Daily Papers

Scientific discoveries increasingly rely on complex multimodal reasoning based on information-intensive scientific data and domain-specific expertise. Empowered by expert-level scientific benchmarks, scientific Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) hold the potential to significantly enhance this discovery process in realistic workflows. However, current scientific benchmarks mostly focus on evaluating the knowledge understanding capabilities of MLLMs, leading to an inadequate assessment of their perception and reasoning abilities. To address this gap, we present the Scientists' First Exam (SFE) benchmark, designed to evaluate the scientific cognitive capacities of MLLMs through three interconnected levels: scientific signal perception, scientific attribute understanding, scientific comparative reasoning. Specifically, SFE comprises 830 expert-verified VQA pairs across three question types, spanning 66 multimodal tasks across five high-value disciplines. Extensive experiments reveal that current state-of-the-art GPT-o3 and InternVL-3 achieve only 34.08% and 26.52% on SFE, highlighting significant room for MLLMs to improve in scientific realms. We hope the insights obtained in SFE will facilitate further developments in AI-enhanced scientific discoveries.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Can our brain signals faithfully reflect the original visual stimuli, even including high-frequency details? Although human perceptual and cognitive capacities enable us to process and remember visual information, these abilities are constrained by several factors, such as limited attentional resources and the finite capacity of visual memory. When visual stimuli are processed by human visual system into brain signals, some information is inevitably lost, leading to a discrepancy known as the System GAP. Additionally, perceptual and cognitive dynamics, along with technical noise in signal acquisition, degrade the fidelity of brain signals relative to the visual stimuli, known as the Random GAP. When encoded brain representations are directly aligned with the corresponding pretrained image features, the System GAP and Random GAP between paired data challenge the model, requiring it to bridge these gaps. However, in the context of limited paired data, these gaps are difficult for the model to learn, leading to overfitting and poor generalization to new data. To address these GAPs, we propose a simple yet effective approach called the Uncertainty-aware Blur Prior (UBP). It estimates the uncertainty within the paired data, reflecting the mismatch between brain signals and visual stimuli. Based on this uncertainty, UBP dynamically blurs the high-frequency details of the original images, reducing the impact of the mismatch and improving alignment. Our method achieves a top-1 accuracy of 50.9\% and a top-5 accuracy of 79.7\% on the zero-shot brain-to-image retrieval task, surpassing previous state-of-the-art methods by margins of 13.7\% and 9.8\%, respectively. Code is available at https://github.com/HaitaoWuTJU/Uncertainty-aware-Blur-Prior{GitHub}.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

The success of neural language models (LMs) on many technological tasks has brought about their potential relevance as scientific theories of language despite some clear differences between LM training and child language acquisition. In this paper we argue that some of the most prominent benchmarks for evaluating the syntactic capacities of LMs may not be sufficiently rigorous. In particular, we show that the template-based benchmarks lack the structural diversity commonly found in the theoretical and psychological studies of language. When trained on small-scale data modeling child language acquisition, the LMs can be readily matched by simple baseline models. We advocate for the use of the readily available, carefully curated datasets that have been evaluated for gradient acceptability by large pools of native speakers and are designed to probe the structural basis of grammar specifically. On one such dataset, the LI-Adger dataset, LMs evaluate sentences in a way inconsistent with human language users. We conclude with suggestions for better connecting LMs with the empirical study of child language acquisition.

IQ testing has served as a foundational methodology for evaluating human cognitive capabilities, deliberately decoupling assessment from linguistic background, language proficiency, or domain-specific knowledge to isolate core competencies in abstraction and reasoning. Yet, artificial intelligence research currently lacks systematic benchmarks to quantify these critical cognitive dimensions in multimodal systems. To address this critical gap, we propose MM-IQ, a comprehensive evaluation framework comprising 2,710 meticulously curated test items spanning 8 distinct reasoning paradigms. Through systematic evaluation of leading open-source and proprietary multimodal models, our benchmark reveals striking limitations: even state-of-the-art architectures achieve only marginally superior performance to random chance (27.49% vs. 25% baseline accuracy). This substantial performance chasm highlights the inadequacy of current multimodal systems in approximating fundamental human reasoning capacities, underscoring the need for paradigm-shifting advancements to bridge this cognitive divide.