUNTEERED TO PUT HIS REQUIREMENTS AND\nCOMMENTS IN A LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMAN WHICH HE\nWOULD FORWARD VIA STATION CHANNELS AND \"THEN LET\nTHE PEOPLE BACK HOME WORK OUT THE CLASSIFICATION\nPROBLEM\"; CONGRESSMAN SAID THAT WOULD BE MOST\nHELPFUL AND WOULD REPRESENT A REAL CONTRIBUTION\nTO HIS REPORT,\n\n18. IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DCOS,\nTHE CONGRESSMAN REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE\nDDCI BY NAME IN DRAFTING HIS MINORITY REPORT AS\nWELL AS IN REVIEWING THE USIB STUDY ON KOREA\n\nSECRET\nREQUIREMENTS, HE STATED THAT HE PROPOSED TO BASE\nHIS REPORT ON THE USIB AND COS REVIEWS OF THE KOREAN\nPROBLEM AND TO INCLUDE EXTRACTS OF THE LETTERS FROM\nTHE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. ALTHOUGH\nSTILL UNCERTAIN AS TO METHODOLOGY, HIS INTENT IS\nTO DEVELOP A POSITIVE REPORT REFLECTING THE HIGH\nDEGREE OF LOCAL COOPERATION THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY\nOBSERVED BUT STRESSED THAT THE REPORT MUST BE\nUNCLASSIFIED BECAUSE THE REPORT MUST BE DESIGNED\nFOR PRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE FLOOR. HE BELIEVED\nTHE DDCI WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR ASSISTANCE IN PULLING\nTOGETHER A REPORT OF THIS NATURE.\n\n19. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT HE AND REPRESENTATIVE\nDAVID C. TREEN WERE IN THE VANGUARD ON THE NEED FOR A\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT\nOF REPRESENTATIVES MCCLARY AND JOHNSON ON THE COMMITTEE.\nHE SAID THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF THIS MINORITY, ALBEIT\nTHREE REPUBLICANS TO ONE DEMOCRAT, WOULD ASSIST ITS\nACCEPTANCE. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MUST NOW MOVE\nRAPIDLY TO RECRUIT HIS OWN STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE\nSECRET\nCOMMITTEE STAFF,\n\n20. ADDITION DISCUSSION IS SCHEDULED WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD FOR 28 OCTOBER. WILL ADVISE.\n\nE2, IMPDET.\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nSECRET\n\nTO: PANAMA CITY\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA\n\nREF: PANAMA CITY 34339 IN 723135\n\n1. HQS AWARE OF AND HANDLING REF CASE. NO NEED FORWARD WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS, NO FURTHER STATION ACTION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER COMES TO STATION ATTENTION.\n\n2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.\n\nLA COMMENT: REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE ON 1972 CASE OF MAIL INTERCEPTS INADVERTENTLY SENT TO PANAMA.\n\nSA/DDO - NORM SHEPANEK (TELECOORD)\n\nDATE: 28 OCT 75\nORIG: BARBARA GRAHAM: EMEP\nUNIT: C/LA/CAM/PA\nEXT: 1805\n\nCLASSIFICATION\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY: 054524\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nSECRET\n\nTO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KOB, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA,\nSYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN, Y\nRYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y\nREF: DIRECTOR 759843 Y\n\n1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY\nMUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM PLMHCONGA. Y\n\n2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT\nTHEIR DISCRETION USE THE DIVISIONS (PLMPTACT) PRIVACY CHANNEL. Y\n\n3. ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE\nSENT TO HQS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE. E2. IMPDET. A\n\nCEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}\nEA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD}\n\nDATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975\nORIG: CEA/ESOC\nUNIT: S.M. LABAR\nEXT: 1704\n\nTHEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA\nRELEASING OFFICER\n\nSECRET\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY: 005088\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nCONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF\n\nTO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KOBE, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA,\nSYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN, Y\nRYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y\n\nREF: DIRECTOR 759842 Y\n\n1. IDENTITY IS: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY.\n2. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.\n\nCEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}\nEA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD}\n\nDATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975\nORIG: CEA/ESEC\nUNIT: S.M. LABAR\nEXT: 1709\n\nTHEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA\nCOORDINATING OFFICER\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY: 005088\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nSECRET\n\nMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR\n\nSTAFF\n\nDATE-TIME GROUP 241922Z\n\nDIRECTOR\n\nMESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 759641\n\nCONC: INFO: FILE\n\nIMMEDIATE SEOUL Y\n\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA Y\n\nREF: A. SEOUL 25645 [IN 722803]\n\nB. SEOUL 25646 [IN 723138] Y\n\n1. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN\n\nREF A TO SPEND ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION\n\nACTIVITIES, BELIEVE SEOUL STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS TASK WITH\n\nFOLLOWING DATA IN MIND: Y\n\nA. BACKGROUND. HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS\n\nKEENLY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW CIA\n\nFUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE\n\nFOCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF FIELD\n\nSTATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL. Y\n\nB. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT\n\nCONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS \"START OF THE INTELLIGENCE\n\nCOLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD\" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF\n\nSTATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW\n\nMANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE\n\nDATE: 24 OCT 75\n\nORIG: TGSHACKLEY: DCM\n\nUNIT: C/EA\n\nEXT: 1428\n\nRELEASING OFFICER\n\nCOORDINATING OFFICERS\n\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\n\nSECRET\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\n\nCL BY: 061971\nOPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HQS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IN KOREAN CONTEXT, TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION DOWN TO AG-4 OR AG-7. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING BY FAN'S, ETC. Y\n\nC. AGENT ACQUISITION. WITH FOCUS OF BRIEFING BEING ON AG-4 OR AG-7, STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET ARE STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES IS CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. Y\n\nD. AGENT AUTHENTICATION. DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. Y\nE. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. Y\n\nF. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRO PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEEDBACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. Y\n\nG. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE\nPROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR SEOUL.\n\n2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS. ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH ROK'S. THIS MIGHT WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS OR FAILURES.\n\n3. HQS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS.\n\n4. PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY. E-2, IMPDET.\n\nAC/EA/JK\nDC/EA\nC/EA/COPS\nA/DDO\n\nDATE: 24 OCT 75\nORIG: TGSHACKLEY: DCM\nUNIT: C/EA\nEXT: 1428\n\nTHEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\n\nCL BY: 061991\nSECRET 240620Z OCT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE SEOUL 25645\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR,\n\nNIACT DIRECTOR\n\nRYBAT CODEL\n\nREF: A. DIRECTOR 758492\n\nB. DIRECTOR 758427\n\n1. CODEL MURPHY ARRIVED SEOUL EVENING 23 OCTOBER\n\nAT ROKG INVITATION. DUE HOSPITALIZATION OF COS, DCOS\n\nCONTACTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE\n\nBRIEFING IF DESIRED. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER\n\nCOUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING ON MORNING OF 24 OCTOBER IN\n\nWHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED\n\nPOINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE HAD\n\nBEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A\n\nDETAILED STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE FIELD,\n\nHE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION\n\nSCHEDULE AS OF 0900 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS.\n\nWHILE PARAMETERS OF HIS INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED IN\n\nINITIAL CONVERSATION, HE ANTICIPATES DEVOTING ONE OR NOT\n\nSECRET\nSEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES.\n\n2. REP. LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS RECEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION. REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH LATER DURING THEIR FIVE DAY STAY.\n\n3. COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER. WHETHER HE IS OR NOT, COS PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP. MILFORD EITHER AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED BE CONFINED FOR ONE WEEK RECUPERATION. THIS OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN, AND IF AGREEABLE TO HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS.\n\n4. WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 0800 LOCAL 25 OCTOBER AS REP. MILFORD'S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS.\n\nE2 IMPDET\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nTO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA-Y\nADMIN Y\n\n1. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG-Y.\n\n2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HHS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES. E2 IMPDET-A\n\nDATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975\nORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD\nUNIT: NE/COPS\nEXT: R-1562\n\nSECRET\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nSECRET\n\nSTAFF\n\nCONF: NE-3\nINFO: FILE\n\nTO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA-Y\n\nADMIN Y.\n\nREF: DIRECTOR 758926\n\nIDEN: PLMHCONGA, E2 IMPDET.A\n\nDATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975\nORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD\nUNIT: NE/COPS\nEXT: R-1562\n\nCLASSIFICATION\nSECRET\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY: 056382\nSECRET\n\nMESSAGE\n\nTO: ROME Y\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA Y\nFOR ACOS AND OZGA Y\n\n1. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE PLANS HOLD HEARINGS ON DESTROY PROJECT 29 OCTOBER. REQUEST MR. OZGA PLAN REVIEW PLDEFINE MATERIAL WITH CHIEF EUROPE ON 27 OCTOBER AND ARRANGE BE HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN AFTERNOON 28 OCTOBER. Y\n\n2. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2, IMPDET.\n\nDATE: 21 OCTOBER 1975\nORIG: PHILIP F. FENDIG\nUNIT: DC/EUR\nEXT: 1233\n\nSA/300 (1ST DRAFT) DC/EUR (1ST DRAFT)\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY:\nTO: LONDON, BONN-Y\nRYBAT PLMHCONGA Y\n\nMANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT MR. DAVID AARON.\nPLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED\nTO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF\nUNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC\nAT YOUR DISCRETION. E2 IMPDET-A.\n| TO: | ACTION | INFO | DATE | INITIALS |\n|-----|--------|------|------|----------|\n| 1 | DGO | | | |\n| 2 | ADDO | | | |\n| 3 | C/PLANS| | | |\n| 4 | C/OPS | | | |\n| 5 | C/SS | | | |\n| 6 | C/CCS | | | |\n| 7 | C/CT | | | |\n| 8 | C/AF | | | |\n| 9 | C/DDO | | | |\n| 10 | C/DIVD | | | |\n| 11 | C/EA | | | |\n| 12 | C/EUR | | | |\n| 13 | C/FR | | | |\n| 14 | C/NE | | | |\n| 15 | C/SE | | | |\n| 16 | C/LA | | | |\n\n**Remarks:**\n\nSenator Church?\n\n**Signature:** ADDO\n\n**Date:** 17 OCT 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs\n\nSUBJECT: The Director's Greeting Card List\n\n1. It is requested that you provide recommendations as to whom the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 10 November 1975.\n\n2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has met here or abroad.\n\n3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.\n\nPeter V. Raudenbush\nSA/ADDO\n\nDistribution:\nC/AF C/SE\nC/EA C/CCS\nC/EUR C/CI\nC/DCD C/OPS\nC/DIVD C/PS\nC/FR C/SS\nC/LA/ SA/DDO\nC/NE SPG/DDO\nMEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs\n\nSUBJECT: DDCI's Greeting Card List\n\nAddressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, all significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of business 10 November 1975.\n\nPeter V. Raudenbush\nSA/ADDO\n\nDistribution:\nC/AF C/SE\nC/EA C/CCS\nC/EUR C/CI\nC/DCD C/OPS\nC/DIVD C/PS\nC/FR C/SS\nC/LA SA/DDO\nC/NE SPG/DDO\n\nE2 IMPDET\nCL BY 037796\n\nCIA INTERNAL USE ONLY\n| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |\n|---------------------------------------------------|------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1. | | | FYI |\n| 2. | | | File in \"Administrative Trip File in July 1972.\" |\n| 3. | | | |\n| 4. | | | |\n| 5. | | | |\n| 6. | | | |\n| 7. | | | |\n| 8. | | | |\n| 9. | | | |\n| 10. | | | |\n| 11. | | | |\n| 12. | | | |\n| 13. | | | |\n| 14. | | | |\n| 15. | | | |\nSECRET 1616502 OCT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE LONDON 66194\n\nTO: DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT PLKMBALL\n\nREF A. DIRECTOR 752556\n\nB. DIRECTOR 754586\n\n1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES.\n\n2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:\n\nA. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY\n\nSECRET\nIF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY.\n\nB. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION.\n\nC. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLIED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE.\n\nD. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON SECRET.\nCOLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. WE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.\n\nE. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN THE U.K.\n\n3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:\n\nA. THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND\nCONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED\nBY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE\nPRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION\nOF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID\nHE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS\nTHE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.\n\nB. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIALE\nDEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT,\nTHE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY\nEFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH\nREPRESENTATIVES SERVING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE\nOF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD\nBE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME\nPROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY.\nAARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS\nPROBLEM.\n\nC. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO\nWHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF\nDAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE\nSANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH\nSECRET\nCOVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.\n\n4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET\n| TO | ACTION | INFO | DATE | INITIALS |\n|----|--------|------|------|----------|\n| 1 | | | | |\n| 2 | | | | |\n| 3 | | | | |\n| 4 | | | | |\n| 5 | | | | |\n| 6 | | | | |\n| 7 | | | | |\n| 8 | | | | |\n| 9 | | | | |\n| 10 | | | | |\n| 11 | | | | |\n| 12 | | | | |\n| 13 | | | | |\n| 14 | | | | |\n| 15 | | | | |\n| 16 | | | | |\n| 17 | | | | |\n\nSIGNED BY: [Signature]\n\nDATE: 17 Oct 75\n**DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS**\n\n**ROUTING SHEET**\n\n| TO: | ACTION | INFO | DATE | INITIALS |\n|-----|--------|------|------|----------|\n| 1 | DDO | | | |\n| 2 | ADDO | | | |\n| 3 | C/PLANS| | | |\n| 4 | C/OPS | | | |\n| 5 | C/SS | | | |\n| 6 | C/CCS | | | |\n| 7 | C/C1 | | | |\n| 8 | C/AF | | | |\n| 9 | C/DCD | | | |\n| 10 | C/DIVD | | | |\n| 11 | C/EA | | | |\n| 12 | C/EUR | | | |\n| 13 | C/FR | | | |\n| 14 | C/NE | | | |\n| 15 | C/SE | | | |\n| 16 | C/LA | | | |\n\n**SUSPENSE DATE**\n\n**REMARKS:**\n\nFile in my travel file.\n\n**SIGNATURE**\n\n64/DDO\n\n**DATE**\n\n17 Oct 75\nSECRET 1617262 OCT 75 STAFF\nCITE BONN 43387\n\nTO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT\n\nREF: DIRECTOR 752556\n\n1. MR. DAVID AARON OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BRIEFED BY STIGGINS, HIBBERT AND DEUTINGER FOR TWO HOURS MORNING 15 OCTOBER. AARON HAD LUNCH WITH HIBBERT AND NEWLY ARRIVED ARMY ATTACHE COLONEL OLIVER RAY. HE MET FOR OVER HOUR WITH AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND AFTERNOON 15 OCTOBER BEFORE DEPARTING FOR LONDON.\n\n2. LARGE PART OF MORNING BRIEFING DEVOTED TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS IN GERMANY. AARON ASKED FOR DEFINITION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT COS SUPERVISED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WHICH EXPLAINED TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL. AARON ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT COORDINATION PROCESS AND HOW THIS IMPLEMENTED. HE WANTED KNOW IF THE COORDINATION PROCESS EXTENDED TO A REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF THE VALUE OF MILITARY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AS REFLECTED IN ITS PRODUCT AND TOLD THAT OUR COORDINATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES GENERALLY CONFINED TO INSURING THAT MILITARY TRADECRAFT MET OUR STANDARDS AND THAT POLITICAL RISKS ACCEPTABLE IN PRACTICE. WE DID NOT REVIEW PRODUCTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. WE MENTIONED THAT MILITARY COLLECTION IN RECENT YEARS WAS ON RELATIVELY MODEST SCALE AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FLAPS IN RECENT YEARS.\n\n3. MR. AARON SAID THAT THE SENATORS ON HIS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO FIND THAT MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COLLECTION ACTIVITY SINCE THIS NOT COVERED IN ANY LEGISLATION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY AUTHORIZED IN NONSKIDS. STIGGINS MADE POINT THAT MILITARY IN GERMANY STRUCTURED ALONG COMBAT INTELLIGENCE LINES AND IN EFFECT ENGAGED IN MILITARY COLLECTION OF TACTICAL NATURE AS TRAINING EXERCISE APPROPRIATE TO THEIR POTENTIAL WARTIME MISSION. MR. AARON SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED MILITARY ORS AND PERSONNEL COULD BE ASSIGNED TO CIA OPERATIONAL.\nCONTROL IN FIELD. WE OPINED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION IN WHICH COORDINATION HAS TRENDED OVER THE YEARS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERS PROBABLY FEEL HIS CONTROL UNDERMINED THEREBY.\n\n4. TURNING TO BKHERALD OPS, MR. AARON SAID HE RECALLED FROM WASHINGTON BRIEFING THAT GERMAN STATION HAD SIZEABLE ALLOTMENT FOR OFFICER ENGAGED IN POLITICAL COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL BASIS. WE EXPLAINED THAT MONIES IN THIS PROJECT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR SALARY-AND-EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF OFFICER (HERZFANZ, NOT MENTIONED BY NAME) AND NOT USED FOR AGENT PAYMENT OR OTHER PURPOSES. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY AARON.\n\n5. HE ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT \"FANCY\" POLITICAL SOURCES, ALONG LINE THAT THESE COULD PERHAPS BE HANDLED AS NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND ASKED WHETHER THESE CONTACTS DID NOT REPRESENT HIGH RISK IF EXPOSED. STIGGINS EXPLAINED AT SOME LENGTH THAT THESE SOURCES VERY FEW-IN-NUMBER, AND WERE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING MANY YEARS CONTACT WITH SPECIFIC CIA OFFICERS, MAKING POINT THAT AGENTS' CONFIDENCE IN CIA BASED ON MANY YEARS ASSOCIATION. WE ESTIMATED FLAP POTENTIAL SLIGHT THESE LONG-STANDING CONTACTS, WHICH COULD BE EXPLAINED AS OLD FRIENDSHIPS. FOR REASON THAT THEY WERE, IN FACT SUCH, THESE RELATIONSHIPS COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS. WE MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THE LOWER-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTAL OPERATIONS ACTUALLY REPRESENTED HIGHER RISK AND CITED GENERAL OUTLINE OF \"HILTON AFFAIR\" (WITHOUT NAMES) AS EXAMPLE HOW DEVELOPMENTAL CASE COULD BE TROUBLESOME. EMPHASIZED THERE HAD BEEN FEW OF THESE OVER YEARS.\n\n6. AARON ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT FEDREP REACTION IN EVENT OUR INCOMPATIBLE SOURCES EXPOSED. WE RESPONDED THAT IN GENERAL GERMANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EMBARRASSING US AND THAT THIS KEY ELEMENT, PLUS FACTOR THAT WE HANDLED ALL INCOMPATIBLE ACTIVITY VERY CAREFULLY, LED US TO CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE NOT RUNNING RISK MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT BY CONDUCTING LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS. POINTED OUT THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE THOSE AREAS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND SOME ECONOMIC FIELDS WHERE GERMANS NOT COMPLETELY CANDID WITH US EMBASSY RE THEIR ACTIVITIES.\n7. Mr. Aaron asked about extent we kept ambassador informed on our activities in West German field. We replied that ambassador saw virtually all reporting and therefore knew where sources located but that as rule we did not clear with him on individual contacts, making reference to \"sources and methods\" provision of our regulation and statutory provisions. Pointed out that each case treated separately but that ambassador and embassy consulates have not had interest in developmental contact with younger political figures outside Bonn area. On other hand he clearly quite concerned with foreign ministry with result that we generally assumed hands-off attitude on FOMIN.\n\n8. Mr. Aaron inquired re station case officer strength and given figures cited in position report dated October 74 (forwarded HOS by TM dated 29 Sept 74.) We explained that breakdown somewhat arbitrary and said that for number officers (those engaged in liaison, support, analysis, for instance) it not always easy to categorize their efforts.\n\n9. He probed in some detail on our NOC strength and we answered candidly. Mr. Aaron seemed surprised at small numbers NOC officers in station and said had heard opinion from some CIA officers that NOC preferable to official cover. We said felt this dependent on location and circumstances and that here in Germany army cover readily available, generally quite satisfactory and cost considerably less than NOC cover. Aaron asked several questions re reasons we would put officer in Germany under NOC. We explained NOC primarily used for personnel we planned keep assigned Germany several years and where NOC probably more secure and for instances where it provided better access. When he pushed for further examples we mentioned had recently considered putting officer under student cover in Heidelberg where official Chinese students significant target represented but that this plan dropped for administrative reasons. We made no mention use journalist cover and did not identify any cover firms by name.\n\n10. Aaron asked Stiggins which of what Aarons envisaged as three principal duties took most time. Aaron outlined COS duties as management of station, embassy responsibilities and coordination of military intelligence activities. Stiggins said management of\nSTATION CLEARLY REQUIRED MOST TIME AND FURTHER THAT WITHIN STATION, THE EFFORT AGAINST THE HARD TARGETS CONSUMED THE MAJOR PART OF HIS TIME AND EFFORT.\n\n11. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AARON PRIOR TO HIS SESSION WITH HIM. EC IMPIET.\nSECRET\nSECRET 161856Z OCT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE BONN 43389\n\nTO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT\n\nREF BONN 43387 (1W716059)\n\n1. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND ONE-HALF SESSION WITH MR. AARON ON 15 OCT. DISCUSSION COVERED THREE MAIN TOPICS: (A) RISKS AND NEED FOR \"FANCY POLITICAL SOURCES\" IN BONN; (B) COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS; AND (C) DEGREE TO WHICH AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES.\n\n2. ON POINT #1, AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONG-STANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE EARLY POSTWAR/OCCUPATION ERA. THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE. THAT IS, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAY'S POLITICAL CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE TO GRADUALLY WITHER AWAY. BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT.\n\nSECRET\nTHE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VALUE\nSINCE THE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSY\nCONTACTS.\n\n3. REGARDING PARA 1.B., AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO AARON\nTHAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER\nINVOLVED IN LARGE-SCALE COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE\nASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS.\nCOS EMPHATICALLY ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO\nCOVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE\nSTATION, AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S\nREFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD\nCONCLUDED THAT IT MUST APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF\nHERZFANZ WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE.\n\n4. WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS\nOF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF\nCOURSE \"HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA\" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME\nOF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE\nIDENTITIES OF ANY OF THEM, HE FOUND THE SITUATION ACCEPTABLE\nHOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PER-\nSONALLY FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT\nCOS would advise him of anything he ought to know. Looking back on the record of the past twenty-five years, the ambassador said he concludes that in fact the ambassadors in Bonn had been kept appropriately advised and the absence of flaps would substantiate the judgment exercised by the respective station chiefs over the years.\n\n5. Mr. Aaron discussed at some length with the ambassador the feasibility of charging the ambassador with greater direct responsibility for supervision of the clandestine effort. Ambassador stated that if it were assigned to him as a mission he would manifestly have to discharge it and would as he saw it probably need a staff of at least two competent officers to carry out the practical staff work on his behalf. Mr. Aaron then raised the question of the British system about which the ambassador made the pertinent observation that it was a question for the government to decide. If it was decided to subordinate clandestine intelligence operations in the field directly to the ambassador, then appropriate arrangement could and would be made. The ambassador was left with the impression by Mr. Aaron that at least a number of the members of the Senate Select Committee are\nGIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE BRITISH SYSTEM AS A MEANS OF INVESTING AMBASSADORS WITH DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. E2: IMPDET.\nSECRET 1613022 OCT 75 STAFF\nSITE BONN 43369\n\nTO: DIRECTOR\n\nRYBAT PLKMBALL\n\n1. MR. AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON 15 OCTOBER.\n\nSAID HE WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE OF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF\nSELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK\nFORCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE. MR. AARON SAID\nHE FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY\nSCHEDULED.\n\n2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS\nCIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT\nGOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE\nCOMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING\nDIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT\nHAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE \"GOING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED.\"\nSAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF\nWRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION.\n\n3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DCSI USAREUR\nGENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY\nSECRET\nCOMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON TALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVE COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE 66TH MIG. MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY. E2 IMPDET.\nSECRET 1616502 OCT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE LONDON 66194\n\nTO: DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT PLKMBALL\n\nREF A. DIRECTOR 752556\n\nB. DIRECTOR 754586\n\n1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES.\n\n2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:\n\nA. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY...\nIF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY.\n\nB. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION.\n\nC. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLIED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE.\n\nD. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED.\nCOLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS\nPOINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER\nAND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER\nIN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT\nPROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE\nWITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS.\nCOS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS\nINFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS\nMIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO\nKNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO\nBASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE,\nOF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY\nOPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.\n\nE. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH\nTHE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON\nTHE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN\nTHE U.K.\n\n3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE\nTHE FOLLOWING POINTS:\n\nTHE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND\nCONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED\nBY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE\nPRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION\nOF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID\nHE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS\nTHE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.\n\nB. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVYABLE\nDEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT,\nTHE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY\nEFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH\nREPRESENTATIVES SERVING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE\nOF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD\nBE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME\nPROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY.\nAARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS\nPROBLEM.\n\nC. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO\nWHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF\nDAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE\nSANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH\nSECRET\nCOVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.\n\n4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET\nTO: CIA Task Force\nFROM: The Review Staff, Walter Elder\nSUBJECT: SSC/HSC Request\nRECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905\n\nThe attached letter requests an orientation briefing for David Aaron who is travelling again, this time to Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.\n\nComments: 1st Meeting - Briefing on 8 Oct 1975 by Walter Elder\n2nd Briefing - 10 Oct 1975 by Elder\n\n| Action | Info |\n|--------|------|\n| SC/DCI | X |\n| A/DDA | X |\n| A/DDI | X |\n| A/DDO | X |\n| A/DDST | X |\n| OGC | X |\n| OLC | X |\n| IG | X |\n| B.Evans| X |\n| SA/DDO | |\nMr. Seymour Bolten \nAssistant to the Director \nRoom 6D0120 \nCentral Intelligence Agency \nLangley, Virginia\n\nDear Mr. Bolten:\n\nThis letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.\n\nAlthough plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.\n\nThe primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military commanders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.\n\nSincerely,\n\n[Signature]\n\nWilliam G. Miller\n\ncopy to Mr. Hyland, State Department\nMr. William G. Hyland \nDirector \nBureau of Intelligence and Research \nDepartment of State \nWashington, D.C. 20520\n\nDear Mr. Hyland:\n\nThis letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.\n\nAlthough the plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.\n\nThe primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military commanders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.\n\nSincerely,\n\nWilliam G. Miller\n\ncopy to Mr. Bolten, CIA\n| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |\n|---------------------------------------------------|------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1. Mr. Rogers | 10/6 | WE | Attached is worth reading. Report on a trip of Daniel Asher and Bell Michael (both 55) to Latin America. Note para 18. BRL 24723. |\n| 2. John Wallace | | | |\n| 3. | | | |\n| 4. | | | |\n| 5. | | | |\n| 6. | | | |\n| 7. | | | |\n| 8. | | | |\n| 9. | | | |\n| 10. | | | |\n| 11. | | | |\n| 12. | | | |\n| 13. | | | |\n| 14. | | | |\n| 15. | | | |\nSECRET 241945Z SEP 75 STAFF\nCITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 SECTION 1 OF 2\nTO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.\nNACT BUENOS AIRES\n\nREBAT PLVWCADET\n\n1. COS HAD TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE MORNING 24 SEPTEMBER. GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT BOTH WERE BUSINESS-LIKE; QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW MONTEVIDEO STATION IS FUNCTIONING IN URUGUAY. HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL. MOST IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE \"FLAP POTENTIAL\".\n\n2. COS DID NOT SHOW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THEM.\n\n3. THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE AMBASSADORS INJUNCTIONS WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OPERATIONS. COS SAID\nAMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE IN URUGUAY WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL NOR DOES HE WANT US TO MOUNT \"ELECTRONIC\" OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS. AARON ASKED IF WE HAD ON-GOING PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS. COS SAID WE DID HAVE SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED MATTER, ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULLY AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH COS RESPONDED THAT HE PRESUMED SO. COS ADDED HE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE COS ARRIVAL HERE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO.\n\n4. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS WOULD WE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF ANY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADOR'S WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE INFORM THE POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF OUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP?\nCOS answered we would first instruct the agent how to handle his overt contact but, depending upon relations, might also discuss the matter frankly with political officer. What about defense attache? Answer: the same.\n\n5. This led to discussion of inter-agency source register. Having just finished with defense attache, ambassador Truehart said Defatt indicated he had many sources registered and therefore we were proscribed from recruiting them. COS pointed out source register is for covert agents only and since Defatt here is proscribed from running covert agents, none of his sources are in inter-agency source register. COS added that many defense attaches misconstrue their registering of their agents in Pentagon series as synonymous with registration in the inter-agency source register.\n\n6. Truehart asked if we exerted \"real control\" over DEA's operations as required by DCID. COS said that on the contrary we exerted no control over DEA nor are we under instructions to try to do so. We do coordinate closely, register their sources, provide traces and assistance, encourage liaison to cooperate fully with them, etc. In addition, when a DEA operation is\n\nSECRET\nBEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED TO KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR AS TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.\n\n7. TRUEHART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WE WORK WITH LIAISON ON THE SOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS. HE WAS ADVISED LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT LIAISON IS PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST SOVIET TARGET, THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING TO APPROACH THIS MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO BUG RESIDENCEE OF A SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE SAID PROBABLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO FLAP POTENTIAL. AARON WANTED TO PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY ENOUGH TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT.\n\n8. AARON AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OD NON-COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS OF INFLUENCE. THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON THEIR REQUEST, THEY WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA (ANSWER: TWO OR SECRET\nTHREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THIS KIND OF THING FOR YEARS.) WE STRESSED THAT THIS PARAGRAPH IN TWO PLACES CONTAINED THE PHRASE \"SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL\" WHICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON, WHILE THEY UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF A SENIOR URUGUAYAN GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT OF INFLUENCE.\n\nANSWER: NO, DO WE HAVE ANY RECRUITED AGENTS OF INFLUENCE IN URUGUAY, ANSWER: NO, ARE WE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES.\n\nTHEN AARON ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY COULD THREATEN PRIORITY U.S. INTERESTS IN URUGUAY. ANSWER: TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME; WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RURN TO OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN THE STABILITY OF URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE U.S. COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY. WE ANSWERED THAT URUGUAY IS SECRET\nCLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANTI-COMMUNIST IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FRIEND OF THE U.S.\n\nAARON ASKED IF SIMILAR PROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF OTHER STATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, I.E. TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT KNOW, CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART POSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER, WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS\nSECRET 241945Z SEPT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.\n\nNIACT BUENOS AIRES\n\nRECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. ANSWER: NO.\n\nTRUEHART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY\n\nCONFESSES TO MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH\n\nCOPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD\n\nTHIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER: YES.\n\nTRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT\n\nTO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DID\n\nNOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE\n\nOPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO\n\nRECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. WE\n\nPRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE\n\nAMBASSADOR TO BE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR\n\nOPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL.\n\n9. SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN\n\nPOWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET; HOPE\n\nPUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER\n\nSECRET\nOBJECTIVES). HOW IS OVER-ALL BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE WITH HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET DIVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS CALLED WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES). WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY DURING THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER: SOME WITHIN PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL. DO WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF BRIEFING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY UNDERSTAND BETTER? ANSWER: NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. AARON IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.\n\n10. IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED OUR MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD WE RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA? ANSWER: YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY HQS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION. CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID WE ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN THE MANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX. WE SAID WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS OD BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE.\nOF OTHER THINGS TO DO.\n\n11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON NOCS WE ADVISED WE HAVE NONE IN URUGUAY, E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET 2314092 SEP 75 STAFF\n\nCITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.\n\nRYBAT PLVWCADET\n\n1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART\n AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO\n OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S\n ACTIVITIES.\n\n2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN\n DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT\n OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD SATURDAY AND MONDAY.\n\n3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS\n OPERATIONS--E.G. LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S\n RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN\n PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM\n STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF\n QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER\n OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL\n ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS,\n FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET\n\nSECRET\nTHE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A \"REPORT CARD\" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O, THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE. AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD\nUP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.\n\n4. THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS (SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).\n\n5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/O'S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS SECRET\nDEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELETAPS, SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HQS BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP. MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO THAT ACTIVITY. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN POL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION, THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE CHILEAN VARIETY.\n\n6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY\nHOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL CO5 SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T\nHAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT\nSAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT\nOVER THE YEARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF\nSUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY,\nCOMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS\nWRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE,\nPLUS SENIOR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFICERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE\nAT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.)\n(AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND\nASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)\n\n7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND\nTUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE\nDISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY\nTO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO\nSTATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL\nSCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST\nSENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO\nONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR\nSEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE\nSECRET\nTHOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM, INTEL ON MAJOR ITEMS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO SUBMISSION. STATION MADE IT A PRACTICE TO CHECK INTEL OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN SENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED. THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN\nSECRET 231409Z SEPT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.\n\nBYBAT PLVWCADET\n\nBRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS\nCONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE\nAMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL\nZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE\nCARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.\n\n8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF\nTHE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE\nPOLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL\nOFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE\nPROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS\nPART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A\nCONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY\nSENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER\nSO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED\nACCORDINGLY).\n\n9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE\nSECRET\nCOLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE\nBUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN\nFACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADOR-\nIAL DUTIES.\n\n10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE\nNAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR\nUNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.\n\n11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE\nCIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.\nTHEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE\nSOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN\nSAY, STATE.\n\n12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO\nEXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA\nWAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION\nTO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID\nCUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN\nWASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE\nHAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)\n\n13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS\nWERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH\nSURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO\nAUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY\nU.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO\nMUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF\nAGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,\nETC.\n\n14. AARON EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER\nPROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD\nBE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF\nOFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,\nTHAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 50 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL\nWORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK\nDAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH\nTHEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION\nAND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.\n\n15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE\nPAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED\nMOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD\nA COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER\nSECRET\nTRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)\n\n16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH AT THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.\n\n17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS. IS SECRET\nA WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT.\n\n18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET 2915472 SEP 75 STAFF\n\nCITE BUENOS AIRES 34519\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.\n\nRYBAT PLVWCADET\n\nREF BUENOS AIRES 34511 (\\ 698265) *\n\n1. VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS RESIDENCE AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT. AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS TO AMB, COS WITHDREW AND WAITED IN ANOTHER ROOM. (UPON DEPARTING COS HEARD AMB ASK VISITORS FOR THEIR CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGGESTED TO VISITORS THAT COS BE PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK WITH HIM PRIVATELY. COS WAS CALLED IN, HOWEVER, TO PARTICIPATE IN LAST FEW MINUTES OF DISCUSSION. IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED AMB WHETHER HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. AARON THEN ASKED AMB WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO. AMB REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COS IN THIS REGARD. AARON THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOW AMB ALL STATION REPORTING. ANSWER: OPERATIONAL REPORTING IDENTIFYING AGENTS OR CLANDESTINE METHODS OF OPERATION COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO AMB WITHOUT SECRET\nHQs approval. Other info could be shown at discretion of COS.\n\nSubj of Rogers letter re showing intel reports to Amb prior to dissemination was then raised by Amb. Amb said he took position this was policy matter which had to be solved in Washington and had so informed Rogers. (COS saw draft of letter to Rogers to this effect.)\n\nAt conclusion of meeting Amb handed COS a news item (Havana Meridiano 80 in Spanish 1-15 Jul 75 pp 5-6, article by Carlos Maria Gutierrez entitled American Ambassador Hill seen as CIA agent in Argentina) and asked that article be shown to visitors in Car. Amb Trueheart read article and commented something to effect that article did not seem to him to be anything to be very concerned about. Mr. Aaron did not read it. Pouching copy. (Amb subsequently told COS article had been given to him in Washington by Deputy Assistant Ryan.)\n\n2. On way to airport after meeting with Amb, Trueheart mentioned Amb's request to see their credentials. Since they had none, they showed their passports. (Amb later told COS he had asked to see credentials since he wanted to see for himself exactly what the limits of their authority were.) COS inferred that visitors were taken aback by Amb's request but meeting with Amb.\nWAS NONETHELESS HARMONIOUS. (AMB LATER CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION.)\n\n3. AMB TELEPHONED COS MORNING 28 SEP AND GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSION WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GIVEN IN HIS OFFICE EARLY MORNING 29 SEP. AMB CHARACTERIZED VISITORS AS INTELLIGENT AND BUSINESSLIKE. AMB HAD IMPRESSION THEY SATISFIED WITH VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES AND WITH COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM EVERYONE. HE SPECULATED THAT THEIR REPORT WOULD BE WRITTEN IN MANNER WHICH SERVES INTERESTS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE SATISFIED WITH BKHERALD OPERATION IN ARGENTINA. ONLY AREA WHERE HE HAD A QUARREL WITH BKHERALD IS THAT OF COMMUNICATIONS: AMB BELIEVES STATE DEPT SHOULD CONTROL ITS OWN COMMUNICATIONS; HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO BKHERALD HAVING ITS OWN COMMO. ALSO, REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS THAT BECAUSE OF TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BKHERALD ACTIVITIES IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW. VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT. AMB SAID HE HAD HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF WHO NOW DECEASED, WIN SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS HAD TOLD HIM SIXTY PERCENT OF MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST SECRET.\nCUBANS. ONLY LATER DID AMB FIND OUT BY CHANCE ABOUT SPORLON EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH AFRICA. AMB SAID MR. HELMS AWARE OF HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS GENERAL WALTERS. EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT BY VISITORS, AMB TOLD COS THAT AMB CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.\n\n4. CURIOUSLY, AARON ASKED DCOS' SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING 26 SEP. ALTHOUGH IT TURNED OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE DID NOT ATTEMPT ELICIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, AARON DID MAKE FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST:\n\n(A) HE SAID HE HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTI-BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN MUTED SOMEWHAT BY FAVORABLE IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED OF VARIOUS BKHERALD OFFICERS IN THE FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.\n\n(B) HE SAID HE THOUGHT BUENOS AIRES' EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION WAS \"JEALOUS\" OF BKHERALD.\n\n(C) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HE, WAS SENIOR OFFICER. HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT WISH ALERT FUTURE STATIONS HE WILL VISIT OF PECKING ORDER.\n5. VISITORS DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES 27 SEP AT 2130 HOURS ON SCHEDULE.\n\n6. AMB SAID HE HAD A GOOD TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHARD SAMPSON IN WASHINGTON, MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS REPORTED DIRECTOR 744995.\n\n7. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.\n\nCS Comment: *Aaron and Trueheart's 26 September conversations with COS and DCOS.\nSECRET 2522342 SEP 75 STAFF\n\nCITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION 1 OF 2\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.\n\nRYBAT PLVWCADET\n\nREF DIRECTOR 745626\n\n1. COS AND DCOS HELD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING THE TWO VISITORS MET PRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED PRIVATELY WITH SMITH. (AARON BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.) COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP.\n\n2. AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE. (AT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE, AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.) AARON ASKED MOST OF QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-BKHERALD. (E.G., ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.)\n\nSECRET\n3. IN DISCUSSING BKHEARALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN \"OUT OF WAY PLACES\" WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTERESTS NOT PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS, POINTED OUT ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID SOME SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FOR INTERNAL HANDLING, ALSO POINTED OUT CI VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS OFFICERS. NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION VALUE OF BKHEARALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD JUSTIFY BKHEARALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION. WE ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME REQUIRED ON WORLD-WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW GOOD SOURCES WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP. TRUEHEART ASKED FOR EXAMPLES, AND WE REFERRED THEM TO HQS FOR DETAILS. TRUEHEART SAID IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHEARALD NOW IN A \"SOVIET PHASE\", WHEREAS IN EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION OR OTHER PHASES. WE SAID SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGET, AND OUR APPROACH TO THEM HAS BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARS.\n4. KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE CONTROL OVER, OR AT LEAST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, DEGREE TO WHICH WE WOULD COORDINATE RECRUITMENT PROPOSAL OF GOVT OFFICIAL PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH. ANSWER: AMB WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY OR HIGH RISK INVOLVED, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE HERE THUS FAR. ASKED WHO DETERMINES IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED. ANSWER: COS. ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWER: HE HAD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUNCTION EXISTED, WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT OR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT. ANSWER: WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT. ASKED WHETHER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION AND ITS MISSION. ANSWER: WE BELIEVE SO, BUT DEFER TO AMB (WHO WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUE-HEART.)\n\n5. BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATIONS'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (I.E., PRIMARILY BY HQS OR THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS TO DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS.\nANSWER: WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM HQS ON CONTINUING BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BUT NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW ON INTERNAL TARGET. WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORTING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS. VISITORS PROBED DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS. WE ALSO POINTED TO OUR PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION TO POL SECTION AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS. REGARDING VOLUME OF REPORTS, WE SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF HQS DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED OFFICERS DO ALSO.\n\n6. IN RESPONSE THEIR QUERIES, WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. SAID COS AND DCOS ONLY STATION OFFICERS DECLARED TO LIAISON. ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH INTEL REP, ANSWER: YES; BUT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM, AND WE SAID RELATIONSHIP...\nSHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND CONTACT IS PASSED FROM ONE PERSON TO ANOTHER. ASKED WHETHER THERE SDECE REP IN BUENOS AIRES. ANSWER: WE NOT AWARE OF ANY. NO MENTION MADE OF ANY OTHER LIAISON CONTACTS AND SUBJECT OF LOCAL POLICE NOT RAISED.\n\n7. SUBJECT OF NOCS NOT RAISED.\n\n8. ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ANSWER: NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS UNDER AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM. WE STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONJINGENCY NATURE OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING NEW AGENTS. ANSWER: WE CONSTANTLY STRIVE TO UPGRADE CALIBER OF OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT SAME TIME WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES. WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME TO ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES IN POLITICAL SCENE.\n\n9. FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING. WE EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTING WHETHER STAFFING ADEQUATE THAT STATION CUT BY OVER 30 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS OR SO, INCLUDING CASE OFFICERS. WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS. WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM\nCONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. OD OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD INSEL NOT PROVIDED.\nSECRET 252234Z SEP 74 STAFF\n\nCITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, RYBAT PLWMCADET\n\n10. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. WE DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS (MONTONEROS AND ERP) AND STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS. AARON SAID THAT CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM ANOTHER AREA WHO HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. (AMB AWARE OF COVERAGE BY PJTENNIS-3 FROM TIME OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR.) WE EXPLAINED HOW SOURCE SUCH AS THIS CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO. WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD PROVIDE TO LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT. ANSWER: NO, FOR SEVERAL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.\n\n11. EVENING 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART. BECAUSE BUENOS AIRES STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING SECRET\nUNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WE WILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. THESE WILL BE COVERED IN NEXT CABLE.\n\n12. WISH THANK INFO ADDEES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS.\n\nE2 IMPDET\nSECRET 2919252 SEPT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE BRASILIA 24777\n\nTO: BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT PLVNCADET\n\nREF: BUENOS AIRES 34519 (w6 995 94)\n\nREF PARA 3 SENTENCE \"EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT\nBY VISITORS, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS\nHAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.\"\n\nFYI: AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNSON,\nDCM, WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEART'S VISIT TO\nBRASILIA. IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA,\nCRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED TO\nBE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATE\nOFFICERS. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GET\nELABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS. E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET 231409Z SEP 75 STAFF\n\nCITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.\n\nRYBAT PLVWCADET\n\n1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART\n AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO\n OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S\n ACTIVITIES.\n\n2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN\n DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT\n OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD SATURDAY AND MONDAY.\n\n3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS\n OPERATIONS--E.G., LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S\n RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN\n PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELNOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM\n STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF\n QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER\n OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL\n ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS,\n FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET\n\nSECRET\nTHE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A \"REPORT CARD\" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O. THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARGET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD\nUP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.\n\n4. THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS (SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).\n\n5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/O'S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS SECRET\nDEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELETAPS, SURVEILLANCE, ETC.,--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HQS BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP. MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO THAT ACTIVITY. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN POL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION, THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE CHILEAN VARIETY.\n\n6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT. WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY\nHOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL CO$T SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T\nHAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT\nSAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT\nOVER THE YEARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF\nSUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY,\nCOMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS\nWRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE,\nPLUS SENIOR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFICERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE\nAT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.)\n(AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND\nASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)\n\n7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND\nTUREHAERT WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE\nDISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY\nTO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO\nSTATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL\nSCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER COB MATTERS WERE FIRST\nSENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO\nONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR\nSEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE\nSECRET\nTHOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR\nITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES\nVIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO\nSUBMISSION. STATION MADE IT A PRACTICE TO CHECK INTEL\nOUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO\nTRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL\nBY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS\nREQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN\nSENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED.\nTHIS HAD NOT HAPPENED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN\nSECRET 2314092 SEPT 75 STAFF\n\nCITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.\n\nRYBAT PLWVCADET\n\nBRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS\nCONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE\nAMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL\nZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE\nCARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.\n\n8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF\nTHE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE\nPOLITICAL SECTION\u2014WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL\nOFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE\nPROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS\nPART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A\nCONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY\nSENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER\nSO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED\nACCORDINGLY).\n\n9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE\nSECRET\nCOLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE\nBUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN\nFACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADOR-\nIAL DUTIES.\n\n10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE\nNAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR\nUNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.\n\n11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIOS AND THE\nCIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.\nTHEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE\nSOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN\nSAY, STATE.\n\n12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO\nEXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA\nWAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION\nTO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID\nCUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN\nWASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE\nHAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)\n\n13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS\nWERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH\nSURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO\nAUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY\nU.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO\nMUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF\nAGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,\nETC.\n\n14. AARON EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER\nPROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD\nBE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF\nOFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,\nTHAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 50 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL\nWORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK\nDAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH\nTHEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION\nAND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.\n\n15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE\nPAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED\nMOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD\nA COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER\nSECRET\nTRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)\n\n16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (AD) THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.\n\n17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS. IS SECRET\nA WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT.\n\n18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.\nSECRET\n\n20 August 1975\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division\n\nSUBJECT: Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing the Intention of SSC Staffers to Visit Latin America\n\n1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC Staffers. This is for your information. You will be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary is established.\n\n2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers before they go and a notification of the stations involved as to what the guidelines are.\n\nJohn H. Waller\nSA/DDO\n\nAttachment\nAs stated above\n\nDistribution:\nOrig & 1 - Addressee w/att\n2 - SA/DDO\n\nE2 IMPDET\nCL BY 055636\n\nSECRET\nSUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad\n\nThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.\n\n1. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.\n\nMost of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions.\nthat could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.\n\nIn sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.\n\nII. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.\n\nAll arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.\nIII. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.\n\nIt is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms\u2014operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.\n\nMembers and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.\n\nIV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.\n\nForeign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.\nV. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES\nWILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.\n\nMany foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.\n\nVI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.\n\nIn those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.\nVII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.\n\nThis briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.\n\nMembers and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.\nMr. Seymour Bolten \nAssistant to the Director \nRoom 6D0120 \nCentral Intelligence Agency \nLangley, Virginia\n\nDear Mr. Bolten:\n\nThis letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been asked to make next month.\n\nAlthough plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September. It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo. If time permits, they might also visit another consular post in Brazil and/or Buenos Aires.\n\nThe primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.\n\nMessrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.\n\nSincerely yours,\n\nWilliam G. Miller\n\ncopy to Mr. Hyland, State Department\nTO: PRIORITY LONDON\n\nREF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975\n\n1. SENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA, IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND CINCUSNAVEUR ON 7 JULY.\n\n2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN U.K. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING. IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE, YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND BRITISH SERVICE CONTACTS.\n\n3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HAS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR\nITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALY, AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.\nTO: IMMEDIATE BONN, MUNICH. Y\nDIRECT BONN MUNICH\nLIAISON Y\n\nREF: MUNICH 30362 [IN 621567] Y\n\n1. AS YOU AWARE, IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOWER IS TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. Y\n\n2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN THE FRG. SHOULD HE DO SO, THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED. BUT, IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE WITH THE BND, OMITTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS FRG LIAISON CONTACTS.\nTHE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST.\n\n3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY (CONSULATE) AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT.\n\nDATE: 1 JULY 1975\nORIG: GALLEN PEABY/HP\nUNIT: E/G/CIL\nEXT: 1562\n\nSECRET\n\nCLASSIFICATION\n\nSECRET\n\nMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR\n\nSTAFF\n\nCONF: INFO: FILE\n\nDIRECTOR\n\nDISSEM BY:\n\nINDEX\n\nNO INDEX\n\nRETURN TO PER\n\nIP FILES\n\n713701\n\nE2 IMPDET-H\n\nCLASSIFICATION\n\nSECRET\n\nPRODUCTION OR REPRODUCTION OF THIS MATERIAL BY ANY MEANS WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS PROHIBITED.\n| FROM: C/SS/CAG 3D0004 | EXTENSION R9125 | DATE 28 July 1975 |\n|----------------------|-----------------|------------------|\n| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | OFFICER'S INITIALS |\n| 1. Mr. John Waller SA/DDO 2B1415 | 29 JUL 1975 | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |\n| 2. | | |\n| 3. Mr. Seymour Bolten Review Staff 6 D 0120 | | |\n| 4. | | |\n| 5. | | |\n| 6. | | |\n| 7. | | |\n| 8. | | |\n| 9. | | |\n| 10. | | |\n| 11. | | |\n| 12. | | |\n| 13. | | |\n| 14. | | |\n| 15. | | |\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten\nReview Staff\n\nVIA: Mr. John Waller\nSpecial Assistant to the DDO\n\nSUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at Right-Wing Governments\n\n1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee.\n\n2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary.\n\n3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was provided to you directly by LA Division.\n\n4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency.\n5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee.\n\nDonald J. Purcell\nChief, Covert Action Group\nServices Staff\n\nAttachments, a/s\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten\nReview Staff\n\nVIA: Mr. John Waller\nSpecial Assistant to the DDO\n\nSUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at Right-Wing Governments\n\n1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee.\n\n2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary.\n\n3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was provided to you directly by LA Division.\n\n4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency.\n5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee.\n\n/s/ Donald J. Purcell\nDonald J. Purcell\nChief, Covert Action Group\nServices Staff\n\nAttachments, a/s\nCovert Action Operations Concerning Right-Wing Regimes\n\nCATEGORY I\n\n1. ETHIOPIA: A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support was to encourage the development of the labor movement as a democratic force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in Ethiopia. The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination in CY 1973 was $291,006. Covert support to the Ethiopian labor movement was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970, on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.\n\n2. SOUTH VIETNAM: From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly democratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and tenant farmers.\n\n3. GUATEMALA: In 1972-73, the Guatemala City Station with access to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military action against Belize.\n\n4. HAITI: As early as 1963, the Special Group discussed ways and means of influencing the Duvalier dictatorship. In 1967, a modest project was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for the purpose of offsetting \"the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to Haiti from Radio Habana.\"\n\n5. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.\n\n6. GERMANY: From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement and its European counterparts.\n1. SOUTH AFRICA: In 1959, after consultation with the Special Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of $165,000 to a leading South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The activity was terminated in 1962.\n\n2. SOUTH AFRICA: A project was initiated in 1962 to encourage the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization. State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of $311,705 was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968.\n\n3. KOREA: In 1963, the Special Group approved a covert action project designed to encourage \"emerging civilian government\" vis-a-vis the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group of National Assembly members.\n\n4. KOREA: The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a newsletter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project, but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.\n\n5. ARGENTINA: Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in the area. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power.\n\n6. BRAZIL: From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to 1972, CIA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished Northeast. This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.\n7. NICARAGUA: During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for military actions against his neighbors.\n\n8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved a program to train 15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders a year outside of Spain to build an effective cadre of Spanish labor leadership. In 1966, the Special Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the Christian Democratic movement in Spain through supportive efforts with youth, political and labor elements.\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller \nSpecial Assistant to DDO\n\nSUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations \nAgainst Right-Wing Governments\n\nREFERENCE: SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975, \nSame Subject\n\nWe have reviewed referent memorandum and have the \nfollowing comments on those paragraphs which concern \nEuropean Division.\n\n13. GERMANY. While this case is somewhat \nbizarre and does not represent a productive operation, \nwe pose no objection to its being presented to the \nSenate Select Committee.\n\n14. SPAIN. We have no objection to the \npresentation of these programs to the Senate Select \nCommittee for review although we share concern expressed \nby SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detri- \nmental to the base negotiations.\n\nSigned/William W. Wells\n\nWilliam W. Wells \nChief, European Division\n\nDDO/DC/E/NW:MFBuell:tj (22 July 75)\n\nDistribution:\nOrig. & 1 - Addressee \n1 - SS/CAG \n1 - C/EUR \n1 - DC/E/NW \n1 - E/G \n1 - E/IB\n\nH2 IMPDET \nCL BY 061414\n\nSECRET\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff\n\nSUBJECT: Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Regimes\n\n1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the three covert action operations in Africa, cited in your memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.\n\n2. In the case of Ethiopia, we understand from your discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the labor project has not been eliminated from your list but that the Director will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing procedural errors in the presentation and review of this project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure to two former assets who have been jailed by the new Ethiopian regime.\n\n3. The Ethiopian labor program was undertaken without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently, the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August 1967 and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council, asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before. He was told that for projects costing $20,000 or less, it had been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303 Committee should examine all political action projects. Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.\n\n4. In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest in 1974 and continued detention of two Ethiopian labor leaders who are former assets under this project, and accusations in\nthe Ethiopian press that the trade union organization received support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA interest in the labor organization potentially dangerous to our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets nor the labor organization have been accused of CIA involvement. An admission now of CIA support to Ethiopian labor or to the two Ethiopian labor leaders in jail could be a sentence of death for them.\n\n5. In the case of South Africa, CIA support to a leading South African political figure to encourage the creation of a new political party remains a very sensitive matter. The principal agent is still a leading and respected spokesman for the opposition party in South Africa and is a leading member of the South African parliament. Exposure of the operation could lead to his identification which would be extremely damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our government's relations in South Africa. For these reasons, we believe it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this operation to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee only.\n\n6. The European philanthropic organization which was used to fund the development of a multiracial trade union organization in South Africa was the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), located in Germany. The South African labor officials and organizations which received funds from FES were not aware that the actual origin of the funds was the United States Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government involvement where none is known to have existed, FES was used to support a number of other covert action operations in Africa and elsewhere and exposure of the foundation would have ramifications other than in South Africa. The Director should be briefed on FES and its range of activities on behalf of CIA if he has not already been informed.\n\nClifton R. Strathern\nDeputy Chief, Africa Division\n\nAttachments:\nAs Stated Above\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller\nSpecial Assistant to the DDO\n\nSUBJECT: Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Governments\n\nREFERENCE: Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated 18 July 1975\nSubject: \"Summary of Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Governments\"\n\n1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our concern centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to Reference as \"were mounted against\" \"right wing governments\". None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which took place in Korea) and TUMIX (which took place in Vietnam) -- were or should be so described as being mounted against the government then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government had was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing advice and support to \"grass root elements\" in an attempt to get these elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking participation in the governmental process.\n\n2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with opposition elements in South Korea. As noted above, the purpose of this contact was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its effort to establish a two-party system in South Korea. The Agency today\nmaintains contact with the major opposition leaders in South Korea and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador in Korea as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of State.\n\n3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations were to be raised with the Senate Select Committee.\n\nRobert D. Brown, Jr.\nActing Chief, East Asia Division\n\ncc: DC/Operations Staff\nC/SS/CAG\nSUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad\n\nThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:\n\n-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.\nIn sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.\nNo matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.\nSECRET 3011282 JUN 75 STAFF\n\nCITE LONDON 628897\n\nTO: DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT\n\nREF DIRECTOR 712872\n\n1. IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPROACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1960'S BY STANDARDS OF 1975.\n\n2. AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE. IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 38 JUNE. SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN\nTRIP, U.K., EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. THIS IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS.\n\nE2 IMPDET.\nSECRET 2712172 JUN 75 STAFF\n\nCITE BONN 41001\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT\n\nFROM GRAVER\n\nREF DIRECTOR 708791\n\n1. IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISIT. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF BERLIN, I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE BERLIN AND MUNICH PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN.\n\n2. WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE \"SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH THE BND\" SINCE, AS HQS AWARE, THE BND IS LOCATED IN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7 ABOUT 'SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT WESTPORT IS A SECRET\nPHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS. THERE IS NO WESTPORT FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS IN FRANKFURT, AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON WESTPORT ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATOR PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN ADDITION TO BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF.\n\n3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES, REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD, IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.\n\n4. WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED. E2 IMPDET.\nSECRET 2711122 JUN 75 STAFF\n\nCITE LONDON 62823\n\nTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT\n\nREF A. DIRECTOR 708791\n\nB. STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNE\n\nC. STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE\n\n1. WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.\n\n2. REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING LONDON 28 JUNE\n\nDEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON\n\nVIA LONDON ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY\n\nEXCEPT MRS. MONDALE. REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT\n\nWOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION. DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS\n\nLONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 1 JULY?\n\n3. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET\n\n* NO RECORD IN CASLE SECRETARIAT.\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nSECRET\n\nSTAFF\n\nCONFIDENTIAL INFO: FILE C1/AN, D2/AC, BLC, C/SS3, C/PS, EG2, C/C1/OP3\n\nTO: LONDON-Y\n\nRYBAT Y\n\nREFS: A. LONDON 62701 [IN 616087]\n\nB. LONDON 62615 [IN 613590] Y\n\nAS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT\n\nNOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE\n\nMEMBERS OF THE CDE. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS,\n\nWE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR-\n\nANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S\n\nKNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE, BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN\n\nHIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT\n\nARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY.\n\nRATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING\n\nSOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT\n\nACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED\n\nAND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET-H\n\nDATE: 25 JUNE 1975\n\nORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS\n\nUNIT: C/EUR\n\nEXT: 1012\n\nWILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR\n\nCLASSIFICATION\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE2 IMPDET\n\nCL BY:\nSECRET 2414512 JUN 75 STAFF\n\nCITE LONDON 62701\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT\n\nREF A, DIRECTOR 708791\n\nB, LONDON 62615 (013590)\n\n1. RE PARA 5 REF A, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC,\n\nINFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM\nSENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS, SYKES AND SIR LEONARD\nHOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE\nON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTROL IS EXERCISED OVER\nBRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL\nSECRETS ACT WORKS.\n\n2. SYKES MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE\nONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT\nSENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR\nREPS.\n\n3. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B.\n\nE2 IMPDET\n\nSECRET\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence\n\nSUBJECT: Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk to QJWIN While Traveling in Europe\n\nThis is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator is traveling in Europe.\n\nThe agent is QJWIN. He was first approached in 1958 through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service. At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in various European countries. Later he became the major asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made a brief visit to the Congo, but took no actions.\n\nOn the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others. QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read. So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have not contacted him since.\n\nWe have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill Miller.\n\nIt is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and of the host government who might wonder about the propriety of investigations being conducted on their territory and involving one of their citizens.\n\nIn any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest to the Department of State, and the senator might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.\n\nWalter Elder\n\nCB: 007789\nE2 IMPDET\nTalking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His Proposed Contact With QJWYN\n\n1. Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the risk of his exposure to his local government and the press. Because of his former activities and relationships he might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible prosecution for espionage at home from his local government and harassment from the media.\n\n2. Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have further cause to believe that the American intelligence service is incapable of protecting its informants from disclosure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship.\n\n3. Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with the CIA.\n\n4. It is possible that the local government involved might lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty without requesting formal permission.\n\n6/24/75\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence\n\nThis is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while traveling in Europe.\n\nYou should know that we have been told that the Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff of a potential problem area in connection with such a proposed meeting. The agent in question is, of course, a subject of interest to the local intelligence service and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence service would agree that a United States senator, especially a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately conduct such investigations within its territory without clearance to do so.\n\nIn any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of State and the senator might be well advised to consult with them before proceeding.\n\nFor your information, the agent referred to is QJWIN and we have not been in touch with him since about 1961.\n\n/s/\nWalter Elder\n\n[Signature]\n\n[Redacted]\n\nCB: 007789\nE2 IMPDET\nMEMORANDUM FOR: DCI\n\nMore facts, per your request, on the PTWIN matter.\n\nTalking points for your use with Sen. Gary Hart are included.\n\nH. Knecht 6-24-75\n\n(DATE)\nSUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD\n\nThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.\n\nI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.\n\nMost of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. Their mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that\ncould result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Several foreign governments or entities thereof now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence agreements-exchanges maintain strong neutral or anti-U.S. foreign policies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is therefore dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In many cases termination of such agreements would result in the loss of unique strategic intelligence and alternate collection methods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.\n\nIn sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.\nII. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.\n\nAll arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.\n\nIII. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.\n\nIt is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms\u2014operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.\n\nMembers and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.\n\nIV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.\n\nForeign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members\nwould be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious\ndamage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their\nidentity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.\n\nV. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES\nWILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.\n\nMany foreign intelligence services will find contact with the\nSSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard\nthat their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the\ninformation they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most\nsensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them,\nthey would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters\nwith members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters\nwere under investigation could well cause the host service to\nreassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence\nactivities.\n\nVI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL\nINTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.\n\nIn those countries in which we operate joint technical collection\nsites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.\nCongressional representatives, especially where there is public\nknowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such\na visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.\n\nSenate Select Committee principals and staff should understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence installations or foreign intelligence installations supported by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government involved.\n\nVII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.\n\nThis briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.\n\nMembers and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.\nSECRET 2017452 JUN 75 STAFF\n\nCITE LONDON 62615\n\nTO: DIRECTOR,\n\nRYBAT\n\nREF A. DIRECTOR 707518\n\nB. DIRECTOR 708791\n\n1. THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S PROPOSED VISIT, AND AMBASSADOR AND MINISTER HAVE BOTH BEEN ALERTED.\n\n2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE GROUND RULES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO US:\n\nA. WHAT CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFF ASSISTANTS HAVE?\n\nB. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMED ABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVERED WITH HIM AND HIS TWO ASSISTANTS?\n\nC. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD\nSPECIFIC CA PROJECTS BE DESCRIBED. ASSUME THERE IS NOT OBJECTIONS TO POINTING OUT THE DAMAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TO TOMAHKBIT, AS A WAY OF DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN THE COURSE OF THE SENATE INVESTIGATION. D. IF THE STATION IS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING SO INFORMED. E2 IMPDET.\nOUTGOING MESSAGE\n\nSECRET\n\nSTAFF\n\nCONF: c/Corro INFO: FILE c/plan, 000, 000/000, c/pleeg, p/olec, olies c/colop3\n\nTO: LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS INFO OSLO, HELSINKI\n\nRYBATY\n\nREF: DIRECTOR 707518 {NOT NEEDED OSLO, HELSINKI}\n\n1. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.}\n\n2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA 7 JULY FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO PARIS {1 DAY} AND BONN {2 DAYS}. NO DECISION YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED DIRECTLY FROM VIENNA.\n\n3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING SPECIFICS.\n\n4. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL\n\nDATE:\nORIG:\nUNIT:\nEXT:\n\nRELEASING OFFICER\nCOORDINATING OFFICER\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\n\nCLASSIFICATION\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY:\nAIRCRAFT Y\n\n5. FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. SENATOR MONDALE HAS ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE (AND PROBABLY MI-6) ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW THE BRITISH COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR Y\n\n6. FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH THE GERMANY EMBASSY AND THE BND Y\n\n7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. IN BONN THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY. IN PARIS THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM Y\n\n8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET Y\n\nDATE: 17 JUNE 1975\nORIG: WILLIAM U. WELLS E.H. KNOCHE\nUNIT: C/EUR\nEXT: 1012\n\nWILLIAM U. WELLS, C/EUR\n\nCLASSIFICATION\nSECRET\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nE 2 IMPDET\nCL BY:\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\n\nDATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100\nRoom 2E-45\n\nSUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed Trip to Europe\n\n1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary, while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:\n a. 30 June - 1 July: London\n b. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one day\n c. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the Paris stop, one day.\n\nIn the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however, has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need Station contact.\n\n2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to discuss \"more generic\" subjects: operational priorities, relations with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions, etc. Their basic interests are related to \"command and control\". It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a Station which concentrates on \"East - West\" operations (read third country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations). He recognized London was a liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer.\nParis, he felt, would provide some understanding of \"third world\" operations. Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the interrelations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service.\n\n3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices in order to discuss the British experiences in \"command and control\". Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know, than to involve the Agency's go-between.\n\n4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German Embassy.\n\n5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason, we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.\n\n6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was connected with Select Committee investigations.\n\n7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference to \"Naval Intelligence\".\n\n8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still tentative and subject to change.\n9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal. Mr. Waller replied negatively.\n\n10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader would be a member of the Senator's party.\n\nDistribution:\n1 - Mr. Knoche\n1 - Mr. Wells\n1 - Miss Page\n1 - Mr. Leader\nSECRET 1668532 JUN 75 STAFF\n\nCITE VIENNA 26077\n\nTO: DIRECTOR.\n\nRYBAT\n\nREF: DIRECTOR 797518\n\n1. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STATION'S POSITION WITHIN EMBASSY, PRIMARY TARGETS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF.\n\n2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF SAME NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENANT COMMANDER.\n\n3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.\nSECRET\n\nMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR\n\nSTAFF\n\nCONF: c/br 6 INFO: FILE DCT, D/DCT, DAO, CS/RF, OLC, CI/PLAN, DDO/DO, CI/LOPS, CI/OPS, CI/SLN/DO, CI/PS/ECR.\n\nTO: PRIORITY LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS-Y\n\nRYBAT Y\n\nSUBJECT: THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE AT THE END OF THE MONTH. Y\n\n1. THE SENATORIAL PARTY WISHES TO VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FIELD. SENATOR MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE EMBASSY. PRESUMABLY THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS. Y\n\n2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADER, A SECOND STAFF MEMBER, MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. Y\n\n3. HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUEST TO SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS. WE DO NOT KNOW, HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE. Y\n\nDATE:\n\nORIG:\n\nUNIT:\n\nEXT:\n\nRELEASING OFFICER\n\nCOORDINATING OFFICERS\n\nAUTHENTICATING OFFICER\n\nCLASSIFICATION\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nSECRET\n\nE 2 IMPDET\n\nCL BY: 012866\n4. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. PLEASE ASK THE AMBASSADOR TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER CIA CHANNELS OR THE ROGER CHANNEL. LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING, DEPENDING ON HOW SENATOR MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. Y\n\n5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART 30 JUNE VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT; ARRIVING LONDON 1 JULY; 2 JULY - VIENNA; 3-4 JULY - BONN; 5-6 JULY - PARIS; 7-8 JULY - LONDON; 9 JULY - RETURN TO THE U.S. Y\n\n6. REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR BRIEFING THE SENATOR. Y\n\n7. FOR BONN, SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT TO WESTPORT. Y\n\n8. HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDET\n\n9. MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON OPERATIONAL DISCUSSIONS TO FOLLOW.\n\nE.H. KNOCHE\n\nLC\n\nRothman\n\nSA/DDO\n\nWILLIAM W. WELLS\n\nDDO\n\nAUTHORIZING OFFICER\n\nCLASSIFICATION\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nSECRET\n\nCL BY:\n\nWILLIAM W. WELLS\n\nDDO\n\nAUTHORIZING OFFICER\n\nCLASSIFICATION\n\nREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nSECRET\n\nCL BY:\nSUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad\n\nThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:\n\n-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.\nIn sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.\nNo matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.\nSUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad\n\nThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:\n\nMembers of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.\nIn sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.\nNo matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.\nSUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad\n\nThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.\n\nI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.\n\nMost of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions\nthat could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC business should be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff to help maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.\n\nIn sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.\n\nII. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.\n\nAll arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.\nIII. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.\n\nIt is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.\n\nMembers and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.\n\nIV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.\n\nForeign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be\nto run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be\ndone to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be\nrevealed to Members or staff of the SSC.\n\nV. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY\nSERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.\nMany foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC\npolitically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their\nrelationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they\npass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters.\nRegardless what assurances are given them, they would find it\ndifficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or\nstaff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation\ncould well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a\nrelationship with U.S. intelligence activities.\n\nVI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN\nTECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.\nIn those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites,\nthe host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional\nrepresentatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the\nCongressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered\nessential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.\n\nVII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.\n\nThis briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.\n\nMembers and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.\nSUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad\n\nThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:\n\nMembers of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.\nIn sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.\nNo matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.\n\nMembers of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10400-10311.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 231, "total-input-tokens": 265032, "total-output-tokens": 72814, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 1000, 1], [1000, 1681, 2], [1681, 2672, 3], [2672, 3810, 4], [3810, 4915, 5], [4915, 5277, 6], [5277, 6336, 7], [6336, 7284, 8], [7284, 7982, 9], [7982, 8799, 10], [8799, 9834, 11], [9834, 10281, 12], [10281, 10542, 13], [10542, 11721, 14], [11721, 12095, 15], [12095, 13213, 16], [13213, 14466, 17], [14466, 15682, 18], [15682, 16939, 19], [16939, 17531, 20], [17531, 18482, 21], [18482, 19629, 22], [19629, 20881, 23], [20881, 22090, 24], [22090, 23271, 25], [23271, 23375, 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207053, 210], [207053, 208272, 211], [208272, 209653, 212], [209653, 211597, 213], [211597, 211916, 214], [211916, 212585, 215], [212585, 213892, 216], [213892, 215106, 217], [215106, 216608, 218], [216608, 218358, 219], [218358, 219032, 220], [219032, 220531, 221], [220531, 222281, 222], [222281, 222955, 223], [222955, 224188, 224], [224188, 225509, 225], [225509, 226595, 226], [226595, 227833, 227], [227833, 228782, 228], [228782, 230281, 229], [230281, 232031, 230], [232031, 232704, 231]]}} +{"id": "08d75728ed8a82e9099fa2b5436e06a8a2e38eb6", "text": "MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James M. Potts\nChief, Africa Division\n\nMr. Richard S. Sampson\nChief, Europe Division\n\nMr. Alan D. Wolfe\nChief, Near East Division\n\nMr. Richard F. Stolz\nChief, Soviet/East European Division\n\nFROM: John D. Walker\n0/SA/DO/0\n\nSUBJECT: Guidelines for Providing Information to the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Security Services\n\n1. Since members of the S&I Staff will be talking with your Divisions in the near future, it may be worthwhile to review the guidelines as to what may be said concerning relationships with foreign liaison services. In the broad sense, liaison services constitute both a source and a method.\n\n2. We are prepared to discuss the following:\n\n a. The identification and responsibilities of the liaison services in a particular area to the extent that we can draw on sources other than information derived through the established liaison relationship, i.e. overt information or information from penetrations which will not endanger the source.\n\n b. In further describing the liaison services, we can provide information on the objectives, key personnel, strength, budget\nand methods of operations of services provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or penetrations and not from details of liaison arrangements with the services themselves.\n\nc. Agency manhours and funds devoted to liaison with the foreign services.\n\nd. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further details on such arrangements, including the scope of funds and equipment provided to such foreign services.\n\nd. We are prepared to provide general comments on the degree of operational cooperation with the Station. If technical support, for example, provides a useful input, we can state that the liaison service provides technical support, using a qualifying adjective to define, such as excellent, limited, etc.\n\n3. We have no objection to the provision of foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with such services. Source descriptions should be those used in the disseminated report.\n\n4. We will not make available details on liaison arrangements, information on sources and methods of such services which have been obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources or other information which would reveal Agency sources and methods or violate the trust on which the official liaison relationship is based.\n\n5. The S&I Staff approves close liaison relationships and believes that these relationships are cost effective.\n\nJohn D. Walker\n\nO/SA/DO/O:JDWalker:kaw (1542)\n\nDistribution\nOriginal - C/AF\n1 - C/EUR\n1 - C/NE\n1 - C/SE\n2 - SA/DO/O\nGuidelines for Providing Information to Congressional Oversight Committees on Foreign Intelligence and Security Services\n\nThese guidelines take into account the fact that foreign intelligence and security services, when acting in connection with the Agency's official liaison with them, constitute both a source and a method and thus require the statutory protection accorded any other intelligence source or method. The guidelines also recognize that the duly constituted oversight bodies of the Congress have expressed an interest in such services and in the general scope, nature and extent of the Agency's relationships with them. The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a formula for dealing with these two sometimes conflicting objectives.\n\nThe Agency is prepared to provide, upon specific request, appropriately classified and sanitized information to oversight committees on the following aspects of foreign intelligence and security services:\n\na. The identification of the governments with whose services CIA has liaison arrangements;\n\nb. Agency man hours and funds devoted to liaison with foreign services;\n\nc. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further details on such arrangements, including the scope of\nfunds and equipment provided to such foreign services;\n\nd. Information on the objectives, key personnel, strength, budget and methods of operation of such services, provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or penetrations and not from the details of liaison arrangements with the services themselves;\n\ne. Where relevant, foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with such services.\n\nThe Agency will not make available to the oversight committees the details of liaison arrangements with foreign services, information on sources and methods of such services obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources, or other information which would reveal Agency sources or methods or violate the trust on which these official liaison relationships is necessarily based.\n\nIn the event of substantial allegations of improper activities conducted by foreign intelligence or security services with which the Agency is presumed to maintain liaison, every effort will be made to provide all relevant facts which bear on such allegations. Where this would involve departure from the above guidelines, the Director will be prepared to meet with the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the committee to seek a satisfactory resolution of such problems.\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD\n\nMr. Colby, Mitch Rogovin and Mr. Knoche met with Chairman Otis Pike at 9:30, 7/24 in Chairman Pike's office to discuss groundrules, etc. for the House Select Committee on Intelligence.\n\nMr. Colby left the following material with Pike:\n\n1. 16 June 1975 Letter to the Honorable Elmer B. Staats Comptroller General of the United States, Signed by Mr. Colby. The letter deals with the GAO's audit of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Attached)\n\n2. Guide to Central Intelligence Agency Statutes and Law dated September 1970 (without the Ryan Amendment on Foreign Intelligence). (Filed in 6D0120)\n\n3. Three Groudrules papers: (Attached)\n --Agreements To Be Sought By the DCI With Chairmen of the Select Committees\n --Secrecy Agreement\n --Guides for Protection of Classified Information And Documents Furnished The Select Committee\n\n4. 11 March 1975 Letter from Colby to Senator Church. (Attached)\n\nRosemarie R. Hesterberg\nChecklist for DCI Discussion with HSC\n\n1. Your intent to be cooperative and forthcoming.\n\n2. Your responsibility to protect S&M. Will need HSC understanding of particularly sensitive matters:\n --names of agents and sources.\n --names of cooperating American organizations and contacts to whom we have pledged confidentiality.\n --material from foreign liaison.\n --sensitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection.\n\n3. Will need to work out security groundrules.\n --Chairman of USIB Security Committee and CIA Director of Security available to help work out custodial arrangements, compartmented clearances, etc.\n\n4. Importance of secrecy agreements. Your willingness to suspend them to permit testimony by current and ex-employees.\n\n5. Will confirm with a letter and an employee bulletin which can be used by HSC in dealing with Agency witnesses and interviews.\n\n24 July 1975\nAGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH\nCHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES\n\n1. It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, that:\n\n (a) Departments and agencies shall have the right to request that testimony be given only in executive session, that in some instances testimony be \"off-the-record\" and that certain testimony be heard only by members and in some cases only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.\n\n (b) Witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony prior to any publication of it.\n\n (c) When questioned about intelligence matters that come under the purview of another organization, witnesses should be permitted to state that a response to the question is not properly within their authority and to respectfully suggest that the appropriate party be called to testify on such matters.\n\n2. It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies furnishing documents to the committees be authorized to excise from those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel under cover or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy may be jeopardized by disclosure. Also excised should be names of sources, operations, specific details of technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels and names of organizations cooperating on a highly confidential basis.\n\n3. In view of their susceptibility to foreign countermeasures, it would be desirable if the DCI could obtain agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees not to require presentation of details\nof the technology of the technical collection programs. It would also be desirable if the Select Committees adopted the use of Compartmented Control Systems to protect documents on these programs and cleared only those staff personnel with an absolute need-to-know. The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area.\n\n4. Further, it would be desirable if the DCI attempt to secure an agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that they will entertain and consider security principles and guidelines which will be provided.\nSECURITY AGREEMENT\n\nI, ____________________________, in accepting employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.\n\nI hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee.\n\nIt is my understanding that in the course of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States of America and I further agree to surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material which has come into my possession as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.\n\nI hereby agree that the burden is on me to determine if information is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative.\nI hereby agree that any information learned during my employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said material contains any classified information as defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the Select Committee, President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has the authority to make the final determination as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.\n\nI have been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 793, 794, 798 and 952; and 50 U.S.C. 783 (b); and 42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive Order 11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified information, and understand their meaning.\n\nFurther, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material. I understand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agreement could subject me to legal and/or administrative action.\n\nI further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.\n\nI take the obligations set forth above freely and without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.\n\n__________________________\nSignature\n\n__________________________\nDate\n\nWITNESS:\n\n__________________________\nSignature\n\n__________________________\nDate\nGUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION\nAND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES\n\n1. Personnel Security Clearances\n\n(a) Background Investigation\n\nIt would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate that no staff personnel is to be given access to any classified material, testimony or information received or generated by the committees without prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field investigation.\n\n(b) Secrecy Agreement\n\nIt would be desirable for the Select Committees to require a signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to the committees' staffs. The agreement should include provisions:\n\n1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations is a condition precedent of employment or assignment;\n\n2) Recognizing US Government property rights to classified information;\n\n3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence of classified information;\n\n4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules and obligations contained in the agreement could subject the signer to administrative and/or legal action under appropriate statutes;\n\n5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the agreement.\n2. **Physical and Document Security**\n\nThe Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be preserved. These rules should be made known to the individuals and agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or materials. Among these should be rules on physical security and document security.\n\n(a) **Physical Security**\n\nIt would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following rules related to physical security:\n\n1) All classified material will be stored in safes for safekeeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with the regulations of this registry for classified material.\n\n2) Twenty-four-hour guard protection, supplemented by anti-intrusion alarms, should be required on the storage area.\n\n3) Areas selected for use in closed session should be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons.\n\n4) The committees should arrange for the conduct of audio countermeasures to preclude the possibility of unauthorized use of transmitters and/or recording devices. It should be noted that a foreign clandestine transmitter was located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973.\n\n5) At the end of each session of the Select Committees, the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff officer who will secure any misplaced classified material or waste.\n6) Areas should be designated in which classified material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should not be removed from these areas for the sake of convenience except when necessary for the work of the committees and should not be transported overnight to the office or residence of personnel of the committees.\n\n(b) Document Security\n\n1) Committees should select and identify a single location and specific personnel authorized to sign acknowledgement of receipt of classified materials provided to the committees.\n\n2) A system of document control should be established to permit control of classified documents to provide for accountability.\n\n3) Duplication of documents should be controlled so as to require a record of the document reproduced, the number of copies reproduced and the custodian or receiving personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be subject to the same controls as the original.\n\n4) Appropriate arrangements should be made for the destruction of classified waste.\n\n5) Transcripts. The committees should give consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate security in the transcription of testimony by committee transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In some, if not all cases, this might include escort of materials to the place of transcription, the securing of carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance with committee rules.\n6) Early agreement should be reached on the disposition of classified materials such as storage under seal in the National Archives. The question of access should be determined by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House.\n\n3. Compartmented Information\n\nThere is some extremely sensitive information in the intelligence community which is disseminated only to those who have a very strict \"need to know\" in order to build, perfect, operate or handle the material produced by extremely sensitive foreign-intelligence collection programs. The sensitivity of these programs rests upon the vulnerability to countermeasures which a foreign government could easily institute if details of the means of collection became known. Thus, even individuals cleared for Top Secret information do not have access to compartmented information unless they are required to have such knowledge in the performance of their duties. This information is handled in Compartmented Control Systems. It would be desirable if the Chairmen would adopt the Compartmented Control Systems on these extremely sensitive collection efforts and clear only those staff personnel with an absolute \"need to know\" about such systems, and that documents related to such systems be handled in a compartmented fashion by the Select Committee. The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area.\n\n4. Security Officer\n\nIt would be desirable if the committees appointed a security officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the departments and agencies of interest to the committee. It would also be desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to identify a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee.\n16 JUN 1975\n\nHonorable Elmer B. Staats\nComptroller General of the United States\nGeneral Accounting Office\n441 G Street\nWashington, D. C. 20548\n\nDear Mr. Staats:\n\nMy attention has been directed to a letter from Mr. Keller, General Accounting Office, to the Honorable William Proxmire dated May 10, 1974, which was placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Proxmire on February 11, 1975. The letter deals with the intelligence community and reviews the General Accounting Office's right to audit and obtain information from the Central Intelligence Agency.\n\nInasmuch as Mr. Keller has treated a subject basic to this Agency's capability to carry out work mandated by Congress, I believe it would serve a useful purpose to review some of the background concerning the use of confidential funds and their relationship to the audit of CIA over the years.\n\nMr. Keller notes in his letter that there are \"a fairly substantial number of instances where expenditures are accounted for solely upon a certification by the head of the department or establishment involved.\" The need is clear in the case of this Agency. The necessity to safeguard certain truly vital foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the Congress in its direction to the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility was complemented by authorizing certain expenditures \"for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature,\" to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director of Central Intelligence. Such expenditures would apply, for example, to a secret agent operating abroad in a hostile climate whose identity must be protected not only so that he can continue supplying the intelligence involved, but also because his freedom\u2014and on occasion his life\u2014weighs in the balance.\n\nOther intelligence activities do not have such obvious security requirements, but are, nonetheless, within the sources and methods concept. Liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies is extremely important in fields of both positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Such liaisons to be effective depend on the confidence of each service that the other will protect not only the mere fact of the relationships, but also its sources and methods and sensitive information. Compromise of any of these brings not only protests from the foreign liaison service, but in some cases a lessening or even cessation of its cooperation.\nEven overt activities have their own security problems. Thus, many U. S. citizens and others are willing to provide sensitive information to overt intelligence units only on condition that their cooperation in this respect be absolutely protected.\n\nThis need for the special protection of intelligence sources and methods has been well recognized by officials in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of our Government. Mr. Lindsay C. Warren, then Comptroller General of the United States, in a letter dated March 12, 1948, to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, addressed the provision granting the Director of Central Intelligence the power to certify the expenditure of confidential funds by stating that while it provided \"for the granting of much wider authority than I would ordinarily recommend for Government agencies, generally, the purposes sought to be obtained in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency are believed to be of such paramount importance as to justify the extraordinary measures proposed therein.\" He went on to say that the \"necessity for secrecy in such matters is apparent and the Congress apparently recognized this fully in that it provided in section 102(a)(3) of Public Law 253, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.\" Under these conditions, he stated, \"I do not feel called upon to object to the proposals advanced...\"\n\nIt has been and it remains the policy of CIA to rely upon vouched funds wherever possible. (Vouched funds are those which can be accounted for and audited in conformance with the laws that apply to other Government agencies and with standard Government regulations and procedures.) Currently more than half of the Agency's appropriations are disbursed as vouched funds. The confidential funds certification authority referred to by Mr. Warren in his March 12, 1948 letter is reserved for \"objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature.\"\n\nFrom the beginning of CIA records for all vouched fund expenditures were made available to and were subject to a voucher audit by the GAO. Use of the voucher audit procedure allowed the GAO to examine expenditure and collection vouchers and related documents to determine whether expenditures were made legally and solely for the objects for which appropriations were made. Use of the voucher audit procedure also allowed CIA to protect those activities of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, i.e., intelligence sources and methods.\n\nSubsequent to the enactment of the CIA legislation, GAO adopted a \"comprehensive audit approach,\" and raised with the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee the desirability of an expanded audit of Agency activities. The Comptroller General stated by letter dated May 29, 1959 to Subcommittee Chairman Kilday that he did \"not recommend any change in section 10 (now section 8) of the Central Intelligence Act\" and that \"any broadening of our audit activities should not include an evaluation of the intelligence activities of the Agency.\"\nMr. Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, agreed that GAO should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comptroller dated October 16, 1959, cautioning, however, that the comprehensive audit would have to be limited so as to remain outside the area of sensitive security operations for which by law the Director's certificate must be deemed a sufficient voucher.\n\nThe results of the trial period of comprehensive audit from 1959 to 1961 were made known to the CIA Subcommittee in a letter of May 16, 1961 from the Comptroller General in which he said the GAO planned to discontinue the audit of CIA activities. He acknowledged that various steps were taken by the CIA \"to place the General Accounting Office in a position to make a comprehensive audit of the overt activities of CIA.\" Nevertheless, he stated that GAO \"cannot effectively review and evaluate activities of the Support Component because the confidential and overt activities of this component are integrated to such an extent that we cannot make reasonably comprehensive audits.\" He further stated \"we have been given sufficient access to make reasonably comprehensive reviews of the overt activities of the Intelligence Component, but such reviews, in our opinion, will not be productive of significant evaluations because we cannot feasibly evaluate the extent to which needed overt information is available for collection or determine the need for the intelligence information selected for collation and use in the production of intelligence reports.\" In short, the Comptroller General was recognizing the conflict between the philosophy underlying a \"comprehensive audit approach\" and the Director's statutory responsibility and authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.\n\nBoth the Director and Chairman Vinson, of the House Committee on Armed Services, requested that the Comptroller General continue to audit Agency affairs on a limited basis, but after another trial period the Comptroller General reiterated his earlier view. In a letter to Chairman Vinson dated June 21, 1962, the Comptroller General stated his belief that for maximum effectiveness \"it would be necessary for our GAO audit staff to have nearly complete access to CIA activities,\" and that even to perform reasonably comprehensive reviews would require \"complete access to the administrative activities ... that are performed in support of both sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA.\"\n\nChairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General on July 18, 1962, stating that, \"the restrictions you met within the Central Intelligence Agency are necessary; I believe, for the proper protection of its intelligence activities and should be maintained.\" The Chairman agreed, however, that in view of the Comptroller General's opinion that a continued audit was not a worthwhile effort, GAO might withdraw from further audit activities in the Central Intelligence Agency.\n\nIn summary, I believe that several points are deserving of emphasis in assessing the nature and history of GAO's audit activities with respect to this Agency:\n(a) CIA cooperated fully in all respects in extending administrative support and in granting security clearances and access to information related to vouched fund activities.\n\n(b) The Chairman of the interested oversight committee in the House of Representatives was fully informed of the nature and status of the activity.\n\n(c) This Agency encouraged GAO to conduct and to continue to conduct its activities consistent with the operational and statutory requirements imposed upon this Agency.\n\n(d) The decision to discontinue the audit activities was made solely by GAO and was approved by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.\n\nSincerely,\n\nW. E. Colby\nDirector\n\nDistribution:\nOrig - Addressee\n1 - DCI\n1 - DDCI\n1 - ER\n1 - OGC\n1 - DDA\n1 - Compt\n1 - OF\n1 - OS\n1 - OLC Subject (GAO) w/basic\n1 - OLC Proxmire file\n1 - OLC Chrono\nOLC: WPY: cg (13 Jun 75)\nThe Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman\nSelect Committee on Intelligence\nHouse of Representatives\nWashington, D. C. 20515\n\nDear Mr. Chairman:\n\nIn our conversation on Friday you asked for the statutory basis for the compartmentation principle. I wish first to respond to your inquiry and then suggest a manner in which your staff can receive access to the sensitive material protected by special compartmentation systems.\n\nThe current basis for the U.S. Government security classification system is Executive Order 11652, promulgated on 8 March 1972. Historically, foreign intelligence has been treated as one category of classified national security information. There are numerous statutory recognitions of the importance of national security information, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act. Consequently, much foreign intelligence is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET according to specifications set forth in the Order. Not all foreign intelligence, however, is classified national security information under the provisions of the Executive Order (e.g., an American source providing foreign information or assistance). Also, the potential risks attendant with the compromise of a foreign intelligence source or method differ substantially from the risks attendant with much classified defense information.\n\nSection 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides: \"That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.\" In recognition of this responsibility, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (17 February 1972) instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to, \"...develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.\"\nSince the National Security Act did not provide for an authority corresponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area, the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. Intelligence Board are responsible for: \"The supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material.\" The Director of Central Intelligence, acting with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence Board, has promulgated a number of directives, regulations and security manuals, related to the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods, and applicable to the overall U.S. intelligence community.\n\nThe fundamental security principle involved in the protection of foreign intelligence and of its sources and methods is a strict application of \"need to know\" -- a principle referred to in Executive Order 11652, Section 6(A). This applies the simple mathematical premise that the fewer the number of individuals made privy to a secret, the less likely that it will be disclosed. The security principle of \"compartmentation\" involving special access and information dissemination controls is designed to ensure that only those individuals whose \"need to know\" has been specifically approved by some higher authority, who have been specially indoctrinated, and who undertake special commitments to protect it are provided access to a particularly sensitive category of foreign intelligence sources and methods. Compartmentation assists in the application of the \"need-to-know\" principle by ensuring that individuals are provided access to only that information clearly essential to the performance of their duties.\n\nCompartmentation was undoubtedly a major contributing factor involved in the nation's secret development of the atomic bomb during World War II, and the principle is still implicit in security procedures related to ERDA's \"RESTRICTED DATA\" as reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In the field of U.S. foreign intelligence activities, compartmentation was practiced throughout the development and operation of the U-2 reconnaissance program. One of the major foreign intelligence categories of activities using formalized compartmentation procedures today involves the matter of foreign signals intercept for intelligence purposes, i.e., communications intelligence. Title 18 of the U.S. Code Section 798 recognizes the special character of this material by providing specifically for prosecution for the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning any communications activities of the United States without the\nnecessity to show intent to harm the United States. The reason for the application of strict compartmentation procedures to communications intelligence and other foreign intelligence activities reflects the extreme vulnerability of the sources. Once an opposition becomes aware of which of its communications we are intercepting, it can take swift remedial action, and the source can be forever lost.\n\nOn Friday afternoon, copies of the secrecy oath used by the executive branch with respect to three compartmented access control systems were made available to you along with the revised forms developed for and executed by certain members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence Activities. I would hope that the enclosed agreement modified for the House Select Committee, combining all three compartments into one document, would meet your particular concerns.\n\nFor your information, in addition to the Senate Select Committee's use of the modified secrecy oath dealing with compartmented access, the following House and Senate committees have obtained compartmented access for their staffs, which was granted after the normal briefings and signing of the secrecy oath:\n\n- Armed Services Committee\n- Appropriations Committee\n- Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee\n\nMay I reiterate the points I made on Friday:\n\na. No material is being withheld from members of the Committee.\n\nb. We are prepared to and did brief the staff of the Committee on noncompartmented matters, based upon your certification of their security clearance and the fact that they entered into an appropriate secrecy agreement with you, a copy of which you provided.\n\nc. The compartmentation procedures of the Intelligence Community have been established pursuant to statute and National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The simplest way for the staff to obtain access to this compartmented material would be to accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modified in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties in access to such compartmented material throughout the\nIntelligence Community. It is clear that the obligations assumed here would run between the staff member and the Committee and in no way would provide any control or influence over them by me or any element of the Intelligence Community.\n\nd. It would undoubtedly be feasible to develop another procedure to ensure special protection of the sensitive matters currently included in the compartmented systems, but this would involve review and discussions with various interested parties which would undoubtedly take some time and delay your investigations.\n\nI hope you will agree that this is the simplest and easiest manner of solving a practical matter so that we can proceed with the substance of your investigations.\n\nSincerely,\n\nW. E. Colby\nDistribution:\n1-DCI\n1-DDCI\n1-IG\n1-OLC\n1-E.H.Knocke\n1-SC/DCI\n\nWhite House Distribution:\n1-Rod Hills\n1-Phil Buchen\n1-Jay French\nI have been informed that pursuant to law (Sections 792, 793, 794, 795, 797 and 798 of Title 18, United States Code) I am not to discuss with or disclose to any person any information relating directly or indirectly to the below identified compartmented Programs, unless such person is currently authorized to discuss or receive such information or material of the particular category involved. I am aware that the responsibility of ascertaining that such an authorization for another person is valid and current, rests with me.\n\nI acknowledge that it is my responsibility to inform myself of the contents of the above mentioned sections of Title 18, U.S. Code, as they pertain to performance of my duties. I am aware further that if a change in my status renders it no longer necessary for me to receive compartmented intelligence, my name will be removed from the list of persons authorized to receive such material.\n\nNews media reports concerning any of these compartmented materials does not relieve me of my obligation under the oath signed below.\n\nI acknowledge that I have been briefed on the following compartmented systems or programs:\n\n__________________________\n__________________________\n__________________________\n\nOATH OF SECRECY\n\nI do solemnly swear that I will not discuss with or disclose to any person, regardless of his official position or status, any information relating directly or indirectly to Compartmented Intelligence, any information derived therefrom, or the nature of the sources of such intelligence, until I have ascertained that such person has been authorized to discuss\n\nCONFIDENTIAL\n\nE-2 IMPDET\nCL BY ________\nand handle this material, and that his authorization has not been revoked, except in the performance of my official duties on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and in accordance with the requirements set forth in the rules of such Committee.\n\nSocial Security Number\n\nSignature\n\nWitness\n\nDate\nMr. A. Searle Field \nStaff Director \nSelect Committee on Intelligence \nRoom 232 \nCannon House Office Building \nWashington D.C. 20515\n\nDear Mr. Field:\n\nAround the end of July, Mr. Roeder, obviously impressed by your admonitions about the need for security, asked if I could work up a package of guidance on how to handle classified documents. Our Office of Security put this together, and while I think Mr. Roeder had in mind something more applicable to an individual than to an office, I thought I would pass this on to you for whatever use you care to make of it.\n\nIncidentally, we have not yet carried out the physical survey of your quarters which you requested on 29 July. I have been in touch with Ms. Hess, and our Office of Security will conduct one as soon as she is ready. We may have some other recommendations for your consideration when that is done.\n\nSincerely,\n\nJerrold B. Brown \nAssistant to the Director\n\nAttachment: a/s\n\ncc: D/OS\nCONFIDENTIAL\n\n14 AUG 1975\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff\n\nATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B. Brown\n\nVIA : Acting Deputy Director for Administration\n\nSUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence - Protection of Classified Materials\n\nREFERENCE : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold B. Brown, subject: Request for Security Aids\n\nIn accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a \"package\" to be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive physical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee's classified material, specific recommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate representatives of the Committee for the specific purpose of conducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the results of this survey and its recommendations, the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Committee's classified material.\n\nRobert W. Gambino\nDirector of Security\n\nAtts.\n\nDistribution:\nOrig & 2 - Adse\n1 - ADD/A\n\nCONFIDENTIAL\nGENERAL SUGGESTIONS\nFOR THE\nPROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL\n\n1. Designate a Committee member as the Security Officer responsible for the overall control handling and protection of the classified material.\n\n2. Establish and maintain a register of all Committee personnel who are authorized to review classified material and insure that no unauthorized personnel will have access to the material.\n\n3. Establish a central document control system whereby all classified documents are properly logged upon receipt and annotated as to disposition.\n\n4. Designate a Document Control Clerk who will be specifically responsible for the logging and control of all classified material. Appropriate records should be established to reflect that all classified material is properly logged in and out, by date and time, to authorized members of the Committee.\n\n5. In the event material is designated as being of a codeword or compartmented nature, special physical security features as enunciated by the Ad Hoc Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board and later adopted as policy should be adhered to. (Specifics regarding these requirements will be provided in the course of the pending survey.)\n\n6. All guards assigned to the physical security control over the Committee's storage area should be U. S. citizens and possess appropriate security clearances.\n\n7. If feasible, a reading room should be established within the designated storage area.\nfor the Committee's classified material, and all research and review activities of the material should be restricted to this area.\n\n8. In those instances where the Committee meets in Executive session, every effort should be made to insure that the site being used has been subjected to a technical security inspection to negate the possibility of unauthorized transmitting or recording devices. This area of concern could pose serious security deficiencies in the event the same area would be used initially in public session and then closed for the Executive session without such an inspection being made.\n\n9. Adequate safeguards should be utilized in the transmission of classified material under the cognizance of the Committee from one area to another.\n\n10. Reproduction of any portion of the Committee's classified material should be prohibited without the express approval of the Staff Director. In this instance, notes, extracts, summaries, etc., made from classified material must also be provided the same degree of protection as that provided to the source material.\n\n11. Access controls to the storage and retention area should be established to insure that only authorized personnel are allowed entrance.\n\n12. Storage of all classified material should be within the designated area as opposed to any areas or outside offices.\n\n13. Security protection should be provided to all Committee transcripts during the transcription process as well as during the periods while they are in transit.\n\n14. A security check procedure should be established to inspect the areas where the Committee meets at the termination of each session to insure that no classified material\nor notes, etc., are inadvertently left unsecured. (Attached are examples of Security Check Sheets.)\n\n15. Arrangements should be made to insure that there are adequate facilities for the destruction of classified waste material. In this instance, such waste material should be provided protection until its final destruction.\n\n16. Only approved classified material destruction methods should be utilized. (Details regarding this can be obtained in the course of the pending survey.)\n\n17. All Committee personnel granted access to classified material by the Staff Director should be briefed on their obligations and responsibilities regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such material.\n\n18. Specific physical security recommendations applicable to the proposed storage area for the Committee's classified material, consistent with sound security principles, must be deferred until the completion of the survey. This would also include recommendations relative to the type of storage containers which the Committee proposes to use.\n\n19. Pending the completion of a security survey at the new storage site, it is suggested that the protective measures currently in effect at the temporary storage facility in Room 232, Cannon Building, not be changed.\n**SECURITY CHECK SHEET**\n\n**TO:** Office of Security \n**THRU:** Component Security Officer\n\n**TO LOCK** \nROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION\n\n**TO CHECK** \nSAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON \"HERRING-HALL-MARVIN\" SAFES TURN DRAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT (on new type, raise latch) AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD. VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD. ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO \"NIGHT\" POSITION\n\n**CERTIFICATION** \nI CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED OR PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM.\n\n**MONTH(S)**\n\n| DATE | OPENED BY | CLOSED BY | CHECKED BY | GUARD CHECK |\n|------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------|\n| | INITIALS | INITIALS | INITIALS | INITIALS |\n| | TIME | INITIALS | INITIALS | INITIALS |\n| | INITIALS | TIME | INITIALS | INITIALS |\n\n**FROM:** \n**TO LOCK** \nROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION\n\n**TO CHECK** \nSAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON \"HERRING-HALL-MARVIN\" SAFES TURN DRAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT (on new type, raise latch) AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD. VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD. ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO \"NIGHT\" POSITION\n\n**CERTIFICATION** \nI CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED OR PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM.\n\n**MONTH(S)**\n\n| DATE | OPENED BY | CLOSED BY | CHECKED BY | GUARD CHECK |\n|------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------|\n| | INITIALS | INITIALS | INITIALS | INITIALS |\n| | TIME | INITIALS | INITIALS | INITIALS |\n| | INITIALS | TIME | INITIALS | INITIALS |\n\n**FORM** 1-63 \n**OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS**\nArea Security Check Sheet\n\n| Items to be Checked | Checker |\n|----------------------------------------------------------|---------|\n| Desks (Including Drawers) | |\n| Tables (Including Drawers) | |\n| Chairs | |\n| Floor | |\n| Window Ledges | |\n| Typewriters | |\n| Stenotype Machines | |\n| Reproduction Equipment | |\n| Trash Receptacles | |\n| Charts, Exhibits, Chalkboards | |\n| Notebooks, Paper Pads, etc. (Check to insure that imprints of classified notes not present) | |\n| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |\n|---------------------------------------------------|------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------|\n| Edward Ryan DD/A Coordinator 4E-27, Hqs. | 14 AUG 1975 | ER | |\n| ADD/A 7D-26, Hqs. | | | |\n| The Review Staff 6D-0120 | | | |\n| Attn: Mr. Jerrold B. Brown | | | |\n| | | | |\nCONFIDENTIAL\n\n14 AUG 1975\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff\n\nATTENTION: Mr. Jerrold B. Brown\n\nVIA: Acting Deputy Director for Administration\n\nSUBJECT: House Select Committee on Intelligence - Protection of Classified Materials\n\nREFERENCE: Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold B. Brown, subject: Request for Security Aids\n\nIn accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a \"package\" to be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive physical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee's classified material, specific recommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate representatives of the Committee for the specific purpose of conducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the results of this survey and its recommendations, the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Committee's classified material.\n\nRobert W. Gambino\nDirector of Security\n\nAtts.\n\nDistribution:\nOrig & 2 - Adse\n1 - ADD/A\n\nCONFIDENTIAL\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Members of USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group\n\nSUBJECT: House Select Committee on Intelligence\n\nAttached is a paper from the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, outlining security arrangements made by the House Select Committee on Intelligence.\n\nJack E. Thomas\nMajor General, USAF (Ret.)\nChief, Coordination Staff, ICS\n\nAttachment\n\nThis Document May Be Downgraded to Unclassified When Removed From Attachment\nSECRET\n\nUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD\nSECURITY COMMITTEE\n\nSECOM-D-105\n2 September 1975\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS\n\nSUBJECT: House Select Committee on Intelligence\n\nOn 29 August 1975, Mr. Robert Gambino, Director of Security/CIA; Mr. William H. Standiford, Deputy Chief, Physical Security Division, Office of Security/CIA; and I viewed the permanent space of the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence at the invitation of Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director of the Committee. We believe the security arrangements made and being made are satisfactory for the storage of compartmented information. Attached is a memorandum outlining the security arrangements.\n\nDonald E. Moore\nChairman\n\nAttachment\n\nThis Document May Be Downgraded to Unclassified When Removed From Attachment\n2 September 1975\n\nHouse Select Committee on Intelligence\n\n1. The House Select Committee staff is now located in its permanent space, B-316, Rayburn Building. Ms. Jacqueline Hess is the Security Officer, telephone number 225-9696.\n\n2. The only entrance is through B-316 and the space consists of several adjoining offices all served by an inner walkway. A member of the Capitol Police is stationed at a guard desk inside the door and admits only authorized individuals. Visitors must sign in with the guard, who calls the appropriate staff employee and visitors are allowed access to the space only in the company of staff employees. Interview rooms are located in the staff area but separated from the work area. During non-work hours two guards are on duty in the space.\n\n3. All classified material is kept in a secure area at the rear of the space with one entrance to the secure room. This room is to be locked at all times when specified employees are not on duty in the room. At the present time, Ms. Hess is the only one who will be able to open the secure area and unless circumstances change this arrangement will continue.\n\n4. All classified material is kept in this secure area, and stored in approved safes with three-way combination locks. At present, Ms. Hess is the only person who possesses the combination to these safes.\n\n5. Reading of classified documents is to be in a reading area, consisting of several tables, in the secure area. A staff employee desiring access to a classified document must make a request for it, Ms. Hess then obtains it, the employee reads it in the secure area and it is then returned to Ms. Hess for return to the safe cabinet. Staff employees have been advised that notes taken from classified documents and material prepared from such notes or the documents must respect the original classification and receive corresponding security. Copying of classified documents is to be strictly controlled, is to be done only on a copying device located in staff space, and copies are to receive the same security protection as the original.\n6. The entire space has been swept and plans call for additional periodic sweeping. There is a motion detector in the secure area which rings at the guard desk in the staff area and also at the main office of the Capitol Police in the Rayburn Building. Tests have been made of this device and the response by the Capitol Police was immediate. Two doors which normally serve as access to the secure area from space occupied by other House Committees have been secured from the inside and alarms are to be installed on these doors.\n\n7. Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director, and Ms. Hess advised that staff employees have been alerted to telephone security and this will be continually stressed. Also they have tried to instill strong security consciousness among all the staff. Mr. Field indicated that at present it is not expected the staff will total more than 35.\nHouse Armed Services\nSubcommittee on\nIntelligence\nand Military Application of Nuclear Energy\n\nThe Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy is newly established and the successor to the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence Chaired by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi. The new Subcommittee has picked up the responsibility of the soon to be abolished Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and is expanding its staff accordingly. Representative Melvin Price's Chairmanship is due to his long years of membership on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There will be an ever-increasing involvement by the Subcommittee in military application of nuclear energy and we undoubtedly will be called upon to provide required foreign intelligence.\n\nMembers of the Subcommittee are as follows:\n\nMelvin Price (D., Ill.), Chairman\nCharles H. Wilson (D., Calif.)\nJack Brinkley (D., Ga.)\nDan Daniel (D., Va.)\nG. V. Montgomery (D., Miss.)\nRonald V. Dellums (D., Calif.)\nBob Carr (D., Mich.)\nCharles E. Bennett (D., Fla.)\nSamuel S. Stratton (D., N.Y.)\nBob Wilson (R., Calif.)\nWilliam L. Dickinson (R., Ala.)\nMarjorie S. Holt (R., Md.)\nRobert W. Daniel, Jr. (R., Va.)\n\nStaff of the Subcommittee are as follows:\n\nJohn Ford, Staff Director\nWilliam H. Hogan, Counsel\nAdam J. Klein, Professional\n\nMr. Ford is Staff Director of the full Committee and replaced Mr. Frank Slatinshek, former Chief Counsel, who retired. Mr. Hogan is Counsel of the Subcommittee and will be the principal staff man on Agency matters. Adam Klein is a specialist in atomic energy matters.\nPROBLEMS\n\nA. House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy\n\nFormer Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi fully exercised his perogatives as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and we could look to him for support in any problems developing with other committees and other members of the House not on the Subcommittee. Based on the reactions of Chairman Melvin Price in the few instances that we have approached him in this Congress for assistance, it is quite evident that he is not the dominant personality as was Chairman Nedzi and will not stick his neck out to defend the Agency. Nor does it appear that the new staff director will be of the forceful personality as was Frank Slatinshek who was very helpful in a number of problems. A few weeks ago former Chairman Nedzi suggested that we resolve a problem involving Representative Donald M. Fraser by going to Speaker O'Neill. This may have been his indication to us that we may have to look to House leadership to resolve problems. Mr. Nedzi also suggested that we contact someone in the White House on a problem. We may be faced with needed White House support on a problem before we approach the leadership.\n\nB. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control\n\nThe extent of Chairman Lester L. Wolff's oversight of the Agency in its narcotics collection activities still remains a looming problem. As indicated by the request for the seal, Mr. Wolff intends to extend the Agency's activities to where there is maximum effective collection of foreign intelligence on narcotics trafficking leading to arrest and conviction without regard to the Agency's statutory prohibitions. The only solution rests with the Attorney General and the White House giving the Agency clear and precise guidelines to operate in this area which the Agency can then point to in any disputes that may arise with the Select Committee as to what the Agency's role should be.\nCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS\nHouse of Representatives\n(95th Congress, 1st Session)\n\nGEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman\n\nDEMOCRATS\n\nJAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi\nROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida\nEDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts\nWILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky\nDANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania\nTOM STEED, Oklahoma\nGEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois\nJOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia\nJOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia\nNEAL SMITH, Iowa\nROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut\nJOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York\nJOHN J. McFALL, California\nEDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey\nCLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland\nSIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois\nFRANK E. EVANS, Colorado\nDAVID E. OBEY, Wisconsin\nEDWARD R. ROYBAL, California\nLOUIS STOKES, Ohio\nGUNN MCKAY, Utah\nTOM BEVILL, Alabama\nBILL CHAPPELL, Florida\nBILL D. BURLISON, Missouri\nBILL ALEXANDER, Arkansas\nEDWARD I. KOCH, New York\nYVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California\nJOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania\nBOB TRAXLER, Michigan\nROBERT DUNCAN, Oregon\nJOSEPH D. EARLY, Massachusetts\nMAX BAUCUS, Montana\nCHARLES WILSON, Texas\nLINDY (MRS. HALE) BOGGS, Louisiana\nADAM BENJAMIN, Jr., Indiana\nNORMAN D. DICKS, Washington\n\nREPUBLICANS\n\nELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan\nROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois\nSILVIO O. CIRINCIONE, Massachusetts\nJOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania\nMARK ANDREWS, North Dakota\nJACK EDWARDS, Alabama\nROBERT C. McEWEEN, New York\nJOHN T. MYERS, Indiana\nJ. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia\nCLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio\nLAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania\nC. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida\nJACK F. KEMP, New York\nWILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado\nRALPH S. REGULA, Ohio\nCLAIRE W. BURGENDER, California\nGEORGE M. O'BRIEN, Illinois\nVIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska\n\nKEITH F. MAINLAND\nClerk and Staff Director\n\nSubcommittees\n\nAGRICULTURE & RELATED AGENCIES\nWhitten, Evans, Burlison, Baucus, Traxler, Alexander, Sikes, Natcher\nAndrews, Robinson, Myers\n\nDEFENSE\nMahon, Sikes, Flood, Addabbo, McFall, Flynt, Giaimo, Chappell, Burlison\nEdwards, Robinson, Kemp\n\nDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\nNatcher, Giaimo, Wilson, McKay, Burke, Benjamin\nBurgener, Kemp\n\nFOREIGN OPERATIONS\nLong, Obey, Koch, Wilson, Yates, Burke, Roybal, Stokes\nYoung, Conte, Smith\n\nHUD\u2014INDEPENDENT AGENCIES\nBoland, Traxler, Baucus, Stokes, Bevill, Boggs, Burlison, Alexander\nCoughlin, McDaide, Young\n\nINTERIOR\nYates, McKay, Long, Evans, Murtha, Duncan, Dicks, Whitten\nMcDaide, Regula, Armstrong\n\nLABOR\u2014HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE\nFlood, Natcher, Smith, Patten, Obey, Roybal, Stolten, Early\nMichel, Conte, O'Brien\n\nLEGISLATIVE\nShipley, Benjamin, Giaimo, McFall, Murtha, Traxler\nArmstrong, Coughlin, Cederberg\n\nMILITARY CONSTRUCTION\nMcKay, Sikes, Murtha, Steed, Long, Chappell\nMcEwen, Regula\n\nPUBLIC WORKS\nBevill, Boland, Whitten, Slack, Boggs, Dicks, Shipley, Chappell\nMyers, Burgener, Smith\n\nSTATE, JUSTICE, COMMERCE & JUDICIARY\nSlack, Smith, Flynt, Alexander, Burke, Early\nCederberg, Andrews, Miller\n\nTRANSPORTATION\nMcFall, Steed, Koch, Duncan, Benjamin, Smith, Addabbo, Evans\nConte, Edwards, O'Brien\n\nTREASURY-POSTAL SERVICE\u2014GENERAL GOVERNMENT\nSteed, Addabbo, Roybal, Patten, Boland, Flynt\nMiller, McEwen\n\nNOTE: Mr. Mahon, as Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Cederberg, as Ranking Minority Member, are ex officio members of all subcommittees of which they are not regular members.\n\nJanuary 26, 1977.\nHouse Appropriations Committee team:\n\nRoom 2 D 0117. Telephones: 5848, 5849 (B) and 1570 (R) 8801 (gray)\n\nLeonard M. (Bucky) WALTERS\nBadge: blue House Committee\nClearances: SI, TK, BYECOM\n\nCharles B. (Chuck) HAYNES\nBadge: green no-escort\nClearances: SI, TK, BYECOM\n\nEugene B. WILHELM\nBadge: blue House Committee\nClearances: SI, TK, BYECOM\n\nGeorge C. BAIRD (Carter)\nBadge: blue House Committee\nClearances: SI, TK, BYECOM\n\nLeon F. (Frank) SCHWARTZ\nBadge: blue House Committee\n\nJohn LAYTON\n\nSupervisory officials of HAC Surveys & Investigations Staff\n(not to be stationed at Hqs bldg, but may visit from time to time):\n\nCornelius R. (Lefty) ANDERSON, Chief\nBadge: green no-escort\n\nMarion S. RAMEY, Deputy Chief\nBadge: blue House Committee\nOX 7-9371\n\nJames Brian HYLAND\nBadge: blue House Committee\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD\n\nSUBJECT: Initial Meeting with House Appropriations Committee Survey Group\n\n1. An initial session was held on 30 July 1976 of about one and a half hours with six persons from the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee, to discuss the purpose of their survey of the Directorate of Operations and to propose some arrangements to govern their access to Agency personnel and documents. The following attended:\n\n Mr. Cornelius (Lefty) Anderson, Chief of Surveys and Investigations Staff\n Mr. Marion Ramey, Deputy\n Mr. Leonard (Bucky) Walters, who will head the team inspecting the Directorate of Operations\n Mr. Charles (Chuck) Havnes, team member\n Mr. Eugene Wilhelm, team member (former Agency employee)\n Mr. George C. Baird, team member\n\nAttending for the Agency were:\n\n Mr. Theodore Shackley, who chaired the meeting\n Mr. Robert Gambino\n Mr. Lyle Miller\n Mr. Thomas B. Abernathy\n Mr. Richard Point\n Mr. Philip F. Fendig\n\n2. The meeting followed reasonably well the attached agenda, which was made available to all at the beginning of the meeting. The following paragraphs summarize the important points covered.\n\n3. Scope: Mr. Shackley asked the group to define its mission, noting some of the topics mentioned in recent conversations with Mr. Snodgrass suggested particular interests whereas the Committee's report on the FY 77 budget\nhad suggested a different orientation. Mr. Anderson, characterizing the enterprise as a survey rather than an investigation, stated that his instructions were from the Chairman of the Committee: they called for a detailed review of the operation of the Directorate in its entirety. Mr. Walters would mention certain particular interests, noted below, but that did not set limits to the ultimate scope of the survey. Mr. Walters then took over:\n\na. He expects to do a complete review, from the managerial and substantive standpoint, of the Directorate. His initial interests indicated an auditor's approach to these questions - how budgets are compiled, examination of accounting procedures for regular and special funds, cost systems and the like.\n\nb. He went on, however, to the management aspects which they would also pursue to determine the results of the Directorate's operations - the value of intelligence produced versus the costs involved in procuring it, and areas of possible overlap in collection with the military and with NSA.\n\nc. Specific areas which would be explored, given, as examples, included contingency reserves, the \"special retirement fund\" (presumably referring to MHHMUTUAL), the procedures for reimbursing the State Department for cover and support, proprietaries (how created, their justification, value and effectiveness), safe-houses and \"CA cadres.\"\n\nMr. Anderson reluctantly agreed to Mr. Shackley's request for a memorandum spelling out these objectives in sufficient detail so that we could take the managerial steps necessary to resolve any conflicts in the priority of the time of our managers and senior operations officers who would be involved in current operations as well as overlapping inquiries from other groups concurrently overseeing the Directorate. Mr. Anderson also asked for any ongoing studies which the Directorate might have which would aid the team in its work.\n4. Duration: The team's first objective will be to render an interim report to the Committee by 1 January 1977, in order to meet the mandate that the survey be used in considering the Agency's FY 1978 budget. The team wishes to start work immediately and will consist of either six or seven members who will occupy space in Headquarters building and presumably do most of their work here; it was brought out, however, that the team would also interview users of our intelligence and other collectors. There was ambiguity in the projection of the total length of the survey; I interpreted Mr. Anderson's remarks to indicate that he expected the team to be with us for most of calendar year 1977.\n\n5. Security: Mr. Anderson explained the arrangement by which the Committee limits access by even the members of the Subcommittee to the reports of his group; they must be reviewed in a specified area and they are stored, in very limited numbers, in the tower of the Capitol in the special facilities there for the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress. Mr. Gambino explained the arrangements for badges, certification of clearances, and provided for the team's consideration a copy of the \"non-disclosure agreement\" which we would like members to sign. There was considerable discussion, and some objection, to the issuance of blue badges which will provide access to virtually all parts of the building but which must be turned in and picked up at the entrance each day. This arrangement was reluctantly accepted but it was made clear at lunch and in later discussion with the team and with Mr. Anderson they are unhappy with this slight infringement on their convenience and physical access to the building.\n\n6. Access: Of more concern was the Agency position that the SA/D0/O would serve as a control point for the team's further access to individuals and documents in the Directorate. The requirement was explained in terms of the need to record, against later requirements such as in fact now in progress stemming from another investigation, the names, subject matter and general content of matters discussed by Agency officers with team members. The requirement to \"monitor\" was explained as an effort to keep this type of record, rather than to impose a third party from the office of SA/D0/O on all interviews; the latter was clearly considered by the team to be an unreasonable intrusion. It was agreed after some discussion that we would proceed with\nsystem outlined in the attached agenda, and that we would reconsider procedures later if they seemed clearly to be unwieldy. We anticipated, however, that once the team splits into smaller groups as is planned, and pursues particular areas of inquiry, it will be possible to evolve a workable system which meets the objectives of both parties.\n\n7. Other: There appears to be no difficulty in protecting identities of sources, providing documents in sanitized form, maintaining notes only in this building and at the appropriate security level and introducing some officers under cover in alias where necessary; all these points were noted and none was objected to. Space and other facilities may be cramped but it appears to be possible to provide adequate space adjacent to the SA/DO/O offices. Mr. Anderson began by noting the outstanding cooperation on the Angola and COMINT surveys done in the building (in which relatively free access to personnel and files had been afforded his team), and ended by stating that the coming survey was not a witch hunt nor an investigation of abuses and that therefore he believed that such access could have very beneficial results for the Agency. It was agreed to begin the survey formally with a briefing by the DDO or ADDO on 3 or 4 August 1976. Mr. Walters with several team members will, however, set up shop on 2 August to review such general briefing papers as Mr. Fendig can make available to them at that time.\n\n(Signed)\nPhilip F. Fendig\n\nPhilip F. Fendig\n\nSA/DO/O:PFFendig:j1 (7368/1398)\n\nDistribution: (all w/att)\nOrig & 1 - DDO\n1 - ADDO\n1 - OLC (Mr. Miller)\n1 - D/SEC (Mr. Gambino)\n1 - COMPT (Mr. Point)\n1 - SSA/DDO\n1 - SA/DDCI (Mr. Bolten)\n4 - SA/DO/O\nAGENDA FOR MEETING WITH\nHOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF\n30 JULY 1976\n\nA. Request statement from Committee representatives of scope, duration and proposed procedure to be followed by Committee investigators.\n\nB. Discussion of arrangements for investigation:\n\n1. Facilities: DDO will provide office space, telephones and secure storage facilities for investigators. Parking spaces and cafeteria privileges will also be provided.\n\n2. Security:\n a. Badges allowing unescorted access to Headquarters building will be issued, to be picked up and left with receptionist. Agreement to be signed when badge issued, per current procedures governing all Congressional staffs.\n b. Clearances through necessary level to be obtained prior to commencement of briefings or interviews, level to be determined on basis of first meeting.\n\n3. Access:\n a. Orientation briefings on Directorate and its subdivisions to be offered.\n b. Access to personnel and documents within Agency to be controlled by office of SA/DO/0, which will maintain record of all interviews and of documents provided.\n c. Documents to be provided upon specific request for study within building. They will be sanitized to protect sources and methods using guidelines previously established for HSC and SSC.\nd. Documents to be examined by the investigation team within Headquarters building. If copies of documents are desired, investigators will request them from SA/DO/O who will see that they are provided promptly in appropriate classified and sanitized form. If required by the Committee (outside Headquarters building), same procedure will be followed but will be subject to review by SA/DO/O.\n\ne. Formal questions are to be put in writing in order to provide proper and full context so that most complete and pertinent answers can be provided.\n\nf. SA/DO/O to monitor all interviews.\n\ng. Discussion of note-taking and reports:\n\n(1) Maintenance of proper security and classification\n\n(2) Notes to retain same level of security classification as documents or interviews on which they based.\nSURVEY BY MEMBERS OF\nTHE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF\n\n1. GENERAL\n\nMembers of the staff of the House Appropriations Committee began an extensive examination of the Directorate of Operations beginning the week of 2 August 1976. They expect that it will take approximately 17 months to complete this study. They state their activities are necessary to better understand the appropriations process. They emphasize that their objective is not to dig out evidence of wrongdoing or improper activities. The staff members' activities will be coordinated through SA/DO/O. The following paragraphs attempt to anticipate the procedures necessary to exercise orderly control over the staff's activities. These procedures may be subject to modification as future experience may dictate.\n\n2. LOCATION\n\nMembers of this Congressional staff have been issued blue badges bearing the words \"House Committee\" which permit unescorted access to all non-specially controlled areas of the building, including the main cafeteria. The staff will be provided suitable private office space in Room 2 D 0117, adjacent to the office of the SA/DO/O, which will be relocated in Room 2 D 0109 as of 6 August 1976. It is expected that they will initially have a greater interest in interviews than they do in documents. Since they will have adequate office space, interviews should be conducted within their premises.\n\n3. CONTROL OF DOCUMENTS\n\na. The staff is expected to make any requests for documentation to the SA/DO/O. Individual officers\nwho receive requests from staff members for documents should ask that the request be put to the SA/DO/O. All documents provided to the SA/DO/O for transmittal to the staff will be logged in by the SA/DO/O and logged back to the component after the staff has completed its study. The SA/DO/O will not, as a matter of routine procedure, retain a copy of the document concerned.\n\nb. All documents will be properly sanitized to protect sources and methods. The staff has indicated that it does not anticipate any need for such detail and accepts the principle of sanitization. Any questions concerning the degree of sanitization should be referred to the SA/DO/O. Ground rules for sanitization are similar to those applied during the activities of the Select Committees. General guidelines will be provided separately.\n\nc. On receipt of a document back from the SA/DO/O the recipient should indicate the date received, and that it had been made available to the staff. The document should be retained by the recipient in the form in which it was provided to the staff for possible further reference; the record copy of the document should also reflect the fact that a sanitized copy was provided to the staff. Any further copies of documents requested by the staff will be made only by the office of the SA/DO/O.\n\n4. INTERVIEWS\n\na. A representative from the office of the SA/DO/O will not necessarily be present during interviews. All interviews should be requested by the staff through the SA/DO/O. The SA/DO/O will maintain a record of the date of interview; the name of the person interviewed, and by whom; the alias if one is used; and the subjects discussed. A form will be provided to the interviewee to record\nthe essential facts. He should retain one copy for possible future reference and one copy should be forwarded to the SA/DO/0.\n\nb. It is recognized that the badge access and the length of the stay in the building by the staff members may lead to unscheduled contacts. If such contacts are connected with the official duties of the staff, then appropriate comments should be forwarded to SA/DO/0 on the form cited above. Officers should be careful not to allow conversations to drift to areas of interest not covered by official interviews. If this does take place, however, we shall rely on the officer concerned to inform the SA/DO/0 of these developments.\n\n5. SECURITY\n\nThe blue badge should be sufficient to indicate that staff members should be treated as visitors in the presence of persons not connected with their official duties. Persons introduced under alias should be careful that the alias is protected if a chance meeting takes place in the presence of other colleagues. In this connection, persons interviewed should be careful not to expose associates who have not been interviewed.\n\nWilliam W. Wells\nDeputy Director for Operations\n\ncy: A/DDC1 (Mr. Bolton) 18 Aug 76\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Divisions and Staffs\n\nFROM : Philip F. Fendig\n SA/DO/0\n\nSUBJECT : Guidance for Interviews with House Appropriations Committee Staff\n\nREFERENCE : DON 5-218, 4 August 1976\n\n1. You have been scheduled at the time indicated on the cover sheet of this memorandum for a briefing to be given to the five members of the Surveys and Investigations Staff team from the House Appropriations Committee. The subjects which the team would like you to cover are contained in the memorandum distributed prior to the DDO staff meeting on 25 August 1976 and discussed at that meeting. I have explained to the Surveys and Investigations team that topic e (personnel policy and practices) will be discussed at a separate briefing to be given by the Chief, Career Management Group. You should touch on the other topics suggested in the memorandum mentioned above.\n\n2. General guidelines are contained in reference notice. The following may be helpful, however, in preparing your briefing. Our general intention is to be as forthcoming as possible while drawing the line clearly at any information which would lead to the identification of a specific source, intelligence method, cooperating person or group with which the Agency has a relationship of confidence, or confidential matter involving a cooperating foreign intelligence service. The fact of liaison with foreign services can in most cases be acknowledged, but details of the relationship and the subject matter of joint or shared operations should not be disclosed.\n\n3. In the briefing contemplated on management policies and practices, most of the above sensitive areas would not appear to arise, but you may find that questions will tend to bring out some more sensitive areas and these should be deferred with an agreement of looking into the possibility of providing further information later. The staff has already had access to basic budgetary material, including funds and\npersonnel strengths broken down by component, and a listing by cryptonyms and funding levels of all OPACTS. They have been given a briefing on the current organization of the Directorate of Operations and are aware that its staff elements will shortly be reorganized. They have a listing of all overseas stations and bases. If you have further questions on material already provided to the Committee, please check with this office.\n\n4. Most of the briefings are scheduled to take place in room 2 D 0117; if possible, a member of my staff will be present. We would appreciate, however, a short Memorandum for the Record, using the attached \"Interview Form\" as a general guide. Space is somewhat limited, but you should bring any supporting personnel you desire to have participate in your briefing. The Surveys and Investigations team is aware that aliases may be used by those with solid cover status; please advise this office if any persons intend to use an alias during these briefing sessions.\n\n5. We will be happy to assist in any way, including follow-up matters which may be developed in the course of these briefings.\n\nPhilip F. Fendig\n\natt\nAugust 18, 1976\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Philip F. Fendig\nSA/DO/O\n\nFROM L. M. Walters, Staff Member\nHouse Appropriations Committee\nSurveys and Investigations Staff\n\nRequest arrangement for comprehensive briefings with appropriate officials regarding the subjects outlined below be provided to HAC S&I Staff members George C. Baird and Leon F. Schwartz.\n\n1. **Paramilitary Covert Action Cadre**\n\n Provide in this briefing data relating to the organization, utilization and cost data for this activity for the periods FY 74, 75, 76 and projected data for FY 77 and FY 78. Organizational data should include manning and equipment levels for the aforementioned periods.\n\n2. **Reorganization of the Directorate of Operations**\n\n Briefing should include rationale behind the proposed reorganization and manpower and dollar savings to be effected by such a change. If additional expenditures in either dollars or manpower positions are involved, justification should accompany the presentation. Explain in detail how the Directorate of Operations plans to absorb the FY 77 loss of 100 manpower positions, if imposed in the pending Appropriations Bill.\n\n3. **The Special Projects Group**\n\n Explain the rationale behind the transfer of Israel from the Near East Division and providing it with special status by placing it directly under DDO. Additional manpower and dollar costs accompanying this change should be addressed.\n\n4. **Coordination Within the Intelligence Community**\n\n Briefing should show the identity and purposes of the various task groups established (both within CIA and community-\nwide) which have been specifically established to deal with the collection vs. analysis problem. Impacts and changes brought about or anticipated within DO as a result of these groups' actions should be covered.\n\n5. Management Policies and Practices of Each DO Staff and Division, (a separate briefing by each) including but not limited to:\n\na. Overview of role of staff or division\n\nb. Decision-making processes and how coordinated in DO, CIA and intelligence community\n\nc. Organizational structure\n\nd. Program development, and execution from initiation to budgeting to implementation, including development of annual plans, their flexibility, and degree of autonomy of case officers, chiefs of stations, desk officers and division or staff directors.\n\ne. Personnel policies and practices including recruitment, training promotion, position classification, establishment of station complements and rotational policies.\n\nf. Management and accounting controls to assure compliance with laws, executive orders, policies and regulations and assurance that funds and other assets are properly used, expended and receipted for.\n\nWhile the order of arranging the presentations is not critical, it is suggested that, if possible, item (1.) be presented earliest and that item (5.) be instituted the week of August 30. Please coordinate with either Mr. Baird or myself for prompt scheduling of these sessions. Also, it would be appreciated if a copy of charts or other documentary material used in the presentations could be provided to the attendees during each briefing session.\nOFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP\n\n| TO | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS |\n|----|------------------|------|----------|\n| 1 | MR FENO16 | | |\n| 2 | | | |\n| 3 | | | |\n| 4 | | | |\n| 5 | | | |\n| 6 | | | |\n\n| ACTION | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY |\n|--------|--------------|---------------|\n| APPROVAL | DISPATCH | RECOMMENDATION |\n| COMMENT | FILE | RETURN |\n| CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION | SIGNATURE |\n\nRemarks: Copies: To Shepard, Sovern\n\nFor your info I have attached pages 6 and 77 DD/076-3259 7 26 May 1976, covering the A100's position with the SNODGRASS on MBO.\n\nAlso attached is a page from the DC1's statement to the Committee on the same subject (no date)\n\nFOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER\n\nFROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE\n---|---\nWALKER | 10 Sept 76\n\nUNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET\n---|---|---\n\nFORM NO. 237 Use previous editions\nin attempting to be both forthcoming and helpful to him and the Committee in understanding the DDO's problems. At the same time Mr. Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr. Shackley, he continued to be irritated with the totality of the Agency's attitude toward providing him with data. Mr. Snodgrass then launched into a long litany on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he perceived them in the time frame February to May 1976. With that as a backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry as to why the Agency was not willing to give him full access to Management by Objective documents. The dialogue which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective documents he will not be able to have a firm understanding of DDO manpower allocation procedures. Secondly, Mr. Snodgrass claims that CIA's position that it will show Management by Objective documents to members of the Committee and not the Staff is an obstructionist tactic. His point being that the members of the Committee do not have the time to look at such documents and they thus depend on the Committee Staff for this type of substantive review. According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the Agency will not provide data to the Staff, it is in fact denying information to the Committee members. Attempts were made by Mr. Shackley to show how men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley reiterated the DDO position that access to Management by Objective documents by Mr. Snodgrass would impact adversely on the whole question of sources and methods as well as the integrity of the reporting system. As a followup to this position an effort was made to find out exactly what it was about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mr. Snodgrass did not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an examination of the Management by Objective documents. It was hoped that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could be discovered which would enable us to deal with Mr. Snodgrass' problems. Our probes in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can only conclude that Mr. Snodgrass is committed to finding some sort of a formula or equation which will enable him to test our manpower allocation system. We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that go\ninto making judgments on operational deployment of manpower such as what targets are in a country, what are the great power interests in a particular country, what is the operational environment in the country i.e., permissive or not, what are the cover possibilities, what are our liaison equities, and what are our needs for regional support from a particular country. These explanations are taken aboard by Mr. Snodgrass, but he is looking for something else which has less variables in it when, in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to commit treason. This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell him that we haven't already told him. (ACTION REQUIRED: Mr. Snodgrass is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropriations Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget. Once this task is completed Mr. Chin, OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass and will try to obtain an elaboration of what specifically are the manpower issues that trouble Mr. Snodgrass. In this context Mr. Chin has been asked to try to determine if a review, position-by-position, of two or three typical Stations within the DDO might give Mr. Snodgrass the insight into manpower allocations that he is currently seeking.)\n\n9. Comment. In net assessment terms one would have to conclude that the 25 May meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from this kind of an encounter. On the one hand the attached briefing book which was examined by Mr. Snodgrass was accepted by the latter as a first rate product. For this the Agency gets high marks. On the other hand, the Management by Objective system, because he can't see the documents, leaves Mr. Snodgrass frustrated and irritated. This evokes acrimonious complaints from Mr. Snodgrass with the end result being that the burden for seeking a solution to a problem created by Mr. Snodgrass is placed on the Agency. In short, we have ended up where we expected to be. Put another way, there appears to be no prospect for establishing the type of dialogue with Mr. Snodgrass which satisfies the interests of both parties. We are inevitably doomed to being in an adversary relationship with him, although it is incumbent on us to continue to minimize, to the extent that\nMBO\n\nMr. Mahon. Would you please provide the Committee staff with some samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think appropriate?\n\nMr. Bush. I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with the Committee off the record, Mr. Chairman. But I am reluctant to do that, and I am even more reluctant to provide the documents themselves or to have their contents described to the Committee by anyone who is not intimately familiar with espionage, counterintelligence and covert action operations and with the entire management system used by the Operations Directorate.\n\nThere are a number of reasons for my position. One serious concern revolves around the effects on our internal processes of the sort of inquiry you propose. One of the primary reasons that our internal management system is effective is that participation is strictly limited to those immediately concerned. Given that we are all human beings, there is no escaping the fact that knowledge that the reports in question are being read, or may at some future time be read, by outsiders will lead to their being written with a view to their possible impact on an extended readership. There will be a tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of problems and to exaggerate accomplishments. Inevitably, the net effect will be to reduce the usefulness of the system.\n\nAnother difficulty involves security. To be useful for judging performance, the reports must be very detailed. Thus they discuss recruitment in terms of numbers, the specific access of agents to information, recruitment techniques, and so forth. By the time all this sensitive material on sources and methods is removed, any samples are going to consist primarily of disconnected bits and pieces or of unenlightening generalizations.\n\nAnd I have a third problem with this request. The reports themselves are but one part of a very complex and thorough process we use for internal management. It takes a detailed familiarity with the process to appreciate its effectiveness. Thus, I feel strongly that someone from the Agency who has that intimate knowledge should be present if and when you want to consider the reports.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10400-10316.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 61, "total-input-tokens": 69431, "total-output-tokens": 21238, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 1183, 1], [1183, 2639, 2], [2639, 3858, 3], [3858, 5112, 4], [5112, 6061, 5], [6061, 6956, 6], [6956, 8802, 7], [8802, 9435, 8], [9435, 11242, 9], [11242, 13034, 10], [13034, 14202, 11], [14202, 15633, 12], [15633, 17207, 13], [17207, 19139, 14], [19139, 21646, 15], [21646, 24787, 16], [24787, 27897, 17], [27897, 28762, 18], [28762, 30643, 19], [30643, 33197, 20], [33197, 35282, 21], [35282, 36026, 22], [36026, 36152, 23], [36152, 37799, 24], [37799, 38113, 25], [38113, 39067, 26], [39067, 40546, 27], [40546, 40546, 28], [40546, 41999, 29], [41999, 43675, 30], [43675, 44926, 31], [44926, 44926, 32], [44926, 46796, 33], [46796, 47781, 34], [47781, 48700, 35], [48700, 50175, 36], [50175, 50595, 37], [50595, 51406, 38], [51406, 53485, 39], [53485, 54350, 40], [54350, 55917, 41], [55917, 57858, 42], [57858, 61037, 43], [61037, 61831, 44], [61831, 63248, 45], [63248, 65165, 46], [65165, 67626, 47], [67626, 69330, 48], [69330, 70605, 49], [70605, 71392, 50], [71392, 72911, 51], [72911, 74624, 52], [74624, 75805, 53], [75805, 77757, 54], [77757, 78906, 55], [78906, 80501, 56], [80501, 82074, 57], [82074, 83095, 58], [83095, 85666, 59], [85666, 88081, 60], [88081, 90275, 61]]}} +{"id": "25f818620c18e4a484c0a2dc7a0e9313da00068a", "text": "3. DEFINITIONS\n\nWithin the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term \"operational use\" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of \"operational use\" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of \"operational use\" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.\n\na. Operational Use\n\nOperational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.\n\nb. DDO Element\n\nAny person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.\n\nc. Operational Contact\n\nAny association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.\n\n4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE\n\na. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:\n\n(1) Operational Use is Prohibited (see paragraph 5):\n\n(a) Members and trainers of ACTION;\n\n(b) Fulbright grantees;\n(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;\n\n(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;\n\n(e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigation agencies.\n\n(2) Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF DDO.\n\n(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;\n\n(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;\n\n(c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;\n\n(d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories), and New Zealand;\n\n(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;\n\n(f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.\n\n(3) Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO (see paragraph 7):\n\n(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;\n\n(b) CARE employees;\n\n(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;\n\n(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;\n\n(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;\n\n(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;\n\n(g) Officials of the Vatican State;\n\n(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;\n\n(i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;\n\n(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;\n\n(k) Volunteers to America.\n\n(4) Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division (see paragraph 8):\n\n(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;\n\n(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations or organizations not assigned in the U.S.;\n\n(c) Members of the academic community.\n\nb. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.\n5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED\n\na. Members and Trainees of ACTION\n\n(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term \"members of ACTION\" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)\n\n(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:\n\n(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.\n\n(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.\n\n(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.\n\n(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.\n\n(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.\n\n(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:\n\n(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.\n(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.\n\nIf contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.\n\nb. Fulbright Grantees\n\nDDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers, and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants in international trade, fair and exposition, who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 71, below).\n\nc. Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom\n\nDDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.\n\nd. Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations\n\nDDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation, or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.\ne. Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies\n\nDDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.\n\n6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED\n\na. Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies\n\nApproval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.\n\nb. DDO Agents or Assets in the United States\n\nIn accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.\n\n(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term \"investigation\" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; \"investigation\" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.\n\n(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.\n\n(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.\n\n(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be\nprovided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien-residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.\n\nc. Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence (Registered by Other U.S. Agencies)\n\nThe Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.\n\nd. Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand\n\n(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).\n\n(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.\n\n(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.\ne. Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands\n\nThe operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.\n\nf. Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries\n\nThe operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany, and The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.\n\n7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED\n\nApproval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations\nDirectorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)\n\na. Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media (see DOI 240-6)\n\n(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.\n\n(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.\n\nb. CARE Employees\n\nIt is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.\n\nc. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)\n\nIndividuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.\nd. Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States (see DOI 60-11)\n\nPrior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.\n\ne. Delegates or Employees of the United Nations\n\nIt is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.\n\nf. Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies\n\nThe operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.\n\ng. Officials of the Vatican State\n\nOperational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.\n\nh. U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees\n\nU.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other\nexchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees\u2014see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchange is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.\n\n1. Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations\n\n(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.\n\n(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.\n\nj. Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute\n\nOperational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.\n\nk. Volunteers to America\n\nOperational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a\ncounterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.\n\n8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION\n\nOperational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.\n\na. Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas (see DOI 50-19).\n\nThe operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.\n\nb. Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.\n\nThe operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.\n\nc. Members of the Academic Community\n\n(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.\n\n(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is\noperationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:\n\n(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;\n\n(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.\n\nIf the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.\n\n(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:\n\n(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.\n\n(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.\n\n(c) The requirements of paragraph (a) apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.\n\n(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the\nSECRET\n\nDOI 50-10\n\nDDO INSTRUCTION\nNO. 50-10\n\nOPERATIONS-GENERAL\n4 September 1973\n\nacademic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.\n\n(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.\n\n9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY\n\nWhen an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.\n\n10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS\n\nCertain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.\n\nWilliam E. Nelson\nDeputy Director for Operations\n\n14\nSECRET", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10406-10136.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 13, "total-input-tokens": 12066, "total-output-tokens": 6575, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 2196, 1], [2196, 4245, 2], [4245, 6581, 3], [6581, 9200, 4], [9200, 11682, 5], [11682, 14185, 6], [14185, 16934, 7], [16934, 19558, 8], [19558, 22347, 9], [22347, 25082, 10], [25082, 27538, 11], [27538, 30288, 12], [30288, 31862, 13]]}} +{"id": "209853e2f2b997f8a4cc7587e64652888b36ab21", "text": "ANNEX B\n\nTHE 201 SYSTEM\n\nRecission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966\n\n1. INTRODUCTION\n\nThe 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lists of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.\n\n2. THE 201 SYSTEM\n\nThe principal features of the 201 system are:\n\na. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.\n\nb. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 331) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.\n\nc. The Master 201 Records: a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.\n\nd. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.\nSECRET\n\nDOHB 70-1-1\nCHAPTER III, ANNEX B\n\n15 November 1974\n\nInformation About Subject\n\n1. Sequence Number and Name\n2. Sex and Date of Birth\n3. Citizenship\n4. Place of Birth\n5. Occupation\n6. Occupation Code\n7. Text\n\nDocument Reference Data Group\n\n8. 201 Number\n9. Name Type Indicator\n10. OI Codes\n11. Record Date (year only)\n12. Reference\n\nISC Control Information\n\n13. Date of latest update of the record\n14. STAR Index Record Number\n\nSECRET\ne. OI Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:\n\n(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)\n(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.\n\nA component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.\n\nA 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.\n\nThe 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.\n\nf. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.\n\n3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER\n\na. General\n\nThe opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on\npersons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:\n\n(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.\n\n(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.\n\n(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.\n\n(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.\n\n(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).\n\n(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).\n\nb. Requesting a 201 File Opening\n\nHeadquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term \"File\" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.\n4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER\n\nInformation about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.\n\nMaterial which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:\n\na. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).\n\nb. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.\n\nc. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.\n\nd. Operational and other security approvals.\n\ne. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.\n\nf. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.\n\ng. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.\n\nh. Copy of contract and termination papers.\n\ni. Secrecy agreement.\n\nj. Agent Duty Status Report.\n\nk. Training and evaluation.\n\nl. SCSWIRL report.\n\nm. Newspaper clippings.\n\nn. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.\n\n5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS\n\nThe 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.\na. Purging\n\nPurging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:\n\n(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.\n\n(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.\n\n(3) All abstract slips.\n\n(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1684).\n\n(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.\n\n(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.\n\n(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.\n\n(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.\n\n(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).\n\nb. Maintenance Procedures\n\n(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201\nSECRET\n\nDOHB 70-1-1\nCHAPTER III, ANNEX B\n15 November 1974\n\ndossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.\n\n(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RM5 for classification into that 201.\n\n(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.\n\n(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.\n\n(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.\n\n(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).\n\n(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.\n\n(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.\n\n(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.\n\n(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).\nBlack-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.\n\n(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.\n\n| UNCLASSIFIED | INTERNAL USE ONLY | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET |\n|---------------|-------------------|--------------|--------|\n| **ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET** | **TRANSMITTED OF INACTIVE 201 Dossiers** | | |\n| **NAME** | **NUMBER** | **DATE** | **REMARKS** |\n| 1/201/Files | GC-32 | | (For guidance see CEB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) |\n| 2. | | | Volume(s) # of volume(s) |\n| 3. | | | of 201. |\n| 4. | | | |\n| 5. | | | |\n| 6. | | | Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2001 to Dossier) |\n| 7. | | | Non-Restricted Dossier |\n| 8. | | | |\n| 9. | | | |\n| 10. | | | For Split Charge Dossiers: |\n| 11. | | | All documents prior to (date) |\n| 12. | | | Converted to 12/Files. All documents after (date) |\n| 13. | | | |\n| 14. | | | |\n| 15. | | | |\n\n28.4\n\nSECRET\n6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES\n\nA 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2577) to the new action desk officer.\n\nThe new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.\n\n7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS\n\na. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.\n\n(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.\n(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)\n\n(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).\n\nb. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-restricted cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.\n\nc. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.\n8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES\n\nThe Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.\n\nIP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.\n\nRequests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.\n\n9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION\n\nA 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.\n\n10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS\n\nMachine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 13) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 000 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.\n\n3. Standard Listings\n\nIssued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field, based on a component's interest as indicated in the \"Action Desk,\" \"Country of Location,\" and \"Interest\nDesk\" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:\n\n1. Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;\n2. Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;\n3. Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;\n4. Numerical, leading to a surname;\n5. Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.\n\n| NAME | TYPE | TOWN | STATE | CITY | ZIP | DCL. | CFT. | JRN. | GT-1 | GT-2 | NET. | URL. | TEL. |\n|------|------|------|-------|------|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|\n| CHIN, SONG | 1 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 |\n| CHIN, SONG | 2 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 |\n| CHIN, SONG | 3 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 |\n| CHIN, SONG | 4 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 |\n| CHIN, SONG | 5 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 | 11111 |\n\nSECRET\n\nDOHB 70-1-1\nCHAPTER III, ANNEX B\n15 November 1974\n\n26.8\n\nSECRET\nAll standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.\n\nb. Non-Standard Listings\n\nBased on one or more of the following selection criteria:\n\n1. Country of location\n2. OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)\n3. Citizenship\n4. Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)\n5. Occupation.\n\nThese selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAFT covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:\n\n(a) Surname\n(b) Given name\n(c) Date of birth\n(d) Country of birth\n(e) Citizenship\n(f) OI code\n(g) Location\nSorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.\n\nc. Scheduled Listings\n\nStandard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.\n\nd. Special Listings\n\nUnscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.\n\ne. Request for Listings\n\nAll requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.\nSECRET\n\nDOHB 70-1-1\nCHAPTER III, ANNEX B\nAttachment 2\n15 November 1974\n\nAUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS\n\nNote: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.\n\n1. Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)\n a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.\n b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.\n c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).\n (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)\n\n2. British Commonwealth\n a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.\n b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).\n c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.\n d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).\n\n3. Other\n Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).\n\n4. Israel\n a. All Israeli diplomats. G/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with G/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.\n b. Military attaches.\n c. Assistant military attaches.\n d. Identified intelligence officers.\n\n20.15\n\nSECRET\n5. North Vietnam\n\nAll diplomats and NPLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.\n\n6. USSR\n\na. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.\n\nb. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.\n\nc. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.\n\nd. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.\nANNEX B\n\nPERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS\n\n1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.\n\n2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.\n\n3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control.\nof the Cuban desk on the *dramatis personae*. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.\n\n4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:\n\n IDN-123457\n\nThese are relabeled \"201\" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter \"I\" in the \"Type of Name\" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.\n\n5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:\n\n Dispatch Symbol and No. \n XYZA-12345\n\n Headquarters File No. \n 201-\n\n6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.\n7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10406-10139.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 19, "total-input-tokens": 17722, "total-output-tokens": 7578, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 1768, 1], [1768, 2209, 2], [2209, 4542, 3], [4542, 6757, 4], [6757, 8193, 5], [8193, 10279, 6], [10279, 12735, 7], [12735, 13780, 8], [13780, 14714, 9], [14714, 15791, 10], [15791, 18081, 11], [18081, 19274, 12], [19274, 21273, 13], [21273, 22045, 14], [22045, 23413, 15], [23413, 23940, 16], [23940, 25667, 17], [25667, 27154, 18], [27154, 27391, 19]]}} +{"id": "a197b61441d2de78e9b6a7aa9b6dabcb1b25e0bb", "text": "MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)\n\nSUBJECT: Related Mission Directive for Mexico\n\n1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico.\n\n2. Your approval is requested.\n\n[Signature]\nJ. C. King\nChief, WH Division\n\nCONCUR:\n\n[Signature]\nChief, DDP/PS\n\n[Signature]\nChief, FX\n\n[Signature]\nChief, CA\n\n[Signature]\nChief, CI\n\n24 January 1961\n\nDistribution:\nOrig & 2 - WHD\n1 - PG\n1 - CA\n1 - CI\n1 - SR\n1 - FL/Plans\n1 - FL/INT\n1 - RI\n\nAPPROVED:\n\n[Signature]\nA/Deputy Director (Plans)\n\n3 JUN 1961\n\nDate Approved\nRELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO\n\nI. GENERAL PROVISIONS\n\nA. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U.S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.\n\nB. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.\n\nC. Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U.S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of motion pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZAPATERO) has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelligence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services. Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section.\n\nD. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence\nGuides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 88 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.\n\nIt will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted.\n\nII. OBJECTIVES\n\nPRIORITY A\n\n1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence services.\n\n a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences.\n\n b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel.\nc. Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel.\n\n2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies.\n\na. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, such as students, teachers and organized labor, in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests.\n\nb. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of international and local Communist front organizations.\n\nc. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in government, educational institutions, state-controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises, labor unions, and student organizations.\n\nd. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free World propaganda via radio, television, newspapers, or other media, and carry out political action operations against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements.\n\ne. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist political, business or civic leaders to carry out propaganda, economic or political actions against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests.\n\nf. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth and student organizations, publications or agents, and when necessary, develop additional assets in key schools in Mexico City and selected provinces.\ng. Develop and support covert press assets on the staffs of influential newspapers.\n\nh. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions.\n\n3. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U.S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism.\n\na. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCM and the PPS.\n\nb. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-ENCINA wing of the PCM.\n\nc. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the Workers' University capable of monitoring cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations.\n\nd. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups through the penetration in the PPS; if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions or groups.\n\n4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U.S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.\n\na. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.\n\nb. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba.\n\nc. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba.\n\nd. Continue to provide operational support for activities\ndirected against the CASTRO regime in Cuba.\n\ne. Utilize propaganda, media, political action assets, and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.\n\n**PRIORITY B**\n\n1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U.S. activities in Mexico and propagandize the dangers of Communism.\n a. Utilize existing media and political action assets to combat anti-U.S. propaganda or activities.\n b. Utilize existing media and political action assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalists and Communists.\n c. Utilize media and political action assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.\n d. Spot and develop for future covert collaboration young local figures who show potential for political leadership and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U.S. interests.\n\n2. Obtain information on the secret intentions and activities of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U.S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.\n a. Continue to develop and influence high level contacts in the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry.\n\n3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.\n a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers.\n b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.\nc. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries.\n\nd. Obtain communications intelligence on bloc diplomatic traffic.\n\n4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.\n\na. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community.\n\nb. Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the SHACF.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10408-10027.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 7, "total-input-tokens": 8038, "total-output-tokens": 2232, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 516, 1], [516, 2585, 2], [2585, 4393, 3], [4393, 6171, 4], [6171, 7762, 5], [7762, 9386, 6], [9386, 9790, 7]]}} +{"id": "5c30017a1f98c0f73c8e2cedbcf7463d94d4a19d", "text": "Mr. Patrick Carpentier \nOffice of the Legislative Counsel \nCentral Intelligence Agency \nWashington, D. C. 20505\n\nDear Mr. Carpentier:\n\nIn connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of President John F. Kennedy, I am writing to request that by March 1, 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency provide a statement explaining in detail the reasons for which a 201 file may be opened. This statement should address the following possible criteria, individually or in any combination, as well as any other possible criteria not specifically listed:\n\n1. Possible and actual sources of intelligence information;\n\n2. Possible and actual intelligence agents, assets, or contract employees;\n\n3. Travelers, particularly travelers to communist or unfriendly countries;\n\n4. Individuals who defect or have attempted to defect to communist or unfriendly countries;\n\n5. U. S. servicemen or former U. S. servicemen who pose counterintelligence dangers by revealing, offering to reveal, or threatening to reveal military or intelligence secrets to communist or unfriendly countries;\n\n6. Individuals whose suspected counterintelligence activities precipitate changes in United States military or intelligence codes, methods, sources or procedures;\n7. Individuals who have been contacted by communist or unfriendly intelligence organizations or instrumentalities thereof;\n\n8. Individuals who have received money or other items of value from communist or unfriendly governments or instrumentalities thereof; and\n\n9. Possible and actual foreign intelligence agents or employees.\n\nPlease address this statement to the time period 1958-1964 in particular, and indicate whether there were any changes in such criteria during these years. Finally, would you please specify in your response under which criteria, or combination of criteria, if any, the opening of a 201 file was considered to be mandatory during this period.\n\nSincerely,\n\nG. Robert Blakey\nChief Counsel and Director\n\nGRB:mgj\nMEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O\nAttention: Mr. Shepanek\n\nFROM: William F. Donnelly\nChief, Information Services Staff\n\nSUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations\nRequest for Information on 201 Criteria (S)\n\nREFERENCE: OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978\n\n1. (S) With reference to the conversation of\n27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS,\nattached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974,\nand an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960.\nA close study of the list of questions submitted by the\nHSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete\nand effective way to respond would be by inviting the\nStaff to review our regulation governing the criteria for\nopening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files\nby the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the\nregulation provides an answer to every question posed by\nthe Staff.\n\n2. (S) The earlier version of the regulation is\nincluded to reflect the situation as it existed in the\nperiod of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later\nversion provides an expansion, clarification and refinement\nof the earlier versions.\n\nWilliam F. Donnelly\nANNEX B\n\nTHE 201 SYSTEM\n\nRescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966\n\n1. INTRODUCTION\n\nThe 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lists of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.\n\n2. THE 201 SYSTEM\n\nThe principal features of the 201 system are:\n\na. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.\n\nb. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.\n\nc. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.\n\nd. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.\nInformation About Subject\n\n1. Sequence Number and Name\n2. Sex and Date of Birth\n3. Citizenship\n4. Place of Birth\n5. Occupation\n6. Occupation Code\n7. Text\n\nDocument Reference Data Group\n\n8. 201 Number\n9. Name Type Indicator\n10. OI Codes\n11. Record Date (year only)\n12. Reference\n\nISG Control Information\n\n13. Date of latest update of the record\n14. STAR Index Record Number\ne. OI Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:\n\n(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)\n\n(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.\n\nA component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.\n\nA 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.\n\nThe 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.\n\nf. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.\n\n3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER\n\na. General\n\nThe opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on\npersons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:\n\n(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.\n\n(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.\n\n(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.\n\n(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.\n\n(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).\n\n(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).\n\nb. Requesting a 201 File Opening\n\nHeadquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term \"File\" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.\n4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER\n\nInformation about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.\n\nMaterial which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:\n\na. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).\n\nb. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.\n\nc. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.\n\nd. Operational and other security approvals.\n\ne. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.\n\nf. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.\n\ng. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.\n\nh. Copy of contract and termination papers.\n\ni. Secrecy agreement.\n\nj. Agent Duty Status Report.\n\nk. Training and evaluation.\n\nl. SCSWIRL report.\n\nm. Newspaper clippings.\n\nn. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.\n\n5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS\n\nThe 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.\na. Purging\n\nPurging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:\n\n(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.\n\n(2) Name trace form (Form 382) unless it has been the basis for the opening.\n\n(3) All abstract slips.\n\n(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).\n\n(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.\n\n(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 810) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.\n\n(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.\n\n(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 887) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.\n\n(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).\n\nb. Maintenance Procedures\n\n(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201\ndossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.\n\n(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.\n\n(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.\n\n(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.\n\n(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.\n\n(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).\n\n(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.\n\n(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.\n\n(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.\n\n(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).\nBlack-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.\n\n(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.\n\n| UNCLASSIFIED | INTERNAL USE ONLY | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET |\n|---------------|-------------------|--------------|--------|\n\n**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**\n\n| BRANCH | TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS |\n|--------|-------------------------------------|\n| FROM | |\n| TO | |\n| DATE | |\n\n1. 201/Files\n OC-52\n\nVolume(s) # of volume(s)\n\n201-\n\nRestricted Dossier\n(Attach Form 2011 to Dossier)\n\nNon-Restricted Dossier\n\nFor Split Charge Dossiers:\nAll documents prior to (date)\nforwarded to 201/Files. All\ndocuments after (date)\nretained at desk.\n\n26.4\n6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES\n\nA 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.\n\n![NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY](image)\n\nThe new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.\n\n7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS\n\na. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.\n\n (1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.\n\n26.5\n(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)\n\n(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021):\n\nb. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.\n\nc. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.\n8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES\n\nThe Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.\n\nIP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.\n\nRequests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.\n\n9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION\n\nA 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.\n\n10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS\n\nMachine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.\n\na. Standard Listings\n\nIssued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the \"Action Desk,\" \"Country of Location,\" and \"Interest\nDesk blocks on the 201: Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:\n\n1. Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;\n2. Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;\n3. Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;\n4. Numerical, leading to a surname;\n5. Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.\n\n| NAME | TYPE | BIRTHPLACE | OCC. CITY | 201 | G1-1 | G1-2 | AC1 | LOC. | INT. |\n|------|------|-------------|-----------|-----|------|------|-----|------|------|\n| CHIN. SHOU 1 | 77151341540020 | CHIN. SHANGHAI | CHIN. HN | CHIN. HN |\n| CHIN. SHOU 2 | 77151341540021 | CHIN. SHANGHAI | CHIN. HN | CHIN. HN |\n| CHIN. SHOU 3 | 77151341540022 | CHIN. SHANGHAI | CHIN. HN | CHIN. HN |\n| CHIN. SHOU 4 | 77151341540023 | CHIN. SHANGHAI | CHIN. HN | CHIN. HN |\n\nSECRET\n\nDOHB 70-1-1\nCHAPTER III, ANNEX B\n\n15 November 1974\nAll standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.\n\nb. Non-Standard Listings\n\nBased on one or more of the following selection criteria:\n\n1. Country of location\n2. OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)\n3. Citizenship\n4. Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)\n5. Occupation.\n\nThese selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:\n\n(a) Surname\n(b) Given name\n(c) Date of birth\n(d) Country of birth\n(e) Citizenship\n(f) OI code\n(g) Location\nSorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.\n\nc. Scheduled Listings\n\nStandard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.\n\nd. Special Listings\n\nUnscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.\n\ne. Request for Listings\n\nAll requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.\nSECRET\n\nDOHB 70-1-1\nCHAPTER III, ANNEX B\nAttachment 2\n\n15 November 1974\n\nAUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS\n\nNote: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.\n\n1. Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)\n a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.\n b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.\n c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (CID).\n (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)\n\n2. British Commonwealth\n a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.\n b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).\n c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.\n d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).\n\n3. Cuba\n Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).\n\n4. Israel\n a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.\n b. Military attaches.\n c. Assistant military attaches.\n d. Identified intelligence officers.\n\n26,15\n\nSECRET\n5. North Vietnam\n\nAll diplomats and NIFSV (PRC) officials stationed abroad.\n\n6. USSR\n\na. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.\n\nb. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.\n\nc. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.\n\nd. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.\nANNEX B\n\nPERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS\n\n1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.\n\n2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.\n\n3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control.\nof the Cuban desk on the *dramatis personae*. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.\n\n4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:\n\n IDN-123457\n\nThese are relabeled \"201\" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter \"I\" in the \"Type of Name\" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.\n\n5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:\n\n Dispatch Symbol and No. \n XYZA-12345 \n Headquarters File No. \n 201-\n\n6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.\n7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10408-10078.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 22, "total-input-tokens": 25257, "total-output-tokens": 7951, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 1284, 1], [1284, 2020, 2], [2020, 3157, 3], [3157, 4925, 4], [4925, 5298, 5], [5298, 7632, 6], [7632, 9847, 7], [9847, 11283, 8], [11283, 13369, 9], [13369, 15766, 10], [15766, 16724, 11], [16724, 17732, 12], [17732, 18805, 13], [18805, 21095, 14], [21095, 21955, 15], [21955, 23953, 16], [23953, 24725, 17], [24725, 26091, 18], [26091, 26618, 19], [26618, 28345, 20], [28345, 29833, 21], [29833, 30070, 22]]}} +{"id": "584e5f60ca3d2f114c076c913a9b15632887b9e7", "text": "ANNEX B\n\nTHE 201 SYSTEM\n\nReclassification: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1968\n\n1. INTRODUCTION\n\nThe 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lists of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.\n\n2. THE 201 SYSTEM\n\nThe principal features of the 201 system are:\n\na. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.\n\nb. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.\n\nc. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.\n\nd. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.\nDOHB 70-1-1\nCHAPTER III, ANNEX B\n15 November 1974\n\nInformation About Subject\n1. Sequence Number and Name\n2. Sex and Date of Birth\n3. Citizenship\n4. Place of Birth\n5. Occupation\n6. Occupation Code\n7. Text\n\nDocument Reference Data Group\n8. 201 Number\n9. Name Type Indicator\n10. Of Codes\n11. Record Date (year only)\n12. Reference\n\nISG Control Information\n13. Date of latest update of the record\n14. STAR Index Record Number\nc. OI Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:\n\n(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)\n\n(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.\n\nA component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.\n\nA 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.\n\nThe 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.\n\nf. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.\n\n3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER\n\na. General\n\nThe opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and JSC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on\npersons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISC for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:\n\n(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a FOA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.\n\n(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.\n\n(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.\n\n(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.\n\n(5) Persons on whom a Main-Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).\n\n(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).\n\nb. Requesting a 201 File Opening\n\nHeadquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term \"File\" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.\n4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER\n\nInformation about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.\n\nMaterial which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:\n\na. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).\n\nb. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.\n\nc. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.\n\nd. Operational and other security approvals.\n\ne. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.\n\nf. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.\n\ng. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.\n\nh. Copy of contract and termination papers.\n\ni. Secrecy agreement.\n\nj. Agent Duty Status Report.\n\nk. Training and evaluation.\n\nl. SGSWIRL report.\n\nm. Newspaper clippings.\n\nn. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.\n\n5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS\n\nThe 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.\na. Purging\n\nPurging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:\n\n1. Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.\n2. Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.\n3. All abstract slips.\n4. All document restriction notices (Form 1884).\n5. The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.\n6. Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.\n7. Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.\n8. Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.\n9. Deferred documents (see Sb(2)).\n\nb. Maintenance Procedures\n\n1. All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201\ndossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.\n\n(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.\n\n(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.\n\n(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.\n\n(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.\n\n(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).\n\n(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OFC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.\n\n(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.\n\n(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.\n\n(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DO1 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DO1 70-10).\nBlack-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.\n\n(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.\n\n| UNCLASSIFIED | INTERNAL USE ONLY | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET |\n|---------------|-------------------|--------------|--------|\n\n**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**\n\n| SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS |\n|------------------------------------------|\n| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DATE | SOURCE | DESTINATION |\n|-----------------|------|--------|--------------|\n| 1. 201/Files 00-10 | | | |\n| 2. | | | |\n| 3. | | | |\n| 4. | | | |\n| 5. | | | |\n| 6. | | | |\n| 7. | | | |\n| 8. | | | |\n| 9. | | | |\n| 10. | | | |\n\n(For guidance see OMB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)\n\nVolume(s) # of volume(s)\nof 201:\n\n- Restricted Dossier\n (Attach Form 201L to Dossier)\n- Non-Restricted Dossier\n\nFor Split Charge Dossiers:\nAll documents prior to (date)\nForwarded to 201/Files. All documents after (date) retained at desk.\n6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES\n\nA 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.\n\n![Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability](image)\n\nThe new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.\n\n7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS\n\na. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.\n\n (1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.\n\nSECRET\n(3) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)\n\n(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).\n\nb. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.\n\nc. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.\n8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES\n\nThe Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.\n\nIP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.\n\nRequests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.\n\n9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION\n\nA 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.\n\n10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS\n\nMachine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and Interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the post-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.\n\na. Standard Listings\n\nIssued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the \"Action Desk,\" \"Country of Location,\" and \"Interest\nDesk\" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:\n\n1. Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;\n2. Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;\n3. Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;\n4. Numerical, leading to a surname;\n5. Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.\n\n| NAME | TYPE | DISTANCE | DEC. | CITY | ZIP | GPO | GPO | SEC. | ORG. | INTERNAL USE ONLY |\n|------|------|----------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|------|------|-------------------|\n| CHIN. | 1000 | 10000000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 |\n| CHIN. | 2000 | 20000000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 |\n| CHIN. | 3000 | 30000000 | 3000 | 3000 | 3000 | 3000 | 3000 | 3000 | 3000 | 3000 |\n| CHIN. | 4000 | 40000000 | 4000 | 4000 | 4000 | 4000 | 4000 | 4000 | 4000 | 4000 |\n| CHIN. | 5000 | 50000000 | 5000 | 5000 | 5000 | 5000 | 5000 | 5000 | 5000 | 5000 |\n\nSECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY\n\nSECRET\n\n263\n\nSECRET\nAll standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.\n\nb. Non-Standard Listings\n\nBased on one or more of the following selection criteria:\n\n1. Country of location\n2. OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)\n3. Citizenship\n4. Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)\n5. Occupation.\n\nThese selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAFT covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:\n\n(a) Surname\n(b) Given name\n(c) Date of birth\n(d) Country of birth\n(e) Citizenship\n(f) OI code\n(g) Location\n\n26.9\nSorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.\n\nc. Scheduled Listings\n\nStandard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.\n\nd. Special Listings\n\nUnscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.\n\ne. Request for Listings\n\nAll requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.\nSECRET\n\nDOHB 78-1-1\nCHAPTER III, ANNEX B\nAttachment 2\n\n15 November 1974\n\nAUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS\n\nNote: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.\n\n1. Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)\n a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.\n b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.\n c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (CID).\n (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)\n\n2. British Commonwealth\n a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.\n b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).\n c. Canadian-Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian-Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.\n d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP/SSS).\n\n3. Cuba\n Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).\n\n4. Israel\n a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/IS should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.\n b. Military attaches.\n c. Assistant military attaches.\n d. Identified intelligence officers.\n\n26.15\n\nSECRET\n5. North Vietnam\n\nAll diplomats and NLF SV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.\n\n6. USSR\n\na. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.\n\nb. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.\n\nc. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.\n\nd. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.\nANNEX B\n\nPERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS\n\n1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.\n\n2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.\n\n3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control.\nof the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.\n\n4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:\n\nIDN-123457\n\nThese are relabeled \"201\" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter \"I\" in the \"Type of Name\" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.\n\n5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:\n\n| Dispatch Symbol and No. | Headquarters File No. |\n|-------------------------|-----------------------|\n| XYZA-12345 | 201- |\n\n6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.\n7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10408-10316.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 19, "total-input-tokens": 18129, "total-output-tokens": 7416, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 1774, 1], [1774, 2195, 2], [2195, 4609, 3], [4609, 6824, 4], [6824, 8260, 5], [8260, 10328, 6], [10328, 12725, 7], [12725, 14175, 8], [14175, 15185, 9], [15185, 16258, 10], [16258, 18549, 11], [18549, 19560, 12], [19560, 21565, 13], [21565, 22337, 14], [22337, 23703, 15], [23703, 24231, 16], [24231, 25958, 17], [25958, 27517, 18], [27517, 27754, 19]]}} +{"id": "3c0a806fef32d1efe2028b336154dc41e7635e6c", "text": "SECRET MESSAGE\n\nDIRECTOR\n\nC/WH 4\n\nDCI, D/DCI, DSP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR\n\nSECRET 020422Z\n\nDIR INFO CNBR CITE HELB 2517 (ROLLOFFIER ACTING)\n\n23 SEP 71\n\nREF DIR 25690-\n\n1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL\n\nFOLL:\n\nA NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC\nINSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY.\n\nB NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL\nL.S.W. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE,\nZAHARI SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122,\n949 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SIMS, BINALONG; CCC 122, 1960\nOLSEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 26 NEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE\nEROG ON ABOVE.\n\nC NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 0591. (WCE838)\n\nD FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS.\n\nE MOON FIRST SECT POSSIBLY IDU R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS\nJUSTACHE; RUSSIA! CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY\nUSE TO SOVS CNBR.\n\nD: 2502 - 5 - 41\n\nCLASSIFICATION REVIEW\nCONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1976\nE IMPDET CL BY 072248\n\nSECRET\n\nINTRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED\n\nCopy No.\n3. SQUARE HAS ARRANGED WITH PM LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG TO BE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT SQUARE.\n\n4. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.\n\nCRET\n\n/S COMMENT: Hqs requested information on the Polish driver connected with a Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.", "source": "olmocr", "added": "2025-03-20", "created": "2025-03-20", "metadata": {"Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10408-10329.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 1844, "total-output-tokens": 611, "total-fallback-pages": 0}, "attributes": {"pdf_page_numbers": [[0, 1061, 1], [1061, 1348, 2]]}}