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Oct 19

An Empirical Study of Harness Design for Coding Agents

Coding harnesses shape how autonomous coding agents translate model capabilities into long-horizon software-engineering performance, yet existing work typically evaluates harnesses as monolithic systems, leaving the effectiveness of individual components unclear. To enable component-level comparisons, we study this question with a lightweight coding harness whose execution loop is fixed while three components are varied: planning, action space, and context management. Across four models evaluated on SWE-Bench Verified and Terminal-Bench 2.1, we evaluate 176 matched settings spanning five context-management strategies, four context-window budgets, and targeted ablations of planning and action space. We find that: (1) Context management becomes increasingly valuable as the context-window budget tightens, with most of its benefit coming from preventing context-overflow failures. (2) Staging rule-based elision before LLM-based summarization provides the strongest overall efficiency among the context-management strategies, whereas making elided content recoverable adds machinery that models rarely use and yields no accuracy gain. (3) Planning shifts from an accuracy scaffold for weaker models to a cost saver for stronger models, with little change in accuracy. (4) Predefined tools improve performance for models with weaker bash proficiency, whereas bash-capable models can operate effectively with a bash-only interface and achieve substantially lower cost, especially on command-line-centric tasks. Trajectory-level analysis explains these effects: context management extends execution trajectories without substantially altering agent behavior, planning changes where trajectories stop, and the action space changes the granularity at which code is written. These findings inform model- and budget-aware harness design and provide a modular framework for evaluating future harness components.

ASIL: Replacing Screenshot-and-Click with Structured State and Semantic Actions

Powerful code agents can execute scripts, call tools, and manage files, yet many important applications remain accessible primarily through graphical user interfaces. We argue that screenshot-and-click is an inefficient interface for software-operating agents: screenshots are state-incomplete, and GUI actions are brittle, semantically weak, and poorly matched to long-horizon planning. We introduce ASIL (Agent-Software Interaction Layer), an agent-native interface that exposes software through structured JSON observations and code-executable semantic actions, realized through the deepest feasible access path for each application. We instantiate ASIL across 15 applications and a benchmark of 300 single-application and 80 multi-application tasks. ASIL reaches above 80 with closed models while executing fewer than five actions per task. Under a repaired runtime and a 50-step screenshot budget, the same tasks yield 6.6 and 26.6 strict success under screenshot-and-click control, rising to 15.0 and 53.3 on an easier OSWorld-comparable band. Against application-native interfaces on matched tasks, ASIL exceeds LibreOffice's UNO API by 28-38 strict points but only matches draw.io's MCP content contract. The structured modality also suits training: small-scale SFT raises Qwen3.5-2B from 58.0 to 72.1 and Qwen3.5-9B from 66.6 to 80.4, and resource-limited on-policy RL further raises them to 74.4 and 82.2.

  • 2 authors
·
Aug 26

A Systematic Taxonomy of Security Vulnerabilities in the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 28